Yet There Is Method In It

HoWP by Bertrand Russell is a fairly weighty (700+ pages) epic review of all European and modern American philosophy. Each philosopher covered has some social context and quick biographical detail covered. Russell then describes, as far as he can, the ideas that proved influential and follows up with a critique from his own view. This format works very well for the majority of the book. It may be prone to reading like an inevitable evolution of ideas because important but less famous ideas probably would be omitted. His dry wit and atheistic outlook also appeal to my taste.

This style breaks down in the 19th and 20th centuries because time has not passed to show the ideas in a broad context. Russells own work was in analytic philosophy. Today’s social attitudes still are built on ancient philosophy and only time will tell if analytic philosophy will have a wider cultural impact. We will know in a few hundred years, I’d imagine!

Modern philosophy has been more assimilated into culture by way of existentialism and (dare I say it) post modernism. Admittedly both became more prominent after the book was written. There is hardly a mention in HoWP of either of these movements.

For the chapter on Nietzsche, Russell seems to go slightly off track and verges on ad hominem. He correctly states that Nietzsche’s influence is based on his commentary of culture, philosophy and history. He incorrectly associates Nietzsche with Nazis and mentions them in the same sentence on several occasions – as if he was try to prove guilt by association. This connection was based on what is now thought of as a distortion of Nietzsche’s writings by his sister.

At the end of the book, he says that he thinks progress is being made in philosophy. This progressive concept of knowledge is taken from science (formerly known as natural philosophy) and it rather appeals to me but it is also counter to post modernism. Another underlying(?) theme in the text is every step forward in philosophy and science in the last 400 years has come from questioning past authority – primarily the authority of Plato. For post modernists, who reject that objective progress is meaningful, we can say at least we have greater diversity of views now people can reject Plato without being branded as heretical or impious.

Anti Citizen One

I was reading extracts from the book “The Cult of the Amateur” by Andrew Keen. He states that

Moreover, the free, user-generated content spawned and extolled by the Web 2.0 revolution is decimating the ranks of our cultural gatekeepers, as professional[s] [...] and other purveyors of expert information are being replaced [...] by amateur bloggers, hack reviewers, homespun moviemakers, and attic recording artists. Andrew Keen

The full extract is available on the BBC.

Andrew Keen makes a simple but fundamental mistake: he equates the professional with competence and the amateur with incompetence. This is so obviously untrue that I find it hard to know where to begin with counter examples! Many examples are stated in the report from Demos titled “The Pro-Am Revolution”

The Pro-Am Revolution argues this historic shift is reversing. We’re witnessing the flowering of Pro-Am, bottom-up self-organisation and the crude, all or nothing, categories of professional or amateur will need to be rethought. Demos

Obviously, if I agreed with Andrew Keen, I would not be writing these words on this blog!

Anti Citizen One

PS I finally finished History of Western Philosophy! Hooray!

The Ontological argument as classically formulated and known by many philosophy students can be stated as follows.

1. ‘God’ by definition is ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ (maximally great).
2. If God did not exist he would not be ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’, for it is greater to exist than not to exist.
3. By definition, then, ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ exists. For to say it does not exist is contradictory.
4. Therefore God exists.

We can summarise it thus…

the existence of God necessarily follows from the concept of God…

Descartes version of the Ontological argument took this form, and he used the analogy of a triangle, he stated that just as it is necessary to posit the combined internal angle of a triangle to be 180 degrees, so too God’s necessary existence can be posited by the idea of God.

Kant provided the most famous objection to this argument, with two specific points. 1) Existence is not a property that can be added to the concept of a thing. 2) It is also wrong to suppose that one can, by means of a concept, define God into existence. He specifically refutes Descartes saying:

“To posit a triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same hold true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being… If we say ‘There is no God’, neither the omnipotence nor any other of its predicates is given; they are one and all rejected together with the subject” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p280.

This refutation, plus Aquinas’ rejection of the original Anselmian version lead Bertrand Russell to declare confidently that:

I think it may be said quite decisively that as a result of analysis of the concept “existence” modern logic has proved this argument invalid. – History of Western Philosophy. p752

However Russells assertion is premature on two counts. Firstly modal logic has developed new techniques since his time that incidentally have offered possible reformulations of the argument (Alvin Plantinga’s version the most famous). Secondly in the paradigm of Wittgenstein’s language games theory, some have posited a revised reading of Anselm’s Proslogion (often considered the first major Ontological argument) which denies that it is intended as an Ontological proof, and emphasises that its validity is contingent upon a) belief in God, b) openness to experience, knowledge or understanding of God, and c) Anselms definition of God as a maximally great being.

It is widely becoming accepted that Anselm and the Proslogion is either misinterpreted or misrepresented. Certainly the text itself takes the form of a prayer, and there is no doubt that Anselm absolutely believed in God a priori to this particular rationale. His own words were that this should be viewed as ‘Faith seeking understanding.’ Furthermore, and of general concern, he states his explicit wish that his Proslogion be read and considered in its entirety. In order to fully appreciate it he believed one could not consider it fragmentarily. Thus any consideration of the Proslogion should entail reading the two forms of the argument, the objections of Gaunilo and his answers to the objections. Sadly few textbooks do this, and unsurprisingly although familiar with the general concepts most students of philosophy are painfully unaware of the rich complexity of the whole text.

Here is a brief overview of the relevant sections of the Proslogion.

Chapter 2 argues that God exists in the mind and in reality. Crucially it is the most misunderstood fragment of the argument. Many people take it that he posits the idea of God, states that God is a maximally great being, and that to be truly maximally great he must exist. Thus reifying the concept. That we have an idea (that doesn’t exist) which to be consistent must be real (and exist). What he actually says is subtly but essentially different. He starts with the premise that God is maximally great. Then he makes an existential declaration that God exists in the mind and that a maximally great being must therefore exist also in and outside of the mind. To put it briefly he is saying that if one comprehends the idea of God one is actually encountering God not a non-real or abstract concept, which would be the case with unicorns, perfect islands or flying spaghetti monsters.

Chapter 3 argues that God cannot be thought not to exist. In brief he is reiterating that the thought of a maximally great being is also the experience of the maximally great being. Thus to think of a maximally great being that does not exist is contradictory and absurd. As the very thought of it is demonstrable proof of its existence. This is as opposed to me thinking of the cartoon character Homer Simpson. The character is real in my mind, and as an image on TV, but he is not a real person. Thus it is possible to think of this person as not existing. But he argues, from the premise that the thought is the experience and that God is maximally great, it is contradictory to think of God as not existing.

Gaunilo’s objections and Anselms responses take the form of 9 arguments – and I shall summarise these in brief also, simply stating Anselms position.

1) God does exist in the mind, his maximal greatness means he is more than just a thought.

2) A maximally great being can be said to exist in and outside of the mind, for a maximally great being would be without a beginning (the uncaused cause), and if we can think of something as being without beginning then we cannot think of it as not existing.

3) Something that existed in only one or the other – not both (mind or reality) – is not a maximally great being.

4) I can think of myself as not existing at a particular time or place (i.e. before I was conceived), but a maximally great being (if it exists) must exist in all times and places.

5) We cannot deny that the thought of a maximally great being cannot exist in the mind, for example we can conceive (albeit limitedly) of infinity.

6) If we can think of something then we can within our limits understand it (i.e. grasp it, or apprehend it).

7) A maximally great being necessarily must exist in and out of the mind.

 8) God as compared to the perfect island is a special case. A perfect island is not a maximally great being thus it may exist in the mind but not necessarily in reality, whereas a maximally great being must exist in both.

9) Although we may not fully understand the magnitude of a maximally great being, this does not mean to say that we cannot produce meaningful conjecture on the matter. We are able to distinguish between lesser and greater goods. Thus we can say that something infinite is greater than something finite. That something that lacks nothing, is greater than something lacking something. That something unmoveable or unchangeable is better than something forced to move or change. We know what it means for something to be ineffable, even if we do not know that which is ineffable.

Anselms Formula then differs from the standard one at the beginning of the post. It goes as follows.

i) God is something than which nothing greater can be thought;

ii) Something than which nothing greater can be thought exists in the mind;

iii) Something existing only in the mind cannot be something which nothing greater can be thought;

iv) Something which can be thought not to be is not something than which nothing greater can be thought;

v) A thing is not something than which a greater cannot be thought if (a) it does not exist whole and entire at al times and in all places, (b) if it is moveable or changeable.

A close inspection shows that this is not the same argument as Descartes formula, nor is it the argument that Kant refutes.

Does it work?
A very brief conclusion raises three points if we are to accept Anselms Proslogion as viable (but viable as what – proof, demonstration, testimony of belief?)

1) The argument demands we accept the definition of God as being a maximally great being.
2) The attributes of maximal greatness, of which we are asked to accept, are condemned to be somewhat vague (how can we fully understand the infinite?), only glimpses of them are ever seen. Thus such attributes can meaningfully only be inferred, not affirmed.
3) In order to go beyond inference, we need to accept the possibility of experiencing a maximally great being – Anselm states this as being able to think of or understand God – but I would be concerned to explicitly call this an experiencing of God that goes beyond merely rational assent – after all Anselm believes wholeheartedly prior to his rationalising – interestingly his biographer Eadmer states: “Behold, one night during Matins, the grace of God shone in his heart and the matter became clear to his understanding, filling his whole heart with an immense joy and jubilation.” – This seems clear to me, to ‘know’ God is an experiential (rather than rational) exercise, firmly placing this within the realm of mystical philosophy.

I would suggest that Anselms argument works – if one believes in a God that is a maximally great being. And that the formula, and the reasonableness that Anselm attributed to it, makes sense within the experiential framework of the religious/mystical language game. A final point in conclusion therefore is that to the external observer (one who is not participating within the same language game – lets say sceptical about God’s maximal greatness) or to the interested scholar – the key to understanding Anselms Proslogion lies not in formal logic, but in the studies of claims to religious experience.

The US, the UK, China and Russia are “endemic surveillance societies”, according to a recent study examining privacy protection around the world that gave the four nations the lowest possible rating. New Scientist

Update: (this story nicely complements the above)

WASHINGTON (AP) – Telephone companies have cut off FBI wiretaps used to eavesdrop on suspected criminals because of the bureau’s repeated failures to pay phone bills on time. Myway

Don Cupitt’s After God: The FutureOf Religion is a remarkable work of postmodern theology of interest both to theists and atheists. This short book (approx 120 pages) covers in accesibly and general language 2 main themes and 3 corresponding premisses. The first half of the book is concerned with the origins of religions and God, and the second half with the future of religions without God.

His three key premises are:

1- Belief in God(s) and all supernaturalism is redundant.

2- Supernatural belief systems are only one facet of the complex phenomenon we know as religion and not its whole purpose and function.

3- Religion is existentially useful.

Before I comment on these premisses first lets identify the author. Don Cupitt has been described as a radical theologian. He is even considered in some quarters the first atheist-theologion (although a seeming contradiction in terms.) He was ordained an Anglican priest in the 1950′s and although he no longer believes in God he remains a minister. He personally describes himself as a Christian non-Realist. Which is to say that he follows certain spiritual practises and ethical maxims traditionally associated with Christianity but does not believe in underlying metaphysical entities such as God or Christ (Jesus was only a man). Others categorise his philosophy and theology as being nihilist textualism which I will explain more of later. Cupitt is an academic, broadcaster and prolific author, and one of the founder members of the “Sea of Faith” network, an organisation that explores spiritual values in the postmodern condition.

In this book ‘After God’, which refers heavily to Nietzsche’s death of God, he opens with a deconstruction of the origins of religions and metaphysical beliefs. This is one of the most fascinating sections of the book with some incredibly good ideas, unfortunately it is also not the least verifiable. As he admits his account of the origins of religions and metaphsyical entities is an entirely subjective account, albeit drawn from a variety of scholars and methods – including existential philosophy, postmodern deconstruction, freudian psychoanalysis and anthropology. As interesting as it is to read one gets the feeling that many people, believers and unbelievers alike, would be sceptical about his theories. However, in my opinion this is not a crippling problem, as the central thesis throughout the book (the death of God) is not dependent upon any particular theory of origin. His is merely one possible account of many – and he is prepared to admit this.

His account very simply states that belief in God, gods, spirits and the supernatural served a functional purpose in pre-rational and pre-scientific times. Animal spirits and totemic cults functioned to develop archetypal images of prey or hunter, animals whose hunting of, or fear of was central to the survival of hunter-gatherer societies. Similarly whole metaphysical belief systems were ‘created’ in order to explain, understand and work in accordance with the seasons, vital for agricultural knowledge. The Iban of Sarawak are an example that come to mind, whose entire metaphysical system is orientated around the cultivation of their staple crop rice. Finally he says monotheism developed at the same time as society became urbanised. Gods became singular, similarly law, culture and governance became centralised.

As I stated earlier Cupitt is a textualist, in his philosophy words and symbols operate at the level of the spirits, and metaphsyical beings are simply reified words or ideas. This is certainly an interesting notion, and one that perhaps owes much to analytical philosophy and Wittgenstein. Of real interest is the deconstruction he gives to certain terms, that in English we take for granted, but which in Greek or Hebrew have greater meaning, and betray signs of their interrelationship with non-religious words and ideas. For example ‘Spirit’ in Greek is ‘pneuma’ a word that means breath. Thus the idea of spirits being invisible, just as the air we breathe is, becomes rather obvious.

The origin of the idea of the soul is excellent, and rather convincing for me. The latin for soul is anima, from which we get the word animation. Thus we can begin to understand that soul originally meant ‘life’. A person who was living was animated. And from this we get the idea that the un-animated body, the dead body is somehow seperated from its soul. Furthermore though the soul became associated not only with the idea of living but with the reality of living. Thus in Hebrew (and to this day in Judaism and other religions) the soul is closely associated with blood. Hence ritual regulations for kosher food, blood-drained flesh. But further to this through this deconstruction we also get some idea of the origin of the geophysical notion that hell is the ‘underworld’ and that hell is a bad place. The archetypal image of spilt blood draining from the body into the ground and under-the-world, is often associated with violent, accidental and unnatural death thus giving rise to notions of horror.

By such processes of deconstruction Cupitt aims to present rational explanations for the origins and functions that metaphysical belief systems held for believers. And although subjectively flawed it serves the desired purpose of preparing the reader for his first major premise. Belief in God, gods, spirits and so on is now redundant. For metaphysics was useful only in the pre-rational and pre-scientific world. Now he says, the rational existence of God is denied and the supernatural account for the origins and workings of the world have been superceded by those provided by the physical sciences.

His second premise is that supernatural beliefs are not essential or integral to religion. Remove the supernatural, and though religion is no longer the same, it still is religious. This is a premise that many people will find hard to swallow. After all atheism and secularism are often concieved of as being mutually contingent systems. But that is of course bunkum. From his functional account of the origins of religion Cupitt adopts the theories of anthropology, that religion (ignoring the supernatural aspects) is a toolkit, a way of life, independently relevent to specific cultures and their unique concerns. The more one studies various religions the more plausible this thesis is. Religious ethics is simply the mythical representation of social values. Origin myths are pre-science. Ritual is dramatic presentation and affirmation of a particular way of life. And of course religion is an existential philosophy, for every religion is concerned with the questions of death and mortality.

It is worth noting, to those who still remain unconvinced of this account that a great number of religions and religous sects do not rely upon supernatural systems. Buddhism is non-theist, some people dispute its religious nature, but this is to adopt a very narrow intepretation of what constitutes religion, and Cupitt settles for the broad ‘way of life’ description. Native Inuit religion posits no Gods and is simply a precautionary cosmology orientated around the dangers of arctic life. Non-theist beliefs can also be found in various postmodern Christian and Reform Judasim movements, whose adherents are numerous. Not to mention Confucianism, Taoism, Jainism and Falun Gong. Also within certain religious groups there is a reduced or even undefined supernaturalism, Jehovah’s Witnesses describe themselves as Christian but reject the divinity of Jesus. And of course mystical traditions including Sufism within Islam (not that it is ever publicised in the Islamophobic culture of today) reject the metaphysical belief in God and talk in terms of a divine spark resident within personal being.

We could argue perenially about what constitutes a religion and what is simply a philosophical school of thought. But such argumentation is futile nonsense and betrays only personal prejudice. A religion is subjectively defined by its own adherents and not by taxonomic classification imposed by an objective observer.

Cupitts third and final premiss then is that religion without supernatural belief can still be vital and useful. And the second major theme of his book is given over to describing what such a religion might be like. The key points of Cupitts analysis is that religion is not essentially institutional, and to many readers it will be evident that Cupitt equates spirituality as synonymous with a religious outlook. So any future religion must be voluntarily assumed and practised (not preached or prescribed). But ultimately future religion will be a therapeutic existential toolkit, of which he provides four major examples.

1) The Eye of God: This practise is the introspective analysis of ones life, through the eyes of our idealisation of God. What is our ideal in life, and how do we measure up to it. Prayer could be included as a technique in this category, the idea of a dialogue with the self.

2) The Blissful Void: This technique borrowed from eastern mysticism is the meditation of the finite within the infinite and the reconciliation of the self with mortality. The aim of this meditation is to put the self within perspective, to accept that I am an individual, but only one of many. I’m not that important in the great scheme of things, but to myself I am, therefore I have duty to live my life to the full.

3) Solar Living: In other words intersubjective ethics. The way in which we behave towards others. Cupitt prefers a simple golden rule morality, and it is hard to disagree with him. He calls it solar living, because like the suns rays, a golden rule mentality radiates outwards to others.

4) Poetical Theology: This final category says lets not destroy religion for the sake of it. But lets maintain those myths and practices that are useful. This includes rituals, let them remain as dramatic re-enactments, as artistic retelling of certain cultural values or cherished ideals. For example like the passion plays, or the teachings of the parables of Jesus. But, he reminds us, never let us forget that they are mythic drama and not metaphysical statements.

In conclusion I have to confess I found this book suprisingly enjoyable. As a theist, who unrepentantly maintains certain mystical intepretations of metaphysical beliefs I thought i’d be bored or overcome with disagreement. Quite the contrary. I found his account for the origins of religions and supernatural beings interesting and in some cases viable. I respected his submission to subjective analysis, which is contrary say to Freud who believed that his account was how it really happened (thus reifying his own myths). I felt uncomfortable that he should be so dependent upon Nietzsche, but that says more about my attitude to his philosophy than anything else. And I am also sceptical about being such a slave to rationalism, which in my opinion is just as much a myth as that which it tries to dispose of. However I respect his consistancy. Finally his suggestions for the future of religion made sense, and it is hard to disagree with any of them. My only query is how can you ever prevent supernatural accounts from arising again, without resorting to intellectual tyranny? Or alternatively how can you prevent these tools from being absorbed into an institutional school of thought, reified from being a self-help technique into the means of existential salvation?

I wholeheartedly reccomend this book to anybody who is even remotely interested in religion, whether they be a believer or not. The book is short, concise, the theories written in accessible language that requires no previous knowledge of theology. From beginning to end an enjoyable and thought provoking read. And crucially a balanced contrast to the Dawkins era thesis that religion is inherently bad for you.