In the OUPbook Postmodernism: a very short introduction, Christopher Butler analyses different themes in postmodernism, particularly its approaches to philosophy, politics and art. In one chapter he considers the postmodern (now reffered to as pomo) approach to science. Generally pomo is characterized as avant garde, anti-realist, irrealist, anti-rational, sceptical and perhaps in some quarters even as anti-science.

The pomo tool of deconstruction when applied to science critically evaluates the role of political and sociocultural influences upon scientific research, funding for the sciences and its technological innovations. A particular focus of concern is concentrated upon weapons development, pollution and industrial exploitation of the worker. A postmodernist critique of science will in general be critical of the notion that the ‘march of science’ equates with progress.

However in Butler’s overview he is generally critical of the pomo approach to science. In fact he appears to support science unconditionally, thus relegating the scope of postmodernism to cultural theory, politics and liberative ethics. This unquestioning adherence to science (for which he doesnt provide a justifying explanation) seems to promote the primacy of deductive reasoning and empirical method over and above all other ways of thinking. Ironically Butler’s pro-science stance would appear to demonstrate what pomo calls the modernist tendency to prejudice. I found this chapter a little hard to swallow as it seems to make an innaccurate generalisation about pomo approaches to science. As is implied in the pomo ‘school of thought’ there is of course no one single approach favoured, thus the anti-science tag would sit uncomfortable with philosophers of science such as Feyerabend and Kuhn, who explicitly accept science as a valid method, but reject its claims to primacy. Such relativistic approaches have sought to legitimise non-scientific and non-rational endeavour (i.e. Religion).

In his chapter, Butler quotes two leading physicists Sokal and Bricmont who responded to the pomo critique. Firstly defending the misuse of some of their work and secondly attacking the pseudo-scientific inclinations of certain philosophers such as Jean Baudrillard. Baudrillard had a tendency in his work to use scientific, or scientific sounding terminology in his writings. Two famous examples were ‘hyperspace‘ and ‘the Euclidian space of war‘. Sokal and Bricmont criticise Baudrillard on two grounds. Firstly it would appear that he is using the terminology in order to give it an air of scientific authority. Secondly, and more misleadingly they accused him of mistaking certain scientific ideas, distorting science, misrepresenting it, and therefore talking unscientific nonsense. This attack was in effect an attack upon the legitimacy of the postmodern critique of science. Butler unquestioningly accepts this attack, I however do not. Baudrillard certainly does use scientific terminology and broaches certain scientific issues. So in response to the critics we must analyse what is happening. There are 3 possibilities.

1) Baudrillard is correct in his use of the terminology, and Sokal and Bricmont are wrong.

2) Baudriallard has redefined the scientific terminology to mean something else. Therefore they only bare a family resemblance to the original meanings of the words, in which case Sokal and Bricmont are at the least mistaken.

3) Baudrillard has misused and misunderstood, or distorted certain scientific concetps. Sokal and Bricmont are right to label this as psuedo-science.

Lets look at the implications of these three possibilities. If 1) is correct then in this case the definitive claims of science are wrong, the edifice has been undermined and science and technology may be about to collapse. I am sceptical about the probability of this outcome (you will be glad to know). If 2) is correct, and I suspect Baudrillard may defend himself along these lines, then the accusations of Sokal and Bricmont are wrong, for they are misunderstood. However Baudrillard does not get such an easy reprieve, for if he has coined new neologisms for old standardly accepted scientific terms, and he has not provided a ready definition then he is responsible for the misunderstanding, and he has done the cause of philosophy a great disservice by creating (rather than destroying) confusion. Finally, if 3) is correct then Baudrillard is guilty of overstepping the barrier between language games and the criticisms levelled against him are justified and correct.

Like I have said, I believe Baudrillard is guilty of causing confusion as opposed to deception. Either way though if in the case of Baudrillard there has been confusion or error then this should not delegitimise the entire pomo approach to science, as Butler would seem to imply. What it does mean is that postmodernists when investigating the epistemological claims of science must be more careful and more vigorous in their critiques. This new sense of caution should not distract pomo philosophers from the fundamentally important task (which is even admitted from within the scientific community) of anlaysing and criticising the sociological and political basis and motivations behind science and scientific research. Particularly where such research has negative technological uses.