The Zhuangzi (part 2) - relativism
Eastern Philosophy, Philosophy, Reviews July 14th, 2008Many scholars upon reading the Zhuangzi describe it as promoting philosophical relatvism. Although it is true that the work contains a relativistic element it is not totally relatvistic and on occasion gives a priveleged position to certain attitudes and behaviours. Thus to dismiss it as purely relatvistic would be a poor analsysis.
The text promotes two particular modes of experience. The first one in the field of cognitive mental states is that of “ming” or clarity. In this text it appears that “clarity” involves the ability to discern subtle distinctions without necessarily evaluating experience in terms of a preferred alternative.
In the field of behaviour the text promotes “wu wei” which translates as “effortless action”. This kind of behaviour is characterized by the minimization of conflict with that which is inevitable and unavoidable in the realm of experiences, thus reducing the “friction and drag” caused by dogmatic commitment to a single preffered outcome.
The text leads us to conclude that the “ideal person” who is variously described in the text as “genuine” (zhenren), “fully realized” (zhiren), or “spiritual” (shenren), is one who is perfectly well-adjusted. In other words such a person is balanced and is at ease in all situations, and as a consequence do not find themselves thrown off course by novelty or unexpected circumstances.
Zhuangzi uses the idiom of the hinge (what he calls the “hinge of Dao” daoshu) to illustrate this sort of cognitive/experiential flexibility.
A state in which ‘this’ and ‘that’ no longer find their opposites is called the hinge of the Way. When the hinge is fitted in the socket, it can respond endlessly. - Basic Writings Ch2.
So although we are concerned not to describe the Zhuangzi as purely relativistic - on account of its priveleging certain attitudes and behaviours - it is still the case that “all truth and valuation are necessarily contextually situated”. Put simply this means that the “good” for one person may not be the same for another, and likewise the case with beauty, truth, usefulness etc.
Fascinatingly though Zhuangzi does not restrict this experiential relativism to different individuals, he also relates this idea to the same individual at different moments and places in time and space. Rather than clashing with the flux that is the world by maintaining a dogmatic adherence to a certain set of standards or attitudes, Zhuangzi proposes that it is more beneficial to the individual to adjust ones standards and attitudes in accordance with the needs of the current situation. One consequence of this attitude of least resistance (wei wu wei) is that one’s resources and overall well-being are best preserved through reducing the friction we experience with the world.
This pragmatic individualism has certain echoes with modern existentialism - and one may suggest has similar faults too (depending on ones perspective i.e. social inaction in the face of intolerable injustice for self-preservation).
implications
This resource preservation philosophy plays an influential role in Chinese medicine and in Daoist alchemical longevity movements.
But for me the concept of the “hinge of Dao” (or as I would simply put it the hinge of being) is interesting because it is the underlying philosophical attitude that informs other areas of the Zhuangzi text and which (in subsequent posts I will explore) informs a seemingly proto-Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, an unresolved Cartesian scepticism, an ontological pluralism akin to Nietzche, and an anarchic political theory.
All quotes lifted from the source attributed at the end of the first post in this series (here).

July 14th, 2008 at 5:29 pm
There is a substantive body of text comparing Nietzsche and The Zhuangzi, and part of it is the type of relativsm that we have dealt with here, better described as perspectivism.
It occured to me while re-reading that the notion of the world in constant flux (critical to Zhuangzi’s experiential perception) is very Nietzschean in flavour.
This is confirmed for me by the description of the Dionysian in The Twilight of The Idols as being able to enter “into any skin, into any affect: he constantly transforms himself.”
One disagreement between Nietzsche and Daoism is the formers rejection of “the way” to ask which is “your way” and the latters affirmation that there is “a way”.
Perhaps I will explore more of these subtleties in a later post.
July 25th, 2008 at 10:28 am
Another variation on Nietzsche’s thoughts on language is Zarathustra’s solipsistic view of words. He also claims it is a temporary escape from solipsism. This quote’s placement is also significant in the book because immediately following is the core idea of the work (Eternal Recurrence).
I thought you might find it interesting in any case.
and later
AC1
July 25th, 2008 at 2:11 pm
Nice quote!
The next post will be on epistemic uncertainty.
July 26th, 2008 at 11:53 pm
I just saw As You Like It. A good one liner on language:
AUDREY I do not know what ‘poetical’ is: is it honest in deed and word? is it a true thing?
TOUCHSTONE No, truly
And I almost don’t need to mention the Simulacrum suggested by “All the world’s a stage…” (and the stage being a representation of the world).
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