A Feyerabend outline.
Epistemological Anarchism, Method, Science January 17th, 2008What follows is a short outline of the main thrust of Feyerabends analytical account of the origins of science, his rejection of Karl Poppers thesis and his espousal of epistemological anarchism. This is extracted as a whole from Straw Dogs by John Gray and is one of the better, simpler accounts of Feyerabends thought.
Science’s Irrational Origins
As portrayed by its fundamentalists, science is the supreme expression of reason. They tell us that if it rules our lives today, it is only after a long struggle in which it was ceaselessly opposed by the Church, the state and every kind of irrational belief. Having arisen in the struggle against superstition, science - they say - has become the embodiment of rational inquiry.
This fairy tale conceals a more interesting history. The origins of science are not in rational inquiry but in faith, magic and trickery. Modern science triumphed over its adversaries not through its superior rationality but because its late-medieval and early-modern founders were more skilful than them in the use of rhetoric and the arts of politics.
Galileo did not win in his campaign for Copernican astronomy because he conformed to any precept of ’scientific method’. As Feyerabend argued, he prevailed because of his persuasive skill - and because he wrote in Italian. By writing in Italian rather than Latin, Galileo was able to identify resistance to Copernican astronomy with the bankrupt scholasticism of his time, and so gain support from people opposed to older traditions of learning:
Copernicus now stands for progress in other areas as well, he is a symbol for the ideals of a new class that looks back to the classical times of Plato and Cicero and forward to a free and pluralistic society.
Galileo won out not because he had the best arguments but because he was able to represent the new astronomy as part of a coming trend in society. His success illustrates a crucial truth. To limit the practise of science by rules of method would slow the growth of knowledge, or even halt it:
The difference between science and methodology which is such an obvious fact of history… indicates a weakness in the latter, and perhaps of the ‘laws of reason’ as well… Without ‘chaos’, no knowledge. Without a frequent dismissal of reason, no progress. Ideas which today form the very basis of science exist because there were such things as prejudice, conceit, passion; because these things opposed reason; and because they were permitted to have their way.
According to the most influential twentieth-century philosopher of science, Karl Popper, a theory is scientific only in so far as it is falsifiable, and should be given up as soon as it has been falsified. By this standard, the theories of Darwin and Einstein should never have been accepted. When they were first advanced, each of them was at odds with some available evidence; only later did evidence become available that gave them crucial support. Applying Popper’s account of scientific method would have killed these theories at birth.
The greatest scientists have never been bound by what are now regarded as the rules of scientific method. Nor did the philosophies of the founders of modern science - magical and metaphysical, mystical and occult - have much in common with what is today taken to be the scientific worldview. Galileo saw himself as a defender of theology, not as an enemy of the Church. Newton’s theories became the basis for a mechanistic philosophy, but in his own mind his theories were inseperable from a religious conception of the world as a divinely created order. Newton explained apparently anomolous occurrences as traces left by God. Tycho Brahe viewed them as miracles. Johannes Kepler described anomalies in astronomy as reactions of ‘the telluric soul’. As Feyerabend observes, beliefs that are today regarded as belonging to religion, myth or magic were central in the worldviews of the people who originated modern science.
As pictured by philosophers, science is a supremely rational activity. Yet the history of science shows scientists flouting the rules of scientific method. Not only the origins but the progress of science comes from acting against reason.
J.Gray, Straw Dogs -thoughts on humans and other animals, p21-23.

January 17th, 2008 at 8:49 pm
I should resist the urge to get into a debate but I don’t think Feyerabend is correct in how science did or does operate.
For one, falsifiability is not as simplistic as he claims but its not anarchism either. If irrefutable evidence is shown against a theory, then that theory is disproved and that version of the theory is abandoned. In reality, scientists tweak theories so they fit better with observation. Feyerabend seems to imply that scientists should burn their notes and retire if they get one piece of contradicting evidence! See my previous article on what I call scope in science.
The argument is made that science is irrational because it had irrational founders - that does not follow necessarily.
Feyerabend says that scientific method has no fixed rules. What about “science should always prefer the best model for physical reality”? Are there any counter examples that were held up as examples of good science?
AC1
January 18th, 2008 at 12:02 pm
A more moderate statement of your opposition.
One problem- Feyerabend does not propose that “scientists should burn their notes and retire if they get one piece of contradicting evidence” - quite the contrary.
To do so would be to embrace naive falsificationism - of the extreme Popperian sort - which as much as you may argue is not the modus operandi of science, there are others within who would argue it is.
That they do not burn their notebooks, and that they “tweak” their theories is evidence (in Feyerabends eyes) that a non-rigid adherence to methodology makes for scientific progress.
See the opening line of his quote - “As pictured by philosophers, science is a supremely rational activity”.
His focus is on the philosophy of science - and a rejection of naive falsification is a rejection of a principle methodology in the philosophy of science.
His argue, by means of a reductio, is remove the method and does science cease to exist?
January 18th, 2008 at 12:50 pm
Since scientists have abandoned that version a disproved theory, it seems that they are in agreement with the method of falsification.
“His argue, by means of a reductio, is remove the method and does science cease to exist?”
No the method of falsification is still valid. Science is not only naive falsification.
AC1
January 18th, 2008 at 1:06 pm
“Science is not only naive falsification”…
thats his point.
“Of his many contributions, perhaps the most important is that there is no method or rule that can capture science completely.” Munevar
Remember his attack is on certain of the naive falsificationists who say that this is all there is to scientific method. And also an attack on the arch-rationalist/empiricists who claim science to be solely their own tool, that works because it uses their guiding principles.
January 18th, 2008 at 3:31 pm
Basically we have not yet understood each others point of view. I still have questions and I don’t feel I have been understood. This would require extensive point by point discussion - which I am going going to do.
Even when we reach understanding, we are not going to agree I expect.
I might have to blog on science some time but I have been avoiding this since this is not really a science blog (or at least it was not founded as one).
AC1
January 18th, 2008 at 4:21 pm
Yes there is a language problem.
Besides reviewing the subject occasionally we can consider this one on hiatus I guess.
I’m not sure disagreement is a foregone conclusion - although I anticipate differances.
I have no problem with you blogging on science matters - as philosophy touches or encounters everything including science. Most of the Feyerabend stuff is simply philosophy - he does value science as a pursuit.
January 18th, 2008 at 7:17 pm
I found a nice simple outline that best describes Feyerabends approach to Falsificationism.
“In the 1960’s Feyerabend’s views moved to a ‘theoretical pluralism’, this view held that for falsification to work best scientists ought to develop as many alternative theories as possible.”
http://www.generation-online.org/p/pfeyerabend.htm