Yet There Is Method In It

Feyerabend was once labelled the ‘greatest enemy of science’ a title that in his later life he took pride in (he was an iconoclast by nature), but which midway through his career threw him into an enormous depression. The roots of his depression and the crass insults he had to suffer for daring to challenge the orthodox view of science were based substantially upon the misunderstanding of his work. One of the ‘problems’ with his writings is the speed with which he moves from clear point to reductio- thus without a careful reading his supporters and detractors often (myself included) end up reading the reductio as though it were his point of view. Consequently since his death with the major retrospective his work is enjoying – one philosopher going so far as to say that minus the iconoclasms he has been wholly rehabilitated – there has been a scramble to make sense of all of his work in its complexity. Subsequently a great deal of focus has been attached to the interpretations of his best students (themselves now noteworthy academics). What follows are some thoughts of Gonzalo Munevar – a one time student of Feyerabends – and now a Proffessor in his own right.

What are Feyerabends greatest contributions?

- Contrary to being an enemy of science Feyerabend showed how complex and humane science is and ought to be. Of his many contributions, perhaps the most important is that there is no method or rule that can capture science completely. The most excellent idea about the nature of science has to allow exceptions. When we look at the history of science, we discover not only that the great scientists violated the methods proposed by the empiricists, but that they had to violate them, otherwise they would not have secured the great successes through which we know them today.

- Until Feyerabend and Kuhn it was supposed that scientific rationality adhered to certain methodological rules. That science was a shining beacon of rationality. Those rules were inductive. The philosophical problem was that even though we “knew” that such scientific method produced knowledge, we could not prove it. Karl Popper argued that the problem came from thinking erroneously that induction was the method of science. We just needed to realize that science was based instead on the method of trial and error. But Feyerabend’s analysis of the history of science demonstrated that adherence to all proposed methods, from Francis Bacon’s to Popper’s, would impede the progress of science. To progress, then, science needs to act against method from time to time.

- The reason is very simple. All varieties of empiricism assume that experience determines the worth of our scientific ideas. This assumption is presumably justified because through experience scientists learn directly what is written on the book of nature. For example, if all observers see a stone fall vertically, the vertical motion of the stone is an immediate or direct truth given by observation – an immediate truth with which our most profound hypotheses about the world must agree. If a hypothesis implies that the stone does not fall vertically, our observations, our experience will then refute it. Unfortunately for empiricism, as Feyerabend reminds us, the Copernican hypothesis claims that the earth rotates on its axis to give us the day-night cycle, and this claim is refuted by the vertical fall of the stone.

- Munevar goes on to explain why this isnt a problem in the end for Galileo. We rejoin it after the explanation.

- These considerations do not imply that scientific hypotheses or theories always defeat the verdict of experience, but they do imply that such victories by theory are possible. This result implies in turn that all empiricist methodological rules must have exceptions. The reason is that such rules assign a higher priority to experience (over theory).

- Feyerabend rescued Galileo from the preposterous role of being the first and greatest hero of empiricism. By doing so, he allowed us to understand science very differently

What were Feyerabends errors?

- He erred in his proposal that all traditions or ideologies should have equal standing. But eventually he realized that, as Marguerite von Brentano had argued, the Nazis and the Quakers would then have equal access to pursue their goals, even though one of the Nazis’ main goals was to exterminate other cultures.

- He also acknowledged, though reluctantly, my criticism to the effect that a society has the obligation to teach its young the skills and the views they need to survive, and that in a world that depends on science that is what students will have to learn, not astrology or voodoo. He thus came to see that there were drastic limitations to his notion of the separation of science and society.

What influence did John Stuart Mill have?

John Stuart Mills essay On Liberty was a great influence to Feyerabend, Munevar explains how so, and why it is essential we see Feyerabend as part of this libertarian tradition (the better to understand his conclusions).

- Feyerabend points out that we are often unable to even discover important evidence against our favorite theories unless we consider seriously alternative theories that can propose and make sense of counter-evidence… No matter how certain we may be of a theory, a scientist who fails to accept it and develops instead a different theory is doing science a favor. For as Feyerabend says, “We need a dream-world in order to discover the features of the real world we think we inhabit (and which may actually just be another dream-world).”

- Feyerabend also acts against the important tradition of Plato and Descartes, whose obsession it was to discover the correct path to unique truth. Mill was the first important philosopher who rebelled against the goal itself. In his essay On Liberty, Mill argued that it does not favor society to force its members to accept the official point of view – no matter how certain it seems to be. By allowing the development of different points of view society profits, for if the official point of view is false, we gain the opportunity to replace with another that might be at least partially true. And if the official point of view turns out to be true anyway, comparing it with alternative points of view allow us to understand it better. Feyerabend’s accomplishment in this area comes from extending Mill’s philosophy to science.

- Feyerabend’s ironic sense of humor led him to proclaim anarchy in the philosophy of science and to suggest that “anything goes.” But he never offered anarchy as a sort of anti-method method. Anarchy is the description that a traditional rationalist would give to the way science should be done according to Feyerabend, and particularly the description that rationalist would give of pluralism. It is that rationalist who finds it obvious that rationality consists in behaving in accordance with the rules of the method of empiricism. And it is that rationalist who recoils in horror at the “anything goes” attitude in science a la Feyerabend.

Interview extracted in paraphrases from here.

The Ontological argument as classically formulated and known by many philosophy students can be stated as follows.

1. ‘God’ by definition is ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ (maximally great).
2. If God did not exist he would not be ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’, for it is greater to exist than not to exist.
3. By definition, then, ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ exists. For to say it does not exist is contradictory.
4. Therefore God exists.

We can summarise it thus…

the existence of God necessarily follows from the concept of God…

Descartes version of the Ontological argument took this form, and he used the analogy of a triangle, he stated that just as it is necessary to posit the combined internal angle of a triangle to be 180 degrees, so too God’s necessary existence can be posited by the idea of God.

Kant provided the most famous objection to this argument, with two specific points. 1) Existence is not a property that can be added to the concept of a thing. 2) It is also wrong to suppose that one can, by means of a concept, define God into existence. He specifically refutes Descartes saying:

“To posit a triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same hold true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being… If we say ‘There is no God’, neither the omnipotence nor any other of its predicates is given; they are one and all rejected together with the subject” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p280.

This refutation, plus Aquinas’ rejection of the original Anselmian version lead Bertrand Russell to declare confidently that:

I think it may be said quite decisively that as a result of analysis of the concept “existence” modern logic has proved this argument invalid. – History of Western Philosophy. p752

However Russells assertion is premature on two counts. Firstly modal logic has developed new techniques since his time that incidentally have offered possible reformulations of the argument (Alvin Plantinga’s version the most famous). Secondly in the paradigm of Wittgenstein’s language games theory, some have posited a revised reading of Anselm’s Proslogion (often considered the first major Ontological argument) which denies that it is intended as an Ontological proof, and emphasises that its validity is contingent upon a) belief in God, b) openness to experience, knowledge or understanding of God, and c) Anselms definition of God as a maximally great being.

It is widely becoming accepted that Anselm and the Proslogion is either misinterpreted or misrepresented. Certainly the text itself takes the form of a prayer, and there is no doubt that Anselm absolutely believed in God a priori to this particular rationale. His own words were that this should be viewed as ‘Faith seeking understanding.’ Furthermore, and of general concern, he states his explicit wish that his Proslogion be read and considered in its entirety. In order to fully appreciate it he believed one could not consider it fragmentarily. Thus any consideration of the Proslogion should entail reading the two forms of the argument, the objections of Gaunilo and his answers to the objections. Sadly few textbooks do this, and unsurprisingly although familiar with the general concepts most students of philosophy are painfully unaware of the rich complexity of the whole text.

Here is a brief overview of the relevant sections of the Proslogion.

Chapter 2 argues that God exists in the mind and in reality. Crucially it is the most misunderstood fragment of the argument. Many people take it that he posits the idea of God, states that God is a maximally great being, and that to be truly maximally great he must exist. Thus reifying the concept. That we have an idea (that doesn’t exist) which to be consistent must be real (and exist). What he actually says is subtly but essentially different. He starts with the premise that God is maximally great. Then he makes an existential declaration that God exists in the mind and that a maximally great being must therefore exist also in and outside of the mind. To put it briefly he is saying that if one comprehends the idea of God one is actually encountering God not a non-real or abstract concept, which would be the case with unicorns, perfect islands or flying spaghetti monsters.

Chapter 3 argues that God cannot be thought not to exist. In brief he is reiterating that the thought of a maximally great being is also the experience of the maximally great being. Thus to think of a maximally great being that does not exist is contradictory and absurd. As the very thought of it is demonstrable proof of its existence. This is as opposed to me thinking of the cartoon character Homer Simpson. The character is real in my mind, and as an image on TV, but he is not a real person. Thus it is possible to think of this person as not existing. But he argues, from the premise that the thought is the experience and that God is maximally great, it is contradictory to think of God as not existing.

Gaunilo’s objections and Anselms responses take the form of 9 arguments – and I shall summarise these in brief also, simply stating Anselms position.

1) God does exist in the mind, his maximal greatness means he is more than just a thought.

2) A maximally great being can be said to exist in and outside of the mind, for a maximally great being would be without a beginning (the uncaused cause), and if we can think of something as being without beginning then we cannot think of it as not existing.

3) Something that existed in only one or the other – not both (mind or reality) – is not a maximally great being.

4) I can think of myself as not existing at a particular time or place (i.e. before I was conceived), but a maximally great being (if it exists) must exist in all times and places.

5) We cannot deny that the thought of a maximally great being cannot exist in the mind, for example we can conceive (albeit limitedly) of infinity.

6) If we can think of something then we can within our limits understand it (i.e. grasp it, or apprehend it).

7) A maximally great being necessarily must exist in and out of the mind.

 8) God as compared to the perfect island is a special case. A perfect island is not a maximally great being thus it may exist in the mind but not necessarily in reality, whereas a maximally great being must exist in both.

9) Although we may not fully understand the magnitude of a maximally great being, this does not mean to say that we cannot produce meaningful conjecture on the matter. We are able to distinguish between lesser and greater goods. Thus we can say that something infinite is greater than something finite. That something that lacks nothing, is greater than something lacking something. That something unmoveable or unchangeable is better than something forced to move or change. We know what it means for something to be ineffable, even if we do not know that which is ineffable.

Anselms Formula then differs from the standard one at the beginning of the post. It goes as follows.

i) God is something than which nothing greater can be thought;

ii) Something than which nothing greater can be thought exists in the mind;

iii) Something existing only in the mind cannot be something which nothing greater can be thought;

iv) Something which can be thought not to be is not something than which nothing greater can be thought;

v) A thing is not something than which a greater cannot be thought if (a) it does not exist whole and entire at al times and in all places, (b) if it is moveable or changeable.

A close inspection shows that this is not the same argument as Descartes formula, nor is it the argument that Kant refutes.

Does it work?
A very brief conclusion raises three points if we are to accept Anselms Proslogion as viable (but viable as what – proof, demonstration, testimony of belief?)

1) The argument demands we accept the definition of God as being a maximally great being.
2) The attributes of maximal greatness, of which we are asked to accept, are condemned to be somewhat vague (how can we fully understand the infinite?), only glimpses of them are ever seen. Thus such attributes can meaningfully only be inferred, not affirmed.
3) In order to go beyond inference, we need to accept the possibility of experiencing a maximally great being – Anselm states this as being able to think of or understand God – but I would be concerned to explicitly call this an experiencing of God that goes beyond merely rational assent – after all Anselm believes wholeheartedly prior to his rationalising – interestingly his biographer Eadmer states: “Behold, one night during Matins, the grace of God shone in his heart and the matter became clear to his understanding, filling his whole heart with an immense joy and jubilation.” – This seems clear to me, to ‘know’ God is an experiential (rather than rational) exercise, firmly placing this within the realm of mystical philosophy.

I would suggest that Anselms argument works – if one believes in a God that is a maximally great being. And that the formula, and the reasonableness that Anselm attributed to it, makes sense within the experiential framework of the religious/mystical language game. A final point in conclusion therefore is that to the external observer (one who is not participating within the same language game – lets say sceptical about God’s maximal greatness) or to the interested scholar – the key to understanding Anselms Proslogion lies not in formal logic, but in the studies of claims to religious experience.

An impassioned plea but not a convincing one. Indeed to disagree and to be intolerant are seperate actions and should be judged seperately. But your ‘dictionary’ definitions are narrow and incomplete. To provide an alternative definition you could always consider wiki where the very first point in its article on intolerance is:

angry argumentation, looking down at people because of their characteristics or viewpoints, negatively portraying something due the contrast with one’s own beliefs, etc. On a more extreme level, it can lead to violence – in its most severe form, genocide.

Now as with Voltaire I will passionately defend your right to disagree, and this is indeed what respect for the “other” means and precisely what I plead for in my post. I respect that you hold a different view, if in the context of the discussion I say ‘I believe in x therefore y’ and you say ‘I do not believe in x because of z’. As long as the argumentation and the logic is valid there is nothing wrong in this sort of disagreement. But ‘angry argumentation’ of the sort that for example saw Richard Dawkins describe a womans face as being somewhat odd – a woman who happens to have a different belief system from his – is intolerant and transgresses mere disagreement. A disagreement would take this form:

The mere statement on the part of a religion that its own beliefs and practices are correct and any contrary beliefs incorrect does not in itself constitute intolerance.

Likewise when an atheist says ‘I dont believe in God’ this is not intolerance, nor is it intolerant to say I believe belief in God to be wrong or harmful to the individual. Its a highly contentious statement but not intolerant. But to describe it as poison – defined as a substance which kills or injures when introduced into living organisms – and the adherents of religion as poisonous – or to describe it in the terms of pathological illness – or to make scornful comments about the ‘sort’ of person who has these beliefs – that is angry and violent use of language and by most reasonable definitions intolerant.

You have said that to say “view X is poison” is not sufficient evidence for intolerance. But then what is? Actual violence – how far do you have to go to incite something? Language is a precious object easily misshapen and misused, when a journalist like Hitchens describes religion as poison, and uses that word “poison” he is employing hysterical language and that is the spark that lights the tinder. When he says that people of faith are plotting he is using the definite article, he is not saying ‘you never know what they might be up to’ he is saying ‘they are plotting’ and that ‘we are in danger.’ The language they use is explicit and pretty clear.

Neither Dawkins nor Hitchens in their choice of words were merely disagreeing. They were being sensationalist and provocative and to that extent were exhibiting not just disagreement but their intolerance and their prejudices. As you pointed out with Mencken he proposes that we are respectful and polite, not that we do not disagree. Please show me where Dawkins and Hitchens in particular are respectful and polite.

Your final word game about what a persons responses are to a question is interesting, becuase it points out a veyr important point. If I ask what your opinion is of my wife as you said you have three options; evade the question, lie or be honest, and you propose (as I would generally agree) that honesty is best. If then you are an honest fellow and you expect that I should respect your honesty and you choose to tell me that she is the most ugliest woman you have ever seen. Then I must accept that although I may disagree with you, your answer was an appropriate response to the question. If however I ask you what time is it? and you were to respond your wife is the ugliest woman I have ever met, your response would be innappropriate, uninvited and as it is subjective untestable and therefore neither right nor wrong but an opinion – about which we would disagree. The offence taken lies in its innappropriateness.

The leap from stated opinion of disagreement to intolerant opinion and to incitement to intolerance and violence lies as Wittgenstein aptly pointed out in his idea of utterances in its spontaneity – its lack of appropriate context. In those situations he argues “spontaneous utterances have the categorial status of deeds.”

So when Dawkins is asked for his opinions concerning the dispute between BA and its employer who wishes to wear her religious symbol (which they do not permit) it is entirely innappropriate to focus his answer on the aesthetic qualities of her face. Hitchens is even more blatant in his intolerance when he describes ‘people of faith’ as plotting your ‘destruction’. He doesn’t qualify this and say:- I only mean the suicide bombers type, but Quakers and Buddhists are OK. Similarly he doesnt say some people of faith are plotting our destruction in the same way that I could utter some politicians are plotting our destruction – he makes it explicitly clear that he means all people of faith – indicative of his paranoia, ignorance and fear and hatred of the other. Dawkins sadly for a very educated man has as you well know a track record for ‘offensive’ language – and there is no point arguing about what counts as offence and that people should have thicker skins, intolerant language which goes beyond the language of disagreement is indefensible. Intolerant language is itself a deed.

My original post, and my presentation of the postmodern paradigm has no problem with disagreement (that is not the issue). But respect for the “other” involves as Nick Clegg has suggested an open heart and mind. Childish name calling, paranoid conspiracy theories, mocking scorn – this is not open-hearted language.

I was inclined to write this after reading an interesting article by Stuart Jefferies in the Guardian concerning the great social divide between religion and secularism that is becoming increasingly intolerant.

“We must accept the other fellow’s religion, but only in the sense and to the extent that we respect his theory that his wife is beautiful and his children smart.” H.L.Mencken

This perceptive comment by an American Journalist many years ago would seem to provide a compelling argument for respecting other peoples beliefs and disbeliefs and most importantly not allowing disagreements about it (which psychologically rest on matters of taste) to spoil friendships. And yet in the latter 20th and early 21st century it would appear that the ‘argument’ between these two deeply entrenched sides has led to the souring of the relationship and a greater dependence upon the law courts and parliament to seperate and adjudicate.

“You have a triangle with fundamentalist secularists in one corner, fundamentalist faith people in another, and then the intelligent, thinking liberals of Anglicanism, Roman Catholicism, baptism, methodism, other faiths – and, indeed, thinking atheists – in the other corner. ” Colin Slee – Dean of Southwark

The battle then, for thats what it is, is no longer about people of faith and people of no faith simply agreeing to disagree and living their lives in accordance with their tastes and with respect to the laws of their society, it has become (between the fundamentalists) a war, a desire to eliminate or subjugate the other. But why should this be so? Why should this situation that has previously been timid have become such a violently contentious issue?

According to Tariq Ramadan a Muslim scholar and senior research fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford, it is due to a fear of the “other”. Secularists and people of faith particularly post 9/11 and post cold war have grown to distrust and fear the other, and percieve a ‘threat’ where perhaps none exists. This seems to me, along with an intellectually stale uncritical and literal acceptance of the ‘key discourses’ (both religious and secular) to have the ring of truth to it. The “other” so central to postmodern ethics and politics, the object with which we are compelled to identifiy in postmodernism, is now described by otherwise intellectually rigorous scholars with abusive terms and mocking scorn. It seems the “other” has never been so far away as it is now, when people of faith condemn to the hellfires those who are heathen and heretic and when atheists such as Dawkins describe faith as a poison, dangerous to self and society, that euphemistically calls “gerinoil” (an acronym for religion).

But abuse is nothing as compared to the sort of language that borders on incitement to hatred or dogmatic ideology. What is going on, truly, in the minds of the author or the reader when someone reads Christopher Hitchens for example conclude the opening chapter of his book God is not Great with words such as these?

“As I write these words and as you read them, people of faith are in their different ways planning your and my destruction, and the destruction of all the hard-won human attainments that I have touched upon. Religion poisons everything.”

Is this not the language of the crusade? Is this not the language of the rabble rouser and the mob? What is being inferred here? That our way of life is in danger thanks to religion and religious people, they will destroy us… unless. ‘Unless’ what? In response to Hitchens the obvious question is, ‘so what are we to do about it?’ – I don’t think I need to elaborate, hateful polemic and hateful propaganda transform into hateful actions sooner or later. Although Hitchens would despise my comparison I must say it nonetheless; in the late 1920′s many Jews would have been revolted at the fiercely anti-semitic polemic evident in Hitler’s raving manifesto Mein Kampf, but too few would have interpreted in it a warning of soon-to-come pogroms, ghettoization and genocide. Precisely the same criticism can be levelled at people of faith too when their dogmatic and unshakeable belief in the righteousness of their God and their scripture leads them to make such violent statements of intent about throwing homosexuals off of tall buildings, or condemning people for making lifestyle choices such as Gay marriage or abortion. Though some may find such choices not to their taste is this justification for condemning them, describing them as abomination, the worst of the worst, and reason to blow them up?

It is remarkeable to note but both sides feel threatened, and when ones way of life is threatene, then much as one would if your life itself was under threat, moves are taken to build the barricades and defend oneself. But unfortunately the deeper one digs the bunker the further one removes onself from the “other” and the less likely one is to even try to attempt understanding, respect, tolerance and reconciliation.

Perhaps most remarkeable of all is that this battleground is being drawn up by intellectuals who should know better. Whose intelligence is such that they should have learnt the lessons of history regards intolerance and absolutist dogmatism. So what are we to do?

Some say education is the key. But how? At Exeter university the Christian Union was banned from its facilities because membership of the Union required a person to sign up to a testimony of beliefs, which naturally as it is a worldview is liable to offend somebody somewhere. Because of its anti-homosexual opinions it was banned. Rightly so perhaps, for surely homophobia has no place in society – but an educational institution banning a society – has all tolerance and freedom of expression – including the freedom to express unpalatable opinions – been eradicated?

Then of course there are faith schools. I shall say little on these as our blog has covered this topic and the pro’s and con’s more than enough already. But is abolition of a system that at present provides choice the answer of tolerance? John Sentamu Archbishop of York sees more sinister forces at play. The abolition of faith schools on the grounds that they are indoctrinaire is just a cover for aggressive secularist policies. What next? The British Humanist Association thinks that religion has too much of a foothold in politics. Certainly with anglican bishops in the house of lords and public rituals broadcast on tv and religious oaths in use across the lands courts, they may have a point. But, is this evidence of an underground movement to subvert the state and the freedom of its citizens by a religious minority (majority if faith identification rather than practise is the criteria) or is it just emblematic of an anachronistic system that hasnt quite realised that the days of ‘Christian Britain’ and the British Empire have long ceased to be true or relevant?

Of course the media and popular culture has got into the act too. The danish cartoons of the prophet Mohammed sparked protests and counter protests, Jerry Springer the Opera has angered evangelicals who want a return to the old strict blasphemy laws. Even childrens authors are having a go, Phillip Pullman argues that atheism should be taught in schools.

“What I fear and deplore in the ‘faith school’ camp is their desire to close argument down and put some things beyond question or debate. It’s vital to get clear in young minds what is a faith position and what is not, so that, for instance, they won’t be taken in by religious people claiming that science is a faith position no different in kind from Christianity. Science is not a matter of faith, and too many people are being allowed to get away with claiming that it is.”

If he is talking about the teaching of a seven day creation as literal truth, or of intelligent design being taught as a challenge to evolutionary science, then yes perhaps there is a problem that needs to be addressed. But is this true of faith schools in general, or is he guilty of the very thing he deplores closing arguments down. Isn’t that what teaching atheism in schools is aimed at doing? Isn’t that what his childrens books hope to achieve? Isn’t that what Dawkins explicitly stated as his intention when he wrote the God Delusion?

I believe it is. From my perspective as a postmodernist, Modernity is now in crisis. The fundamentalist corner of religious and secular thinkers are plunging us into a new dark age. As rigorously dogmatic as each other all emphasis on practise and inner peace is ignored in favour of beliefs.

“It is not just in the rigidity of their unbelief that atheists mimic dogmatic believers. It is in their fixation on belief itself… When they dissect arguments for the existence of God, atheists parody the rationalistic theologies of western Christianity.” John Gray professor of European Thought at the London School of Economics.

Science may not be a faith, in the literal meaning of the word, but it is a worldview and its methods nothing more than a toolkit to present and verify it, and is therefore totally neutral regards religious claims (when both language games stay in their respective corners I admit!).

“No scientific method says that there is no doubt. If you don’t accept there’s doubt in all things, you’re being intellectually dishonest. ” Rabbi Nueberger

Would it that the fundamentalists of both sides could see and share this postmodern view. It is bad enough when a society tears itself apart over whether its employers may allow its workers to wear a religious symbol while at work, and to debate the values of faith and secularism. But when ‘believers’ and I deliberately use that word of both sides use the language of hate, scorn and derision then I fear we are building ourselves a huge bonfire that is going to do irreperable damage.

What have we come to when an otherwise respectable intellectual and scientist such as Richard Dawkins can comment publicly – as though it was worth us bothering to listern – his opinions on the worker who wanted to wear her small crucifix to work.

“I saw a picture of this woman. She had one of the most stupid faces I’ve ever seen.” R.Dawkins

Surely we have learnt the lessons of Soviet Russia who tried and failed to eradicate religion forceably. Are not people free to choose, should we not as Mencken asks tolerate with a sense of irony the peculair oddities in the beliefs of ‘others’. If we dont then the divide will only get deeper and the comments of Richard Chatres Bishop of London, will I fear, for both secularists and religious minded people come to be true.

“If you exile religious communities to the margins, then they will start to speak the words of fire among consenting adults, and the threat to public order and the public arena, I think, will grow and grow.”

Tolerance and respect for diversity will cost us substantially less than intolerance, division and hatred for others beliefs.

I have just read the Troublesome Offspring of Cardinal Guzman by Louis De Bernieres.  And at first I was afraid I wouldnt like it and that it would simply be a theist bashing novel, or a literary work of art that sought to undermine religion (see Phillip Pullman). I was really suprised how much I enjoyed it, and how challenging to me (a religious believer) it was.

Synopsis lifted from wikipeadia:-

Cardinal Guzman lives extravagantly in the capital, and immorally, due to the discoveries of his having had a young son and his loathing of the poor shanty-dwellers who live below his palace. Despite the downfall of El Jerarca in Señor Vivo and the Coca Lord, the drug trade continues and the economy of the country spirals ever downward. Cardinal Guzman’s clergy and the corrupt military of the country set out to destroy the heresy of the countryside, and, more specifically, Cochadebajo de los Gatos, the town where the characters of the previous books have settled. In so doing the hypocrisy of his faith with his own promiscuousness is revealed.

My thoughts:-

The book provided an insightful commentary on the absurd hypocrisies of life. Nothing is beyond the books scope, religion, politics, secularism, militarism, drugs, its got it all. The heros of the book dwell in Cochadebajo de los Gatos and encompass ex-communists, vigilantes, a defrocked priest, a professor, an indigenous Indian shaman, desertors from the army, a musicologist and an army of prostitutes. This city ruled on egalitarian principles with no institutional moralising (polygamy is tolerated) is presented as an idyll, inhabited by every type of person you could imagine, peacefully co-existing side by side. Politics and religion, the two main themes are represented in every form, desireable and abhorrent. In the postmodern character of this novel the heros are tolerant of all traditions. The criminals of the piece President Veracruz, Cardinal Guzman, Monsignor Anquilar are depicted in their fully abhorrent, corrupt and malign selves. The basic message of the novel is about the plurality of human traditions and beliefs, and the corruptibility and hypocrisy of power. The crusade scenes are deliberately bloodthirsty and make very hard reading, but achieve the desired effect both as an analogous comment and as a historical account of the real crusades that the religion of ‘brotherly love’ once perpetrated against those whose beliefs were somehow different.

The book though was full of hope, that the ordinary person can do extraordinary things. And any number of ordinary people can achieve even greater feats of extraordinariness. My favourite tool used in the book was the various spiritual entities, from ghosts, to saints, to heretical visions, to the indigenous gods of latin america. They are portrayed as real beings (for those who believe in them) but most importantly as reasonable beings. St Thomas Aquinas who appears renounces all his earthly writings and condemns those who engage in spiritually inspired violence based upon the theological ideas he was once certain of. The author interestingly has Thomas quote from his own hagiography where sometime prior to his death he stopped writing, having had a vision, and realised the hopeless inneffability of God. The spiritual beings, where they come into the book constantly remind us that the reality of belief often falls way short of the ideal. Likewise secularism is commented upon as having its own fanatics, its own violent failings (mostly this is done in the political storyline).

Like I said it was a challenging read, the villains were as bad as could be imagined, the atrocities conducted on their behalf too real for comfort. But I finished the book with a renewed sense of hope. The spiritual and political ideals that underpin the lives of many will survive the degradations of the institutions that purport to uphold them. There are good Christians for whom the taint of the inquisition would be grossly unfair. There are political people who wish to change the world we live in for the better, for whom the crimes of the powerful were a betrayal of all that was good. Power, as the saying goes, corrupts absolutely. But tolerance, plurality, sharing and common sympathy. These are virtues that can change the world, and you dont need to be a President or a Cardinal to bring about that change. In a ringing endorsement of existentialism and postmodernism, you and I can make choices about how we live and how we treat those who are different (which is everyone else in essence). Our choices can bring about change.

Here is an alternative review, which is slightly more positive.

I’d expected to dislike the encyclical entirely. And am suprised to find myself in partial agreement with AC1. But on reflection I think Pope Benedict isnt quite so negative as it is portrayed. Certainly it is inherently conservative, and I am a little concerned that he should make no reference to the Conciliar document Gaudium et Spes (which deals with the Church and its place in the modern world) a document that shows a desire for progress and reconciliation.

Most of the encyclical reads like the conclusions of a philosopher nearing his death (which he is), sorting out his intellectual estate. A lot of it is old news and a repeat of his pre-papal writings. Yet within the document he expresses some suprisingly (for him) progressive views. Including a reformulation of the idea of purgatory. Part of his lifes work has been to promote the unity between faith and reason, a project that is not entirely at ease in the postmodern condition where it seems to have been completely seperated.

I particularly found this quote interesting (having already judged the encyclical to be a discourse of power – and a conservative theological manifesto).

No one and nothing can guarantee that the cynicism of power—whatever beguiling ideological mask it adopts—will cease to dominate the world. This is why the great thinkers of the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, were equally critical of atheism and theism.

Although ultimately he rejects this thesis as having gone too far, he accepts that it is a valid response to the injustices created by competing discourses of power – hiding behind whatever mask (including Christian love) it chooses to seduce us with. This is quite radical I must say for a conservative pope, and his vaguely implied conclusions are that in order to avoid reaching that same thesis the Church is in need of reform – perhaps not progressive reform – but a renewal of itself. And thus ultimately as all Christian institutions aim to do – he harks somewhat towards a return to the idealized picture of the early apostolic church.

His opening lines state this message quite clearly. Salvation/Redemption (the justification for the Church’s existence) is not a guarunteed given. It is offered, and therein lies hope. The goal towards which the achievement makes the journey of life worthwhile (within his worldview). But the process by which this is achieved is in our hands which sounds rather existential. In that light I feel that this encyclical is not quite as bad as I at first feared.

Formerly, powerful encryption techniques have only been available within military and academic circles. The computer revolution has put this resource into any users hands. This includes anti-government dissidents and terrorists. Even without attempting to hid the message, encrypted data is also similar in appearance to random data.

Governments may have the power to break strong encryption, but that ability would be of the highest secrecy. It would therefore hardly be used except in the most extreme cases. Rather than breaking the code (or admitting to breaking it), the UK government passed The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). This enables them to require people to hand over their encryption keys. If the user does not comply, they face up to 2 years in prison. Apparently “I forgot the password” is not a valid defense against this.

What is worrying is that most files on your computer are potential stores for hidden or encrypted data. If you are asked for the passwords, you MUST provide the password or face prison. You cannot prove that there isn’t data being hidden! If you are falsely accused, you go to prison.

This is not a hypothetical situation. There is an animal rights activist who claims is facing this dilemma.

Anti Citizen One

PS. Orwell’s big brother was an amateur compared to these people…

One of my pet interests is in languages, linguistics and the role of language in thought, knowledge and consequently philosophy.

There is a staggering statistic that most people are unaware of and that is that on average one language dies every 2 weeks. This decimation of microsocial linguistics is truly tragic as each language (no matter how obscure and premodern) contains axiomatic and idiomatic terms that are culturally specific and unique.  Take the Monchak language of western Mongolia that will be dead within a generation, this language has no word for grandchild but several for goats with different colours or markings. Why is this important, wouldnt fewer languages make cross-cultural communication easier?

The problem is this: with each language that dies an idea, or a way of formulating an idea, a way of percieving the world, in other words a nugget of knowledge is lost.

And this is important to a variety of human endeavours including science and medicine. Today pharmacologists searching for new drugs to combat rapidly evolving bacteria and viral diseases are looking evermore at the traditional herbal and medical traditions of remote pre-modern cultures. Different ways of looking at the world, and of harnessing its resources that 50 years ago would have been condemned and ignored as primitive and of little value, today is being reevaulated for the benefit of future generations. With each language that dies out, or goes unrecorded, snippets of information and ideas may be lost.

The National Geographic Enduring Voices Project are sponsoring and collaborating with the Living Tongues Institute for Endangered Languages. Please take a look at their website in order to at least get a better idea of why this is an important conservation project.

In a news article today it has been announced that Civil Servants working within the Education Department will in future be able to take bank holidays under the religious days of their choice.

At present the country has 8 set bank holidays that apply to all workers, some of which (including Christmas Day and Good Friday) have their roots in Christian festivals. Under the new proposal it means staff who do not celebrate the Christian calender (for example) may choose to work from home on those days which they can then take-off in lieu on those days that they wish to mark.

This proposal means that Hindus, Sikhs, Jews, Muslims, Ba’haists, Zoroastrians and Pagans (amongst others) may work on Christmas day if they choose, and have their festivals such as Diwali, Hannukah, Eid etc., marked as a bank holiday instead. This proposal would also appear to be applicable to atheists and secularists alike, who may choose to transfer any one of the 8 current bankholidays to another date of their choice, for whatever reason they choose.

In my opinion this is a positive move. Some ‘right wingers’ have already criticised this initiative for being politically correct or for denigrating the Christian heritage of our country. This is a mute point as it is quite possible to describe this country as being post-christian in terms not merely of religious adherence but of practise. I think the idea of cultural flexitime is an excellent compromise and avoids the extreme of having multiple extra bank-holidays established in order to appease minority faith groups.

Chad Varah was the founder of the Samaritans, a charity that espoused listening therapy for the suicidal and despairing.

When founded in 1953, suicide was still viewed as a symptom of mental illness and moral depravity, Varah preffered to view it as a symptom of circumstance, whose genesis in individuals could vary for enormous reasons.

He was motivated to found this charity when as a newly ordained priest in the Anglican church he conducted a funeral for a 13 year old girl who had committed suicide upon experiencing her first menstrual cycle. Uninformed about adolescence and sexual development she had assumed it to be a symptom of a sexually transmitted disease and in despair and shame, took her own life. He vowed from that moment to help all people in despair and to offer therapeutic advice on sexual matters without judgement or condemnation.

Consequently upon founding the movement, named by the media after the ‘Good Samaritan’ of Christian scriptures he established certain fixed rules.

• The Charity was to be secular.
• It’s therapy was to be listening based.
• It’s members were to be taken from all branches of society.
• They should be neither “prudish” nor “preachy” as the problems they would encounter would be of an extremely personal nature, and the aim of the therapy was to listen to the person in need, and not to lecture them.

Chad Varah, mirroring Augustine of Hippo centuries before, freely admitted in his biographies to sexual experimentation before his marriage and his ordination in the church. This he saw as giving him an insight into the angsts and emotions encountered by those who suffered turmoil in an age where sex and sexuality was never openly discussed. He was an advocate of open and thorough sex education. And in later life whilst continuing to minister as a priest he also sat on the board of reference for the Adult magazine ‘Forum’.

He died aged 95 on the 7th November 2007, if not a “saint” as classically defined then perhaps a “model” and “Iconic” figure of the postmodern-paradigm.