Yet There Is Method In It

I have been lacking in posts recently as I have been both lazy, mentally drained and suffering from sporadic cut-offs thanks to a shoddy modem/router.It is with pleasure then I announce “I’m back!”

I was interested to see AC1 comment on recent news as I was planning on doing so myself – and at the same time air some of my more unusual views.

There are really three main news items that are capturing my attention at the moment:

1) The lifting of the excommunication on a holocaust denying Bishop.

2) The Edinburgh “Gay adoption” row, and

3) The Christian Nurse.

Holocaust Denial

The first story is troubling for me as a nominal Catholic, although I should celebrate the hoped for “return to the fold” of schismatic Catholics to the church – a precursor for a greater ecumenical push between world religions – I am dissappointed that the Holocaust Deniar Bishop Williamson has not been publicly disciplined.

There is an interesting tension here that revolves around freedom of speech – a matter much discussed on this blog. We needn’t repeat the arguments over and again – suffice to say though that I feel extraordinary pain that in the name of freedom of conscience Bishop Williamson’s evidentially wrong and misinformed beliefs concerning the scale and nature of the holocaust should be permitted the oxygen of publicity that his office and his rehabilitation to the Church has afforded him.

A very interesting article concerning this tension between censorship and freedom of conscience can be found on the hermeneutic of continuity blog. Where a traditionalist priest struggles with the notion of freedom of conscience and the spreading of error. His resolution interpreted in the Church’s conciliar teachings are that freedom of conscience is a responsibility rather than a right and that we have the responsibility to pursue that which is true – therefore in the context of Holocaust denial the overwhelming weight of evidence and testimony to the horrors of the “Shoah” should suffice to encourage mass censure of this mans false beliefs.

Gay Adoption

In principle I have no objection to Gay adoption. I am unconvinced by those arguments (usually motivated by a pre-existing heterosexually dominant bias) that the classic mother/father unit is always the best environment to bring up a child. There is no reason why a Gay couple (whatever their status in law i.e. married, cohabiting etc.) or indeed any couple (whether their relationship be sexual or not) cannot provide a safe, caring, loving and nurturing environment for the upbringing of children.

The role of sexuality and sexual orientation has minimal impact on the upbringing of children (indeed I may be understimating how positive such an upbringing may be in terms of encouraging a pluralistic attitude with regards human nature).

It is to put it bluntly “wrong” to suggest that a Gay couple could distort the emotional and sexual development of any children in their care. Homosexuality is a) not infectious, and b) not acquired. The sexual orientation of any children who have been placed in the care of homosexual couples is wholly incidental.

However. I am troubled by the Edinburgh case that has been in the news recently. Namely two young children have been placed in the adoptive care of a Gay couple, despite the protestations of their maternal grandparents who insist they are capable and willing to care for them themselves.

Generally where family is available – and they are deemed to be fit to bring up children – then priority should be given to the family – not because it is in the family’s interests but because it is in the childrens interests. Living with your grandparents (in theory) should be far less of a major upheaval than living with total strangers.

Edinburgh Social Services have deemed that the grandparents are unable to adopt the children because firstly they are too old (grandfather 61, grandmother 49), and secondly because they are too ill (grandfather has angina, grandmother type 2 diabetes). Having informed the grandparents of their decision they then told them that the children would be adopted by a gay couple. The grandparents claim they did not object to gay adoption (though they did not favour it) but they did object to their being disqualified. The reaction of social services was very blunt – the objection must clearly be homophobic and unless they changed their attitudes and became more open minded they would never be allowed to see their grandchildren again.

My opinions very briefly are that despite news reportage I may give some benefit of the doubt to social services – age and health should be taken into consideration regards suitability for adoption. However I would like to know if the judgement that disqualified them was made by a doctor or by a social worker. Are they medically unfit to adopt – or is this just an opinion formed by a non-medical professional?

I am also worried about the increasing power that the state is taking over society. To threaten the grandparents with permanent loss of contact unless they conform to an opinion that social services approves is potentially dangerous. Are we in thought police territory yet?

(I’m aware that in the previous section I was concerned with limitations to freedom of conscience yet here I am arguing total liberty – I’m not being inconsistent so much as highlighting the extraordinary tension between the two positions.)

My final concern is that the press have manufactured this into a homophobic issue.

Christian Nurse

This story fascinates me. The nurse asks a patient if she would like a prayer said for her, patient declines, takes no offence (though considers it weird), mentions it to the nurses colleague the following day, nurse gets suspended.

What is a nurse/nursing? My definition (which I consider fairly accurate) is that a nurse is a medical health practitioner who offers a more “holistic” service than that which can be provided by a physician.

Thus the nurse not only carries out the physicians instructions re: medication, dressing of wounds, general health care provision etc, but also provides support, basic counselling skills, caring observation of the patients welfare status and so on.

Part of this “holistic” approach focuses on the “spiritual” well being of the patient. I will post more on the beneficial uses of religion and spirtuality in health care soon (this story broke shortly after I started gathering materials for it).

The definition of “spiritual” well being in a multi-denominational and plural society necessarily needs be very broadly defined. Indeed one could describe the terms “spiritual” and “well being” as identical (i.e. not referencing any transcendent factor).

In this context then one would be hard pressed to suggest that asking a patient if they wished to be prayed for was a bad/wrong thing to do. One could argue that this approach (though overtly religious) was part and parcel of a holistic caring approach to the patient that a nurse ought provide.

Now for some problems and analysis.

1) The nurse had previously been warned about her behaviour (having been caught handing out prayer cards to another patient).

2) Though the nurse offered to pray and freely accepted the refusal such an overt statement may seem evangelical (forcing of ones beliefs).

3) Such an offer may be liable to offend.

The first issue is interesting – she has “previous” and has seemingly gone against the wishes of her local primary care trust. It is therefore (whether the policy is correct or not) an internal disciplinary matter. It is not a global persecution of expressions of the Christian faith (though one may argue it is a more localised persecution). What is more interesting though is that neither the prayer card, or prayer request patient made a complaint. Offence was neither intended nor taken – yet offence has been registered by a third non-interested party. Again (a common theme in this post) there seems to be a tension between freedom of conscience and institutional censure.

The second issue is a strange one. I dislike being evangelised (and yet I am a person of faith). Clearly a person who does not share the same faith or who is a non-believer altogether may feel irritated at being evangelised and preached to. This is a problem again with freedom of conscience and living in a plural society. Should a person of faith assume the “worst” and keep their beliefs private? Or should they be allowed the freedom to express themselves – partically when its expression has benign intent.

As I noted on a previous comment – a famous atheist once remarked (in suprisingly conciliatory tones) that if ones worldview was such that you believed in good/evil, life after death, eternal bliss etc., then you would have to really hate someone not to want to share the “good news” with them.

In this case I think offering to pray for someone – an expression of good will here – another way of saying “I hope you get better soon” – is not evangelising.

The late Irish comedian Dave Allen (no friend of organised religion) used to close his shows with the phrase “and may your God go with you.”

I think it is inevitable that in a plural society there will be a diversity of beliefs regarding God, the spiritual etc. Many of religion and many of no religion – it is therefore important that we recognise benign sincerity wherever we see it and understand though we may not share the same “language game” that good wishes may be expressed in a variety of idiomatic ways.

The third issue is curious and follows on from the other two. Offence may not be intended but may be taken – such is the fragile nature of intepretation and translation between language games. The patient in the story said she thought it unusual – insofar as though she wasnt offended she could see how some people might interpret the question “shall I pray for you?” as meaning “God you look awful – beyond medical help – you’re best chance is a miracle!”

My only comment on this is – (and again this reflects the overriding theme of this post the tension between freedom of conscience and censorship) – if were constantly vigilant to the fact that what we say may be interpreted in ways we never intended and that the seemingly benign may transform before our very eyes into something heinous – then most likely we would be struck mute for ever!

Personal Concluding Thoughts

I had the misfortune of being seriously ill a couple of years ago and of being thoroughly dependent upon the care provided by visiting nurses. None of them to my knowledge openly prayed for me or asked about my spiritual wellbeing. And yet in their actions a broadly spiritual concern was expressed – and I am perpetually grateful to them for it.

I did in my sick bed recieve from concerned individuals good wishes (of a secular variety) and also expressions of religious sentiment.

There is some research that suggests that praying for someone (and informing them of it) may be cathartic to their recovery. There is also conflicting research that suggests the effects to be negligible.

Personally I found it a) satisfying – it is nice to know people care, but also b) irritating.

I found it irritating for three reasons philosophical and theologically formed.

i) I am quite fatalistic – it is not so much that something happens for a reason, but that things happen and one must make do with ones circumstances – Although I was in pain, and distress I quickly came to be at ease with my situation – it was out of my control, therefore I let go of my attachment to suffering. Consequently my suffering became redemptive, enlightening even, and I learnt more about myself in a short space of time than I had ever known in all my previous years.

ii) I am quite cynical and humble – God (if you happen to believe in Him) surely has far more pressing concerns than to worry about little old me and my ailments. Don’t pray for me, beg him to stop earthquakes, floods, famines, war, pestilence, and so on.

iii) I am a philosophical and theological disciple of the Rhineland School of Mysticism – exemplified by the teachings of Meister Eckhart. Prayer is a human institution – a psychological reaction to circumstance – it is not bad of itself but it can become an object of fetishistic attachment. It can be an obstacle to letting go of attachments, a vehicle of selfishness and a barrier to simply “being.”

In the New Testament Jesus is reported as praying on only a handful of occasions. Usually they are private affairs. Throughout them though is one common theme – that of the resignation of the self-will -  not mine but “thy will be done.”

This is the crux of ‘Christian’ prayer as Jesus is supposed to have taught it.

Eckhart summed up the selfishness of our attachments and our abuse of prayer when he said:

but if they should fall sick they would wish it were God’s will that they should be better. These people, then, would rather that God willed according to their will than that they should will according to His. This may be condoned, but it is not right. The just have no will at all: whatever God wills, it is all one to them, however great the hardship.

Eckhart coined the phrase Abegescheidenheit which loosely translated can mean living without a why. The lucky man is attchment free and is content with whatever befalls him, sickness, health, weal or woe.

Therefore this nurse’s case is in my humble opinion – no great offence to society or to the healthcare profession. In fact I would propose that her goodwill is such that it overflows and she is a fine model of what the nursing profession can be. Her suspension is therefore heavyhanded and sad reflection of the ease of misinterpretation. I wouldnt mind betting that the patient who mentioned it in passing, now wishes she had remained silent.

What this does represent though is perhaps an immature approach to her faith and to prayer. We all wish the sick to get better, we all wish to live long and happy lives. But life is not like that – the evidence is all around us to see. For some people this is a damning condemnation of the supposed goodness of God and perhaps demonstrative of His non-existence. For others it is simply demonstrative of the selfishness of the human ego that we should seek to define God’s will as compatible with ours. Some people find the approach of the via negativa uncomfortable, is a God that allows suffering or who shows no inclination of goodness worthy of our attention and worship?

The nurse didn’t do a bad thing, and is being wrongly persecuted. But the nurse most likely should have persisted in her caring capacity without the need for a public expression of her faith. By her actions alone – and indeed by the actions of the entire medical proffession – we may judge for ourselves what manner of persons they are. And if a patient requests some form of explicit expression of benign goodwill such as a prayer then regardless of ones personal beliefs one should be willing to offer it knowing that it is part of a holistic approach to wellbeing.

I abandoned reading Harper’s “The Seventh Solitude” because it was doing my head in by its use of nihilism which was very different from my understanding of the term. There are two main definitions of nihilism, as far as I can tell.

The first is the rejection of objective moral truth. The simplest justification of this view is the is-ought problem, which argues that “ought” statements cannot be based on “is” statements. This inevitably implies that any objective meaning of life is meaningless or undefinable. By this definition Nietzsche can be said to be a nihilist.

One must stretch out one’s hands and attempt to grasp this amazing subtlety, that the value of life cannot be estimated. Twilight, FN

Kierkegaard objected to this view and implied “the eternal” was the only escape from nihilism.

If there is no eternal consciousness in a human being, if at the bottom of everything is only a wild ferment, a power that, twisting in dark passions, produces everything great or inconsequential; if an unfathomable, insatiable emptiness lies hidden between everything, what would life be then but despair? Fear and Trembling, SK

This view also highlights the common belief that nihilism is accompanied by anomie, ultra-pessimism or “immoral” behavior. I stumbled across a strange online manifesto for nihilism which uses this form of nihilism as a positive force – and I thought is website was unorthodox…

The second definition of nihilism, as used by Nietzsche, is “depreciation of life” or “will to non-existence”. Nietzsche labels any idea that implies that non-existence is preferable to existence as nihilistic. The aim in his philosophy is to make life possible without resorting to nihilistic concepts. The act of valuing metaphysical realities as higher than apparent realities was his chief objection to religion, as this necessarily devalues the apparent/realist reality.

Two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self; the heavenly by the love of God. St Augustine

Nietzsche’s view of moral relativism is interesting as it treats the various moral systems as wholly within a realist world. I think of this as a type of moral/physical monistic realism. Metaphysics is not invited to the party.

There are more idols than realities in the world [...]

To invent fables about a world “other” than this one has no meaning at all [...] Twilight, FN

This ironically makes Nietzsche a nihilist by one definition and an anti-nihilist by the other! I am still trying to think of catchy terminology to clarify types of “nihilism” but without success. With the use of alternative terminology, the former definition is simply moral relativism and the later is anti-metaphysical realism.

Anti Citizen One

PS I just finished reading Fear and Trembling and Tipping Point. I need to read some fiction next! Bring on the Murakami!

PPS In comedy form, nihilism is taken to an extreme in the film “The Big Lebowski”: “We believe in nothing, Lebowski! Nothing!”. This simple claim shares elements of both forms of nihilism.

I have been broadening my reading around Kierkegaard and I have concluded that both Nietzsche (FN) and Kierkegaard (SK) wrote in the same spirit and similar style – writing as a psychological investigation rather than a traditional discussion of abstract concepts. This is not too surprising considering they were almost contemporaries and have similar biographic details. On the other hand, the conclusions they arrive at are wildly different but I am delaying that analysis until a later time.

Common Themes of SK and FN

Both tried to find some truth outside of the common prejudice. This alienation from the mainstream is fundamental to both but is a break from other philosophical systems: in that neither SK or FN desire to establish a system and the impossibility of the majority to agree with their point of view.

The spiritual man differs from us men in being able to endure isolation, his rank as a spiritual man is proportionate to his strength for enduring isolation, whereas we men are constantly in need of “the others,” the herd; we die, or despair, if we are not reassured by being in the herd, of the same opinion as the herd, etc. The Instant No 5, Christianity of the Spiritual Man

“LIFE is a well of delight; but where the rabble also drink, there all fountains are poisoned.” “How have I flown to the height where no rabble any longer sit at the wells?” 28, Zarathustra

He certainly would not at once have allowed these thousands to call themselves disciples of Christ. No, He would have held back more stoutly. Therefore in three and a half years He won only eleven – whereas one Apostle in one day, may be in one hour, wins three thousand disciples of Christ. SK, The Instant No 5, A Genius / a Christian

“Not to the people is Zarathustra to speak, but to companions! Zarathustra shall not be the herd’s herdsman and hound! To allure many from the herd – for that purpose have I come.” FN, Zarathustra
“You seek followers? Seek zeros!” FN, Twilight

Both appeared to reject making objective valuations of life. At other times, they paradoxically do just that. To be fair to SK, he wrote under various pseudonyms and probably sought to examine concepts from various angles – possibly none of which are is personal view (although I am tempted to think books under his own name are his personal view). FN’s view evolved through his writings from being clearly influenced by Hegel and Schopenhauer to rejecting their views. But apart from this he attempted to be paradoxical in the same book (e.g. his view of women ranging from highly praising to being highly critical).

… assume that we are all thieves, what the police call suspicious characters [...] then to be that = 0; this is not to say that it does not mean anything much; no, it means nothing at all. The Instant No 5, When we are all Christian

…there is nothing that could judge, measure, compare, or sentence his [a man's] being, for that would mean judging, measuring, comparing, or sentencing the whole. But there is nothing besides the whole. Twilight, FN

Based on both SK and FN’s writings, attitudes towards women where quite different in the nineteenth century (to put it mildly). Both associate women with deception. Nietzsche was specifically critical of the early feminism movement, possibly due to the implication that women were “victims” and sought the goal of “equality”. A quick hunt on the Internet on SK and feminism give me the impression that SK was critical of feminism if a superficial interpretation is used, but a more sophisticated reading reveals things are more complex.

(I am considering doing an analysis of FN’s infamous “Thou goest to women? Do not forget thy/the whip!” line but Zarathustra is like a riddle. Women are almost certainly not meant as women generally. Exercise to the reader: what does she represent?)

And the long robes – in fact that is feminine attire. Thereby thought is led on to something which also is characteristic of official Christianity, the unmanliness of using cunning, untruth and lies as its power. The Instant No 5, SK

Progress of the idea: it [idealism?] becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible — it becomes female, it becomes Christian. (Twilight, FN)

An interesting parallel is the concept of the transitional nature of “human” was not lost on these writings. Both used the concept of man arising from animal (or what I prefer to called non-human) beginnings. Again, a superficial reading of this could be interpreted as a eugenics but neither writer intended to imply that human was objectively “higher” than a beast. But the difference between human and non-human were not ignored either.

In the New Testament sense, to be a Christian, in a upward sense, as different from being a man as, in a downward sense, to be a man is different from being a beast. The Instant No 7, SK

I teach you the Superman. Man is something that is to be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass man? [...] What is the ape to man? A laughing-stock, a thing of shame. And just the same shall man be to the Superman: a laughing-stock, a thing of shame. (Zarathustra, FN)

As I mentioned, both were interested in psychological explanations of belief and behavior. Both realized that a maladjusted human (who is “sick”) causes him to choose self harming behavior. Popular “wisdom” says the reverse: we are “made sick” by our “vices”. SK goes further than FN and claims sickness is the natural state for humans. For FN’s view of this analysis, see “Backworldsmen” and “The Problem of Socrates” (and its not agreement!)

For it is an ordinary accompaniment of illness to desire most vehemently, to love most of all, precisely that which is injurious to the sick man. But, spiritually understood, man in his natural condition is sick, he is in error, in an illusion, and therefore desires most of all to be deceived, so that he may be permitted not only to remain in error but to find himself thoroughly comfortable in his self-deceit. SK, The Instant No 7

Instinctively to choose what is harmful for oneself, to feel attracted by “disinterested” motives, that is virtually the formula of decadence. FN, Twilight

AC1

PS I am going an audio book of the Gay Science and it is sucking up so much time. The final duration is looking like more than 12 hours. Let’s just say it takes much longer than that to record and edit it to the final version.

Having already dealt in earlier parts of this review with the classic arguments for the existence of God and a postmodern interpretation of religion, I now want to examine some more metaphysical concepts. As earlier noted Richard Harries wrote this book as a realist apologetic for Christian belief. In other words he is attempting to convey through realist language and concepts a summary of what contemporary orthodox Christian belief entails. This therefore requires him to deal with metaphysics as a good deal of Christian belief involves supernatural or transcendent categories of being and reality.

In this part of the review then I will look fairly briefly at three issues he raises. First what is the soul? Secondly how should I live my life? And finally Miracles and the laws of nature.

Soul Language

Don Cupitt the radical postmodernist theologian whose influence colours Anthony Freemans theology (to which Harries book is a response) in one of his books went to great lengths to make sense of the concept of soul and spirit. Looking at their varying etymologies he pointed out that spirit came from the same word for air and the concepts must be related – spirit is supposed to be invisible yet in the traditional theistic cosmology it is also a fundamental part of our environment in which we have our being. Similarly the soul has as its latin originate “animus” from where we get the concept of animation or more literally being alive. This is fairly evident from the traditional Christian view that at death the soul and body are seperated – one may even suggest that this is the theological definition of death. What is interesting is that in Hebrew theology (still evidenced today in Judaism) is that the blood is that which carries our life – thus blood is synonymous with the soul. From that titbit of information hopefully the importance of Jewish kosher traditions should be evident. But also of dramatic interest the geophysical concept of hell as being the “underworld” probably originates from the synonymous association of the soul with blood. As likewise the notion of hell being a painful place. These ideas coagulate (!) around the simple premise that a violent death is one wherein the blood is spilt (draining into the earth and thus into the underworld).

The difficulty with soul language is that today many people of belief and unbelief are not exactly sure what the soul is meant to be. Is it a thing? A Physical entity? Is it perhaps with our greater understanding of the human body more synonymous now with our consciousness (as opposed our blood)?

Harries attempts very simply to answer these questions – and if one were to accept his explanation one may be concerned to wonder why such clarity is lacking elsewhere (pulpit, classroom, social convention).

… it is not necessary to believe that we have a soul that is a kind of a box within a box. Modern science, like the Hebrews of old, stresses that we are psychosomatic unities, body, mind and spirit all bound up together. It may be that ‘soul’ language is important in drawing attention to our spiritual nature and destiny. But we do not have to believe that soul is an isolatable thing. Nor do we have to believe that our bodies will be raised from the grave like characters in a painting by Stanley Spencer. So far as we know, our bodies decompose, to become part of the earth which in due course is recycled in other ways.

I have a strong sense of approval for the psychosomatic unity of the person as described by Harries here, and I think that at a simple brushstroke hopefully it dissolves some of the more incredulous speculations made about the ‘soul’ by those who either believe or disbelieve in it as being an organic ‘thing’ in the same way in which my lungs are essential to my body. It is not and Christian belief makes no such demands.

Before I move onto questions of how we should live this life of ours I want briefly to consider eschatology (the end things). Harries mentions the Christian notion of the resurrection of the body but suggests that again this is not a literal raising of our corpses from the grave but is perhaps a more symbolic concept concerning the after-life. He makes no attempt to describe what such a life may be like – whether we are conscious of it – whether it is eternal bliss or whatever. He does reiterate the traditional Christian theology that we will be re-created in the ‘stuff of glory’ but humbly concedes he has no idea what this may mean. I have my own thoughts informed by Wittgenstein and Meister Eckhart not to mention zen and a scientific theory of the block universe – but I shall keep these to myself for now. I shall however quote a rather nice musical analogy that Harries proffers -

In the same way that music written for one instrument, say a violin, can sometimes be played on other instruments, the music which we are, played on the instruments of flesh and blood in this life, can be played on another instrument in the next.

How should I/we live our life?

Harries having discussed the notion of the soul and briefly addressed eschatology then discusses in an interesting and unique way a concept of heaven and divine justice. He actually agrees albeit in a limited fashion with the Christian existentialism of Freeman. Without explicit references to Kierkegaard or perhaps even to Eckhart and his exhortation to lose and then find oneself within the eternal now it is obvious that these are influences.

Freeman believes that this desire for true justice can be met by concentrating on the quality of life rather than its extent. He suggests that if we live intensely, in the here and now, in the light of our highest values, then we will achieve a quality of life which is more important than anything else. The quality of a play or poem does not depend on its length, nor does the quality of our lives.

As Martin Luther King once said “longevity has its place” but it isn’t the be -all and end-all. Our lives when scrutinized in the here and now (the eternal constant of the present) is more fruitfully lived in a quest of self-authenticity than it is in placing upon ourselves the incredible burden of the expectation of eternity and the existential paralysis that this may entail.

Although Harries offers some support for this – calling this carpe diem philosophy an important pastoral truth he does not dwell on it nor give it his total endorsement. Rather he insists on the necessity of eternal life and divine justice as an explanatory footnote for why a supposedly loving God could impose or allow some incredibly unbearable lives for so many people.

I felt a little dissappointed at this shifting of the focus onto the grander philosophical speculations about the problem of evil – when as ‘mere’ mortals a Christian Existentialism that endorses self-authenticity and intense experience of life here and now can be a legitimate response to the everyday problems of social evil that blight the world.

Miracles and the Laws of Nature

However despite my dissappointments Harries proceeds with an internal logic that continues to enchant me (as an eventual summary of my review I could simply say he makes a very convincing case). He returns to the problem of evil – not all suffering in the world is caused by human beings, there is disease and natural disasters.

Harries then offers a reason for not blaming God for natural disasters – by shifting the focus away from our sense of suffering. In our finite time and limited perspective of the entire history of the universe as it was, is and is to be it is rather short-sighted to get angry about natural disasters. To use an analogy of my own it is rather like reading sleeping beauty but getting so despondent about the chances of her ever waking up that I simply discard the book adopt a jaded view of the story and never come to realise the eucatastrophe (the happy ending) that would have awaited me had I been patient.

Of course one might argue that if we continue to insist on the positive identification of God as love as an eternal and objective truth (albeit by definition a truth that has to be accepted conditionally on faith) surely our patience is being sorely tested? As Homer Simpson once pitifully prayed “Dear God, give the bald guy a break”.

Harries though offers a slighlty more palatable explanation – whilst reaffirming his philosophical colours as a theistic evolutionist. God does not simply make the world, he makes the world make itself.

God has given the basic elements of matter a life of their own and has woven the universe from the bottom upwards through the free interplay of millions of forces.

Thus for example earthquakes are no bad of themselves – as though they were some kind of moral affrontary – it is simply a natural process and the behaviour of the earth doing what the earth is supposed to do.

This seems to be a very disinterested deistic God who sets the whole chain of events in motion and who is either disinterested in the suffering caused along the way, or who is perhaps positively insistent on the presence or perception of such suffering (which does not sit well with a loving God).

Harries offers a second justification for this view. In order to be the type of thinking and choosing beings that we are we need a relatively stable environment. In other words the environment in which we live with all its pitfalls and dangers and disasters. If, Harries argues, we lived in an Alice in Wonderland style world where the laws of nature could be abrogated by a God whose constantly saying “oops” everytime a natural disaster occurs and who plucks people into his figurative hand and takes them up to safety we would never learn to think at all.

Harries seems to be describing a distant and uninvolved God and perhaps also therefore seems to be rejecting determinism (which is not necessarily a scientifically sound view). At some times he appears to suggest that it simply wouldnt be fair for God to do one miracle and then not ot perform others… why not? If God is all-powerful then he can do anything right? Include being morally inconsistent and distinctly unfair in his treatment of people. I don’t wish to let this childish diatribe undermine Harries exposition of Christian theology or to suggest that disbelief is therefore a de facto better position to hold. I do think it perhaps illustrates though the philosophical difficulties of a via positiva – a positive list of definitions concerning God.

A few paragraphs later and Harries does suggest that possibly at some point in history a suspension of the laws of nature has taken place and a miracle has occured. He makes no effort to describe when this may have been or why it may have occured – but one could assume on account of his orthodox Christian beliefs that he may have had the bodily resurrection of Jesus as an example.

Concluding Notes

This section of the book dissappointed me the most as it seems at times he is finding himself going in circles. It is as I have already described an example of how the via positiva can make theology untenable as a series of acceptable propositions. In fairness though Harries does maintain a certain consistency with everything he has discussed previously. He by no means makes objective statements of truth but statements of objective belief liberally interspersed with a genuinely cognitive agnosticism that says ‘I don’t know all the answers but I’m doing the best that I can’.

I had hoped that the block universe and eternalism may have been discussed but perhaps he felt such concepts too difficult to describe and elaborate upon for his intended audience.

What has been evident is what one may call a primitive form of Christian universalism (though he may reject that label). And a tendency towards an Irenaen theodicy (with which I have some sympathy). Irenaeus (2nd cent.) proposed that we are made in the image of God but that it is through living our lives we grow into the likeness of Him. Similarly Harries response to the problem of evil – particularly natural evil – seems to be (and this is a fairly common theme in Christian theology) that suffering can be redemptive.

My one nod of approval in the direction of this idea – that it is through suffering and evil that we come to know the Good – is that the concept and notion of suffering – of being in a state of suffering – of identifying oneself as being a victim of some misfortune is a self-centred or solopsistic viewpoint – and that redemption may lie in resignation to the fact that we are mortal, finite beings within a specific time and space – but that if we adopt a quantum view (similar to the notion of the flapping of a butterflies wings in the amazon causes wind across the globe) and transcend our solopsism to adopt a the-optic (God’s eye) view of the universe in its entirety encompassing all space and time (the block universe) as a single place in an instantaneous present – then the problem is dissolved.

The final part of this review concerns Rationalism and Christian belief.

In this part of my review I wish to briefly explore Harries discussions on the postmodern view of language. He is attempting to describe the views of Anthony Freeman the postmodernist theologian who has ceased to believe in a supernatural or transcendent God – seeing Him rather as being a projection of human ideals. Much of postmodernism has its roots in relativism, subjectivism and a sort of late Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Language.

A simple exposition of this philosophy goes like this:

mind is a social reality and language a public phenomenon. We see mothers bending over their prams making noises at their babies. In due course the noises are reciprocated and come to be recognized as talk. Soon this talk becomes internalized as thought. But the talk is prior and public and this enters into the very soul of our thinking. Because language is a public possession, written texts are particularly important. How those texts are intepreted or read still depends very much on the interests and outlook of the readers and these in turn will reflect the ineterests and concerns already built into the language that we use to intepret the texts. If we say we want to find out what a particular text really means, we are stymied, for the language we used to interpet it ourselves is a given, which will shape how we read…

Harries, again somewhat suprisingly is not completely anti-pomo. He accepts a certain degree of interpretative and cognitive relativism. However he rejects total scepticism and abandonment of truth and meaning notions – correctly suggesting that such a position would dissolve philosophy into just one of many methods of literary criticism.

I would just add by means of a clarification that although language is public and in turn shapes our ways of thinking this should by no means be used to suggest that speech is thought, or that absence of speech indicates absence of thought. (I could write much more here on my theories of unthought-thoughts and vocal-thought-thinking-thoughts or about the conscious and unconscious but I will digress.)

I will finish with a quote from Anthony Freeman that illustrates what one may call a postmodern view of religion – it is this view which Harries is ultimately attempting to challenge with recourse to realist arguments.

“A false distinction within Christian doctrine itself between an essential core and a negotiable husk. In presenting the faith to this generation I am bound to be presenting a different faith from that which my forefathers presented. Not just a different interpretation of the same essential core, but a different faith. This is because there is no essence of inner core. The interpretation is not like taking the shell off a nut. It is like peeling the layers off an onion: the interpretation goes all the way down. All is intepretation. That is the essence.”

I saw Steve Jones (the geneticist) talking about the future of the human species. It was a very slick presentation. It seemed to be an expanded discussion of an article he published in the telegraph. He claimed that human evolution has come to a halt. The reasons for this are perhaps not interesting in this blog’s context. I was immediately skeptical of his conclusion but he did add two important conditions: he was only referring to the western world and the halt in evolution was temporary.

Any claims of constancy or certain knowledge in the apparent world should be examined closely since they can only come from two lines of reasoning:
1) A priori – there is no reason why constancy (or even inconstancy) should be expected, so no certain claim can be made.
2) A posteriori – basing a theory on past observations can never provide certainty since the next observation might disprove a theory.

The purists would try to apply this reasoning to my argument. An uncertainty might be the possibility of other sources of knowledge apart from a priori and a posteriori. What we can say is any claim about the apparent world without an element of doubt is, at best, misleading*. Since the apparent world is different at different times, we can speculate that change is possible. It seems the universe has changed greatly through out its existence, and it is therefore conceivable that constancy is illusionary. We could say some things are constant and some things are transitory. There is also a possibility that an seeming constant in the world is in fact going through a slow transition – too slow for us to perceive. As Heraclitus said, “All things are flowing.” Also Nietzsche, “Insofar as the senses show becoming, passing away, and change, they do not lie.” (A luck “guess” by Heraclitus – that everything is made of one primordial element (fire) is not so far from the modern concept of mass/energy equivalence.)

A few blogs have attempted to rebut Steve Jones on practical grounds which might be interesting for some.

Anti Citizen One

* probably

In his apologetic for Christian and Theistic Realism Richard Harries deals with the tricky field of arguments for the existence of God. This is rather important as he is after all trying to argue for the existence of God as a real being, and furthermore propose that it can be posited using realist language.

Perhaps suprisingly he is not altogether convinced by the standard or classic arguments/proofs of the existence of God and even goes so far as to describe them as “regulative ideas” inasmuch as it lends comforting support to “those who would like to see the world as the product of a rational intelligence”. Yet, he argues, such regulative ideas are nothing more than “nice” – they have little logical foundation (they cannot stand alone). His concession to the traditional arguments is thus: “the so-called proof therefore must always leave the matter open”. In other words it is not so much a logical formula that may be presented to the sceptic or unbeliever in the hope that they would somehow be convinced of the necessity of belief, as it is a grounding in rational thought that satisfies the already believing.

I would like now to focus on his treatment of the argument from design, as it is an argument that still has great currency amongst theists and which causes the most consternation for materialist atheists – not least because of the seemingly pseudo-scientific nature of the language game that some modern proponents of the design argument seem to adhere to.

Harries argues that the argument from design fails from the outset. The notion that as a computer may infer a human designer so too the world implies a divine designer is an illogical inference by progression. The inference demands a standard of comparison and by its definition the universe (i.e. all ‘created’ matter) is beyond complete or categorical perception and thus will not yeild to comparison.

When it comes to the universe, I do not have a category of designed universes to compare with another category that have somehow sprung up of themselves. There is only one universe. (There may very well be many worlds in addition to this one but by definition the God with whom we are concerned is the Creator of all possible worlds, i.e. the universe.) So we are simpy not in a position, on the basis of logic, to say whether the universe is designed or not. The matter is open.

I would add that the God-hypothesis Harries is proposing (i.e. the Judaeo-Christian creator God) similarly by necessity is the creator of all possible universes, and if we wish to talk of parallel universes then a new terminology such as meta-universe is needed.

Harries continues by praising as an example the evolutionary account of the creatures of the world such as those posited by Dawkins. He has no problem with the theory that says that “through a process of natural selection and random mutation… the most complex and beautiful forms can evolve from simple ones over a long period of time.” This is a thoroughly reasonable scientific account and as the evidence to support it grows we have little or no reason to doubt its retitude.

However this does not negate the idea of a designer – as he has already argued the classical proof as it is, is beyond resolution and the argument must remain open. Consequently he advocates a theory of theistic evolution (without going into details).

He also accepts – to the point of sympathy anyway – the position of scepticism about God’s goodness as evinced through the waste and violence that is resplendent throughout nature. But he suggests this does not negate the idea of design and is concerned with altogether a different matter entirely. He neatly wraps up the theistic evolutionary worldview with a quote from Frederick Temple in the 19th century “God makes the world make itself”. In short he argues arguments from design do not prove the existence of God or design, but neither does a scientific description of how the ‘process’ works resolve the God-hypothesis either.

A final brief comment on the classic arguments for the existence of God as found in the philosophy of religion and their alienation from religious belief as practised and lived goes as follows: “A person could come to the end of a logical train of argument with the conclusion that God must logically, exist: and it could leave him stone cold.”

The classic arguments focusing as they do on various aspects or properties of the proposed divinity always diminish the meta-concept of the divinity that the Judeao-Christian traditions believe in and worship.

Later on in his consideration of rational arguments or proofs of the existence of God he touches on a postmodern or holistic psychology of belief and disbelief. “It is always possible to give a psychological explanation of both belief and disbelief.”

Of course such explanations do not prove/disprove the beliefs but they may shed further understanding on the processes involved. He uses monotheism and its attachment to the argument from causality as an example. A monetheist

“looking at the argument from causality will always tend to have some sympathy with it and want to go along with it, because he or she already believes there is a Creator. Because their heart already moves in gratitude from Creation to Creator, it is natural for their mind to move in that direction as well. Cardinal Newman once wrote that: ‘The whole man moves, paper logic is but the record of it.’ I believe this is too extreme and that logic can act as the helmsman of the ship, not simply a log book of where we have been. Nevertheless, Newman’s remark does bring out the important truth, that our great shifts of belief or disbelief are never purely intellectual, they involve the whole person. So, because we know God in our own life, we will naturally believe him to be present in the life of the world of which we are a part.”

I am reminded of two Wittgenstein quotes here that I feel are relevent (though I shall paraphrase). Firstly that the sum of belief dawns on the believer in the same way that as the sun rises we can better see to the horizon (in other words belief may be enhanced by logical or rational argument but rarely if ever can it be prompted by it). Secondly the world of the happy man is very different to that of the unhappy man – thus reinforcing Harries psychological point I think that a person who is inclined to theism will see and feel the strength of arguments that support his belief even though independent of this a priori belief those same arguments are incapable of logically resolving the questions.

I am moved to remember that St Anselm talked of “Faith seeking Understanding” and not of understanding or knowledge in order to find Faith.

Harries concludes the chapter concerning belief with a brief discussion on the various types of disbelief. “I suspect that most of those who disbelieve do so because they have had a bad experience of religion. Some do so because their understanding of religion is full of misconceptions. Some may be unwilling to make the necessary changes in lifestyle which the Christian faith asks of us. Others see no way of reconciling the tragic quality of so much existence with the claim that there is a loving Creator. There is a variety of reasons, all of which have to be looked at seperately.”

I find this brief paragraph unsatisfactory. On the one hand I appreciate his nuanced commentary that “atheism” is not one single monolothic entity. That there are various types of disbelief and reasons for disbelief and that each needs be considered seperately. I think that this kind of pluralism is a healthy alternative to the ‘them and us’ mentality often exhibited by the loudest tub-thumpers for either side. Yet I feel that he has missed out on the category of disbelievers who genuinely have concluded – indeed one might say believe – that there is no God. He would probably classify these as ‘misconceptions’ and this would betray the chauvenistic attitude of someone who maintains that in the end belief is good and disbelief (at the least) harmful to the self.

I would add though that such a category is difficult to discuss – atheists don’t like to be called ‘believers’ – even if they object to a narrow or naive definition of faith/belief. I would propose that it may even be difficult to isolate these different types of disbelief – for a person who through a solely materialist epistemology has decided that there is no God may very well have also had a bad experience of religion, hold different views on morality, and even be responding negatively to a radically different God-hypothesis than that held by believers.

Also he tends to bypass agnostics here, although one may say that his stance that the “proofs” of the existence of God are not “proofs” and that philosophically the matter remains open is a nod in their direction. All in all though despite these criticisms I think he displays a fairmindedness and openness to plurality of belief all too rare in this arena of debate.

Here is my long overdue book review on Richard Harries “The Real God“. Published in 1994 it is a short work on the philosophy of religion and basic theology by the then Bishop of Oxford Richard Harries. The full title of the book is The Real God: A response to Anthony Freeman’s God in Us. Thus this may be seen as being part of a dialogue, however to Harries credit it is not necessary to have first read the other book in order to make sense of this work.

This book is essentially a Realist apologetic for Christian belief and its remit is neatly summed up in the blurb by the question “If God exists, how can we know this?”

Immediately this should get materialist atheists and varying degrees of agnostics interested as the question seems to imply discussion on the physical and empirical basis of theistic belief. This should also interest students of “language games” who may wonder at the degree to which Harries seeks to straddle the science-religion divide. (Note this is really a false dichotomy – as Wittgenstein rejected the notions of islands of discourse – similarly in terms of hypothesis and narratives of origin religion and science have somewhat overlapping interests).

Significantly though this book was not written with the average Dawkins supporter in mind – and predates the “God Delusion” by some years. It may be interesting and informative to compare the different God-hypothesis both authors present (but thats a whole ‘nother task!)

Primarily as noted this book was a response to Anthony Freeman’s “God in Us”. Freeman was an Anglican priest and member of the “Sea of Faith” theological school who argued from a postmodern perspective about the human origins of religion. He eventually left the institutional church after
arguing that God as a metaphysical entity was not real, but that God was a projection of human ideals.

The Sea of Faith network have been variously described as Christian Atheists and Christian Humanists. Though as befits a postmodern school of thought they evade precise definition by virtue of holding many differing views without proferring any particular orthodoxy. Perhaps the most important position they do hold in common is that irrespective of the divine or human character of religion, the reality or non-existence of a deity, religion can play a positive role both personally and socially.

Harries responds to this with the intent that he is going to present a realist thesis on God. And although I have more sympathy for arguments that come from a via negativa (a negation of talking about the attributes of God) and am described variously by many as an anti-realist, I must confess that I enjoyed Harries arguments and style of writing.

He begins by exploring the character of God. What type of a person or being is he? Interestingly he is not concerned with obscure theological points (like how many angels can dance on a pinhead) but with human projections of divinity. He argues quite sympathetically that one of the prevailing themes in modern secularism and irreligiosity is liberation from an oppressive judgemental and rule-weilding God. And then goes on to propose that the projection of the divinity that we make (as reflected in art, prayer and theological themes) changes with society. Thus at different stages of history God the creator dominates moreso than God the judge etc. An example he gives is the Medieval triumphalism of God the King – an image that has less impact, significance and relevance to the modern mind.

This interesting chapter serves to illustrate that the conception of God is multifaceted as indeed is our experience of religion. And thus it is a reminder both to the individual believer, to the unbeliever who has left religion and to the religious institution itself that theistic-themes need to be constantly re-explored, re-invigorated and re-described.

Over a series of posts I will continue this review focusing on the various themes that Harries presents, and particularly at those themes that are of interest to this blog, and finish with some of my concluding thoughts.

Part 2 will deal with belief and disbelief, specifically with attempts to argue from design, and the psychology of belief and disbelief and its irrelevance to the notion of “proof”.

Part 3 will explore a postmodern analysis of faith.

Part 4 will deal with talking about that which we call “soul”, existential fulfilment of our lives here and now, and miracles and the laws of nature.

Part 5 will explore rationalism, the nature of scientific proof, relatvism, the eschatology of genuine “truth” with regards certain philosophical speculations and an apologetic for Christian Rationalism. Plus some concluding notes from me.

Carrying on from a previous post which linked to the “Only A Game” Blog and its fascinating series of posted reviews on Charles Taylor’s “A Secular Age” – here is Part 4 “Religion” versus “Science” – It is in brief a description of the false dichotomy that the above phrase engenders not to mention the partisan psychology of many of its adherents.

Well worth a read.

Over on the “Only a Game” blog there is an interesting series of reviews on Charles “Chuck” Taylor’s latest book “A Secular Age”.

Charles Taylor is considered possibly the greatest living philosopher in the english speaking world. I must admit rather shamefully to not having heard of him until recently. He is an interesting guy and is in many respects an intellectual descendent of Wittgenstein.

A practising Catholic he nonetheless holds views that are a very unconventional fit to what most people expect a Catholic to be. He is clearly an original thinker. His latest book “A Secular Age” charts the historical development of religion in the west leading up to and including secularism. His study focuses on how society has undergone the transition from a time when it was virtually impossible not to believe in God to a time where even  those of the strongest and most determined faith accept that their is but one of many options available to them.

Rather than post a copy of somebody elses review (I haven’t read the book yet) I thought i’d just link to them. It makes interesting reading and the book is top of my wishlist. It is a serial review – here are the first three in the series:

Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

On the same blog an excellent (though sarcastic) post on the horrors of a “science pope” (warning may contain Feyerabend).