Various things occured to me recently regarding Wittgenstein and his latter day attitudes to Solopsism.
Firstly Wittgenstein had little time or respect for the history of philosophy and is said (most probably accurately) that he never even took the time to read Descartes, upon whose foundations most subsequent philosophies developed.
Secondly he wrote in some of his final works that the Solopsist was talking nonsense, on the simple basis that if one is to doubt everything then surely one must include the language, phraseology and logic of doubt itself within the schema of uncertainty. And this he said is self-refuting, the project cannot get off the ground. Remember this assertion is based on his lifelong principle that one cannot have a purely private language, and that meaning is found in use.
Thirdly he famously refused to deny to Russell that there was not a rhinoceros in the room, thus seemingly rejecting all common sense.
Fourthly he also refuted H.E.Moore’s common sense “here is a hand” discourse, accusing him of misusing terms like “I know”.
Wittgenstein says very little about the Solopsist directly, mainly because as already mentioned he had little time for established philosophy. But two things were made apparent, he rejected Descartes solopsist on account of the inexpressability of doubt, but he also it is said (and perhaps seems obvious when we consider the rhinoceros) had a great deal of sympathy for the solopsistic way of thinking. He once commented in private letters that life was very much like a dream only occasionally interrupted by reality, and the difficulty was in discerning which was which.
Wittgenstein criticizes Descartes Solopsist not for his suspicions and doubts of themselves, but for his vocalisation of this doubt. To doubt, one might say is human, but to vocalise, institutionalise, express and perhaps even objectivise that doubt is he believes to play a specific language game whose construction and internal logic is based upon a subjective and relative consensus and an experience-based internal logic that leads to the creation of a particular language game.
In other words to publically state that one doubts or cannot be certain of the real is to fall into the trap of using idioms and expressions that are defined by and which themselves are creators and constructors of the real.
By the same measure he rejects Moore’s common sense approach, “here is a hand” etc. To say that one “knows” that this is hand and that it is a part of me is to play an equally subjective and consensus based language game.
This subject deserves a much deeper analysis than I am going to provide right now, but the main point is that Wittgensteins sympathy for the solopsist, refusal to deny the presence of rhinoceros in the room (contrary to common sense) and yet rejection of Cartesion scepticism and Moorian common sense are all indicative of his radical subjectivism. If meaning is found in use (the central maxim of his later work) then our entire idiomatic perspective about the created world is therefore subjective and the real is a construct of our language games and not a fixed thing per se.
In conclusion i’d like to make two opposing points. Firstly in criticism one may be inclined to suggest that Wittgenstein is tending towards logocentrism, as he specifically criticizes the expression of objective doubt or knowledge in language and yet whilst accepting the validity of this uncertainty provides no alternative or meaningful outlet other than that provided by language. Secondly and somewhat more in support and perhaps as an answer to the first point, Wittgensteins sympathy for the solopsist and criticism of his ever daring to express his doubt, is an expression of his belief that like the solopsist trapped in uncertainty, we too are trapped by the languages that we use, trapped in subjectivity. Finally the more one considers these latter points in Wittgenstein the more apparent it becomes that his early Tractarian philosophy was a key developmental part of his later work. The more I consider his sympathy for the solopsist and his logocentric solopsism the more I recall his phrase in the Tractatus “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. (5.6)”
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