Yet There Is Method In It

I encountered a blog posting about the “myth” of the underdog against scientific dogma.

We love stories like this; in our culture we love the underdog, who sticks to his or her guns, in spite of heavy opposition. In this narrative, we have heroes, villains, and a famous, brilliant scientist proven wrong.

I’m sure you could pick out instances in science history where this story is true, but more often it is not. You wouldn’t know this from the pages of our major news media though; in fact you’d probably get the impression that the underdog narrative is the way science works. Michael White

Not to say that it never happens. The first example of an underdog that occurs to me is John Harrison and his solution to the longitude measurement problem. Interesting though.

In related news, Monsignor Gianfranco Girotti was quoted by the newspaper L’Osservatore Romano suggesting seven new and updated deadly sins. I have only seen the list of sins and not any iterpretation, which would be probably more revealing… But this list was:

• Environmental pollution
• Genetic manipulation
• Accumulating excessive wealth
• Inflicting poverty
• Drug trafficking and consumption
• Morally debatable experiments
• Violation of fundamental rights of human nature

I mention this because aspects of science appears at least twice. I will just make a few comments on exceptions and contradictions in these guidelines.

Environmental pollution: I hope they don’t mean all environmental pollution as that would be rather – - fatal. For thousands of years we have been using fire, and later power stations to cook and heat our homes. This all releases CO2 which, in a naive reading, would be sinful. We may excuse this one of they mean excessive pollution – but who defines excessive? (Technically breathing releases CO2 – do we have to stop breathing?)

Genetic manipulation: This one falls into the same trap as environmental pollution – selective breeding is arguably a form of genetic manipulation. Presumably cats, dogs, cows, etc have morally acceptable origins. If we want to assume unawareness of genetics excepted these activities, we might ask could creation of new domestic species using genetics be moral? Why are the methods of selective breeding and genetic modification treated differently when they both lead to the same outcome?

Drug trafficking and consumption I assume they do not mean all drugs – since wine is used in Catholic ceremonies. What drugs do they mean? Illegal drugs? Slight problem: different countries have different laws and also laws change.

Morally debatable experiments A few possibilities -
Hwang Woo Suk faking his results (this probably breaks one of the ten commandments but not of the original deadly sins)
various governments and companies experimenting on unwilling or unwitting human subjects.
animal vivisection is objectionable to some people.
experiments involving pregnancy or death – I expect this is the churches primary concern.

I don’t have an automatic objection to this point except perhaps its vagueness.

Anti Citizen One

PS I am just off to finish my genetic/psychotropic drug/massively polluting mad science project that is going to make me a ton of money….

Some of our recent dialogs have concerned how and to what extent religious ‘involvement’ in politics is appropriate (if at all). Both of us agree that as a libertarian ideal everyone has a free voice and ‘right’ to participate in the democratic process – even if their opinions are objectionable. I have tended to argue at times that institutions as collective lobby groups also have the right to participate, thus something like the ‘Church’ can be seen in a similar light to a political party. But problems arise from this point of view. At what stage does ‘involvement’ i.e. advancing a ‘right to life’ thesis become ‘interference’ i.e. seeking to criminalize an activity by enforcing one moral view upon others.

In this light ethicist Charles Curran once promoted a strategy to guide various religious groupings towards an ethical and pluralist participation within democracy – that entitles them to voice their opinions without enforcing them. It is worth noting he wrote at length in the context of this in the U.S. where religion and politics are closely entwined – but I think his framework is applicable everywhere.

First of all there are three protagonists to consider. The Church as an institution, religious interest groups, and the individual person. Clearly the way each protagonist speaks and influences politics is very different. Anyway these are thr four principles that Curran outlines as the most important ways for religious opinions to be presented to society.

1) Metanoia – Change of Heart. If any social and political change is ever to be possible on any issue then of fundamental concern is personalism. A change of heart in the individual must precede meaningful social change. So a meaningful dialogue needs to be established with the individual. This of course is a two way street, engage in a case-by-case study of the issues, learn from those whose opinion or approach to an issue differs, respect disagreements or alternative views. Most importantly of all recognise the ethical inadequacy of universal objective prescriptive rules or descriptive analysis.

2) Education. By itself education is inadequate – for social problems as percieved by one persepctive as such go deeper than mere ignorance of the issues. But as part of a wider strategy education can be useful.

3) Compassionate action for those who are victims. In order to precipitate greater social change it is never enough to simply talk, religious people as an institution, an interest group or as individuals need to act upon their principles both to demonstrate the valdity of their approach but also to establish it as a viable alternative. Thus for example in the U.S. charitable hospitals that require no medical insurance as condition of treatment. Or in the UK the Cardinal Winning Pro-life initiative that offers material and spiritual support through crisis pregnancies and after birth, making pro-life pro-choice as well by making the choice a viable option (without judging those who eventually opt for abortion).

4) Institutional action. Aside from practising what they preach religious groups if they want to change social attitudes on an issue need to be involved in the political process. The best way to do this isnt by objective rule making or critical analysis (preaching) but by advocating for those without advocates. Being a “voice” for those without a mouthpiece.

As a holistic approach all of this should seem reasonable even to the non-religious. It is simply an ethical way to engage with society and promote social change. Although people may disagree with the ‘message’ they should hopefully agree with the liberty to promote a plurality of values.  But what about specific legislation – should a religious group openly support or promote a law on any given issue – when in practise legislation enforces a singular rather than a plural view?

Curran underlines the difficulty involved in this. Specific issues (about which legislation is usually directed) entertain such a vast number of variable factors that without broad knowledge of all the relevant data it is impossible to know with any certitude what is the appropriate response. Consider abortion, if it were criminalized would it be ethical? Women would still suffer crisis pregnancies but appropriate medical assistance would be forced underground. Poor healthcare would then be an issue, as would the unscrupulous taking advantage of the vulnerable and desperate. Clearly backstreet abortions are undesirable and no matter how much society may change in their attitudes to life-rights there will always be a demand.

So the first principle Curran advocates is the gathering of all the facts. So promoting a religious point of view in a political context requires that the point of view be supported by as much ‘objective’ interdisciplinary data as possible.

Secondly there must be an explicit admission that even with a broad knowledge base on complex ethical issues (in which every situation and every circumstance may vary) absolute certitude and the elimination of error cannot be realistically attained. There is an exception to every rule.

Thirdly is the issue of representation. A religious institution may wield greater collective influence in the political arena than an individual acitivist, but are they ever justified in definitavely speaking as a single entity? There will be those individuals within the institution who dissent – surely they should be entitled to do so and to act as their conscience dictates without fear of reprisal? But equally problematic if an institution maintains silence does this not acquiesce in the status quo?

Again Curran emphasizes that these three principles are combined. A religious institution may be ethically justified in becoming politically active but they must be in possession of all the relevant facts, must acknowledge that no rule can be absolute and that dissent from their point of view is to be expected.

Therefore he says that political involvement should be on different levels. The individual should be as active as they wish. Smaller groups should be engaged in political activism (the Civil Rights movement in America) but institutions should speak out rarely and only on matters of great import. and in a context where they can make a meaningful and constructive contribution to public welfare.

Thus he says the institution should speak out only if it can propose a law that would be equitable (of benefit to all), enforceable and open and malleable to alternative views in a pluralistic society. Thus using the example of abortion he states that any religious involvement in abortion law must provide for all people in all circumstances thus not putting any undue burden on those members of society who are less affluent. It must be enforceable morally and politically – thusthe spectre of illegal back street abortions should provide sufficient reason not to propose a blanket ban. And finally it must be admitted that not everybody within society accepts the idea that abortion is the killing of a human being.

Therefore Curran concludes that on most complex ethical issues a religious institution should clamour for either a moderate law respectful of pluralistic opinions and varying circumstances or for no law at all.  Whilst simultaneously working towards promoting their underlying values i.e. respect for life, and providing viable alternatives for ‘victims’ to choose from i.e. if abortion is required for largely economic reasons provide long-term meaningful economic support.

Finally there obviously must be a balance between providing an ethical discourse to society – being an advocate for the vulnerable and oppressed (speaking out against racism, genocide, torture, war, abortion, euthanasia and so on) – and broadly acceptable legislative action that benefits the common good (free healthcare, racial integration etc.)

I’m guessing the previous post to be in part a response to my thoughts on the current bioethics debates. And alas I feel myself being drawn into a debate that normally I would prefer to keep at the office or within the academic environment. Anyway I will try to respond to some of your points.

You describe the Pope’s writings as betraying “Arbitrary Reasoning” – well besides the obvious arbitrariness of the accusation you are entitled to your opinion. Certainly if one were to read his works in isolation or out of order then his reasoning probably could seem arbitrary. On the other hand if you read his works from the 60′s onwards (a gargantuan task) you would probably get a feeling for the reasoned consistency of his arguments (though by no means should this deter you from your disagreements).

You criticise his view for being speciesist and this topic has been written on at some length, so I will move over that one. Other than to say that he could be regarded as necessarily speciesist – consistent with the anthropic thrust of Christian philosophy – as opposed to being arbitrarily so.

You dislike the appeal to tradition and again there is little more I can say on this matter other than it is a self-justifying position for the office he holds as the successor to Peter. Appeals to tradition are tautologically a traditional way of building arguments in philosophy. It can become a logical fallacy if the tradition that is being appealed to is given unquestionable authority. But a simple overview of pontifical literature shows that unbending adherence to tradition is not the modus operandi, for example in the days of St Thomas Aquinas “life” was assumed to begin some days after conception and at variable times for boys and girls. Now, informed by medical science this view has been rejected and a life begins at conception theory has been adopted. Before I explain this a little further, just one cautionary note your opposition to the appeal to tradition (without qualification) has a similarity to the fallacy of the appeal to novelty.

It seems that you also oppose the assumption to a universal right to life. Now we have discussed the idea of natural rights before and satisfactorily concluded that the notion is ridiculous. But is this what he is arguing for? In the snippet of text you quoted he talks about unconditional respect this is appeal to cultivating a respectful attitude not an appeal to natural rights.

Biomedical ethics has engaged in an important debate concerning “life” and its “beginnings”. Personally I adhere to a theory that is called “longitudinal form.”

From conception through conceptus, blastocyst, embryo, fetus all the way to birth there are no singular definable and isolatable boundaries of transition. One could take pictures of the developmental stages and label them as seperate stages of being – but this is an artificial seperation for these stages in action or process are inseperable and belong to a single continuity of cell division and growth. One could talk about the first beat of the heart, the first signs of mental life, the development of the nervous system or even birth as “the beginning of life” but these are parts of an organic continuum.

This longitudinal view of life is generally adopted post-natal by all of us. Although we differentiate between tot, child, teen, young adult, middle-age and the elderly there are no objective or singularly definable moments that one can point to and declare with any certainty that there was a particular moment of transition.

Similarly so then by extension even birth is a process rather than a straightforward before/after event. The child in the womb in the days preceding birth is virtually indistinguishable from the child immediately post-birth – generally we talk about viability at this stage. But as medical care for premature babies improves yet more boundaries in viability are smashed and it is not uncommon to hear of 26 week old survivors. But being “born” and taking one’s first breath of air by ones self (or being capable of doing so) is not the deciding factor (usually) in discerning whether the child is “alive”, “vital” or “viable”. It is important, but not singularly so.

We can understand various moments of embryonic development by taking them in isolation and comparing them with other stages – but these stages are not independent of each other and only become totally meaningful when considered as part of an organic process. Thus it is possible to talk about life or the process of growing-life beginning at conception without having recourse to notions of the soul or the direct action of a divinity.

Now than having rejected ‘natural rights’ we still acknowledge artifical or assumed rights. The difference in view is that natural rights are somehow inherent whereas the other type of right is in the gift of human discourse. This latter is a fairly democratic way of operating. By consensus most of us wish to avoid being murdered thus a social taboo has arisen around the act of murder. Similarly the vast majority of us engage in a primitive form of social contract by choosing not to murder each other – quite often on the selfish context that if I dont kill you hopefully you will extend the same courtesy to me!

But what qualifications does one require in order to be eligible for certain rights? Obviously I cannot extend the right to life to a dead body, nor the right to vote in free elections to an embryo. Clearly there are circumstances where we consider one or other of our species invalid to certain rights.

What then about the right to life? Well generally we extend the gift of this right to all living people, exceptions are made in some societies for capital crimes where the right to life is supposed to have been negated by criminal action. Similarly some cultures have begun to diminish the primary status this right usually enjoys by defining it as in competition with the right to die, or more pertinantly the right to choose the means and time of ones death. But even in this case the right hasn’t been completely abrogated, rather a realism has descended upon certain ethical views, a realism that rights are in the gift of society and are not endowed by a supernatural power or inherent in our natures. And of course even the right to die is qualified on the grounds of voluntary decision making, such a right is gifted to those who are autonomous and capable of making an informed and consensual decision. Unique cases exist such as permanent coma’s and brain death (or persistant vegitative states) but thats a seperate issue.

So what about the unborn child, are they qualified to recieve the gift of rights? This is the crux of the debate. There are those who use the language and imagery of parasitical life to negate the qualification of the unborn child to recieve rights so long as they are dependent upon the host (mother). But what about the child who has just been born? Although breathing and living independently, they are still vulnerable and incapable of sustaining their own fragile lives, in other words they depend on the kindness of others. Consequently infanticide has become an extraodinary social taboo, particularly if the motivation for murder is selfish and not the result of some unfortunate psychological illness. What difference in moral ‘status’ then is there between the child who has just been born and who is dependent on their mother/carer, and the child in the womb who is viable? And as longitudinal form asks, what difference then in moral status is there between a full-term but as yet unborn child and one that is yet to have become fully developed?

The argument then proceeds that rather like the artificial nature of viewing the stages of developmental growth independent of the whole process from conception (to death), so too certain divisions in moral status and eligibility to the right of life are artificial too.

If we understand that the right to life is a gift, and we choose to remove that right from the unborn child, then if we are to be consistent and not ageist or hypocrital then we must concede that the same right to life may be removed from any one uf us at any time if society (in whose gift the right belongs) defines us as somehow ineligble.

And if society can define the unborn child, the elderly or disabled as being ineligble candidates for the right to life, then what is to prevent society from deciding arbitrarily that our eligibility to that right can be questioned on the grounds of race, gender, sexuality, religion, profession, political opinion etc.

And this is not just the apocalyptic ravings of a hypothetical slippery slope argument – one need only look to recent history to observe governments assuming the power to gift rights and to take them away. We all know (hopefully) of the Holocaust, but let us remember also the Killing Fields of the Khmer Rouge who decided that amongst others those who wore spectacles were enemies of the state and ineligible to posess the same rights as anyone else simply because eye spectacles were considered a sign of education.

You also ask about the “natural time” of death when nowadays that time may be elongated or shortened by medical intervention. This is an important question, but surely the concept is analytical and self-defining, the natural time of death is that which occurs without direct medical intervention. Although you dont say as much your begging of the question seems to imply that because medical science can elongate our lives we ought to make use of their services. Why should this be so? It is known in medicine and medical ethics as “vitalism” the attitude that one must avoid death at all costs. The individual is not compelled to take advantage of the medical services available to them, indeed it is one of the fundamental tenets of medicine that they should seek to help those who come to them for assistance.

One could also define the “natural time” of death as being that which occurs without “extraordinary” medical intervention (and this is indeed the position of the Catholic Church). The question one should ask then is what is “extraordinary” and what reasons does an individual have to want to sustain their life artifically beyond its self-sufficient viability?

You’re second major objection is concerning the “annoyance” of religious groups imposing their view on society with regards ethics (for example abortion). I hate to say it but this just seems to confirm your abhorrence to all things religious and highlights the fragile relationship many people have to the idea of ‘free-speech’.

If there was a situation where roving bands of Catholic militiamen were arresting pregnant women and imprisoning them until they went full-term in order to prevent an abortion, then I may accept that they were imposing their views on society. But this isn’t happening and nobody is suggesting that it should. Those instances (more prevalent in America) where acts of violence are perpetrated against those who facilitate abortion are not acting in religious interests, no matter how badly they protest that they are or how much those who hate religion may try to smear them. It is a sad reality that there are those who allow their personal prejudice to cloud their judgement and who voicably use religious belief as a justification for wholly non-religious means. These people are hypocrites and should be judged as such. In much the same way that we would judge and condemn all forms of hypocrisy in all walks of life.

Now you may argue that anti-abortion lobby groups who would desire a change in the law whether it be greater restrictions or complete illegalization are, albeit through non-violent means, trying to impose their morality upon society as a whole. While this is true to an extent if you genuinely are arguing that this “annoyance” is wrong, anti-social or somehow contrary to your libertarian ethic, then you are painfully naive and certainly not a libertarian in any sense of the word.

How else was abortion legalized in the first place, without the lobbying of a pro-abortion interest group, to legalise the practise on the grounds of free-choice and medical safety? Was this not the imposition of one viewpoint onto the rest of society? Is this not what all human laws are? Is this not what democratic governance is about?

You ask “Isn’t it enough for them to live virtuously (by their own standard) and well away from politics?”

I assume by this you are suggesting that a religious point of view has no place being involved in political debate. If so I can think of no greater assault on the libertarian ideals of free-speech and freedom of conscience that John Stuart-Mill wrote about in chapter 2 of his work On Liberty on the liberty of thought and discussion.

Surely your request that the “annoying” religiously minded people who oppose abortion for example (although I know plenty of atheist pro-lifers also which further highlights the tyranny of your proposition) could be inversely applied to yourself and the ‘non-believers’? Isn’t it enough for you to live virtously by your own standard and stay well away from politics?

If we maintain a system of democratic governance that permits the participation of the people within the organon of power – a system that has the authority to rule over everybody – what ‘right’ have you to deny the freedom to voice an opposing view on any given matter of legislation?

Lets forget abortion, religious belief and non-belief for a moment and apply your maxims to another issue altogether. I oppose the hunting of foxes with hounds, I consider it abominably cruel and unfair and an activity more about sport than pest control. I detest those who support hunting and who consider it to be making a sport out of a “necessary” pest-control activity. But they are entitled to their different point of view and they are entitled – no matter how “annoying” they are and no matter how unlikely it is that I will ever change my mind on the issue – to voice their opinions and to seek a change in legislation.

And so to the final point, in a participatory democracy, that it is alleged we belong to, we can never have any justification in attempting to silence the views of others no matter how objectionable they may seem, when the desired outcome of our participatory democracy is to enact laws that govern us all.

If the law applies to us all – then the oppurtunity to oppose that law must apply to us all. Therefore in the case of abortion, if one group opposes it, on the grounds that it is a violation of the unborn childs right to life (a right that they consider to be either inherent or in the gift of society) then this view may be validly expressed as equally as those who believe that the right to choice overrides the rights claims of an unborn child.

To oppose a law (any law) and to hope that someday it may be changed whilst admitting equally that it may not – depending on the vicissitudes of prevailing opinion is the fundamental axiom upon which liberty is built. To demand that anyone cease from voicing their opposition or from trying to enact change is nothing less than tyranny.

The subject of teaching Britishness in schools has taken a fresh twist with claims that patriotism should be taught as a “controversial issue”. BBC

AC1

The Pope recently voiced concerns on certain areas of biotechnological research.

As people grapple with the moral questions that arise from the advances in the bio-medical field, the Holy Father offered two “fundamental criteria for moral discernment.” The criteria are: “unconditional respect for the human being as a person, from conception to natural death; and respect for the origin of the transmission of human life through the acts of the spouses”. Pope Benedict XVI

I find it hard to dissect many of the Popes statements due to their arbitrary reasoning. However, I find them speciesist, an appeal to tradition and assuming universal natural right to life is workable.

Also I find the idea of a “natural” time of death curious when we often artificially extend and sometimes shorten lives using medicine. Who can say when is the natural time of death?

Another annoyance are religious groups that want to impose their views, for example on abortion on non-believers. Isn’t it enough for them to live virtuously (by their own standard) and well away from politics?

Perhaps they should listen to this observation made back in the 1830s:

‘In France’, he [Alexis de Tocqueville] said, ‘I had almost always seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom marching in opposite directions’, but in America they walked hand in hand.

[... American] religious leaders were careful never to get involved with party politics. They knew that politics is of its essence divisive. And if religion got too involved with politics, it too would become divisive. Dr Jonathan Sacks

For “big” governments, we still need to make value judgments so religion and the state cannot easily be separated. Who should have the final say in contentious issues? Another option is to have “small” government, for example libertarianism.

Back to bio-ethics, we may want to debate the possibility of artificial human same-sex reproduction. The New Scientist has an interesting article on that possibility (subscription required – sorry).

Science seems to broaden human possibilities. Perhaps the larger issue is if someone gave us near infinite power, what is morality? “But pray tell me, my brethren, if the goal of humanity be still lacking, is there not also still lacking–humanity itself?”

Anti Citizen One

This week a debate took place in the House of Lords concerning the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill. Being debated at this particular stage was an amendment by Baroness Masham to eliminate disability as a reasonable grounds for abortion. Baroness Meacher spoke out against the amendment citing the case of two children she knows with cerebral palsy, she concluded that “It would be in their best interests to have been aborted.”

Baroness Tonge, who is known for her advocacy of Voluntary Euthanasia spoke out in slightly different terms against the amdendment. Aware it would seem that to talk of killing the disabled is not politically sound, she attempted to redefine the term (albeit it a manner that sounded eerily familiar to any student of 20th century history).

“… we were not talking here about disabled human beings, but about some grossly abnormal human beings; many of those whom I have seen bear little resemblance to human beings.”

Now I dont think it prudent to get into an elongated debate on this blog concerning abortion or euthanasia, as they are issues fraught with difficulty and constantly loaded with emotional bias. And although I personally oppose both I am aware that this confirms primarily my own philosophy concerning what makes somebody a “human” being, and what sort of dignity, respect or rights ought to be attached to that being.

But the phraeseology and tone in which some of the politicians have spoken is worrisome to me. I am reminded of the words of Cardinal Von Galen at this time, a remarkable man who publicly spoke out against Nazism, particularly their euthanasia and anti-jewish pogroms. He was such a high profile figure within Germany that his dissent was never silenced and the worst sanction he suffered was house arrest from 1941 onwards. On the issue of what makes a “human” being, and what sort of respect or dignity we should attach to them he said:

“If it is once accepted that people have the right to kill ‘unproductive’ fellow humans–and even if initially it only affects the poor defenseless mentally ill – then as a matter of principle murder is permitted for all unproductive people, in other words for the incurably sick, the people who have become invalids through labor and war, for us all when we become old, frail and therefore unproductive.

Then, it is only necessary for some secret edict to order that the method developed for the mentally ill should be extended to other ‘unproductive’ people, that it should be applied to those suffering from incurable lung disease, to the elderly who are frail or invalids, to the severely disabled soldiers. Then none of our lives will be safe any more. Some commission can put us on the list of the ‘unproductive,’ who in their opinion have become worthless life. And no police force will protect us and no court will investigate our murder and give the murderer the punishment he deserves.

Who will be able to trust his doctor any more?”

Chilling words, and appropriate for us still.

I found references to a “Fascinating (and long: 117-page) paper on ethical implications of robots in war.”

Hollywood often portray robotic soldiers as being very unreliable – but is that any worse than the humans currently in war zones?

Anti Citizen One

Just a quick and not too serious observation on the song “A Boy Named Sue” by Johnny Cash. The protagonist, Sue, is victimized because of his name and and he swears to get revenge on this father – this is slave morality.

He does track down his father, fights – wins – and has his father at gun point. His father tells him:

“Son, this world is rough
And if a man’s gonna make it, he’s gotta be tough
…
And it’s the name that helped to make you strong.
…
But ya ought to thank me, before I die,
For the gravel in ya guts and the spit in ya eye
Cause I’m the son-of-a-bitch that named you “Sue.’

Essentially the father argues that Sue’s identity is not simply not the “good” and “bad” parts but the totality has to be considered. Without Sue’s tough life, Sue would not have surpassed his father at all. Victimhood as a label (self applied or assigned) is subjective. People can choose to view things in any way they choose – that can be in a positive (master morality) or negative light (seeing yourself as victim). (“From the Military School of Life – Whatever does not kill me makes me stronger.” FN)

It also illustrates the usefulness of enemies. Without challenges in life, we might would be forced to remain sedentary. Without some opposition and risk in life, life would be pointless. We should not seek to eliminate enemies because that would be unnecessary – we can benefit from them (but not through their intent, obviously). Would G W Bush still be in power without terrorist enemies? They certainly benefited someone.

If Sue was not called Sue or If Sue killed his father, it would have rejected this idea completely. And it would not have been a cool song!

“Happiness is the exercise of vital powers, along lines of excellence, in a life affording them scope.” (The Greek Way, 1964) – although will to “happiness” is perhaps misleading. There is sometime broader than happiness that we strive for?

Anti Citizen One

After the arrest of Salvatore Lo Piccolo, allegedly of the Sicilian Mafia, the following list of commandments were discovered:

1. No-one can present himself directly to another of our friends. There must be a third person to do it.
2. Never look at the wives of friends.
3. Never be seen with cops.
4. Don’t go to pubs and clubs.
5. Always being available for Cosa Nostra is a duty – even if your wife’s about to give birth.
6. Appointments must absolutely be respected.
7. Wives must be treated with respect.
8. When asked for any information, the answer must be the truth.
9. Money cannot be appropriated if it belongs to others or to other families.
10. People who can’t be part of Cosa Nostra: anyone who has a close relative in the police, anyone with a two-timing relative in the family, anyone who behaves badly and doesn’t hold to moral values.

The best one is the last line: you can’t be part of the Mafia if you are immoral. The point is that they are putting forward a system of morals that they are capable of following and holding it up as an example of “morality”. Almost everyone else would not be able to follow their moral code. Conclusion: just because people going around calling things “good” does not mean anything more than “I approve of you”.

Anti Citizen One

Darwin considered the implications of his theory for human development in his works The Descent of Man (1871) and The Expression of the Emotions (1872). Following the observations made from a lifetimes work he suggested that human mental ability and social behaviour could be shown to have the same sort of historical development as the human body. The term that has been given to this expression of his theories is ‘Social Darwinism.’

In the same way that Laplace considered the philosophical implications of the Newtonian model of the universe, so Herbert Spencer developed social theories based upon Darwinism. It was Herbert Spencer who coined the phrase “survival of the fittest” to describe the application of the theory of natural selection to ethical and social questions. His theories were extremely controversial, and they went beyond anything that Darwin himself would have suggested. He was opposed by many and in particular by T. H.Huxley, one of Darwin’s most vocal supporters.

Spencer believed that the implication of natural selection was that human society should follow the struggle for survival in nature. For example, those who were not strong enough to live should be allowed to die. Whatever makes the totality of life greater is good, but whatever diminishes life is inherently bad. He believed that the Poor Laws, which made provision for the destitute, and state education, were bad, as they benefited only those who were incapable of taking care and bettering themselves.

The survival of the fittest morality have arguably been one of the most destructive ideological forces of the modern age. But, in defence of Darwin and the theories of natural selection, we must remember that it is totally concerned with offering an account of the process of evolution (what it is supposed did in fact happen), and not a social commentary (what it is supposed ought to happen).

In fact Spencer’s whole ethical viewpoint is guilty of the naturalistic fallacy, as G.E.Moore points out; Spencer attempts to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.

Likewise Professor Steve Jones comments, “Evolution is to the social sciences as statues are to birds; a convenient platform upon which to deposit badly-digested ideas…There might be inborn drives for rape or for greed, but Homo sapiens, uniquely, need not defer to them.”

 It would appear then that Darwin’s evolutionary view of the origin of the moral sense, in fact, holds no quarrel with a theistic viewpoint. There is something about human behaviour and ethical actions, which seem to suggest either a unique quality, or a heightened one, at the least. Social Darwinism in truth has little or nothing to do with Darwinian evolutionary theory, as it was originally intended. One is a scientific commentary upon the evolution of the species, whereas the other is a social commentary that has little basis in science.

Finally could it be said that Darwin’s theory of the origin of the moral sense, essentially moral subjectivism, is irreconcilable to the objectivity of a theistic account of morality? I would suggest not; we identify the moral value of an act by virtue of some form of natural property. The moral subjectivist, like Darwin, would identify these natural properties as being reflective of personal feelings of approval or revulsion. We can know that certain acts with certain ‘natural properties’ are wrong because of the feelings that they cause within us.

For the atheist and those who posit that God is not the basis of ethics, this argument removes the role that the theists claim God plays in the moral life. But the theist can respond to this by attributing our moral psychology, those feelings of revulsion or acceptance, as being part of a natural make up intended (dare I say designed) by God. Although this is not a conclusive position, it does suggest that theism and moral subjectivism are not irreversibly contradictory positions.