Yet There Is Method In It

This is something of a development from my first response where I asked was it right to impose western cultural values upon non-western cultures. The idea that I was driving at and may expand upon more in my concluding post is that principles such as freedom of speech are fine, but we also have a right to be offended.
This post is going to take a more radical direction though and ask the question why must we assume the existence of natural rights?

Having re-read the opening post in this string I noticed that apart from once the notion of rights wasn’t really explicitly stated. Rather the concept was inferred with ideas such as freedom of speech, freedom of religious belief and so on. In principle I would agree with these notions but I am concerned (in the philosophical sense) that these principles are based upon unnacceptable assumptions. Namely the assumption that we have inalienable, or universal, or natural rights. The philosopher G.E.Moore described this assumption as a naturalistic fallacy, the error of trying to derive an ‘ought’ statement from an ‘is’ statement where there is no ‘ought’ premise.

A few philosophers have touched upon this problem with regards to natural rights, but perhaps none so vociferously as the Utilitarian thinker Jeremy Bentham.

Bentham wrote on the matter in his ‘Critique of the doctrine of Inalienable, Natural rights.’ http://www.ditext.com/bentham/bentham.html

This was written as a response to the written constitutions that followed the French and American Revolutions which used such phrases as “We hold these truths to be self-evident” and “The end in view of every political association is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.”

Now for some criticism! At the basic level we can criticise the notion of rights as being individualistic and thereby inadequate to the cause of society as all basic rights are really competative. The right to freedom of speech can stand opposed to the right not to be slandered against, or lied about. The right to life is in contrast with the right to die (argued for by the pro-euthanasia lobby). We also struggle with ‘right conflicts’ when for example someone is murdered, thus having their right to life contravened by the murderer, what ‘rights’ status does the murderer enjoy? Where capital punishment is applicable the argument is that the murderer has forfeited their right to life, upon whose authority and judgement is this decision reached? We have a right to liberty, yet we also have a right to justice, how can we reconcile the two when we imprison criminals? With regards the U.S. Constitution and its basis in the Declaration of Rights how can we reconcile death by electric shock, gassing, hanging etc, or imprisonment, or Guantanamo Bay with the right not to suffer from cruel or unusual punishments?

All of these which point towards the inconsistency of inalienable and natural rights, are summed up by Bentham in his following critique. If you have a right not to be oppressed, then you have a right to resist oppression, if you have a right to resist oppression then you have a right to resist all law, authority, administration and percieved unpleasantness. If such rights exists then “Submit not to any decree or other act of power, of the justice of which you are not yourself perfectly convinced.” A fine notion one might think, were he not being sarcastic. For he concludes if you are a criminal, or a sociopath brought before the courts for a criminal act, then “If a judge sentences you to be imprisoned or put to death, have a dagger ready, and take a stroke first at the judge.”

The point Bentham is making is, if we assume natural and inalienable rights, from where do these rights originate and from where do they gain such authority?

The declaration of rights found in the U.S. Declaration of Independence ascribes the root of these rights to the ‘Creator’ who endowed them upon humanity. Yet the use of the word Creator is problematic, as it infers theological principles. The truth is there are no theological principles that endow humans with natural or inalienable rights. Nor do religions subscribe to such notions. Christianity for example, echoed by Kant, is concerned more with Duties and Responsibilities than with Rights. “Do Unto Others That Which You Would Have Done Unto Yourself” (ed. My emphasis). So we cannot really ascribe natural rights to a divine source. We have also seen the opposition to a derivation of rights from Natural law in the Naturalistic Fallacy, deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is.

So whats the answer to the question, where do natural rights come from and what gives them their authority? Jonathon Wallace points out that the phrase “We hold these truths to be self-evident” is simply a “more elegant version of ‘Because we said so.‘” Jean-Jacques Rousseau also believed that a concept of ‘rights’ had no relevence to a theory or practise of ‘constitutionalism’ and that ‘natural rights’ had no relevence to the proposition of a constitution, legal code and set of ‘rights.’ He proposed instead that society existed because of a ’social contract’ where rights and responsibilities are derived from a consentual contract between government and people.

This last view is much the same as that held by Bentham, he felt that where ‘rights’ existed they were essentially human made and their authority and relevance came from humans themselves and human governance. Therefore they were neither inalienable nor natural and more importantly they were impermanent, which for a Utilitarian such as he was, was crucial. A right existed as a social phenomena, that served its purpose only so far as it was advantageous to society. Where it was advantageous it becomes enshrined in law, but the moment it ceases to be advantageous it should be abolished. The notion of ‘rights’ he believed served society, not the other way around. Any concept of natural rights he felt, as well as being a naturalistic fallacy was also vague and undistinguishable. And a ‘right’ as he termed it (a socially advantageous legal principle) was devalued the instant it became entangled with other so-called ‘rights’.

So where do we stand today? I think we find ourselves caught in the same fog of indeterminacy that Bentham so thoroughly objected to. On the one hand we commonly agree to a right to life, which better stated is the right not to be unnaturally killed by another. This is upheld by the law in Murder, Manslaughter and various other degrees of unlawful killing statutes. Such statutes, and one could say such a right, exists because it is socially advantageous not to have people randomly or maliciously killing their fellow citizens. But in cases such as abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, self-defence, certain societies do not maintain the right to life as being socially advantageous, particularly where it conflicts or competes with alternative ‘rights’. The womans ‘right to choose’, the ‘right to death’, the ‘right to protect society/justice’, the ‘right to wage war’. So while we agree that we have the right not to be killed ourselves we tend to prevaricate and become indeterminate when applying those rights elsewhere. The fog of indeterminacy further shows itself when we hold such lofty and general principles that we call ‘natural rights’ and yet resort to laws and legal codes and courts of law to rule upon them and make arbitrary decisions.

The question I ask then is can we assume natural rights? Or are rights, just like social and political values specific to each society? In which case, with regards the argument in defence of offence, once again is it not wrong to impose our concept of natural rights upon others?

Bentham described ‘natural rights’ as “terrorist language“, “More confusion - more nonsense - and the nonsense, as usual, dangerous nonsense.”

In answer to my own question then, I fully support Jeremy Bentham when he declares that notions of ‘natural rights’ are “simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptable rights, rhetorical nonsense, - nonsense upon stilts!”

I commend this argument to the house.

I wish to argue that we do not have the right not to be offended. It is likely the offended party has views that others would find offensive so we cannot judge the argument based on one sides displeasure, anger, resentment, or wounded feelings (this is the definition of offended).

“Religion doesn’t seem to work like that; it has certain ideas at the heart of it which we call sacred or holy or whatever. That’s an idea we’re so familiar with, whether we subscribe to it or not, that it’s kind of odd to think what it actually means, because really what it means is ‘Here is an idea or a notion that you’re not allowed to say anything bad about; you’re just not. Why not? — because you’re not!’” Douglas Adams

People usually defend their current views regardless of their current validity. This is seen in cases of conformational bias where we emphasis evidence that agrees with our current view.

The Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons saw outrage and protests against what was intended as humour. Many people were killed in demonstrations around the world. I consider this over-reacting to say the least. But then Islam is not tolerant of critisism:

Those who malign Allah and His messenger, Allah hath cursed them in the world and the Hereafter, and hath prepared for them the doom of the disdained. Quran 33:57

But this quote does illustrate an all powerful God does not need defending from insults - he can look after himself! Why then the outrage? Some religions are more tolerant, for example Father Ted is considered amusing, while some took exception to Dogma.

In an example of cultural offense: “An Indian court has issued an arrest warrant for Hollywood actor Richard Gere after he kissed Bollywood star Shilpa Shetty in public.” Most people only heard about this because it was splashed across newspaper headlines with photos. If this was offensive, why did it end up selling newspapers and their owners profiting from the supposed outrage? A smart observation: “If the human body’s obscene complain to the manufacturer not me” Larry Flynt in the movie (question: is that a direct quote?)

Dawkins’s views have been considered “insulting” and “patronising” by many commentators. The insulting aspect of his views is the physical world is all that there is and there is no God - and if you disagree you are “delusioned”. This is in a nutshell materialism which “holds that the only thing that can truly be said to exist is matter; that fundamentally, all things are composed of material and all phenomena are the result of material interactions; that matter is the only substance.” Is it insulting that he said opponents of materialism are deluded? Well possibly but he did not intend to insult - its just his view (and mine). If I say people who believe in Odin are deluded is that insulting? In this case there are no believers to offend (that are known to me*). Unsurprisingly, the non-existence of Odin is accepted without complaint.

*Update: Apparently Germanic Neopagan groups believe in him. Instead of Odin, imagine I had said Flying Spaghetti Monster - a god who definitely has no current believers.

Perhaps people who rush to the defense of religion should take a look at their sacred texts which generally are more forgiving.

“..do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you” Luke 6

“Repel evil with good.” Quran 28:54

An exception or related rule is people should not be harassed. If I stood outside your house with a megaphone and ranted at you all day with upsetting opinions, or posted shocking photos then that is not cool.
If you voluntarily watched a TV programme or read a book, that is not harassment since you can switch off/put it down at any time.

Also, for a thought experiment, imagine a person that was offended by absolutely anything - we could not do anything for fear of causing offense. Everything is forbidden. Reductio ad absurdum, etc. That is why I oppose censorship (which usually an instrument of state control) but accept classification of material. On the other hand: “The sinister fact about literary censorship in England is that it is largely voluntary” George Orwell.

My ideal is people can freely discuss their views without forcing or imposing them on other people. My current view is summed up in this quote:

We must accept the other fellow’s religion, but only in the sense and to the extent that we respect his theory that his wife is beautiful and his children smart. HL Mencken

And a quote that I just found:

“Everyone is in favor of free speech. Hardly a day passes without its being extolled, but some people’s idea of it is that they are free to say what they like, but if anyone else says anything back, that is an outrage.” — Winston Churchill

Anti Citizen One