The Zhuangzi offers a relativistic, perspectivist and non-essentialist analysis of language. In one analogy the author describes language as being like a fish net, an item that is only useful until the fish has been caught, but which is then obsolete and should be forgotten about until a new fish (or in this case a new meaning) is sought.

Words are not just wind. Words have something to say. But if what they have to say is not fixed, then do they really say something? Or do they say nothing? People suppose that words are different from the peeps of baby birds, but is there any difference, or isn’t there? - Ch2. Basic Writings.

It is possible to interpret this text in a sort of proto-wittgensteinian way. An anti-essentialist (and by extension logical-positivist) exposition of language is proposed. In the manner that the late Wittgenstein proposed “meaning is use” there seems to be a similar approach to language in the Zhuangzi.

Words are “signifiers”, that is they represent something, but that which they signify is not meaningful or discoverable in and of themselves. One cannot take a word, isolate it and strip it down to its essence and essential meaning (a claim that the logical positivists made). Meaning is not constant, rather it is dependent upon and itself contributes to the general context of the “text” in which it finds itself; statement, sentence, paragraph, discourse etc. Words do not have a pancontextual meaning, but only have or gain meaning when we attribute meaning to it in particular circumstances.

There is an interesting parrallel and bridge between the Zhuangzi and the early and later Wittgenstein. Towards the end of the Tractatus Wittgenstein teasingly tells us that the book (and indeed philosophy and language) is senseless:

6.54 My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Similarly having advocated that we throw away language once we have caught the meaning, Zhuangzi asks:

Where can I find a man who has forgotten words so I can have a word with him? Basic Writings p140

The Zhuangzi proceeds beyond this general contextualism to provide a more detailed analysis of language, quite remarkable considering its antiquity and the comparitively recent interest that philosophy has given to the topic.

The Zhuangzi distinguishes between three kinds of language. Watson (1968) translates these as “imputed words”, “repeated words” and “goblet words”. The first are words attributed to a great historical or legendary figure, which increases the impact that they have. The second are words which gain credibility by virtue of repetative familiarity, the analytical conclusion being that the familiar is often mistaken for the self-evident. Finally the third type “goblet words” are words whose meaning changes, Zhuangzi describes these as “words that are no-words”. It is a type of language that constantly refreshes itself thus more accurately being able to convey meaning - much like a goblet it is a vessel which may filled and emptied and thus more closely mirrors the distinctions necessary for understanding.

Zhuangzi it seems was influenced by his teacher and debating partner Hui Shi who held a similarly perspectivist philosophy of language. He focused on comparitive language - the type which is most transparently relativistic and perspectival. For example he said the word “tall” has no fixed range of reference (or therefore meaning). Tall for a Giraffe is not Tall for a Horse. Hui Shi generalised this relativistic aspect and concluded that no distinctions or differences rested on external reality, they are all merely projections of different perspectives.

Apart from the interesting superficial comparisons between the Zhuangzi and more contempory philosophies of language (Wittgenstein, Lyotard, Barthes, Derrida etc.) the ideas expressed fundamentally underpin an anarchic epistemology and existential morality, some more of which I hope to explore in subsequent posts.