I’m guessing the previous post to be in part a response to my thoughts on the current bioethics debates. And alas I feel myself being drawn into a debate that normally I would prefer to keep at the office or within the academic environment. Anyway I will try to respond to some of your points.
You describe the Pope’s writings as betraying “Arbitrary Reasoning” - well besides the obvious arbitrariness of the accusation you are entitled to your opinion. Certainly if one were to read his works in isolation or out of order then his reasoning probably could seem arbitrary. On the other hand if you read his works from the 60’s onwards (a gargantuan task) you would probably get a feeling for the reasoned consistency of his arguments (though by no means should this deter you from your disagreements).
You criticise his view for being speciesist and this topic has been written on at some length, so I will move over that one. Other than to say that he could be regarded as necessarily speciesist - consistent with the anthropic thrust of Christian philosophy - as opposed to being arbitrarily so.
You dislike the appeal to tradition and again there is little more I can say on this matter other than it is a self-justifying position for the office he holds as the successor to Peter. Appeals to tradition are tautologically a traditional way of building arguments in philosophy. It can become a logical fallacy if the tradition that is being appealed to is given unquestionable authority. But a simple overview of pontifical literature shows that unbending adherence to tradition is not the modus operandi, for example in the days of St Thomas Aquinas “life” was assumed to begin some days after conception and at variable times for boys and girls. Now, informed by medical science this view has been rejected and a life begins at conception theory has been adopted. Before I explain this a little further, just one cautionary note your opposition to the appeal to tradition (without qualification) has a similarity to the fallacy of the appeal to novelty.
It seems that you also oppose the assumption to a universal right to life. Now we have discussed the idea of natural rights before and satisfactorily concluded that the notion is ridiculous. But is this what he is arguing for? In the snippet of text you quoted he talks about unconditional respect this is appeal to cultivating a respectful attitude not an appeal to natural rights.
Biomedical ethics has engaged in an important debate concerning “life” and its “beginnings”. Personally I adhere to a theory that is called “longitudinal form.”
From conception through conceptus, blastocyst, embryo, fetus all the way to birth there are no singular definable and isolatable boundaries of transition. One could take pictures of the developmental stages and label them as seperate stages of being - but this is an artificial seperation for these stages in action or process are inseperable and belong to a single continuity of cell division and growth. One could talk about the first beat of the heart, the first signs of mental life, the development of the nervous system or even birth as “the beginning of life” but these are parts of an organic continuum.
This longitudinal view of life is generally adopted post-natal by all of us. Although we differentiate between tot, child, teen, young adult, middle-age and the elderly there are no objective or singularly definable moments that one can point to and declare with any certainty that there was a particular moment of transition.
Similarly so then by extension even birth is a process rather than a straightforward before/after event. The child in the womb in the days preceding birth is virtually indistinguishable from the child immediately post-birth - generally we talk about viability at this stage. But as medical care for premature babies improves yet more boundaries in viability are smashed and it is not uncommon to hear of 26 week old survivors. But being “born” and taking one’s first breath of air by ones self (or being capable of doing so) is not the deciding factor (usually) in discerning whether the child is “alive”, “vital” or “viable”. It is important, but not singularly so.
We can understand various moments of embryonic development by taking them in isolation and comparing them with other stages - but these stages are not independent of each other and only become totally meaningful when considered as part of an organic process. Thus it is possible to talk about life or the process of growing-life beginning at conception without having recourse to notions of the soul or the direct action of a divinity.
Now than having rejected ‘natural rights’ we still acknowledge artifical or assumed rights. The difference in view is that natural rights are somehow inherent whereas the other type of right is in the gift of human discourse. This latter is a fairly democratic way of operating. By consensus most of us wish to avoid being murdered thus a social taboo has arisen around the act of murder. Similarly the vast majority of us engage in a primitive form of social contract by choosing not to murder each other - quite often on the selfish context that if I dont kill you hopefully you will extend the same courtesy to me!
But what qualifications does one require in order to be eligible for certain rights? Obviously I cannot extend the right to life to a dead body, nor the right to vote in free elections to an embryo. Clearly there are circumstances where we consider one or other of our species invalid to certain rights.
What then about the right to life? Well generally we extend the gift of this right to all living people, exceptions are made in some societies for capital crimes where the right to life is supposed to have been negated by criminal action. Similarly some cultures have begun to diminish the primary status this right usually enjoys by defining it as in competition with the right to die, or more pertinantly the right to choose the means and time of ones death. But even in this case the right hasn’t been completely abrogated, rather a realism has descended upon certain ethical views, a realism that rights are in the gift of society and are not endowed by a supernatural power or inherent in our natures. And of course even the right to die is qualified on the grounds of voluntary decision making, such a right is gifted to those who are autonomous and capable of making an informed and consensual decision. Unique cases exist such as permanent coma’s and brain death (or persistant vegitative states) but thats a seperate issue.
So what about the unborn child, are they qualified to recieve the gift of rights? This is the crux of the debate. There are those who use the language and imagery of parasitical life to negate the qualification of the unborn child to recieve rights so long as they are dependent upon the host (mother). But what about the child who has just been born? Although breathing and living independently, they are still vulnerable and incapable of sustaining their own fragile lives, in other words they depend on the kindness of others. Consequently infanticide has become an extraodinary social taboo, particularly if the motivation for murder is selfish and not the result of some unfortunate psychological illness. What difference in moral ’status’ then is there between the child who has just been born and who is dependent on their mother/carer, and the child in the womb who is viable? And as longitudinal form asks, what difference then in moral status is there between a full-term but as yet unborn child and one that is yet to have become fully developed?
The argument then proceeds that rather like the artificial nature of viewing the stages of developmental growth independent of the whole process from conception (to death), so too certain divisions in moral status and eligibility to the right of life are artificial too.
If we understand that the right to life is a gift, and we choose to remove that right from the unborn child, then if we are to be consistent and not ageist or hypocrital then we must concede that the same right to life may be removed from any one uf us at any time if society (in whose gift the right belongs) defines us as somehow ineligble.
And if society can define the unborn child, the elderly or disabled as being ineligble candidates for the right to life, then what is to prevent society from deciding arbitrarily that our eligibility to that right can be questioned on the grounds of race, gender, sexuality, religion, profession, political opinion etc.
And this is not just the apocalyptic ravings of a hypothetical slippery slope argument - one need only look to recent history to observe governments assuming the power to gift rights and to take them away. We all know (hopefully) of the Holocaust, but let us remember also the Killing Fields of the Khmer Rouge who decided that amongst others those who wore spectacles were enemies of the state and ineligible to posess the same rights as anyone else simply because eye spectacles were considered a sign of education.
You also ask about the “natural time” of death when nowadays that time may be elongated or shortened by medical intervention. This is an important question, but surely the concept is analytical and self-defining, the natural time of death is that which occurs without direct medical intervention. Although you dont say as much your begging of the question seems to imply that because medical science can elongate our lives we ought to make use of their services. Why should this be so? It is known in medicine and medical ethics as “vitalism” the attitude that one must avoid death at all costs. The individual is not compelled to take advantage of the medical services available to them, indeed it is one of the fundamental tenets of medicine that they should seek to help those who come to them for assistance.
One could also define the “natural time” of death as being that which occurs without “extraordinary” medical intervention (and this is indeed the position of the Catholic Church). The question one should ask then is what is “extraordinary” and what reasons does an individual have to want to sustain their life artifically beyond its self-sufficient viability?
You’re second major objection is concerning the “annoyance” of religious groups imposing their view on society with regards ethics (for example abortion). I hate to say it but this just seems to confirm your abhorrence to all things religious and highlights the fragile relationship many people have to the idea of ‘free-speech’.
If there was a situation where roving bands of Catholic militiamen were arresting pregnant women and imprisoning them until they went full-term in order to prevent an abortion, then I may accept that they were imposing their views on society. But this isn’t happening and nobody is suggesting that it should. Those instances (more prevalent in America) where acts of violence are perpetrated against those who facilitate abortion are not acting in religious interests, no matter how badly they protest that they are or how much those who hate religion may try to smear them. It is a sad reality that there are those who allow their personal prejudice to cloud their judgement and who voicably use religious belief as a justification for wholly non-religious means. These people are hypocrites and should be judged as such. In much the same way that we would judge and condemn all forms of hypocrisy in all walks of life.
Now you may argue that anti-abortion lobby groups who would desire a change in the law whether it be greater restrictions or complete illegalization are, albeit through non-violent means, trying to impose their morality upon society as a whole. While this is true to an extent if you genuinely are arguing that this “annoyance” is wrong, anti-social or somehow contrary to your libertarian ethic, then you are painfully naive and certainly not a libertarian in any sense of the word.
How else was abortion legalized in the first place, without the lobbying of a pro-abortion interest group, to legalise the practise on the grounds of free-choice and medical safety? Was this not the imposition of one viewpoint onto the rest of society? Is this not what all human laws are? Is this not what democratic governance is about?
You ask “Isn’t it enough for them to live virtuously (by their own standard) and well away from politics?”
I assume by this you are suggesting that a religious point of view has no place being involved in political debate. If so I can think of no greater assault on the libertarian ideals of free-speech and freedom of conscience that John Stuart-Mill wrote about in chapter 2 of his work On Liberty on the liberty of thought and discussion.
Surely your request that the “annoying” religiously minded people who oppose abortion for example (although I know plenty of atheist pro-lifers also which further highlights the tyranny of your proposition) could be inversely applied to yourself and the ‘non-believers’? Isn’t it enough for you to live virtously by your own standard and stay well away from politics?
If we maintain a system of democratic governance that permits the participation of the people within the organon of power - a system that has the authority to rule over everybody - what ‘right’ have you to deny the freedom to voice an opposing view on any given matter of legislation?
Lets forget abortion, religious belief and non-belief for a moment and apply your maxims to another issue altogether. I oppose the hunting of foxes with hounds, I consider it abominably cruel and unfair and an activity more about sport than pest control. I detest those who support hunting and who consider it to be making a sport out of a “necessary” pest-control activity. But they are entitled to their different point of view and they are entitled - no matter how “annoying” they are and no matter how unlikely it is that I will ever change my mind on the issue - to voice their opinions and to seek a change in legislation.
And so to the final point, in a participatory democracy, that it is alleged we belong to, we can never have any justification in attempting to silence the views of others no matter how objectionable they may seem, when the desired outcome of our participatory democracy is to enact laws that govern us all.
If the law applies to us all - then the oppurtunity to oppose that law must apply to us all. Therefore in the case of abortion, if one group opposes it, on the grounds that it is a violation of the unborn childs right to life (a right that they consider to be either inherent or in the gift of society) then this view may be validly expressed as equally as those who believe that the right to choice overrides the rights claims of an unborn child.
To oppose a law (any law) and to hope that someday it may be changed whilst admitting equally that it may not - depending on the vicissitudes of prevailing opinion is the fundamental axiom upon which liberty is built. To demand that anyone cease from voicing their opposition or from trying to enact change is nothing less than tyranny.
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