Yet There Is Method In It

In a refreshing break from current social norms, various artists at the Free Art Fair have been giving pieces away to members of the public for free. I applaud this because it notes that something is worth while even if it does not have a financial price tag. It also blurs line between professional and amateur - this distinction is often unhelpful when placing value on their work.

The ironic thing about altruistic acts is, if it is truly selfless, then the giver should not expect anything in return. The question that might be posed to a moralist, is if selfless action is the best action, why do we try to give gifts to people in the expectation they will be received? Isn’t receiving an unworthy action compared to altruism? This at least encourages others to act in an “unworthy” fashion.

A close relation is the action of giving (or bestowing) but without the baggage of altruism or even the baggage of expected rewards. (The action is not even its own reward, perhaps.) Perhaps the best is to give as a choice and, if a person is inclined, as necessity.

In other news, I was disturbed but unsurprised to read this:

With so many scientific papers chasing so few pages in the most prestigious journals, the winners could be the ones most likely to oversell themselves—to trumpet dramatic or important results that later turn out to be false. This would produce a distorted picture of scientific knowledge, with less dramatic (but more accurate) results either relegated to obscure journals or left unpublished. The Economist

I notice financial rewards are linked to a researcher’s publication record. Perhaps scientific journals could do with a little more of the bestowing virtue?

Anti Citizen One

PS Interesting news item on economic growth destroying the ecosystem.

I have recently finished reading The God Delusion. I have complicated feeling about the book. On one hand it is well written with interesting anecdotes. On the other hand it does appear to be using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.

The book could perhaps be shorter if this argument was more focused rather than attack every aspect of religion. An example is the argument “because we cannot explain X, god did it.” Dawkins first points out that this is not logically valid but then goes about explaining X with X in this case being complexity of life. This causes Dawkins’s critics to attack evolution but this distraction causes the invalid argument criticism to be forgotten.

The writing style is aimed at a general reader which necessarily involves some simplification of the arguments. I don’t think much is lost in the simplification but it does annoy philosophers. Most of the arguments are taken from Hume, Epicurus, etc so there is nothing new. What Dawkins brings to the debate is to contemporise them. Interestingly, there is very little overlap between Dawkins and Nietzsche although they have similar goals. Nietzsche would have blasted Dawkins’s humanism.

Dawkins has become infamous for his views on the non-existence of God. I feel I should mention the common criticism and note that they are wide of the mark. For those who criticize Dawkins for simply expressing his opinion, this hardly seems compatible with modern (free speech) or biblical (turn the other cheek) ethical standards. Others assume criticism of religion is the same as calling for its eradication. Dawkins does not calls for this in the book. Those that call Dawkins’s position a “religion”, a faith or an indoctrination method are usually committing ad hominem tu quoque. And finally a common criticism against Dawkins is agnosticism causes evil actions. I have not heard any valid causal connection between the two and it is a non sequitur as it stands. I suggest anyone trying to read the book to ignore previous views, either for or against.

He makes a good point on the source of morality in religion and almost taken from the pages of modern philosophy. Most religious people interpret religious texts to find a moral system. The literalists have an untenable position due to inconsistencies in the text. But what do we use to guide interpretation? Dawkins argues this interpretation must necessarily come from outside scripture. This undermines any claim that morality comes from holy books and puts religious morality on the same level as secular morality.

He also cites studies that different cultures have an instinctive grasp of a common morality. Reading between the lines, it is almost like calling for that to be the basis of morality. This reminds me of Hume’s attempt at founding morality on empirical observation. This approach to morality is incomplete since it only addresses morality when everyone is in agreement with moral law. For novel moral questions, our instinct is often silent.

Dawkins has no time for agnosticism. He distinguishes between two types of agnosticism. For the first type (which he calls Permanent Agnosticism in Principle) is a deistic God beyond the reach of evidence. He seems dismissive of this position and treats it as similar to ignosticism (the concept of God is meaningless). It is difficult to fathom Dawkin’s argument on this point. This brand of agnosticism is perhaps a distant relative of a postmodern God (in that the significance of God comes from the believer rather than from an objective source). The second type of agnosticism (Temporary Agnosticism in Practice) treats God as being inside and part of nature (an empirical hypothesis). Dawkins dismisses TAP because, in his view, the empirical evidence implies that there is no God. Before the postmodernists object to this argument, remember that most religious people believe God is very real and capable of physical manifestation. Dawkins’s book explicitly does not address Deism, Pantheonism, Buddhism or any similar world view. His argument is against the mainstream God of Abraham.

The aim of the book takes a controversial stance in today’s “tolerant” society. Dawkins sets out to deconvert believers whose belief is wavering. He recognises that it is impossible to deconvert a firm believer using rational argument and this is not his aim. The second and perhaps more difficult point is he equates religious instruction of children to child abuse. He argues that children never had a chance to make a free and informed decision to belong to religion. Children should therefore be protected from their parents. Liberals should note that an outside agency disrupting a family has a certain precedence; we allow the state to interfere with family affairs. But Dawkins assumes that free choice in belief is possible and I am not sure if that is true! When I child is part of a family, the teaching of some moral system is unavoidable. Independent thought can be encouraged but at some point this is oxymoronic - a young adult is told to have original thought and freedom. To obey this instruction is then not free or original! I find it difficult to imagine a society in which children are protected from the religion of their parents. The alternative is for parents to voluntarily not teach religion until early adulthood. I doubt many religions would agree to that constraint.

A final note: attaching the labels “militant”, “religious” or “fundamentalist” to Dawkins is ad hominem. If an argument is to be made against his religious position, please people, address his argument directly and don’t go after the man. It annoys me when implicit atheists (”the absence of theistic belief without a conscious rejection of it”) are grouped with other variants of atheism. The absence of belief is obviously not a type of religion or fundamentalism.

Anti Citizen One

An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals by David Hume

After reading his work “Concerning Human Understanding”, I was eager to see if Hume had any insight into morality. He previously pointed out the is-ought problem and I did wonder how Hume could overcome this limitation to say anything useful on morality. His primary argument is to avoid the question of the basis of morality and describe everyday morality and how might might have arisen. Hume argues people judge morality based on public utility (utilitarianism as far as I can tell) and sentiment.

Usefulness is agreeable, and engages our approbation. This is a matter of fact, confirmed by daily observation. But, USEFUL? For what? For somebody’s interest, surely. Whose interest then? Not our own only: For our approbation frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the interest of those, who are served by the character or action approved of… (Par 177)

This descriptive ethical approach is partly true but also partly false. To some extent, people held in high regard have provided some service to the public. Typical is the award of titles to those providing public service. But other public figures are rewarded for being a social parasite - this applies to celebrity culture. Also not all people who make moral judgments fit into Hume’s model. One man is called a freedom fighter and also a terrorist. Hume does not seem to address diversity of opinion.

Hume observes the praise given to acts of public benefit, both for their intended outcome and also for their actual outcome.

For a like reason, the tendencies of actions and characters, not their real accidental consequences, are alone regarded in our more determinations or general judgements; though in our real feeling or sentiment, we cannot help paying greater regard to one whose station, joined to virtue, renders him really useful to society [...] In morals too, is not the tree known by the fruit? (Par 185 Footnote)

But any great enterprise requires a degree of risk. It is said “the distance between insanity and genius is measured only by success”. So an unsuccessful pioneer is bad, a successful pioneer is good? It seems so arbitrary - but Hume is attempting to describe how morality works in the majority of people.

This point on the majority of people’s morality is not far from the truth. Epicurus claimed the purpose of life was the pursuit of happiness. Nietzsche also claimed most people made moral judgments by condemning threatening forces (ressentiment).

Hume repeatedly claims his argument is true because it is a “reasonable presumption”. His assumptions and over-generalisations did begin to wear me down. A key example is this:

All men, it is allowed, are equally desirous of happiness; but few are successful in the pursuit… (Par 196)

How can he, of all people, claim that all a group have a particular property without observing them ALL? The statement is also untrue. Many humans seem to want unhappiness by their choices that will tend to bring them pain and misery.

All men are equally liable to pain and disease and sickness; and may again recover health and ease. (Par 200 Footnote 3)

Again, we only have to look around us to see not all men are equally liable to sickness. Someone who is at death’s door cannot be said to be equally liable to recover than someone who merely stubs his toe!

Although Hume resists making statements on what ought to be good and evil, he finally succumbs in the conclusion.

And though the philosophical truth of any proposition by no means depends on its tendency to promote the interests of society; yet a man has but a bad grace, who delivers a theory, however true, which, he must confess, leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious. Why rake into those corners of nature which spread a nuisance all around? Why dig up the pestilence from the pit in which it is buried? (Par 228)

He admits himself that a theory - even a “true” theory - should be disregarded if it is “dangerous and pernicious”! And, even though he denies it on the first line, he implies that a theory is good if it promotes the interests of society…

Oh dear, oh dear, oh dear. But at least Hume is direct in his arguments.

It is trivial to observe that to condemn an act because it is “pernicious”, he is saying either “you should do X because Y is true” (and violate his own is-ought principle) or even the tautological “you should not do X because X is evil (i.e. X is something you should not do)”!

Amusingly, he goes on to say anyone who disagrees with him is obviously a bit weird.

I must confess that, if a man think that this reasoning much requires an answer, it would be a little difficult to find any which will to him appear satisfactory and convincing. If his heart rebel not against such pernicious maxims, if he feel no reluctance to the thoughts of villainy or baseness, he has indeed lost a considerable motive to virtue; and we may expect that this practice will be answerable to his speculation. (Par 233)

He here condemns someone’s disagreement because it is “villainy or baseness” BUT what “villainy” and “baseness” are is currently the subject under discussion!

This book predates existentialism by about a century. I think Hume would have been a great existential philosopher but he did not make the conceptual leap. To that branch of philosophy, this book does not qualify as philosophy at all. I think it is more a work of anthropology since, as a description, it has some merits.

I can think of several more objections but it is almost too depressing for me to attack Hume. I will just leave it to the debunker-king Nietzsche to spell out his objection:

The most general formula on which every religion and morality is founded is: “Do this and that, refrain from this and that — and then you will be happy! And if you don’t…” Every morality, every religion, is based on this imperative; I call it the original sin of reason, the immortal unreason. In my mouth, this formula is changed into its opposite — the first example of my “revaluation of all values.” An admirable human being, a “happy one,” instinctively must perform certain actions and avoid other actions… (Twilight of the Idols)

I needed this as an antidote after that book!

Anti Citizen One

I have been trying to find an interesting angle on the recent law passed by the UK government. I am afraid I have not found anything particularly insightful! Both sides seem to be talking past each other. If I may paraphrase each side:

Religion: we respect human life and we should therefore not experiment on embryos.

Scientists: we should experiment on embryos to advance medicine because we respect human life.

This indicates a difference in their conceptions of “respect”. Without specifying this, saying we have respect from human life is ambiguous. It annoys me that most of the media coverage does not scratch the surface of this issue.

My own opinion has been expressed in my blog post - the Paragon of Animals. To base objects based on divisions between species is, almost by definition, arbitrary and transient (all life forms are our distant cousins and all species have a finite duration of existence).

Anti Citizen One

It probably suprises some readers that a blog on philosophy and politics, that spends a good deal of time discussing ethics and morality (either meta-ethical or applied) should spend so little time discussing possibly the most contentious ethical debate of the 21st century so far (in the UK at least). I refer of course to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill.

Our silence on this matter, other than a comment by me on the issue of rhetoric in ethical debate, and Ac-1’s review of a public debate on genetic modification, is born out of two things. Firstly the acceptance that quite probably we will disagree, and secondly our mutually large workloads at the moment.

Anyway the debate itself now is getting much more heated across the nation, and the press is in overdrive. Today certain papers have a selection of contrasting public opinions on the debate, and from these I have decided to provide a descriptive analysis of the ethical debates taking place around this proposed legislation. As descriptive ethics is an empirical method there will be no value-judgements made as regards whether these proposals are morally right or wrong.

Who Is Right?

First of all obviously this debate has very well defined positions for and against, and indeed the more well-defined (and therefore more deeply entrenched) these viewpoints are, the more contentious and “nasty” the debate tends to be. Both sides then, those who support embyro research and those who do not, define themselves not only with regard to their own beliefs but also with regard to the beliefs of their opponents. Thus an arbitrary act of splitting occurs and the debate becomes one of binary opposites the good versus the bad - only from the panoromic view of the descriptive ethicist (that I am adopting here) these values are empty; for both sides naturally view themselves as being morally good in comparison to their morally deviant opponents.

Some examples from correspondances:

The main contents of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill reveal to us the level of ungodliness to which this nations leaders have sunk.

and alternatively

Religion has always regarded science as its enemy, as the more we learn, the more difficult it is to keep faith.

Thus on the one hand the opponents of the HFE bill are able to define their morally righteous position in contrast to the morally decadant supporters of it. And alternatively one supporter of the bill characterises the views of the opposition as the death throws of outdated superstition. For the opponents of the bill who are religiously motivated the bills supporters are attacking the creation of God (the ultimate error) and are advocating an “unholy gospel” that is becoming an”evil religion in itself” or in other words the fundamental ‘godly’ values that underpin society are being attacked and thus society itself is in collapse. By perfect contrast one supporter of the bill who views all opponents as religious “loonies“, whilst admitting that science is neither perfect nor always succesful suggests it is nonetheless (in comparison to religion) in the vanguard of human progress for “without it mankind will only stagnate.”

First Analytical Conclusion Our first conclusion must be that from their respective positions, the values of the opposite is always incoherent. Thus one is either ungodly (aka evil) or one is superstitious (i.e. stupid). The moral rectitude of the one is only enhanced by the faults of the other. But from our panoramic viewpoint there is a serious problem, who defines Truth and Progress? In comparison to “God’s truth” all human truth seems irrelevant; or in comparison to metaphysical concepts the technological advances and innovations made possible by the natural sciences make all other “Progress” seem inadequate.

Thus already we should observe that there are mutually incompatible value systems in place, a difference as vast as binary form is from decimal.

Types of Argument For

Lets now look at the various types of argument that are being employed by either side - for when we consider the variety of these we should also be able to observe the different language games being employed.

Those who argue for the HFE proposals fall into three categories: the argument from scientific progress, the argument from scientific results, the argument for scientific method.

The argument from scientific progress. This argument is broadly deontological and objective. It argues that science is the best means we have of observing and understanding the material world and that the increase in scientific knowledge is commeansurable with human progress. Ergo if human progress is good, anything that increases scientific knowledge is good. As a result the ethical objections to embryo research (whether on religious grounds or not) are either a) irrelevant considerations altogether (scientific knowledge is always good) or b) of secondary concern (scientific knowledge is neutral it is its applications that may be morally evaluated).

This viewpoint I would suggest is the official scientific view (i.e. that of the professional institutional scientist.)

The argument from scientific results. This type of argument is broadly teoleological and consequentialist and often Personalist. Its first concern is end-results, and may be characterised by the simplistic formula “the ends justify the means.” This does not necessarily imply that “anything goes” but it measures the moral or ethical value of scientific research by its results. Again it is very “progress” orientated (and thus subjective in that respect). But interestingly it is also a type of argument that anticipates a retrospective justification (it is both forward and backward looking). As one correspondent argued:

Science may not always get it right, or produce the results we expect…

but, the implication is, without trying we would not know. The logic of this argument is fairly straightforward, the scientific method identifies a problem (in this case incurable illnesses) it proposes a solution (genetic modification) and establishes research protocols (stem cell research) and lists its requirements (embryos - among other things). Scientific researchers then propose a hypotheses, anticipates results, and justifies its research with expectant hope of success. It is not simply advocating tinkering around with a few embryos to see what happens. It has a specific telos/end in view. In this case the means of curing various thusfar incurable illnesses. (Incidentally when such research suceeds it provides evidence and rhetorical weight to the more objective views concerning the rectitude or primacy of the scientific method).

This sort of argument is also Personalist and in the forum of general debate can also become emotivist. It is important to point out that the actual scientific reasons for conducting this research are not personalist or emotivist (in general- though I would be suprised if this were universally true of all research). Therefore Personalist and Emotivist arguments are often employed by those scientists and non-scientists alike who stand to benefit from the success of the research.

Why should our son be denied a possible cure, remission or alleviatio of the chronic illness that threatens his life…?

and

As someone who could potentially derive great benefit from embryo research, I find it distressing to read that some… are against it.

also

I’m disgusted with those who are opposing further embyro research. Why? If your wife was, like mine, suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, you would think very differently on this matter, as any timy glimmer of hope would be a godly thing.

Although many scientists will point to the possible benefits of research and thus would employ teleological arguments, ordinarily such expectations would be based only on the objective beliefs that a) science is the best way to proceed, and b) that it has a proven track record.

This type of argument though is more strongly found in non-scientific supporters, those who stand to gain from any medical benefits procured by the research.

The argument for scientific method. This argument similar to the first argument is Objective and Deontological in nature, and indeed much like the argument from scientific progress it argues that the scientific method provides the best means for observing and understanding the world, and thus for producing results to encountered problems. But this type of argument can proceed beyond scientific practise into a form of scientism or scientific chauvenism, and can argue that its methods alone are the benchmark by which it should be judged and not alternative standards i.e. morality, religion, pseudoscience etc.

This type of arguing, generally found outside of the proffessional scientist class, has a tendency to focus not on the benefits or merits of its methods, aims, or results, but on the failings or inadequacies of its alternatives. Thus two types of logical fallacy tend to creep into these arguments, the argumentum ad hominem and the argument from authority. The best way in which to describe the approach of these arguments is to use a sporting cliche “playing the man, not the ball” in other words arguing on grounds other than the facts of the matter. Some examples are:

We oppose the Roman Catholic Church’s narrow minded, dogmatic objection…

and

our religious leaders are attempting to destroy advances in medical science…

or

I object to its disingenous propaganda and the sinister pressure it’s applying to elected politicians… If the Cardinals and bishops dont like living in a liberal, tolerant, progressive state, they should relocate to one where the prevailing views are more attuned to theirs…

must not impose a restriction on the majority of people who do not agree with their beliefs.

Conclusion on the arguments for

The first argument, that scientific research should be permitted despite external evalutaions, because all science adds to the pool of human knowledge and contributes to our progress, is a self-justifying argument. It makes sense from within the scientific language game, for it defines itself as rational and progressive. The only problem is that terms and concepts such as progress do not necessarily equate with truth or goodness. All three terms are intepreted and valued in different ways in different contexts. Does an increase in knowledge equate with progress or equate with goodness, and how do we judge if this is so?

The second argument the teleological one seems to me the most sensible - in terms of its not being self-referential or overtly chauvenistic. Its premise is simple, judge us by our deeds. Thus it can argue that certain scientific research is morally justifiable on account of its long-term or eventual benefits. There are however two caveats to this type of argument. i) consequentialist arguments assume that we can know what the consequences will be - can we be certain that the ends indeed justify the means - what if the research ultimately fails to find any cure? ii) Also such argumentation could be used to justify any amount of atrocious behaviour (depending on your perspective), i.e. the atomic bomb: the death of hundreds of thousands of “innocent” civilian lives at Hiroshima and Nagasaki ultimately hastened the end of the war and thus it is assumed fewer military casualties. Could one not from this example justify pre-emptive military strikes against any percieved threat?

The second part of the second argument, the personalist one, is for me a very understandable approach. The gung ho mentality of “he who dares wins” is particularly resonant. Nobody particularly likes illness or suffering least of all if the subject of that illness or suffering is the self or a close or loved one. But further to this general dislike of illness and suffering, it becomes particularly unpalatable when we discover that there is nothing medical science can do about it. Thus when research proposals dangle tantalizingly on a stick above those who are desperate and provides them with hope then a personalist and emotivist motivation for supporting those research proposals are understandable. But there are certain issues that need to be discussed - a personalist approach could be viewed by some as a selfish one (albeit understandable) and one may be inclined to ask about proportionality and perspective. There is also the concern that in the light of personalist motivations the objectivity of that person may be compromised - if we cannot be certain of the success of a research project is it wise to invest so much emotive hope in it or to arouse such emotive expectations for it? Finally there is the argument that in philosophical and rational debate there is no place for emotivist arguments whatsoever - is a consequentialist appeal about possible benefits an appropriate method of discussion?

Finally the third argument for is that from the scientific method. This tends to be more rhetorical and chauvenistic than the other arguments, and has a danger of descending into any number of logical fallacies. But if one was arguing on the grounds of proven track records why shouldnt one argue from authority? Or if one was absolutely convinced that the origins of the fault of the opposition view lay in the persons or motives behind that view (in this case the perception that the Church’s authority is being challenged) why shouldn’t these contextual pieces of information be presented?

Types of Argument Against

I am going to characterise the arguments against the HFE as being Catholic. By this I do not mean that they are solely Roman Catholic or exclusively religious, but that they are universal (the greek word being catholicos). And by universal I mean that most of the arguments against are very similar. The main one is the argument from the right of the unborn child. This argument takes two explicit forms firstly the cryto-religious view that has recourse either to notions of the soul, or to a view of life starting at conception. This form of argument is mostly Deontological and Objective, it argues that the embryo is a human being and has all the dignity and expectation of rights that any other human being (post-natal) has, including the right to life. That right to life - which in the religious language game is either a natural right or a right that is bestowed by God - is an absolute right, thus the opposition to the HFE bill is an opposition to the means irrespective of the ends. Thus a typicl expression of this view from the correspondances goes:

The creation of animal/human hybrids would be highly immoral and unethical. Even if a case could be proved that such a hybrid creatio had resulted in cures for diseases, this could never be justified since human lives should never be sacrificed.

Thus in this type of argument the operative view is that the embryo is a human being in essence if not wholly recognisably so in substance.

The second type of argument against HFE is curious insofar as it seems to straddle both Deontological and Teoleological categories. This is commonly known as the argument from potential. In classical embyro research and abortion dilemmas it establishes the objective rule that it is wrong to kill a human embryo because it has the potential to become a fully rights-laden human being. Furthermore some emotivist variations of this argument beg the question, what sort of a potential human being are we aborting - could it have become the scientist to discover the cure to “x”? This type of argument naturally also then has a sort of Consequentialist flavour to it, although it is more open ended than most consequentialist arguments as there is little way of knowing what type of a person the human embryo will become (in terms of personality and achievements to mankind) - indeed the same argument could be used bizarelly to justify abortion ‘just imagine what sort of monster we might be allowing to be born?’

With regards the HFE bill though this second type of argument is emerging a strongly rhetorical one. On the one hand there are those accusations that the research is of “Frankenstein” proportions. There are the accusations (false the scientists claim) that there will be half-human half-animal hybrid or chimeras created. But a further example of a Consequentialist-type argument is the speculation known as the slippery slope effect. What some critics of the bill ask about the possibility that one day scientists will allow or attempt to let the hybrid embryo go full term?

Conclusion on the arguments against

Just as with the arguments for, the arguments against tend to be deeply entrenched and reliant upon additional underlying values. In this case quite often the arguments rely upon a view of what constitutes a human being, or a view on when life begins. It is not an exclusively religious point of view either relying upon metaphysical notions such as the soul. For example there is an opinion described as longitudinal form that argues that “life” is not easily categorised into development stages - at least not so easily as to be able to take any stage out of context. Rather this view argues one must consider life as an organic continuum, and realise that the stages such as blastocyst, embryo, baby, prebubescent, adolescent, adult, geriatric etc. can only be observed in isolation and out of context. One does not step out of one developmental stage and then enter another, so much as morph from one to another. This argument proposes that the unborn child then as part of this longitudinal continuum should if any human is to be said to have rights, have them also from the moment of conception.

There is interestingly an absence of personalist arguments against the HFE legislation. This is not to say that such arguments do not exist, but that more often than not they would be considered less relevant than personalist arguments for. An example would be those who have lost children in the womb by miscarriage or abortion, or those who are unable to have children who feel that the harvesting and termination of so many emrbyo’s is wasteful.

Overall Conclusion the clash between language games

In conclusion I would just like to make some final observational statements. It should from the above analysis be fairly clear that in arguments for and against there is both a comparitive element of self-justification and a variety of differing emphases on means and ends - not to mention types of argument employed.

But it is this element of comparitive self-justification that interests me the most for it seems to confirm for me a theory of cognitive relativism (this is an observational theory and has no relation to moral relativism). The form of cognitive relatvism that it seems to fit best is in my opinion an ethical version of language games theory.

In this hypotheses, there is an action or a proposition with certain aims and methods - in our case embryo research. In order to enable these actions legislation must be passed, and accordingly a debate about the merits or lack thereof of the proposed action must be held. In such a situation it is feasible that everybody involved in the debate may agree that the proposed actions are justifiable and the consensus may be that it is the right thing to do. Thus the proposed action is approved of and is described in terms of moral or ethical approval. It is even possible that such approval can then be transformed into an ethical standard, held up as an example of the right that should be emulated, and this in turn can then transform into ethical propositions i.e. ought statements.

But there are also circumstances (as here) where there is neither agreement nor any reasonable grounds to believe that consensus may be reached. It appears that those who are for and those who are against the proposed action (HFE bill) are so well-set in their beliefs that what we have may be described as an ethical dilemma.

What is characteristic is that both sides will self-referentially i.e. for their own reasons and motives adjudge themselves to be holding the right or morally correct position. But furthermore they will also define their righteousness by comparison with the opposite view which will be described and characterised as everything that the right is not.

Interestingly though for our analysis it must be said that in this case (as in so many seriously contrasting either/or cases) an ethical dilemma is more of a clash of mutually incoherent forms of life (worldviews).

The Church is putting the ‘interests’ of clumps of cells, with no consiousness, brain or organs, ahead of human beings who are sentient and suffering…

That comment by a support of the bill neatly sums up the irreconciliable difference between the two forms of life that clash and correspond to the for and against arguments in the HFE bill. Those who support the bill either de-emphasize or outright deny the humanity of the embryo, whereas those against the bill see the embryo as fully human in essence and potential. Those who support the bill deny or limit the claims of the embryo to any rights when compared to the fully formed adult, those against the bill believe those rights to be applicable either by necessity or by extension.

Both the fors and the against use strongly deontological and objective arguments, or if not manifest in the arguments themselves these tendencies can be found in the underlying assumptions of both be it the materialist view of the merits of scientific method and its sole claim to progress, or the view that life begins at conception.

Both the fors and against use broadly consequentialist views and both suffer from the same potential uncertainties that plague such arguments. The potentiality of an embyro is undermined by the large uncertainty that it would ever attach to the wall of the womb, develop full-term, live long after birth etc. Similarly for all the hope and expectation attached to the proposed research there is no copperfastened guaruntee that it will suceed, or that any of the possible cures posited will be attained.

In a descriptive overview such as this it would be inappropriate to make value-laden judgements and promote one argument over another. Thus I will avoid any prescriptive propositions concerning the actual case itself. But three things do occur to me that are worthy of note.

1- the alienating danger of personalist and emotivist arguments - In the HFE scenario much is at stake for its supporters and its detractors not least in terms of credibility, but most of all in terms of results. Personalist and emotivist arguments though I would not exclude them as irrational or less-rational than other detached arguments are nonetheless inflammatory and potentially dangerous rhetorical tools. It is not in the interests of humanity as a whole for society to fragment and to alienate groups of each other on account of mutually incompatible or incoherent beliefs. To falsely characterise research scientists as evil-doers hell bent on creating monsters or to attach blame to the religious opponents of such research as the cause of much unneccessary suffering -particularly when the outcome is always less then certain - is to benefit nobody. Thus in the field of rational ethical debate a certain clinical detachment would be advisable as would be the self-regulatory limitation of rhetoric for political reasons masquerading as philosophical debate.

2- A step-back from the cauldron of debate ought to be a necessary part of clinical detachment, and the recent arguments concerning the language used to describe animal/human hybrids needs to be reviewed. As I mentioned in an earlier post of mine, it needs be noticed that the terms of the legislation and thus attacks against the terms of the legislation should not be interpreted as attacks against the research proposal and the researchers themselves even though the moral position may not be altogether different. Thus although the proposal of the researchers may be to use the husk of an animal egg as a receptacle for a human nucleus (with an animal to human ration of 1:99 if not greater) the wording of the legislation itself is vague enough that the ’spectre’ of a 50/50 animal/human hybrid is sufficient enough in the minds of its opponents to warrant mentionand criticism. Thus the proposed law and not the proposed research is not being attacked.

3- Thus the relative strengths and weaknesses of the consequentialist argument must be mutually appreciated. For although the supporters of the HFE bill are strongly critical of the slippery-slope style argument that condemns the current research proposals on the basis of its potential extreme manifestations i.e. the possibility that one day a 50/50 chimera may be created and allowed to develop full-term - the supporters of the HFE bill are also reliant upon an inverse formula of the slippery-slope argument (what I would call the idealised mountain-top) by having constant recourse to the possible (as opposed probable which has less rhetorical strength) benefits such research could accrue.

However although this style of argument may be valid - no matter how irritating the rhetoric employed, once more clinical detachment is advisable. To condemn the current research scientists and their proposals on account of future faults is unfair, unscientific, obscurantist and an example of “playing the man not the ball” - but it is similarly mistaken to expect that such a slippery slope argument not be employed when it would be unfair to demand of these particular research scientists to make promises on behalf of all subsequent scientists and research projects in the future. Although 50/50 human animal chimeras are not the desired telos of this research it is valid to be concerned by virtue of procedural deterioration that one day this may be the desired telos. A procedural deterioration being where a boundary or a taboo has been crossed further encroachments inevitably entail as the shocking effect recedes.

It is hard as a cognitive relativist at times not to despair that mutual incoherence will ever be overcome and to believe that people/groups will always shout past each other on account of too strongly held underlying views. But it is somewhat conciliatory to believe and hope that we should have the freedom to disagree and debate from our own language game/forms of life perspectives in these ways.

Friedrich Nietzsche begged us to look beyond the traditional dichotomy and prejudice of good and evil. Our traditional means of viewing the world involve arbitrary splits; creating them and us.

What we do in dreams we also do when we are awake: we invent and fabricate the person with whom we associate - and immediately forget we have done so. aphorism 138

Out of a desire for moral coherence and convenience we retrospectively and proactively justify our subjective truths my making them into universals.

Our vanity would have just that which we do best count as that which is hardest for us. The origin of many a morality. aphorism 143

In short, systems of morals are only a sign-language of the emotions. aphorism 187

And so he is led to say:

What is done out of love always takes place beyond good and evil. aphorism 153

The medieval German mystic Meister Eckhart similarly taught that the just man does just deeds, but the doing of just deeds does not make a just man.

Whoever loves justice remains so fully established in it that what he loves becomes his own essence. Justi vivent in aeturnum

The just man does not seek support elsewhere, he does not let his acts be determined by external precepts. When you conform with exterior laws, your acts are merely legal. The just man who acts out of intimate assimilation with Justice “is”.

The path, Meister Eckhart preaches, is detachment, or releasement from distinctions, names, oppositions.

Whatever bears a name can be juxtaposed or be compared with something that has another name.

Indeed, before there were creatures, God was not yet God, but he was what he was. But when creatures came to be and recieved their created being, then God was no longer God in himself, rather he was God in the creatures…

Thus we say that man must be so poor that he is not and has no place wherein God could act. Where man still preserves some place in himself, he preserves distinction. This iswhy I pray God to rid me of God, for my essential being is above God insofar as we comprehend God as the principle of creatures. Blessed are the Poor

Thus Eckhart asks us to live life without a why, to go beyond good and evil, beyond the distinctions of creator and created.

If you seek God for the sake of a foundation, Eckhart says, if you look for God even for the sake of God himself then ‘you behave as though you transformed God into a candle in order to find something with it; and when one has found what one looks for one throws away the candle’ Reiner Schurmann quoting Eckhart’s Omne datum Optimum.

So Nietzsche and Eckhart in terms of a moral discourse both point towards detachment or releasement, the living without a why, the going beyond good and evil, the loss of the prejudices of Binary Opposition.

Those who seek something with their works, those who act for a why, are serfs and mercenaries. Eckhart, Justus in perpetuam vivet.

It is interesting to note that this wisdom of letting-be is to be found across the continents and the ages, in the context of Nietzsche’s post-christian paradigm, Eckharts via negativa, and also in the Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu’s book of the way. The second ideogram of the Tao is remerkable in its resemblance both to the teachings of the above masters and the analysis of Jacques Derrida and the Post-Structuralists.

When people see some things as beautiful, other things become ugly. When people see some things as good, other things become bad.

Being and non-being create each other. Difficult and easy support each other. Long and short define each other. High and low depend on each other. Before and after follow each other.

Therefore the Master acts without doing anything and teaches without saying anything. Things arise and he lets them come; things disappear and he lets them go. He has but doesn’t posess, acts but doesn’t expect. When his work is done, he forgets it. That is why it lasts forever. Tao Te Ching ~ 2

I just attended a public debate on genetic modification. It went into more technical depth than I was expecting - this was a pleasant surprise. Since the panel were mainly medical professionals or scientific journalists, there was no instant rejection of genetic modification. This allowed what I consider a rational discussion of current and future possibilities. Of course, I am aware that some hold the view that genetic modification is not rational or moral. Various terms in the debate are emotionally charged and usually impairs rational discussion.

A few interesting points:

When asked, most of the audience would not allow direct genetic modification to screen for eye colour of children - but we do this passively anyway because we (usually) have free selection of our mate. This allows crude selection of genes that give certain aesthetic characteristics e.g. eye colour, height, beauty. (Sexual selection theory)

What is the difference between genetic modification and eugenics? Current medical practice is based on informed decisions by individuals rather than state compulsion.

One opinion: as long as it is safe, it should be allowed. Government interference should be minimized.

One observation: medical ethics are mostly concerned with the good of an individual. Most questions about the long term effect on society were not discussed in depth. One valid point was genetic modification was no different to medicine generally. Medicine has radically extended life spans and changed society. To rule out genetic manipulation would be inconsistent with precedent.

My view: people should have maximal personal responsibility. But I suspect most or all (including me) would be greatly burdened to take responsibility for this freedom. “…[S]uch a destiny of a task compels one to run into the sunlight at every opportunity to shake off a heavy, all-too-heavy seriousness.” (Nietzsche.) For example, some cultures would select male children because they are considered “more useful”. (An untimely thought: could a very patient terrorist insert harmful genes into a target population? You heard it here first.) If we had wide free choice, would children all look like celebrites (and out of date ones at that)? I don’t want some special interest group to mess up the gene pool, thank you very much.

Anti Citizen One

I encountered a blog posting about the “myth” of the underdog against scientific dogma.

We love stories like this; in our culture we love the underdog, who sticks to his or her guns, in spite of heavy opposition. In this narrative, we have heroes, villains, and a famous, brilliant scientist proven wrong.

I’m sure you could pick out instances in science history where this story is true, but more often it is not. You wouldn’t know this from the pages of our major news media though; in fact you’d probably get the impression that the underdog narrative is the way science works. Michael White

Not to say that it never happens. The first example of an underdog that occurs to me is John Harrison and his solution to the longitude measurement problem. Interesting though.

In related news, Monsignor Gianfranco Girotti was quoted by the newspaper L’Osservatore Romano suggesting seven new and updated deadly sins. I have only seen the list of sins and not any iterpretation, which would be probably more revealing… But this list was:

• Environmental pollution
• Genetic manipulation
• Accumulating excessive wealth
• Inflicting poverty
• Drug trafficking and consumption
• Morally debatable experiments
• Violation of fundamental rights of human nature

I mention this because aspects of science appears at least twice. I will just make a few comments on exceptions and contradictions in these guidelines.

Environmental pollution: I hope they don’t mean all environmental pollution as that would be rather - - fatal. For thousands of years we have been using fire, and later power stations to cook and heat our homes. This all releases CO2 which, in a naive reading, would be sinful. We may excuse this one of they mean excessive pollution - but who defines excessive? (Technically breathing releases CO2 - do we have to stop breathing?)

Genetic manipulation: This one falls into the same trap as environmental pollution - selective breeding is arguably a form of genetic manipulation. Presumably cats, dogs, cows, etc have morally acceptable origins. If we want to assume unawareness of genetics excepted these activities, we might ask could creation of new domestic species using genetics be moral? Why are the methods of selective breeding and genetic modification treated differently when they both lead to the same outcome?

Drug trafficking and consumption I assume they do not mean all drugs - since wine is used in Catholic ceremonies. What drugs do they mean? Illegal drugs? Slight problem: different countries have different laws and also laws change.

Morally debatable experiments A few possibilities -
Hwang Woo Suk faking his results (this probably breaks one of the ten commandments but not of the original deadly sins)
various governments and companies experimenting on unwilling or unwitting human subjects.
animal vivisection is objectionable to some people.
experiments involving pregnancy or death - I expect this is the churches primary concern.

I don’t have an automatic objection to this point except perhaps its vagueness.

Anti Citizen One

PS I am just off to finish my genetic/psychotropic drug/massively polluting mad science project that is going to make me a ton of money….

Some of our recent dialogs have concerned how and to what extent religious ‘involvement’ in politics is appropriate (if at all). Both of us agree that as a libertarian ideal everyone has a free voice and ‘right’ to participate in the democratic process - even if their opinions are objectionable. I have tended to argue at times that institutions as collective lobby groups also have the right to participate, thus something like the ‘Church’ can be seen in a similar light to a political party. But problems arise from this point of view. At what stage does ‘involvement’ i.e. advancing a ‘right to life’ thesis become ‘interference’ i.e. seeking to criminalize an activity by enforcing one moral view upon others.

In this light ethicist Charles Curran once promoted a strategy to guide various religious groupings towards an ethical and pluralist participation within democracy - that entitles them to voice their opinions without enforcing them. It is worth noting he wrote at length in the context of this in the U.S. where religion and politics are closely entwined - but I think his framework is applicable everywhere.

First of all there are three protagonists to consider. The Church as an institution, religious interest groups, and the individual person. Clearly the way each protagonist speaks and influences politics is very different. Anyway these are thr four principles that Curran outlines as the most important ways for religious opinions to be presented to society.

1) Metanoia - Change of Heart. If any social and political change is ever to be possible on any issue then of fundamental concern is personalism. A change of heart in the individual must precede meaningful social change. So a meaningful dialogue needs to be established with the individual. This of course is a two way street, engage in a case-by-case study of the issues, learn from those whose opinion or approach to an issue differs, respect disagreements or alternative views. Most importantly of all recognise the ethical inadequacy of universal objective prescriptive rules or descriptive analysis.

2) Education. By itself education is inadequate - for social problems as percieved by one persepctive as such go deeper than mere ignorance of the issues. But as part of a wider strategy education can be useful.

3) Compassionate action for those who are victims. In order to precipitate greater social change it is never enough to simply talk, religious people as an institution, an interest group or as individuals need to act upon their principles both to demonstrate the valdity of their approach but also to establish it as a viable alternative. Thus for example in the U.S. charitable hospitals that require no medical insurance as condition of treatment. Or in the UK the Cardinal Winning Pro-life initiative that offers material and spiritual support through crisis pregnancies and after birth, making pro-life pro-choice as well by making the choice a viable option (without judging those who eventually opt for abortion).

4) Institutional action. Aside from practising what they preach religious groups if they want to change social attitudes on an issue need to be involved in the political process. The best way to do this isnt by objective rule making or critical analysis (preaching) but by advocating for those without advocates. Being a “voice” for those without a mouthpiece.

As a holistic approach all of this should seem reasonable even to the non-religious. It is simply an ethical way to engage with society and promote social change. Although people may disagree with the ‘message’ they should hopefully agree with the liberty to promote a plurality of values.  But what about specific legislation - should a religious group openly support or promote a law on any given issue - when in practise legislation enforces a singular rather than a plural view?

Curran underlines the difficulty involved in this. Specific issues (about which legislation is usually directed) entertain such a vast number of variable factors that without broad knowledge of all the relevant data it is impossible to know with any certitude what is the appropriate response. Consider abortion, if it were criminalized would it be ethical? Women would still suffer crisis pregnancies but appropriate medical assistance would be forced underground. Poor healthcare would then be an issue, as would the unscrupulous taking advantage of the vulnerable and desperate. Clearly backstreet abortions are undesirable and no matter how much society may change in their attitudes to life-rights there will always be a demand.

So the first principle Curran advocates is the gathering of all the facts. So promoting a religious point of view in a political context requires that the point of view be supported by as much ‘objective’ interdisciplinary data as possible.

Secondly there must be an explicit admission that even with a broad knowledge base on complex ethical issues (in which every situation and every circumstance may vary) absolute certitude and the elimination of error cannot be realistically attained. There is an exception to every rule.

Thirdly is the issue of representation. A religious institution may wield greater collective influence in the political arena than an individual acitivist, but are they ever justified in definitavely speaking as a single entity? There will be those individuals within the institution who dissent - surely they should be entitled to do so and to act as their conscience dictates without fear of reprisal? But equally problematic if an institution maintains silence does this not acquiesce in the status quo?

Again Curran emphasizes that these three principles are combined. A religious institution may be ethically justified in becoming politically active but they must be in possession of all the relevant facts, must acknowledge that no rule can be absolute and that dissent from their point of view is to be expected.

Therefore he says that political involvement should be on different levels. The individual should be as active as they wish. Smaller groups should be engaged in political activism (the Civil Rights movement in America) but institutions should speak out rarely and only on matters of great import. and in a context where they can make a meaningful and constructive contribution to public welfare.

Thus he says the institution should speak out only if it can propose a law that would be equitable (of benefit to all), enforceable and open and malleable to alternative views in a pluralistic society. Thus using the example of abortion he states that any religious involvement in abortion law must provide for all people in all circumstances thus not putting any undue burden on those members of society who are less affluent. It must be enforceable morally and politically - thusthe spectre of illegal back street abortions should provide sufficient reason not to propose a blanket ban. And finally it must be admitted that not everybody within society accepts the idea that abortion is the killing of a human being.

Therefore Curran concludes that on most complex ethical issues a religious institution should clamour for either a moderate law respectful of pluralistic opinions and varying circumstances or for no law at all.  Whilst simultaneously working towards promoting their underlying values i.e. respect for life, and providing viable alternatives for ‘victims’ to choose from i.e. if abortion is required for largely economic reasons provide long-term meaningful economic support.

Finally there obviously must be a balance between providing an ethical discourse to society - being an advocate for the vulnerable and oppressed (speaking out against racism, genocide, torture, war, abortion, euthanasia and so on) - and broadly acceptable legislative action that benefits the common good (free healthcare, racial integration etc.)

I’m guessing the previous post to be in part a response to my thoughts on the current bioethics debates. And alas I feel myself being drawn into a debate that normally I would prefer to keep at the office or within the academic environment. Anyway I will try to respond to some of your points.

You describe the Pope’s writings as betraying “Arbitrary Reasoning” - well besides the obvious arbitrariness of the accusation you are entitled to your opinion. Certainly if one were to read his works in isolation or out of order then his reasoning probably could seem arbitrary. On the other hand if you read his works from the 60’s onwards (a gargantuan task) you would probably get a feeling for the reasoned consistency of his arguments (though by no means should this deter you from your disagreements).

You criticise his view for being speciesist and this topic has been written on at some length, so I will move over that one. Other than to say that he could be regarded as necessarily speciesist - consistent with the anthropic thrust of Christian philosophy - as opposed to being arbitrarily so.

You dislike the appeal to tradition and again there is little more I can say on this matter other than it is a self-justifying position for the office he holds as the successor to Peter. Appeals to tradition are tautologically a traditional way of building arguments in philosophy. It can become a logical fallacy if the tradition that is being appealed to is given unquestionable authority. But a simple overview of pontifical literature shows that unbending adherence to tradition is not the modus operandi, for example in the days of St Thomas Aquinas “life” was assumed to begin some days after conception and at variable times for boys and girls. Now, informed by medical science this view has been rejected and a life begins at conception theory has been adopted. Before I explain this a little further, just one cautionary note your opposition to the appeal to tradition (without qualification) has a similarity to the fallacy of the appeal to novelty.

It seems that you also oppose the assumption to a universal right to life. Now we have discussed the idea of natural rights before and satisfactorily concluded that the notion is ridiculous. But is this what he is arguing for? In the snippet of text you quoted he talks about unconditional respect this is appeal to cultivating a respectful attitude not an appeal to natural rights.

Biomedical ethics has engaged in an important debate concerning “life” and its “beginnings”. Personally I adhere to a theory that is called “longitudinal form.”

From conception through conceptus, blastocyst, embryo, fetus all the way to birth there are no singular definable and isolatable boundaries of transition. One could take pictures of the developmental stages and label them as seperate stages of being - but this is an artificial seperation for these stages in action or process are inseperable and belong to a single continuity of cell division and growth. One could talk about the first beat of the heart, the first signs of mental life, the development of the nervous system or even birth as “the beginning of life” but these are parts of an organic continuum.

This longitudinal view of life is generally adopted post-natal by all of us. Although we differentiate between tot, child, teen, young adult, middle-age and the elderly there are no objective or singularly definable moments that one can point to and declare with any certainty that there was a particular moment of transition.

Similarly so then by extension even birth is a process rather than a straightforward before/after event. The child in the womb in the days preceding birth is virtually indistinguishable from the child immediately post-birth - generally we talk about viability at this stage. But as medical care for premature babies improves yet more boundaries in viability are smashed and it is not uncommon to hear of 26 week old survivors. But being “born” and taking one’s first breath of air by ones self (or being capable of doing so) is not the deciding factor (usually) in discerning whether the child is “alive”, “vital” or “viable”. It is important, but not singularly so.

We can understand various moments of embryonic development by taking them in isolation and comparing them with other stages - but these stages are not independent of each other and only become totally meaningful when considered as part of an organic process. Thus it is possible to talk about life or the process of growing-life beginning at conception without having recourse to notions of the soul or the direct action of a divinity.

Now than having rejected ‘natural rights’ we still acknowledge artifical or assumed rights. The difference in view is that natural rights are somehow inherent whereas the other type of right is in the gift of human discourse. This latter is a fairly democratic way of operating. By consensus most of us wish to avoid being murdered thus a social taboo has arisen around the act of murder. Similarly the vast majority of us engage in a primitive form of social contract by choosing not to murder each other - quite often on the selfish context that if I dont kill you hopefully you will extend the same courtesy to me!

But what qualifications does one require in order to be eligible for certain rights? Obviously I cannot extend the right to life to a dead body, nor the right to vote in free elections to an embryo. Clearly there are circumstances where we consider one or other of our species invalid to certain rights.

What then about the right to life? Well generally we extend the gift of this right to all living people, exceptions are made in some societies for capital crimes where the right to life is supposed to have been negated by criminal action. Similarly some cultures have begun to diminish the primary status this right usually enjoys by defining it as in competition with the right to die, or more pertinantly the right to choose the means and time of ones death. But even in this case the right hasn’t been completely abrogated, rather a realism has descended upon certain ethical views, a realism that rights are in the gift of society and are not endowed by a supernatural power or inherent in our natures. And of course even the right to die is qualified on the grounds of voluntary decision making, such a right is gifted to those who are autonomous and capable of making an informed and consensual decision. Unique cases exist such as permanent coma’s and brain death (or persistant vegitative states) but thats a seperate issue.

So what about the unborn child, are they qualified to recieve the gift of rights? This is the crux of the debate. There are those who use the language and imagery of parasitical life to negate the qualification of the unborn child to recieve rights so long as they are dependent upon the host (mother). But what about the child who has just been born? Although breathing and living independently, they are still vulnerable and incapable of sustaining their own fragile lives, in other words they depend on the kindness of others. Consequently infanticide has become an extraodinary social taboo, particularly if the motivation for murder is selfish and not the result of some unfortunate psychological illness. What difference in moral ’status’ then is there between the child who has just been born and who is dependent on their mother/carer, and the child in the womb who is viable? And as longitudinal form asks, what difference then in moral status is there between a full-term but as yet unborn child and one that is yet to have become fully developed?

The argument then proceeds that rather like the artificial nature of viewing the stages of developmental growth independent of the whole process from conception (to death), so too certain divisions in moral status and eligibility to the right of life are artificial too.

If we understand that the right to life is a gift, and we choose to remove that right from the unborn child, then if we are to be consistent and not ageist or hypocrital then we must concede that the same right to life may be removed from any one uf us at any time if society (in whose gift the right belongs) defines us as somehow ineligble.

And if society can define the unborn child, the elderly or disabled as being ineligble candidates for the right to life, then what is to prevent society from deciding arbitrarily that our eligibility to that right can be questioned on the grounds of race, gender, sexuality, religion, profession, political opinion etc.

And this is not just the apocalyptic ravings of a hypothetical slippery slope argument - one need only look to recent history to observe governments assuming the power to gift rights and to take them away. We all know (hopefully) of the Holocaust, but let us remember also the Killing Fields of the Khmer Rouge who decided that amongst others those who wore spectacles were enemies of the state and ineligible to posess the same rights as anyone else simply because eye spectacles were considered a sign of education.

You also ask about the “natural time” of death when nowadays that time may be elongated or shortened by medical intervention. This is an important question, but surely the concept is analytical and self-defining, the natural time of death is that which occurs without direct medical intervention. Although you dont say as much your begging of the question seems to imply that because medical science can elongate our lives we ought to make use of their services. Why should this be so? It is known in medicine and medical ethics as “vitalism” the attitude that one must avoid death at all costs. The individual is not compelled to take advantage of the medical services available to them, indeed it is one of the fundamental tenets of medicine that they should seek to help those who come to them for assistance.

One could also define the “natural time” of death as being that which occurs without “extraordinary” medical intervention (and this is indeed the position of the Catholic Church). The question one should ask then is what is “extraordinary” and what reasons does an individual have to want to sustain their life artifically beyond its self-sufficient viability?

You’re second major objection is concerning the “annoyance” of religious groups imposing their view on society with regards ethics (for example abortion). I hate to say it but this just seems to confirm your abhorrence to all things religious and highlights the fragile relationship many people have to the idea of ‘free-speech’.

If there was a situation where roving bands of Catholic militiamen were arresting pregnant women and imprisoning them until they went full-term in order to prevent an abortion, then I may accept that they were imposing their views on society. But this isn’t happening and nobody is suggesting that it should. Those instances (more prevalent in America) where acts of violence are perpetrated against those who facilitate abortion are not acting in religious interests, no matter how badly they protest that they are or how much those who hate religion may try to smear them. It is a sad reality that there are those who allow their personal prejudice to cloud their judgement and who voicably use religious belief as a justification for wholly non-religious means. These people are hypocrites and should be judged as such. In much the same way that we would judge and condemn all forms of hypocrisy in all walks of life.

Now you may argue that anti-abortion lobby groups who would desire a change in the law whether it be greater restrictions or complete illegalization are, albeit through non-violent means, trying to impose their morality upon society as a whole. While this is true to an extent if you genuinely are arguing that this “annoyance” is wrong, anti-social or somehow contrary to your libertarian ethic, then you are painfully naive and certainly not a libertarian in any sense of the word.

How else was abortion legalized in the first place, without the lobbying of a pro-abortion interest group, to legalise the practise on the grounds of free-choice and medical safety? Was this not the imposition of one viewpoint onto the rest of society? Is this not what all human laws are? Is this not what democratic governance is about?

You ask “Isn’t it enough for them to live virtuously (by their own standard) and well away from politics?”

I assume by this you are suggesting that a religious point of view has no place being involved in political debate. If so I can think of no greater assault on the libertarian ideals of free-speech and freedom of conscience that John Stuart-Mill wrote about in chapter 2 of his work On Liberty on the liberty of thought and discussion.

Surely your request that the “annoying” religiously minded people who oppose abortion for example (although I know plenty of atheist pro-lifers also which further highlights the tyranny of your proposition) could be inversely applied to yourself and the ‘non-believers’? Isn’t it enough for you to live virtously by your own standard and stay well away from politics?

If we maintain a system of democratic governance that permits the participation of the people within the organon of power - a system that has the authority to rule over everybody - what ‘right’ have you to deny the freedom to voice an opposing view on any given matter of legislation?

Lets forget abortion, religious belief and non-belief for a moment and apply your maxims to another issue altogether. I oppose the hunting of foxes with hounds, I consider it abominably cruel and unfair and an activity more about sport than pest control. I detest those who support hunting and who consider it to be making a sport out of a “necessary” pest-control activity. But they are entitled to their different point of view and they are entitled - no matter how “annoying” they are and no matter how unlikely it is that I will ever change my mind on the issue - to voice their opinions and to seek a change in legislation.

And so to the final point, in a participatory democracy, that it is alleged we belong to, we can never have any justification in attempting to silence the views of others no matter how objectionable they may seem, when the desired outcome of our participatory democracy is to enact laws that govern us all.

If the law applies to us all - then the oppurtunity to oppose that law must apply to us all. Therefore in the case of abortion, if one group opposes it, on the grounds that it is a violation of the unborn childs right to life (a right that they consider to be either inherent or in the gift of society) then this view may be validly expressed as equally as those who believe that the right to choice overrides the rights claims of an unborn child.

To oppose a law (any law) and to hope that someday it may be changed whilst admitting equally that it may not - depending on the vicissitudes of prevailing opinion is the fundamental axiom upon which liberty is built. To demand that anyone cease from voicing their opposition or from trying to enact change is nothing less than tyranny.