Yet There Is Method In It

The subject of teaching Britishness in schools has taken a fresh twist with claims that patriotism should be taught as a “controversial issue”. BBC

AC1

The Pope recently voiced concerns on certain areas of biotechnological research.

As people grapple with the moral questions that arise from the advances in the bio-medical field, the Holy Father offered two “fundamental criteria for moral discernment.” The criteria are: “unconditional respect for the human being as a person, from conception to natural death; and respect for the origin of the transmission of human life through the acts of the spouses”. Pope Benedict XVI

I find it hard to dissect many of the Popes statements due to their arbitrary reasoning. However, I find them speciesist, an appeal to tradition and assuming universal natural right to life is workable.

Also I find the idea of a “natural” time of death curious when we often artificially extend and sometimes shorten lives using medicine. Who can say when is the natural time of death?

Another annoyance are religious groups that want to impose their views, for example on abortion on non-believers. Isn’t it enough for them to live virtuously (by their own standard) and well away from politics?

Perhaps they should listen to this observation made back in the 1830s:

‘In France’, he [Alexis de Tocqueville] said, ‘I had almost always seen the spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom marching in opposite directions’, but in America they walked hand in hand.

[... American] religious leaders were careful never to get involved with party politics. They knew that politics is of its essence divisive. And if religion got too involved with politics, it too would become divisive. Dr Jonathan Sacks

For “big” governments, we still need to make value judgments so religion and the state cannot easily be separated. Who should have the final say in contentious issues? Another option is to have “small” government, for example libertarianism.

Back to bio-ethics, we may want to debate the possibility of artificial human same-sex reproduction. The New Scientist has an interesting article on that possibility (subscription required – sorry).

Science seems to broaden human possibilities. Perhaps the larger issue is if someone gave us near infinite power, what is morality? “But pray tell me, my brethren, if the goal of humanity be still lacking, is there not also still lacking–humanity itself?”

Anti Citizen One

This week a debate took place in the House of Lords concerning the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill. Being debated at this particular stage was an amendment by Baroness Masham to eliminate disability as a reasonable grounds for abortion. Baroness Meacher spoke out against the amendment citing the case of two children she knows with cerebral palsy, she concluded that “It would be in their best interests to have been aborted.”

Baroness Tonge, who is known for her advocacy of Voluntary Euthanasia spoke out in slightly different terms against the amdendment. Aware it would seem that to talk of killing the disabled is not politically sound, she attempted to redefine the term (albeit it a manner that sounded eerily familiar to any student of 20th century history).

“… we were not talking here about disabled human beings, but about some grossly abnormal human beings; many of those whom I have seen bear little resemblance to human beings.”

Now I dont think it prudent to get into an elongated debate on this blog concerning abortion or euthanasia, as they are issues fraught with difficulty and constantly loaded with emotional bias. And although I personally oppose both I am aware that this confirms primarily my own philosophy concerning what makes somebody a “human” being, and what sort of dignity, respect or rights ought to be attached to that being.

But the phraeseology and tone in which some of the politicians have spoken is worrisome to me. I am reminded of the words of Cardinal Von Galen at this time, a remarkable man who publicly spoke out against Nazism, particularly their euthanasia and anti-jewish pogroms. He was such a high profile figure within Germany that his dissent was never silenced and the worst sanction he suffered was house arrest from 1941 onwards. On the issue of what makes a “human” being, and what sort of respect or dignity we should attach to them he said:

“If it is once accepted that people have the right to kill ‘unproductive’ fellow humans–and even if initially it only affects the poor defenseless mentally ill – then as a matter of principle murder is permitted for all unproductive people, in other words for the incurably sick, the people who have become invalids through labor and war, for us all when we become old, frail and therefore unproductive.

Then, it is only necessary for some secret edict to order that the method developed for the mentally ill should be extended to other ‘unproductive’ people, that it should be applied to those suffering from incurable lung disease, to the elderly who are frail or invalids, to the severely disabled soldiers. Then none of our lives will be safe any more. Some commission can put us on the list of the ‘unproductive,’ who in their opinion have become worthless life. And no police force will protect us and no court will investigate our murder and give the murderer the punishment he deserves.

Who will be able to trust his doctor any more?”

Chilling words, and appropriate for us still.

I found references to a “Fascinating (and long: 117-page) paper on ethical implications of robots in war.”

Hollywood often portray robotic soldiers as being very unreliable – but is that any worse than the humans currently in war zones?

Anti Citizen One

Just a quick and not too serious observation on the song “A Boy Named Sue” by Johnny Cash. The protagonist, Sue, is victimized because of his name and and he swears to get revenge on this father – this is slave morality.

He does track down his father, fights – wins – and has his father at gun point. His father tells him:

“Son, this world is rough
And if a man’s gonna make it, he’s gotta be tough
…
And it’s the name that helped to make you strong.
…
But ya ought to thank me, before I die,
For the gravel in ya guts and the spit in ya eye
Cause I’m the son-of-a-bitch that named you “Sue.’

Essentially the father argues that Sue’s identity is not simply not the “good” and “bad” parts but the totality has to be considered. Without Sue’s tough life, Sue would not have surpassed his father at all. Victimhood as a label (self applied or assigned) is subjective. People can choose to view things in any way they choose – that can be in a positive (master morality) or negative light (seeing yourself as victim). (“From the Military School of Life – Whatever does not kill me makes me stronger.” FN)

It also illustrates the usefulness of enemies. Without challenges in life, we might would be forced to remain sedentary. Without some opposition and risk in life, life would be pointless. We should not seek to eliminate enemies because that would be unnecessary – we can benefit from them (but not through their intent, obviously). Would G W Bush still be in power without terrorist enemies? They certainly benefited someone.

If Sue was not called Sue or If Sue killed his father, it would have rejected this idea completely. And it would not have been a cool song!

“Happiness is the exercise of vital powers, along lines of excellence, in a life affording them scope.” (The Greek Way, 1964) – although will to “happiness” is perhaps misleading. There is sometime broader than happiness that we strive for?

Anti Citizen One

After the arrest of Salvatore Lo Piccolo, allegedly of the Sicilian Mafia, the following list of commandments were discovered:

1. No-one can present himself directly to another of our friends. There must be a third person to do it.
2. Never look at the wives of friends.
3. Never be seen with cops.
4. Don’t go to pubs and clubs.
5. Always being available for Cosa Nostra is a duty – even if your wife’s about to give birth.
6. Appointments must absolutely be respected.
7. Wives must be treated with respect.
8. When asked for any information, the answer must be the truth.
9. Money cannot be appropriated if it belongs to others or to other families.
10. People who can’t be part of Cosa Nostra: anyone who has a close relative in the police, anyone with a two-timing relative in the family, anyone who behaves badly and doesn’t hold to moral values.

The best one is the last line: you can’t be part of the Mafia if you are immoral. The point is that they are putting forward a system of morals that they are capable of following and holding it up as an example of “morality”. Almost everyone else would not be able to follow their moral code. Conclusion: just because people going around calling things “good” does not mean anything more than “I approve of you”.

Anti Citizen One

Darwin considered the implications of his theory for human development in his works The Descent of Man (1871) and The Expression of the Emotions (1872). Following the observations made from a lifetimes work he suggested that human mental ability and social behaviour could be shown to have the same sort of historical development as the human body. The term that has been given to this expression of his theories is ‘Social Darwinism.’

In the same way that Laplace considered the philosophical implications of the Newtonian model of the universe, so Herbert Spencer developed social theories based upon Darwinism. It was Herbert Spencer who coined the phrase “survival of the fittest” to describe the application of the theory of natural selection to ethical and social questions. His theories were extremely controversial, and they went beyond anything that Darwin himself would have suggested. He was opposed by many and in particular by T. H.Huxley, one of Darwin’s most vocal supporters.

Spencer believed that the implication of natural selection was that human society should follow the struggle for survival in nature. For example, those who were not strong enough to live should be allowed to die. Whatever makes the totality of life greater is good, but whatever diminishes life is inherently bad. He believed that the Poor Laws, which made provision for the destitute, and state education, were bad, as they benefited only those who were incapable of taking care and bettering themselves.

The survival of the fittest morality have arguably been one of the most destructive ideological forces of the modern age. But, in defence of Darwin and the theories of natural selection, we must remember that it is totally concerned with offering an account of the process of evolution (what it is supposed did in fact happen), and not a social commentary (what it is supposed ought to happen).

In fact Spencer’s whole ethical viewpoint is guilty of the naturalistic fallacy, as G.E.Moore points out; Spencer attempts to derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.

Likewise Professor Steve Jones comments, “Evolution is to the social sciences as statues are to birds; a convenient platform upon which to deposit badly-digested ideas…There might be inborn drives for rape or for greed, but Homo sapiens, uniquely, need not defer to them.”

 It would appear then that Darwin’s evolutionary view of the origin of the moral sense, in fact, holds no quarrel with a theistic viewpoint. There is something about human behaviour and ethical actions, which seem to suggest either a unique quality, or a heightened one, at the least. Social Darwinism in truth has little or nothing to do with Darwinian evolutionary theory, as it was originally intended. One is a scientific commentary upon the evolution of the species, whereas the other is a social commentary that has little basis in science.

Finally could it be said that Darwin’s theory of the origin of the moral sense, essentially moral subjectivism, is irreconcilable to the objectivity of a theistic account of morality? I would suggest not; we identify the moral value of an act by virtue of some form of natural property. The moral subjectivist, like Darwin, would identify these natural properties as being reflective of personal feelings of approval or revulsion. We can know that certain acts with certain ‘natural properties’ are wrong because of the feelings that they cause within us.

For the atheist and those who posit that God is not the basis of ethics, this argument removes the role that the theists claim God plays in the moral life. But the theist can respond to this by attributing our moral psychology, those feelings of revulsion or acceptance, as being part of a natural make up intended (dare I say designed) by God. Although this is not a conclusive position, it does suggest that theism and moral subjectivism are not irreversibly contradictory positions.

Darwin believed there was a scientific basis for the morality of man. Morality and the moral sense are attributes that can be found in our species. So in accordance with his evolutionary mechanism Darwin maintains that moral sensibility can be accounted for in much the same way, as can other traits in evolutionary terms; in other words the development of this moral faculty must have good evolutionary reasons.

Darwin and other evolutionary ethicists such as Herbert Spencer, Julian Huxley, G.G.Simpson and C.H.Waddington believed that we had to refer to social biology.

Darwin expounds his position in the Descent of Man where he says; “any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man.”

Having proposed that mans moral capacity developed as a consequence of evolutionary imperatives he then goes on to identify four main areas where the moral capacity originates. The first is the social instincts that drives animals to take pleasure from being in an association with its fellows, thus according it a sympathetic urge that drives them to act for the benefit of those of the same species and association (family unit). The second is the vivid recollection of past action and motives that would come with a higher mental development, and the feeling of dissatisfaction that arises when desires or instincts are unsatisfied. The third essential element in the origin of the moral faculties is the development of language, which Darwin notes allows the ‘community’ to express it’s wishes and to form common opinion on how the public good can best be served. This however is dependent on the sympathetic character, which Darwin calls the foundation stone of the social instinct. Finally individual habit would shape the conduct of each animal, social instinct and sympathy, in common with other instincts, are strengthened by habit. Habit therefore, shaping the sense of obedience to communal wishes and judgements.

Darwin, however, points out that even if these four building blocks of the moral sense were acquired by social animals that attained a near human intellectual level, it would not guarantee an identical moral code, or a common interpretation of rightness or wrongness.

Nevertheless something similar or identical to the conscience would be developed, because animals would find a conflict of instincts, coupled with an uncertainty as to which impulse should be obeyed, and furthermore emotions such as satisfaction and dissatisfaction would be felt when past ‘experiences’ were reflected upon in the mind. This reflective nature would instruct the animal that one course of action would be better to another, that one ought to do one thing and ought not to the other. This faculty of ‘ought’ or ‘ought not’ reflections, Darwin calls “the most noble of all the attributes of men”.

The most important element though in all of the evolutionary account for ethics is the sociability of man and animals, the affection which animals of the same social group hold for each other and even inter-specieal, in the case of the man/dog relationship. Darwin points to the mutual service in the higher animals that warn each other of danger, or the way in which animals preen each other for parasites or thorns. Then of course there is the phenomenon of pack hunting where the group collectively hunt, kill and feed off of the prey; where the animal if left individually may have considerably less success in its hunting capabilities. Darwin identifies these phenomena as a feeling of love that animals hold for others within the same ‘association’, a sympathising in the pains and less so in the pleasures of others, emotions which are “not felt in non-social adult animals”. Examples of this social sympathy are evident in the cases of young, elderly and vulnerable members of the animal association. Other social instincts that can be seen as moral, is the power of self-command, loyalty and obedience.

This all leads us though to the fundamental question of origins, why do many of the higher animal species exhibit these social instincts, and ultimately why is man moral? Of course the feeling of discomfort when parted and comfort whilst together is a suitable suggestion, but Darwin believes there is more; that the development of the moral faculty and the social instinct is necessary for the continued evolvement and survival of the species.

He states that it is more probable that the feelings of comfort and discomfort when in the presence of society or absence from it, were naturally developed in order to induce those animals that would benefit from association and society, to form such groups. This is comparable to the development of the sense of hunger and the feeling of relief from hunger that was first acquired to induce animals into eating. The social instinct further developed through the young remaining with the parents, so that those animals which took greater pleasure in society, benefited by being generally safer from attack, whereas those animals that did not associate with others would “perish in greater numbers”. Darwin therefore states that the social instinct has largely been gained through natural selection.

And so Man can trace his moral urges to natural selection and his evolution from the lower species; for social instincts of mutual love, sympathy, sociability and obedience, are traits held in common with other animals. Furthermore, man’s higher intellect enables him to be guided according to his inherited instincts to act for the social good. Couple this with his instinctive sympathy, and man is caused to value the approbation of his fellow men and is thus influenced in his actions. Darwin marvels at the moral faculty and acclaims the inherited social instincts as giving “the impulse to some of his best actions”. Man’s instinctual love, sympathy and self-command strengthened by habit and by reason, impels man to act according to particular codes of conduct, in such a way that as Darwin quotes Kant, “I will not in my own person violate the dignity of humanity.”

There are three doctrines, which are held (generally) by Christianity, of which the first two are also shared with the other great Monotheistic faiths, Judaism and Islam.
1) God is good. 2) God wills us to do what is good. 3) God is the basis of ethics.

Le Poidevin points out that the first two are not implicit to the idea of a creator, however, the third premise can be used as the basis of the moral argument for the existence of God.

Plato, in his Euthyphro, identified a problem with the acceptance of all three premises; the third doctrine, namely that God is the basis of ethics, makes it difficult for us to understand the other two doctrines. He presents us with the question, “How are we to understand the idea that God wills us to do what is good?”. To which there are two possible answers, either (a) God wills us to do what is good because certain acts are of themselves good, and he wishes them to be performed, or (b) An act is good only because God wills it. As Le Poidevin states, neither of these answers are wholly satisfactory to the theist, for they both raise problems with theistic belief, as we understand it.

If we accept the first answer, that certain acts are good independent of God, and it is their natural goodness that makes God will them, then it follows that moral values are independent of God. Therefore if God did not exist, there would still be moral values, thus the moral argument for the existence of God is scuppered, and the basis for ethics has nothing to do with theism.

If on the other hand we accept the second answer, that an act is good solely by the virtue of God’s willing it, then we are confronted with another problem; namely that “God wills us to do what he wills us to do”. Therefore, returning to the three original doctrines that we considered, it would seem that God’s willing us to do what is good, is contrary, under a metaphysical interpretation, to the concept that God is the basis of ethics. There is also a contradiction between the notion of God being good and being the basis of ethics, for “if ascribing goodness to something just means that God wills it, then the assertion that God is good becomes the curious and morally empty assertion that God wills that he be as he is”

This renders the arguments that God is the basis of ethics, and that morality is a demonstration of God’s existence, as logically incoherent and therefore false. This is the meta-ethical argument for theism, which takes the following formula:
1/ If theism is true then ‘God is good’ is morally significant.

2/ If theism is true then God plays an explanatory role in ethics.

3/ If ‘God is good’ is morally significant, then moral goodness must be Independent of God.

4/ If God plays an explanatory role in ethics, moral goodness cannot be Independent of God.

Therefore the conclusion that theism is false is reached the following way, 1 and 3 considered together, imply 5:

5/ If theism is true then moral goodness must be independent of god.

But also 2 and 4 mutually considered imply 6:

6/ If theism is true then moral goodness cannot be independent of God.

Positions 5 and 6 therefore provide us with the conclusion that, If theism is true then moral goodness both is, and is not, independent of God. A self-contradictory and seemingly false position.

But the Christian or theist response can be found if the third proposition is re-considered, for it is necessary to explore the meaning of the term ‘goodness’. If we look at Plato’s question (“Does God will us to do what is good because, independently of him, it is good, or is it that what is good is so only because he wills it?”) we find that it is assumed that we must choose one premise or the other and not both. Although at first it would appear that we couldn’t accept both positions. If we attempt to define ‘good’ in more than one way, then it is possible that ‘good’ acts can be independent of God’s will, but also that in another sense of the term, ‘good’ acts are good because he wills them. If the theist position can justify this argument, then it is possible that they can escape the meta-ethical argument.

What is needed is to distinguish between two elements in morality, descriptivity and prescriptivity.

Descriptive morality identifies acts that when done, would bring about a particular beneficial consequence. But there can also be an ‘ought’ statement in descriptive morality, which is of its nature conditional, so for example ‘one ought to eat, if one wants to stay alive’. (The ‘ought’ here is Hypothetical). Prescriptive morality, on the other hand, suggests an obligation in our actions, ie. If we wish to achieve x we ‘Must’ do y. Or to put it another way, a prescriptive sense of ‘good’ carries an unconditional ‘ought’: for example, “one ought to stop killing, full stop, and not merely to avoid censure”. In making this distinction and asserting that there are acts, which are prescriptively and unconditionally good, as well as the conditional descriptive acts, we are “assenting to a certain conception of morality”.

So the theistic response to the meta-ethical argument is to say that something can be descriptively good, which is in our best interests and which is independent of God’s will. And at the same time we can say without contradiction that there are those things that are good because God wills it.

The final consideration that the theist needs to make is the concept that ‘God is good’. The meta-ethical argument suggests that either ‘God is good’ is morally insignificant, or moral goodness is independent of God. The approach to this dilemma that Le Poidevin adopts is that when we say ‘God is good’ what we are doing is applying an analogy of God’s goodness to a morally good member of the human race. For example morally good parents would take care of their children, in the same way that God can be said to take care of his creation. But also implied in the statement ‘God is good’ is that unlike humans, God is a source of moral value, his goodness consists of the fact that he is the origin of ethics. If he were the basis of ethics, then we would agree that such a role would not be insignificant, and comparatively, as Le Poidevin suggests, neither is the concept of ‘God is good’.

Therefore the theist can amend the third premise in the meta-ethical argument; so instead of reading:

If ‘God is good’ is morally significant, then moral goodness must be independent of God.

It should instead read:

If ‘God is good’ is morally significant then moral goodness is not independent of God.

This line of argument has often been used as a defence against the implication from Darwin that humans as a species are not unique or that we are created moral beings.

The Monotheistic traditions maintain that the Moral law is given: the Decalogue, the Sermon on the Mount, and the prescriptions of the Quran and Torah. If the moral law is given we can infer the existence of a lawgiver. This concept has given rise to the Moral Argument for the Existence of God. Its logic is similar to that of the divine clockmaker; through the evidence of design we can infer a designer, similarly through the evidence of moral laws and the moral sense, we can infer the existence of a moral lawgiver.

More specifically, through the evidence of man’s altruism, sense of duty, sense of guilt, we can infer the existence of something to which we feel accountable.

Cardinal John Henry Newman proposed this when he spoke of the role that the Conscience plays in the process of ethical decision-making:

“If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear….If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which (the conscientious person’s) perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine.”