Thoughts on Dawkin’s “The God Delusion”
Ethics, Religion, Reviews September 21st, 2008I have recently finished reading The God Delusion. I have complicated feeling about the book. On one hand it is well written with interesting anecdotes. On the other hand it does appear to be using a sledgehammer to crack a nut.
The book could perhaps be shorter if this argument was more focused rather than attack every aspect of religion. An example is the argument “because we cannot explain X, god did it.” Dawkins first points out that this is not logically valid but then goes about explaining X with X in this case being complexity of life. This causes Dawkins’s critics to attack evolution but this distraction causes the invalid argument criticism to be forgotten.
The writing style is aimed at a general reader which necessarily involves some simplification of the arguments. I don’t think much is lost in the simplification but it does annoy philosophers. Most of the arguments are taken from Hume, Epicurus, etc so there is nothing new. What Dawkins brings to the debate is to contemporise them. Interestingly, there is very little overlap between Dawkins and Nietzsche although they have similar goals. Nietzsche would have blasted Dawkins’s humanism.
Dawkins has become infamous for his views on the non-existence of God. I feel I should mention the common criticism and note that they are wide of the mark. For those who criticize Dawkins for simply expressing his opinion, this hardly seems compatible with modern (free speech) or biblical (turn the other cheek) ethical standards. Others assume criticism of religion is the same as calling for its eradication. Dawkins does not calls for this in the book. Those that call Dawkins’s position a “religion”, a faith or an indoctrination method are usually committing ad hominem tu quoque. And finally a common criticism against Dawkins is agnosticism causes evil actions. I have not heard any valid causal connection between the two and it is a non sequitur as it stands. I suggest anyone trying to read the book to ignore previous views, either for or against.
He makes a good point on the source of morality in religion and almost taken from the pages of modern philosophy. Most religious people interpret religious texts to find a moral system. The literalists have an untenable position due to inconsistencies in the text. But what do we use to guide interpretation? Dawkins argues this interpretation must necessarily come from outside scripture. This undermines any claim that morality comes from holy books and puts religious morality on the same level as secular morality.
He also cites studies that different cultures have an instinctive grasp of a common morality. Reading between the lines, it is almost like calling for that to be the basis of morality. This reminds me of Hume’s attempt at founding morality on empirical observation. This approach to morality is incomplete since it only addresses morality when everyone is in agreement with moral law. For novel moral questions, our instinct is often silent.
Dawkins has no time for agnosticism. He distinguishes between two types of agnosticism. For the first type (which he calls Permanent Agnosticism in Principle) is a deistic God beyond the reach of evidence. He seems dismissive of this position and treats it as similar to ignosticism (the concept of God is meaningless). It is difficult to fathom Dawkin’s argument on this point. This brand of agnosticism is perhaps a distant relative of a postmodern God (in that the significance of God comes from the believer rather than from an objective source). The second type of agnosticism (Temporary Agnosticism in Practice) treats God as being inside and part of nature (an empirical hypothesis). Dawkins dismisses TAP because, in his view, the empirical evidence implies that there is no God. Before the postmodernists object to this argument, remember that most religious people believe God is very real and capable of physical manifestation. Dawkins’s book explicitly does not address Deism, Pantheonism, Buddhism or any similar world view. His argument is against the mainstream God of Abraham.
The aim of the book takes a controversial stance in today’s “tolerant” society. Dawkins sets out to deconvert believers whose belief is wavering. He recognises that it is impossible to deconvert a firm believer using rational argument and this is not his aim. The second and perhaps more difficult point is he equates religious instruction of children to child abuse. He argues that children never had a chance to make a free and informed decision to belong to religion. Children should therefore be protected from their parents. Liberals should note that an outside agency disrupting a family has a certain precedence; we allow the state to interfere with family affairs. But Dawkins assumes that free choice in belief is possible and I am not sure if that is true! When I child is part of a family, the teaching of some moral system is unavoidable. Independent thought can be encouraged but at some point this is oxymoronic - a young adult is told to have original thought and freedom. To obey this instruction is then not free or original! I find it difficult to imagine a society in which children are protected from the religion of their parents. The alternative is for parents to voluntarily not teach religion until early adulthood. I doubt many religions would agree to that constraint.
A final note: attaching the labels “militant”, “religious” or “fundamentalist” to Dawkins is ad hominem. If an argument is to be made against his religious position, please people, address his argument directly and don’t go after the man. It annoys me when implicit atheists (”the absence of theistic belief without a conscious rejection of it”) are grouped with other variants of atheism. The absence of belief is obviously not a type of religion or fundamentalism.
Anti Citizen One

September 22nd, 2008 at 2:46 pm
Some comments in reverse on what is a very informative and concise and fair review.
Labels against the man may not necessarily be ad hominem - not if used as a rhetorical means rather than as a logical end. Obviously the use of perjoratives in rhetoric and polemic is intended to sway the reader/listener into having sympathy or common identity with one view or another. And as such has no relevance to the logical rectitude of any propositions he may or may not make.
However a postmodern analysis would suggest that nobody is wholly independent from such implicit bias. And it may well be argued that Dawkins himself proceeds from a generalised ad hominem view that religious belief is irrational or wrong etc. and then seeks to demonstrate this with appeals to reason.
Indeed one may suggest in a Feyerabendian vein that Dawkins often expresses a rationalist chauvenism in some of his more outspoken comments (”The enemies of reason”, “She has a stupid face” etc.) in order to distinguish between the rational and reasonable (good people, trustworthy people, good parents, good leaders) and the irrational and mad (bad or dangerous people, child abusers, prone to terrorism and fundamentalism).
However - rhetorical ad hominems - quite rightly as AC-1 says - should not be employed as a rejection of those parts of his arguments that are themselves (or at least are potrayed as being) non-rhetorical.
One of the contentious elements of his writings is the equation of a religious upbringing with child abuse. Quite aside from the (again rhetorical) inflammatory associations society currently interprets with regard child abuse (sexual misconduct, physical violence etc.) I find it particularly distasteful insofar as AC-1 highlights we allow the state to intervene in child abuse cases - thus the implicit inference is that the secular state should protect children from their religious parents.
My distaste arises out of the fact that this has historical precedent. The Soviet Union under Krushchev undertook a third purge against religion in society. The first under Stalin which involved arrests, prosecutions, imprisonment, exile and executions failed to supress religious belief or practise (a 1937 census revealed over 55% of the population still identified with Russian Orthodoxy). The second assault following the relaxation of religious laws during the Second World War saw the normalisation of institutional disabilities for religious believers. Churches were shut - thus anybody attending a religious service at home or in a non-registered building or location was holding an illegal gathering. Anybody found to hold religious beliefs or to have participated in religous services were denied membership of the Communist Party and commonly found employment and higher education oppurtunities denied to them as well - as a corrollory anyone found working on the black market as many were forced to do to avoid abject poverty were similarly liable for prosecution.
The third purge (which is said to have had most success in undermining the catacomb or underground orthodox churches) saw the state sieze the offspring of religious persons and imprison them in specialist re-education boarding schools were a variety of clockwork orange type methods were employed to ‘convert’ the child to atheism. Often in those cases where there was a failure the child could expect to find themselves institutionalised in a mental hospital.
Much of this seems to me to be contrary to most notions of a fair or just society. Dawkins does not make such demands - let that be clear - but his views seem to be such that as AC-1 noted the state may feel itself justified to intervene.
It is interesting to note that Dawkins claims not to wish to deconvert firm believers by means of rational argument - nor indeed thinks it to be possible. But rather that he aims at that portion of the population whose belief is wavering.
This to me seems to be ideological proselytism during a time of existential crisis. And such interference (by believers or non-believers) would seem to be paternalistic and contrary to autonomous decision making.
I find his objections to agnosticism fairly interesting and his categorisations reflect those of my own (though in reverse - I deny that non-belief and implicit atheism are of the same genus). His dismissal of Permanent Agnosticism in Principle is in my opinion an own goal of dramatic proportions. It is a philosophical perspective in epistemology that proposes that certain metaphysical concepts are either unmeasurable (ignosticism) or inherently impossible to prove or disprove (radical scepticism).
It is an own goal insofar as he therefore is stating that the God-hypothesis may be resolved one way or another (including the affirmation of the hypothesis and the demonstration of the existence of God). The means by which he approaches this position is by arguing that the hypothesis may be put to the test by the evidence. There is unfortunately a multiplicity of problems with taking this approach.
First of all it requires a firm and commonly agreed definition of the divinity and its attributes and the manner of which these may or may not manifest themselves in the world.
I propose that such a common agreement may never be found. A very simple example in the Catholic-Orthodox Christian traditions would be the internal dissent (unresolved) between a philosophical via positiva versus via negativa. Between Scholasticism and Hesychasm. And of course the according tensions between these philosophical positions and the everday practise of religious belief - strong institutional church versus anchorite individualism. The mediation of a priesthood and rituals and the private contemplation of the eremitic life.
Then what of manifestations - how can the divinity be known - can it be accessed - what can be known etc.?
All of these particular positions in the philosophy of religion can form a complex variety of theistic propositions. And just as AC-1 is annoyed at the general lumping together of implicit atheism with other atheisms - so too the more scholarly theists resent an oversimplified picture being presented of theism being a block view.
Before this becomes an elongated rant (which it is not intended to be as I rather enjoyed this review) perhaps I should make some concluding comments and questions.
It seems to me that Dawkins approaches the God-hypothesis from one of two directions.
1) On the basis of empirical observations he see’s no reason to attribute divinity to phenomena that may be explained naturally.
or
2) On the basis of a search for evidence for an assumed divinity he is lead to conclude that no such evidence exists.
Which of these accurately reflects Dawkins starting position?
If it is the first may we be confident that he has not approached the task without an a priori or implicit atheism colouring his views, observations and conclusions?
I suggest we cannot.
If it is the second may we be confident that in searching for evidence he has a) exhausted every possible avenue, b) has definitavely proved and demonstrated for all time the paucity of evidence both past, present and future?
Again I suggest we cannot.
Dawkins once famously said that he didnt bother reading theology as they all accepted the existence of God a priori and that this was no basis for a rational debate. And on another occasion that he is open to changing his view if “scientific” evidence could be shown to him that would cause him to discard his view.
On both occasions he demonstrates that he he too starts from a fixed position - in this case methodological scepticism and empirical materialism - and as such there is no guaruntee that a suitable cognitive framework can be estabished whereby an open debate may be embarked upon.
Without describing what sort of evidence he should require, or elucidating on how such evidence may be measured, interpreted or evaluated - nor for that matter satisfactorily resting upon a fixed definition of which God-hypothesis he is seeking to ‘prove’ or demonstrate - then alas we must find ourselves stuck in an impasse - or resign ourselves to a guided debate wherein preassumed values may be allowed to restrict free enquiry.
In conclusion I feel that Dawkins presents a narrow spectrum of possibility and is concerned to restrict free-enquiry with an arbitrary and guided system of logic. As such then I feel he misuses logic.
“A thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it is the thought. What is thinkable is possible too.” Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 3.02