Yet There Is Method In It

I saw Steve Jones (the geneticist) talking about the future of the human species. It was a very slick presentation. It seemed to be an expanded discussion of an article he published in the telegraph. He claimed that human evolution has come to a halt. The reasons for this are perhaps not interesting in this blog’s context. I was immediately skeptical of his conclusion but he did add two important conditions: he was only referring to the western world and the halt in evolution was temporary.

Any claims of constancy or certain knowledge in the apparent world should be examined closely since they can only come from two lines of reasoning:
1) A priori - there is no reason why constancy (or even inconstancy) should be expected, so no certain claim can be made.
2) A posteriori - basing a theory on past observations can never provide certainty since the next observation might disprove a theory.

The purists would try to apply this reasoning to my argument. An uncertainty might be the possibility of other sources of knowledge apart from a priori and a posteriori. What we can say is any claim about the apparent world without an element of doubt is, at best, misleading*. Since the apparent world is different at different times, we can speculate that change is possible. It seems the universe has changed greatly through out its existence, and it is therefore conceivable that constancy is illusionary. We could say some things are constant and some things are transitory. There is also a possibility that an seeming constant in the world is in fact going through a slow transition - too slow for us to perceive. As Heraclitus said, “All things are flowing.” Also Nietzsche, “Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie.” (A luck “guess” by Heraclitus - that everything is made of one primordial element (fire) is not so far from the modern concept of mass/energy equivalence.)

A few blogs have attempted to rebut Steve Jones on practical grounds which might be interesting for some.

Anti Citizen One

* probably

Plans to extend pre-charge detention from a maximum of 28 days to 42 were defeated in the Lords by 191 votes. BBC

They still plan to introduce it if there is an emergency - which means civil rights can be abridged when inconvenient for the state. Keep paying attention to this.

I doubt we will be needing this power anyway.

AC1

Update 21/10 UK’s top prosecutor warns against growing state power

In his apologetic for Christian and Theistic Realism Richard Harries deals with the tricky field of arguments for the existence of God. This is rather important as he is after all trying to argue for the existence of God as a real being, and furthermore propose that it can be posited using realist language.

Perhaps suprisingly he is not altogether convinced by the standard or classic arguments/proofs of the existence of God and even goes so far as to describe them as “regulative ideas” inasmuch as it lends comforting support to “those who would like to see the world as the product of a rational intelligence”. Yet, he argues, such regulative ideas are nothing more than “nice” - they have little logical foundation (they cannot stand alone). His concession to the traditional arguments is thus: “the so-called proof therefore must always leave the matter open”. In other words it is not so much a logical formula that may be presented to the sceptic or unbeliever in the hope that they would somehow be convinced of the necessity of belief, as it is a grounding in rational thought that satisfies the already believing.

I would like now to focus on his treatment of the argument from design, as it is an argument that still has great currency amongst theists and which causes the most consternation for materialist atheists - not least because of the seemingly pseudo-scientific nature of the language game that some modern proponents of the design argument seem to adhere to.

Harries argues that the argument from design fails from the outset. The notion that as a computer may infer a human designer so too the world implies a divine designer is an illogical inference by progression. The inference demands a standard of comparison and by its definition the universe (i.e. all ‘created’ matter) is beyond complete or categorical perception and thus will not yeild to comparison.

When it comes to the universe, I do not have a category of designed universes to compare with another category that have somehow sprung up of themselves. There is only one universe. (There may very well be many worlds in addition to this one but by definition the God with whom we are concerned is the Creator of all possible worlds, i.e. the universe.) So we are simpy not in a position, on the basis of logic, to say whether the universe is designed or not. The matter is open.

I would add that the God-hypothesis Harries is proposing (i.e. the Judaeo-Christian creator God) similarly by necessity is the creator of all possible universes, and if we wish to talk of parallel universes then a new terminology such as meta-universe is needed.

Harries continues by praising as an example the evolutionary account of the creatures of the world such as those posited by Dawkins. He has no problem with the theory that says that “through a process of natural selection and random mutation… the most complex and beautiful forms can evolve from simple ones over a long period of time.” This is a thoroughly reasonable scientific account and as the evidence to support it grows we have little or no reason to doubt its retitude.

However this does not negate the idea of a designer - as he has already argued the classical proof as it is, is beyond resolution and the argument must remain open. Consequently he advocates a theory of theistic evolution (without going into details).

He also accepts - to the point of sympathy anyway - the position of scepticism about God’s goodness as evinced through the waste and violence that is resplendent throughout nature. But he suggests this does not negate the idea of design and is concerned with altogether a different matter entirely. He neatly wraps up the theistic evolutionary worldview with a quote from Frederick Temple in the 19th century “God makes the world make itself”. In short he argues arguments from design do not prove the existence of God or design, but neither does a scientific description of how the ‘process’ works resolve the God-hypothesis either.

A final brief comment on the classic arguments for the existence of God as found in the philosophy of religion and their alienation from religious belief as practised and lived goes as follows: “A person could come to the end of a logical train of argument with the conclusion that God must logically, exist: and it could leave him stone cold.”

The classic arguments focusing as they do on various aspects or properties of the proposed divinity always diminish the meta-concept of the divinity that the Judeao-Christian traditions believe in and worship.

Later on in his consideration of rational arguments or proofs of the existence of God he touches on a postmodern or holistic psychology of belief and disbelief. “It is always possible to give a psychological explanation of both belief and disbelief.”

Of course such explanations do not prove/disprove the beliefs but they may shed further understanding on the processes involved. He uses monotheism and its attachment to the argument from causality as an example. A monetheist

“looking at the argument from causality will always tend to have some sympathy with it and want to go along with it, because he or she already believes there is a Creator. Because their heart already moves in gratitude from Creation to Creator, it is natural for their mind to move in that direction as well. Cardinal Newman once wrote that: ‘The whole man moves, paper logic is but the record of it.’ I believe this is too extreme and that logic can act as the helmsman of the ship, not simply a log book of where we have been. Nevertheless, Newman’s remark does bring out the important truth, that our great shifts of belief or disbelief are never purely intellectual, they involve the whole person. So, because we know God in our own life, we will naturally believe him to be present in the life of the world of which we are a part.”

I am reminded of two Wittgenstein quotes here that I feel are relevent (though I shall paraphrase). Firstly that the sum of belief dawns on the believer in the same way that as the sun rises we can better see to the horizon (in other words belief may be enhanced by logical or rational argument but rarely if ever can it be prompted by it). Secondly the world of the happy man is very different to that of the unhappy man - thus reinforcing Harries psychological point I think that a person who is inclined to theism will see and feel the strength of arguments that support his belief even though independent of this a priori belief those same arguments are incapable of logically resolving the questions.

I am moved to remember that St Anselm talked of “Faith seeking Understanding” and not of understanding or knowledge in order to find Faith.

Harries concludes the chapter concerning belief with a brief discussion on the various types of disbelief. “I suspect that most of those who disbelieve do so because they have had a bad experience of religion. Some do so because their understanding of religion is full of misconceptions. Some may be unwilling to make the necessary changes in lifestyle which the Christian faith asks of us. Others see no way of reconciling the tragic quality of so much existence with the claim that there is a loving Creator. There is a variety of reasons, all of which have to be looked at seperately.”

I find this brief paragraph unsatisfactory. On the one hand I appreciate his nuanced commentary that “atheism” is not one single monolothic entity. That there are various types of disbelief and reasons for disbelief and that each needs be considered seperately. I think that this kind of pluralism is a healthy alternative to the ‘them and us’ mentality often exhibited by the loudest tub-thumpers for either side. Yet I feel that he has missed out on the category of disbelievers who genuinely have concluded - indeed one might say believe - that there is no God. He would probably classify these as ‘misconceptions’ and this would betray the chauvenistic attitude of someone who maintains that in the end belief is good and disbelief (at the least) harmful to the self.

I would add though that such a category is difficult to discuss - atheists don’t like to be called ‘believers’ - even if they object to a narrow or naive definition of faith/belief. I would propose that it may even be difficult to isolate these different types of disbelief - for a person who through a solely materialist epistemology has decided that there is no God may very well have also had a bad experience of religion, hold different views on morality, and even be responding negatively to a radically different God-hypothesis than that held by believers.

Also he tends to bypass agnostics here, although one may say that his stance that the “proofs” of the existence of God are not “proofs” and that philosophically the matter remains open is a nod in their direction. All in all though despite these criticisms I think he displays a fairmindedness and openness to plurality of belief all too rare in this arena of debate.

Part 7 of the “A Secular Age” review on the Only a Game Blog is here.

This is entitled The Imminent Frame and is a discussion on materialism versus transcendentalism.

It raises the contentious issue of belief in epistemology.

Richard Dawkins for example holds what is considered a naive interpretation of Faith when he says:

“Faith, being belief that isn’t based on evidence, is the principal vice of any religion,” whereas Science “is free of the main vice of religion, which is faith”.

As a counterpoint Charles Taylor quotes evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin as an example of a materialist who maintains a lucidity about “their prior ontological commitments”.

“Our willingness to accept scientific claims that are against common sense is the key to understanding the real struggle between science and the supernatural. We take the side of science in spite of the patent absurdity of its constructs, in spite of its failure to fulfill many of its extravagant promises of health and life, in spite of the tolerance of the scientific community for unsubstantiated just-so stories, because we have a prior commitment, a commitment to materialism.

It is not that the methods and institutions of science somehow compel us to accept a material explanation of the phenomenal world but, on the contrary, that we are forced by our a priori allegiance to material causes to create an apparatus of investigation and a set of concepts that produce material explanations, no matter how counterintuitive, no matter how mystifying to the uninitiated. Moreover that materialism is absolute, for we cannot allow a divine foot in the door.”

“But I don’t even believe in Jebus!”

A classic quote from the Simpsons, where Homer, forced into missionary activity for his failure to honour a donation to a PBS fundraiser, takes the path of Peter and denies belief.

Rowan Williams (now Archbishop of Canterbury) once said of the Simpsons it “is one of the most subtle pieces of propoganda around in the cause of sense, humility and virtue.” and continuing in his review of a book “The Gospel According to the Simpsons” says “Mark Pinsky manages to decipher the code without deadening the humour which is quite an achievement.”

All comedy, indeed all narratives and utterances and communications are according to the postmodernists codes.

And in that very Simspons quote above (biblically inspired and borderline sacrilege) lies the essence of the coding in humour. Who would have thought (I didn’t until recently) that Jebus was actually the name of the city of Jerusalem before King David conquered it?!

The theological value of the Simpsons lies in its ability to do three things in particular. It presents the Simpson family as a religiously observant family (note this does not make them saints) and thus reflects the reality of life in America and other parts of the world. Secondly it conveys a variety of moral dilemmas in its storylines (without being preachy or even committing to one particular worldview). Finally it treats institutional religion with the same satirical criticism as it treats all institutions - the “Church” has its faults just as does freemarket Capitalism, but it does not propose the abolition of religion nor promote Communism.

Laughing about religion is important - particularly in the abrahamic religions where humility is presented as a virtue. But is it possible to go too far?

I think the problem lies in an inability to decode the Gospel (if you are Christian) and an unwillingness to read the text existentially. Jesus as the scriptures point out is human, and a part of humanity is humour. But few people seem to talk about Jesus in the vein of a comedian or teller of jokes.

Why is this? Well three possibilities. Some of what Jesus says or some of the Gospel narrative is serious (Crucifixion is particularly difficult to satirize without arousing cries of insensitivity - irrespective of the religious aspect to Crucifixion it is one should imagine a fairly painful and nasty thing to have happen or to witness). Some of the humour that Jesus uses is perhaps lost in transcription (you had to be there to get it), lost in translation, or simply lost in encoding for the modern reader. And of course some religous believers amplify an aspect of their religious heritage to the dimunition of another (thus the divinity of Jesus is preciously guarded by the morally sensitive, but his teachings to turn the other cheek, his dire warnings of the persecutions suffered on his behalf are forgotten).

I think the first and last point are the most relevant regards causing and taking offence and as has been discussed on this blog ad nauseum there is certainly room for a little leeway on both sides. One can cause offence but one can also seek to be offended and self-censorship (the only kind that has any worth) can be practised by all parties.

Elton Trueblood an American Quaker theologian wrote an interesting book called Humor of Christ (sic) on the subject of a joking Jesus. He suggests that indeed some parts of the Gospel narrative are intrinsically unfunny and that it may be rather difficult to find any humour in certain parts of the narrative. But he says it is a misconception (often peddled by humourless Christians) that it is all to be taken seriously and that there was no comedy at all in Jesus’s teachings.

He describes Jesus’s humour as being ironic, sardonic, and on occasions where needed sarcastic. Thus the inconsistent Peter (he of the prophesied denials) is nicknamed “the Rock”. The parables are full of sly, wry and absurdist and surrealist imagery, beam and mote, gnat and camel, camel and the eye of the needle (to mention just a couple of examples). Trueblood concurs with my suggestion (or vice versa) that there is probably also a great deal more humour that has been lost in translation.

I certainly will need to re-analyze many gospel texts in order to see if there is plenty more humour available. Matheww 24:28 for example is cited as an example of Jesus’s self-deprecating humour. Describing his ability to draw a crowd he says “Wherever there is a carcass, there the vultures will gather.”

However as Pinsky argues a joking Jesus is not the same as a Jesus joke and perhaps it is at this juncture we must return to the problem of offence (caused and taken). Trueblood offers perhaps the best descriptive advice on the matter when he says:

” The only kind of laughter which can be redemptive is that which goes beyond scorn to recognition of a common predicament.”

It is for that reason that I have always found Father Ted funny, and find much in the Life of Brian that is virtuous. But it is that thin balance between laughing amongst ourselves (both believers and unbelievers together) at the hypocrisy, or idiosyncracies of those persons or institutions that hold themselves up as a paradigm of virtue, and the more sinister scornfulness that seems a predicate to prejudice of the most vulgar kind. How many ‘attacks’ on Islam are less about the religion and its values than about the cultures that have embraced it?

I guess I havent really added anything new to this debate. After all what price freedom? But perhaps I would repeat my old adage that the concept of “rights” is really a concept about competing values. The right to freedom of speech is put in peril next to the right to freedom of religious belief, or freedom from persecution. Once the debate turns to “rights” inevitably the argument becomes circular.

Well now I need to wrap it up - before this post becomes circular. Clearly some notion of balance is required but wherein can one find the common denominator that everyone of belief or nonbelief can adhere to and agree with? My only suggestion humbly proffered - but pessimistic of already - is a retreat from notions of objectivity and the embrace of subjectivity.

Here is my long overdue book review on Richard Harries “The Real God“. Published in 1994 it is a short work on the philosophy of religion and basic theology by the then Bishop of Oxford Richard Harries. The full title of the book is The Real God: A response to Anthony Freeman’s God in Us. Thus this may be seen as being part of a dialogue, however to Harries credit it is not necessary to have first read the other book in order to make sense of this work.

This book is essentially a Realist apologetic for Christian belief and its remit is neatly summed up in the blurb by the question “If God exists, how can we know this?”

Immediately this should get materialist atheists and varying degrees of agnostics interested as the question seems to imply discussion on the physical and empirical basis of theistic belief. This should also interest students of “language games” who may wonder at the degree to which Harries seeks to straddle the science-religion divide. (Note this is really a false dichotomy - as Wittgenstein rejected the notions of islands of discourse - similarly in terms of hypothesis and narratives of origin religion and science have somewhat overlapping interests).

Significantly though this book was not written with the average Dawkins supporter in mind - and predates the “God Delusion” by some years. It may be interesting and informative to compare the different God-hypothesis both authors present (but thats a whole ‘nother task!)

Primarily as noted this book was a response to Anthony Freeman’s “God in Us”. Freeman was an Anglican priest and member of the “Sea of Faith” theological school who argued from a postmodern perspective about the human origins of religion. He eventually left the institutional church after
arguing that God as a metaphysical entity was not real, but that God was a projection of human ideals.

The Sea of Faith network have been variously described as Christian Atheists and Christian Humanists. Though as befits a postmodern school of thought they evade precise definition by virtue of holding many differing views without proferring any particular orthodoxy. Perhaps the most important position they do hold in common is that irrespective of the divine or human character of religion, the reality or non-existence of a deity, religion can play a positive role both personally and socially.

Harries responds to this with the intent that he is going to present a realist thesis on God. And although I have more sympathy for arguments that come from a via negativa (a negation of talking about the attributes of God) and am described variously by many as an anti-realist, I must confess that I enjoyed Harries arguments and style of writing.

He begins by exploring the character of God. What type of a person or being is he? Interestingly he is not concerned with obscure theological points (like how many angels can dance on a pinhead) but with human projections of divinity. He argues quite sympathetically that one of the prevailing themes in modern secularism and irreligiosity is liberation from an oppressive judgemental and rule-weilding God. And then goes on to propose that the projection of the divinity that we make (as reflected in art, prayer and theological themes) changes with society. Thus at different stages of history God the creator dominates moreso than God the judge etc. An example he gives is the Medieval triumphalism of God the King - an image that has less impact, significance and relevance to the modern mind.

This interesting chapter serves to illustrate that the conception of God is multifaceted as indeed is our experience of religion. And thus it is a reminder both to the individual believer, to the unbeliever who has left religion and to the religious institution itself that theistic-themes need to be constantly re-explored, re-invigorated and re-described.

Over a series of posts I will continue this review focusing on the various themes that Harries presents, and particularly at those themes that are of interest to this blog, and finish with some of my concluding thoughts.

Part 2 will deal with belief and disbelief, specifically with attempts to argue from design, and the psychology of belief and disbelief and its irrelevance to the notion of “proof”.

Part 3 will explore a postmodern analysis of faith.

Part 4 will deal with talking about that which we call “soul”, existential fulfilment of our lives here and now, and miracles and the laws of nature.

Part 5 will explore rationalism, the nature of scientific proof, relatvism, the eschatology of genuine “truth” with regards certain philosophical speculations and an apologetic for Christian Rationalism. Plus some concluding notes from me.

More links from the Only a Game blog where a series of reviews of Charles Taylors “A Secular Age” has been posted.

Here are the links to parts 5 & 6 which cover “The Nova Effect” a theory defining secularism as spiritual pluralism and “Religion Today” (speaks for itself).

Well worth a read. Charles Taylor is a very unconventional theistic philosopher and provides a sensible rationale for the cohabitation of the varieties of religious belief alongside and within secularism.

Participants were shown news reports that contained inaccuracies, followed by a correction. The news reports were not real, but were presented to the volunteers as coming from either the New York Times or Fox News. Again, the findings suggest that facts that contradicted political ideology were simply not taken in; if anything, challenging misbelief with fact checking has the counterintuitive effect of reinforcing that misbelief. Ars Technica

Carrying on from a previous post which linked to the “Only A Game” Blog and its fascinating series of posted reviews on Charles Taylor’s “A Secular Age” - here is Part 4 “Religion” versus “Science” - It is in brief a description of the false dichotomy that the above phrase engenders not to mention the partisan psychology of many of its adherents.

Well worth a read.

I have recently finished reading The God Delusion. I have complicated feeling about the book. On one hand it is well written with interesting anecdotes. On the other hand it does appear to be using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

The book could perhaps be shorter if this argument was more focused rather than attack every aspect of religion. An example is the argument “because we cannot explain X, god did it.” Dawkins first points out that this is not logically valid but then goes about explaining X with X in this case being complexity of life. This causes Dawkins’s critics to attack evolution but this distraction causes the invalid argument criticism to be forgotten.

The writing style is aimed at a general reader which necessarily involves some simplification of the arguments. I don’t think much is lost in the simplification but it does annoy philosophers. Most of the arguments are taken from Hume, Epicurus, etc so there is nothing new. What Dawkins brings to the debate is to contemporise them. Interestingly, there is very little overlap between Dawkins and Nietzsche although they have similar goals. Nietzsche would have blasted Dawkins’s humanism.

Dawkins has become infamous for his views on the non-existence of God. I feel I should mention the common criticism and note that they are wide of the mark. For those who criticize Dawkins for simply expressing his opinion, this hardly seems compatible with modern (free speech) or biblical (turn the other cheek) ethical standards. Others assume criticism of religion is the same as calling for its eradication. Dawkins does not calls for this in the book. Those that call Dawkins’s position a “religion”, a faith or an indoctrination method are usually committing ad hominem tu quoque. And finally a common criticism against Dawkins is agnosticism causes evil actions. I have not heard any valid causal connection between the two and it is a non sequitur as it stands. I suggest anyone trying to read the book to ignore previous views, either for or against.

He makes a good point on the source of morality in religion and almost taken from the pages of modern philosophy. Most religious people interpret religious texts to find a moral system. The literalists have an untenable position due to inconsistencies in the text. But what do we use to guide interpretation? Dawkins argues this interpretation must necessarily come from outside scripture. This undermines any claim that morality comes from holy books and puts religious morality on the same level as secular morality.

He also cites studies that different cultures have an instinctive grasp of a common morality. Reading between the lines, it is almost like calling for that to be the basis of morality. This reminds me of Hume’s attempt at founding morality on empirical observation. This approach to morality is incomplete since it only addresses morality when everyone is in agreement with moral law. For novel moral questions, our instinct is often silent.

Dawkins has no time for agnosticism. He distinguishes between two types of agnosticism. For the first type (which he calls Permanent Agnosticism in Principle) is a deistic God beyond the reach of evidence. He seems dismissive of this position and treats it as similar to ignosticism (the concept of God is meaningless). It is difficult to fathom Dawkin’s argument on this point. This brand of agnosticism is perhaps a distant relative of a postmodern God (in that the significance of God comes from the believer rather than from an objective source). The second type of agnosticism (Temporary Agnosticism in Practice) treats God as being inside and part of nature (an empirical hypothesis). Dawkins dismisses TAP because, in his view, the empirical evidence implies that there is no God. Before the postmodernists object to this argument, remember that most religious people believe God is very real and capable of physical manifestation. Dawkins’s book explicitly does not address Deism, Pantheonism, Buddhism or any similar world view. His argument is against the mainstream God of Abraham.

The aim of the book takes a controversial stance in today’s “tolerant” society. Dawkins sets out to deconvert believers whose belief is wavering. He recognises that it is impossible to deconvert a firm believer using rational argument and this is not his aim. The second and perhaps more difficult point is he equates religious instruction of children to child abuse. He argues that children never had a chance to make a free and informed decision to belong to religion. Children should therefore be protected from their parents. Liberals should note that an outside agency disrupting a family has a certain precedence; we allow the state to interfere with family affairs. But Dawkins assumes that free choice in belief is possible and I am not sure if that is true! When I child is part of a family, the teaching of some moral system is unavoidable. Independent thought can be encouraged but at some point this is oxymoronic - a young adult is told to have original thought and freedom. To obey this instruction is then not free or original! I find it difficult to imagine a society in which children are protected from the religion of their parents. The alternative is for parents to voluntarily not teach religion until early adulthood. I doubt many religions would agree to that constraint.

A final note: attaching the labels “militant”, “religious” or “fundamentalist” to Dawkins is ad hominem. If an argument is to be made against his religious position, please people, address his argument directly and don’t go after the man. It annoys me when implicit atheists (”the absence of theistic belief without a conscious rejection of it”) are grouped with other variants of atheism. The absence of belief is obviously not a type of religion or fundamentalism.

Anti Citizen One