Thomas Becket and the meaning of Words
Language December 21st, 2007In the last couple of posts we have had a very interesting debate about fundamentalism and the language of intolerance. This has also been supplementary to a number of posts that we have written on free speech and offence. The crucial question that these posts all hinge upon is where is the point of demarcation between the language of disagreement, the language of intolerance and the language of violence?
The problem around which this question revolves is that the boundaries between these different types of language, which have different intentions, seem rather blurred and indistinct. Thus we ask ourselves how sensitive should we be?
In earlier posts AC1 has proposed that we take a literal view of language and assume good faith on behalf of the authors. Thus only when language is explicitly commanding violence to another should we condemn it as the language of intolerance. But this view is highly problematic and overly simplistic, it requires us to assume in the absence of explicit commands to the contrary that the author is benevolent in intent. Furthemore though it completely ignores the role of the reciever and the context in which the language is taken. By ignoring these two key elements we forget the complexity of language and the axiom that its meaning is best found in its use.
In a language game there are three crucial elements. The speaker/writer whose intentions may not be explicitly known, but whose intentions we hope to interpret from his words. Equally important is the person of the listener and reader to whom the words are addressed, the meaning of the words and the consequences rest heavily upon this persons shoulders. The final element is context which can be determined with recourse to history, tone, environment, and circumstances. The meaning of a sentence of words has deeply imbedded and interwoven within it a number of assumptions, evaluative judgements, conditions, intents and so on. Thus the spoken and written word, far from being literally translatable is in fact often deeply complex. Thus only with reference to these three elements of deconstruction can we begin to meaningfully understand and identify the boundaries between the language of disagreement, intolerance and violence. - It is important to note here that the right to disagree is assumed, but that in common judgement it is an abuse of the liberty of speech to be intolerant and to incite hatred.
To give a general picture of how these elements work and how language is extraordinarily complex - how meaning is found not in the words by themselves but in the interaction between speaker and listener and the circumstances of their utterance - I will use an analogous example from history. The words spoken in anger by King Henry II that led directly to the murder of Thomas Becket.
The precise formula of the words used are argued over by historians. The two extremely different versions are as follows.
1- “Who will rid me of this turbulent priest?”
alternatively
2- “What miserable drones and traitors have I nourished and brought up in my household to let their Lord be treated with such shameful contempt by a low-born cleric?”
Either way, the historians argue the words were interpreted by Reginald Fitzurse, Hugh de Moreville, William de Tracy, and Richard le Breto, four Knights of the Kings court eager to curry favour, as an explicit Royal Command. Their execution of this command resulted in the murder and martyrdom of Thomas Becket. On face value: without intepreting the Kings words for ourselves we can say that this was an incitement to violence. And yet, by AC1’s more literal intepretation of meaning if the King had spoken the second formulation above, that in content was an exhortation of anger against the members of his court for not defending the Kings honour - we should say that there was absolutely no incitement to violence and that the murderous Knights had misinterpreted the King - who would then appear to be exhonerated from the crime!
Yet what is clear from history is that in popular opinion the King was held to be directly accountable for the actions of his knights and thus was an accessory (unwittingly perhaps) to the murder itself. It is clear from history that Henry accepted this judgement (either from genuine remorse or political expediency) and subjected himself to a lengthy public penance.
Our interpretation of his words and the violent consquences of them, mean that we should seek to understand the power of language as lying not in their literal meaning but in their use, application and context. In other words when Henry spoke his words of anger, the Knights in the context of that anger directed at them and towards Becket, chose to interpret the words violently. Thus Henry II’s exhortation became (with or without intention) an incitement to violence. And an example of an absence of the sort of respect and politeness that Mencken exemplifies as being characteristic of the language of disagreement.
The power of language lies not only in the speaker but in the hearer and the overall environment in which the words are spoken and heard.
In Ac1’s theory of language had the King said “go and kill Thomas Becket” then the Knights murder would have been an appropriate response to the command, and the King would have been accessory to and the incitement of the murder. Thus if we were to seize the knights post-murder and ask why had they done this, they could reply we were only obeying orders. Although this would not exhonerate them it would provide a contextual meaning for their actions and lay the blame squarely at Henrys door.
If however the King said simply “Beckets challenge to my authority is an insult to my Kingly dignity” then we should take the Knights actions to be wholly disproportionate and innappropriate. They would be condemned severely and the King would be exhonerated as in no way could the words he uttered be interpreted as an incitement to violence - he was simply stating an opinion or a fact and the Knights were mistaken.
But in the context of what really happened, the Kings rage at Becket, the Kings displeasure at the attendants to his court not doing anything to defend his honour, the feudal relationship between King and Knight, and the traditional punishment for treason:- the Knights interpretation of the King was inevitable, even if he spoke the ambguous 2nd formula the context of speaker and listener and the environment in which it was spoken means that Henry was responsible for inciting violence, either by intent or carelessness. And if our judgement be the latter, in the context of the murder his carelessness is no defence and this should serve as a retrospective maxim to reinforce Menckens proposition that in the language of disagreement we be careful to show respect and due politeness lest our words be interpreted any other way.

December 21st, 2007 at 2:03 pm
In the context of fundamentalism I should reassure the reader that:
the language of disagreement (i),
the language of intolerance (ii),
and the language of violence (iii),
are not all the same thing.
To disagree is not to be intolerant or violent, however it is a progression. The language of violence has as its implicit constituents the languages of intolerance and disagreement.
Thus if we wish to maintain the integrity of the language of disagreement we have to be cautious regarding the content and context of the language used.
A fundamentalist may speak all three languages, the languages of disagreement, intolerance and violence. Or indeed they may speak only disagreement.
But the definition of fundamentalism (broad or narrow) implies a degree of intolerance as to be a fundamentalist is to adopt a fundamental position or proposition that you will not modify or moderate in any circumstances.
Thus when I say that I am a libertarian it is implicitly implied that I am intolerant of totalitarianism, and as a fundamental point (a libertarian cannot be a totalitarian also) then I am in that sense a fundamentalist.
Ironically, the definition of fundamentalism that I have prescribed is fundamentalist itself. There is (as far as I can intepret) no other definition of fundamentalism that is appropriate or correct.
Thus we see that there is an exception to the general meaning=use rule and that is in analytical language where its meaning is explicitly contained within its definition.
So a tolerant intolerance is logically impossible, an open minded fundamentalist is a contradiction.
This exception to the meaning=use rule is important and vital for us when statements lack all ambiguity and take the form of an analytical statement.
So if Henry II commands “go kill Becket” the meaning is found in the words themselves.
This is the only sort of meaning that AC1 seems to be willing to admit to, but besides the exceptions where it is valid in more general circumstances it is too narrow to be useful or pragmatic and all manner of injustices and intolerances could be hidden within ambigous language and permitted to continue without criticism.
January 18th, 2008 at 8:18 am
[...] Thomas Becket and the meaning of Words In the last couple of posts we have had a very interesting debate about fundamentalism and the language of intolerance. This has also been supplementary to a number of posts that we have written on free speech and offence. … [...]