Searle’s Response to the Is-Ought Problem
Existentialism, Language, Philosophy May 1st, 2008Searle published an attempt to answer Hume’s Is-Ought Problem. It states:
Consider the following series of statements:
(i) Jones uttered the words “I hereby promise to pay you,
Smith, five dollars.”
(2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
(3) Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation
to pay Smith five dollars.
(4) Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
(5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.
Searle J R, How to Derive “Ought” From “Is”, The Philosophical Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan., 1964), pp. 43-58
Searle states that the following are tautological truths:
“All promises are (create, are undertakings of, are acceptances of) obligations,”
“One ought to keep (fulfill) one’s obligations.”
With these definitions, we can see the logic to go from statement (2) to (5) because it is a tautological, according to Searle, to equate “promise” with “ought to”. It is then possible to simplify the above argument with:
(A) Jones uttered the words “I hereby ought to to pay you,
Smith, five dollars.”
(B) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.
I cannot see any way B automatically follows from A. And since this is logically equivalent to Searle’s response, we can see the original argument is invalid in going beyond step (1). Another way to state my objection is to consider if “One ought to keep (fulfill) one’s obligations” is really tautologically true? If we can say “promise = obligation”, then is “One ought to keep (fulfill) one’s promises” a tautological truth? No, it isn’t.
And, even if Smith believes he ought to pay back Smith, why ought he believe that? The whole argument is couched in social convention and definition of words – to a critical eye this reeks of faulty reasoning.
Ayn Rand’s attempt also relies on the loose interpretation of words. “The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the relation between ‘is’ and ‘ought’” Which is suddenly appears similar to Searle’s answer.
Update: I also noticed Searles definition “All promises are (create, are undertakings of, are acceptances of) obligations,” does not really reduce to “promises are obligations”; the words in the brackets are important. Promises are only representations of obligations. Obligations may be represented without actually existing!
Anti Citizen One

May 4th, 2008 at 2:44 pm
A man as he ought to be: that sounds to us as insipid as “a tree as it ought to be.”
Will to Power, 332, Nietzche