The Ontological argument as classically formulated and known by many philosophy students can be stated as follows.

  1. ‘God’ by definition is ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ (maximally great).
  2. If God did not exist he would not be ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’, for it is greater to exist than not to exist.
  3. By definition, then, ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ exists. For to say it does not exist is contradictory.
  4. Therefore God exists.

We can summarise it thus…

the existence of God necessarily follows from the concept of God…

Descartes version of the Ontological argument took this form, and he used the analogy of a triangle, he stated that just as it is necessary to posit the combined internal angle of a triangle to be 180 degrees, so too God’s necessary existence can be posited by the idea of God.

Kant provided the most famous objection to this argument, with two specific points. 1) Existence is not a property that can be added to the concept of a thing. 2) It is also wrong to suppose that one can, by means of a concept, define God into existence. He specifically refutes Descartes saying:

“To posit a triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same hold true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being… If we say ‘There is no God’, neither the omnipotence nor any other of its predicates is given; they are one and all rejected together with the subject” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p280.

This refutation, plus Aquinas’ rejection of the original Anselmian version lead Bertrand Russell to declare confidently that:

I think it may be said quite decisively that as a result of analysis of the concept “existence” modern logic has proved this argument invalid. – History of Western Philosophy. p752

However Russells assertion is premature on two counts. Firstly modal logic has developed new techniques since his time that incidentally have offered possible reformulations of the argument (Alvin Plantinga’s version the most famous). Secondly in the paradigm of Wittgenstein’s language games theory, some have posited a revised reading of Anselm’s Proslogion (often considered the first major Ontological argument) which denies that it is intended as an Ontological proof, and emphasises that its validity is contingent upon a) belief in God, b) openness to experience, knowledge or understanding of God, and c) Anselms definition of God as a maximally great being.

It is widely becoming accepted that Anselm and the Proslogion is either misinterpreted or misrepresented. Certainly the text itself takes the form of a prayer, and there is no doubt that Anselm absolutely believed in God a priori to this particular rationale. His own words were that this should be viewed as ‘Faith seeking understanding.’ Furthermore, and of general concern, he states his explicit wish that his Proslogion be read and considered in its entirety. In order to fully appreciate it he believed one could not consider it fragmentarily. Thus any consideration of the Proslogion should entail reading the two forms of the argument, the objections of Gaunilo and his answers to the objections. Sadly few textbooks do this, and unsurprisingly although familiar with the general concepts most students of philosophy are painfully unaware of the rich complexity of the whole text.

Here is a brief overview of the relevant sections of the Proslogion.

Chapter 2 argues that God exists in the mind and in reality. Crucially it is the most misunderstood fragment of the argument. Many people take it that he posits the idea of God, states that God is a maximally great being, and that to be truly maximally great he must exist. Thus reifying the concept. That we have an idea (that doesn’t exist) which to be consistent must be real (and exist). What he actually says is subtly but essentially different. He starts with the premise that God is maximally great. Then he makes an existential declaration that God exists in the mind and that a maximally great being must therefore exist also in and outside of the mind. To put it briefly he is saying that if one comprehends the idea of God one is actually encountering God not a non-real or abstract concept, which would be the case with unicorns, perfect islands or flying spaghetti monsters.

Chapter 3 argues that God cannot be thought not to exist. In brief he is reiterating that the thought of a maximally great being is also the experience of the maximally great being. Thus to think of a maximally great being that does not exist is contradictory and absurd. As the very thought of it is demonstrable proof of its existence. This is as opposed to me thinking of the cartoon character Homer Simpson. The character is real in my mind, and as an image on TV, but he is not a real person. Thus it is possible to think of this person as not existing. But he argues, from the premise that the thought is the experience and that God is maximally great, it is contradictory to think of God as not existing.

Gaunilo’s objections and Anselms responses take the form of 9 arguments – and I shall summarise these in brief also, simply stating Anselms position.

1) God does exist in the mind, his maximal greatness means he is more than just a thought.

2) A maximally great being can be said to exist in and outside of the mind, for a maximally great being would be without a beginning (the uncaused cause), and if we can think of something as being without beginning then we cannot think of it as not existing.

3) Something that existed in only one or the other – not both (mind or reality) – is not a maximally great being.

4) I can think of myself as not existing at a particular time or place (i.e. before I was conceived), but a maximally great being (if it exists) must exist in all times and places.

5) We cannot deny that the thought of a maximally great being cannot exist in the mind, for example we can conceive (albeit limitedly) of infinity.

6) If we can think of something then we can within our limits understand it (i.e. grasp it, or apprehend it).

7) A maximally great being necessarily must exist in and out of the mind.

 8) God as compared to the perfect island is a special case. A perfect island is not a maximally great being thus it may exist in the mind but not necessarily in reality, whereas a maximally great being must exist in both.

9) Although we may not fully understand the magnitude of a maximally great being, this does not mean to say that we cannot produce meaningful conjecture on the matter. We are able to distinguish between lesser and greater goods. Thus we can say that something infinite is greater than something finite. That something that lacks nothing, is greater than something lacking something. That something unmoveable or unchangeable is better than something forced to move or change. We know what it means for something to be ineffable, even if we do not know that which is ineffable.

Anselms Formula then differs from the standard one at the beginning of the post. It goes as follows.

i) God is something than which nothing greater can be thought;

ii) Something than which nothing greater can be thought exists in the mind;

iii) Something existing only in the mind cannot be something which nothing greater can be thought;

iv) Something which can be thought not to be is not something than which nothing greater can be thought;

v) A thing is not something than which a greater cannot be thought if (a) it does not exist whole and entire at al times and in all places, (b) if it is moveable or changeable.

A close inspection shows that this is not the same argument as Descartes formula, nor is it the argument that Kant refutes.

 

Does it work?
A very brief conclusion raises three points if we are to accept Anselms Proslogion as viable (but viable as what – proof, demonstration, testimony of belief?)

1) The argument demands we accept the definition of God as being a maximally great being.
2) The attributes of maximal greatness, of which we are asked to accept, are condemned to be somewhat vague (how can we fully understand the infinite?), only glimpses of them are ever seen. Thus such attributes can meaningfully only be inferred, not affirmed.
3) In order to go beyond inference, we need to accept the possibility of experiencing a maximally great being – Anselm states this as being able to think of or understand God – but I would be concerned to explicitly call this an experiencing of God that goes beyond merely rational assent – after all Anselm believes wholeheartedly prior to his rationalising – interestingly his biographer Eadmer states: “Behold, one night during Matins, the grace of God shone in his heart and the matter became clear to his understanding, filling his whole heart with an immense joy and jubilation.” – This seems clear to me, to ‘know’ God is an experiential (rather than rational) exercise, firmly placing this within the realm of mystical philosophy.

I would suggest that Anselms argument works – if one believes in a God that is a maximally great being. And that the formula, and the reasonableness that Anselm attributed to it, makes sense within the experiential framework of the religious/mystical language game. A final point in conclusion therefore is that to the external observer (one who is not participating within the same language game – lets say sceptical about God’s maximal greatness) or to the interested scholar – the key to understanding Anselms Proslogion lies not in formal logic, but in the studies of claims to religious experience.