Recommend On Liberty.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_Liberty

To qoute:
Feyerabend points out that we are often unable to even discover important evidence against our favorite theories unless we consider seriously alternative theories that can propose and make sense of counter-evidence such as the compound motion of bodies in the case of the Copernican theory. Our science has, then, greater opportunities to progress if we accept a theoretical pluralism. This is the second important historical contribution made by Feyerabend, a contribution closely allied with his first. No matter how certain we may be of a theory, a scientist who fails to accept it and develops instead a different theory is doing science a favor. For as Feyerabend says, “We need a dream-world in order to discover the features of the real world we think we inhabit (and which may actually just be another dream-world).”

This second philosophical contribution of Feyerabend acts not only against Newton but also against the important tradition of Plato and Descartes, whose obsession it was to discover the correct path to unique truth. Century after century, generation after generation of skeptics sowed doubts about the path to truth suggested by this or that great philosopher. But Mill was the first important philosopher who rebelled against the goal itself. In his essay On Liberty, Mill argued that it does not favor society to force its members to accept the official point of view – no matter how certain it seems to be. By allowing the development of different points of view society profits, for if the official point of view is false, we gain the opportunity to replace with another that might be at least partially true. And if the official point of view turns out to be true anyway, comparing it with alternative points of view allow us to understand it better. Feyerabend’s accomplishment in this area comes from extending Mill’s philosophy to science. Science also profits by allowing the development of points of view different from the one that “agrees with the facts.” And we find one of the best examples of how science profits precisely in the case of Galileo and his defense of the Copernican revolution.

Feyerabend’s ironic sense of humor led him to proclaim anarchy in the philosophy of science and to suggest that “anything goes.” But he never offered anarchy as a sort of anti-method method. Anarchy is the description that a traditional rationalist would give to the way science should be done according to Feyerabend, and particularly the description that rationalist would give of pluralism. It is that rationalist who finds it obvious that rationality consists in behaving in accordance with the rules of the method of empiricism. And it is that rationalist who recoils in horror at the “anything goes” attitude in science a la Feyerabend.

“Consider for a moment that until rather recently a person could end up in prison for practicing acupuncture (medical fraud); that in the name of “development” millions of women in the Third World were advised to stop breast-feeding their children and use powder milk instead (which of course they mixed with contaminated water on more than one occasion); and that in the presumably most advanced country in the world a high percentage of people are so obese they can hardly walk, thanks to a “scientific” diet – a diet officially sanctioned by the state – that forbids eggs (to which the human body is adapted) and emphasized, still emphasizes, refined carbohydrates (to which the human body is not adapted, which causes all sorts of physiological problems, obesity amongst them).”

It is this arrogance that he fights against and he comments (similar to discussions we had once before concerning the Iban and their religious anthropology)
“if a tradition has served a society well and has allowed its members to adapt well to their environment, we have no right to impose our truth on them, no matter how scientific and confirmed it may appear to be.”

One of the key minor points that has to be made is that relativism ought (although I am trying to avoid a naturalistic fallacy here) not be considered as an imperative. It is not, it is about the realm of possibilities.

To approach the difficulties in accepting the axiom of ‘cosmological relativism’ which I do not explicitly seek, you may ‘choose’ to believe what you wish, I will defer further explanations till the next post.

Libertarianism without reference to natural rights is difficult I will agree. But I am referring to libertarian anarchism, where instead of rights again we talk of potentials and probables and possibilities.

The key questions could be … can it work?
Your scepticism betrays that you think it would not. Yet again the point of Feyerabend (which will be focused in the next post) is that:
a) cosmological relatvism/epistemological anarchism cannot be enforced. It is neither a reccomendation nor a requirement but an opinion that an embracement of diversity (method, viewpoints, ideologies) may have benefits.
b) cosmological relatvism/epistemological anarchism is not a worldview for export into other regions or societies that seem (or believe for themselves) to be getting on rather well without it. (Such societies may be sophisticated and modern or what some call primitive).
c) It is not a worldview to be exported to those whose inhabitants show no desire to change their ways (anti-x I would posit).
d) the key word for Feyerabend and found in the thoughts of the Zapatistas is ‘participation’.

In his earlier years Feyerabend in order to shock and horrify declared “anything goes” (this was an epistemoligical statement and not an ethical one). Towards the end of his life as he developed a sophisticated vision of relativism one could paraphrase his political idea as:
“a call to arms for everyone open to new ideas, diversity of belief, and variety in approach, to participate in the development of our own societies.”

May I ask, if you intuit that it is clear that a compromise or an average of ALL possible points of view results in disagreement or deadlock, is this intuition based on your subjective response to the idea or upon a reflection and experience of ALL possible points of view?
One of Feyerabends key points is that the latter, knowledge and experience of ALL points of view, is something that is lacking in most/ALL people. We simply cannot comprehend the diversity of opinion and tradition that society comprises, hance the solopsism or egoism that some are moved to.

That anything is intuitively clear to you, is something that I cannot be certain or convinced of as being a valid intuition. Thus I can only attempt to try to understand your intuitions, and it is this attempt at participating in and exploring your alternative worlviews that is the guiding principle of ‘cosmological relativism’.
It is a liberation from a sytematic way of thinking that immediately rejects ‘x’ because of ‘anti-x’. It is a liberation from the grounded debate i.e. reason or rationalism wherein only its adherents may fully participate, all non-adherents are unreasonable, irrational, immediately wrong, misguided, foolish…etc.
It is an execution of my individual sovereignty that I am free to make such choices.

“Thus any seemingly ‘objective’ statement that you may wish to make has to be isolated as an observational statement made in a particular space and time and context.”

So there are no objective statements. But you treat definition of cosmological relativism as objective. In fact it is relative, so not universally true. Any attempt to impose a relative truth on people, pretending that it is objective, would be … unwise.

The structure of your post seems to assume I accept Feyerabend’s axiom of cosmological relativism. If you explicitly said, let us assume X, then we can discuss the consequences. But since we are discussing X, we can’t just assume X. (X being “cosmological relativism” is true.)

This reminds me of you batting away my comments on Wittgenstein using language games. You can’t justify X with X.

“the libertarian strain is definable as the sovereignty of the individual”

I think we could make progress if we examine the definitions of Libertarianism. Can you expand your definition to include how social interactions are conducted and conflicts resolved? To see that without you referencing natural rights should be interesting.

“You define anti-x for yourself as incompatible. Yet such incompatibility can only fully be known when it is placed within the context of every other tradition.”

Ok, I define tradition anti-X as incompatible with tradition X (within the viewpoint of tradition X). When ever tradition X attempts to access centres of power it can be blocked (from their POV) by anti-X. It is intuitively clear to me that if you compromise or “average” ALL possible points of view, you only get disagreement or deadlock.

AC1

The definition of cosmological relativism is that your apprehension of a ‘thing’ is relative to the method of observation you use, is relative to the assumptions that you hold, is relative to all the prejudices and systematic values that come with your particular position.

Thus any seemingly ‘objective’ statement that you may wish to make has to be isolated as an observational statement made in a particular space and time and context.

I’ll repeat the central axiom which seems to be getting lost, which is that one must assume equality to all points of view. This does not mean that all points of view are equal, for in the final analysis of time they may prove not to be.

When we proceed beyond the equality of a view to make qualitative judgements the key axiom again is that such judgements are entirely relative to the position that you as judge holds.

This holds true of relativism also, thus your oft recycled rejection that relatvism is either absolute (thus not relative) or not absolute (thus not true in all cases) is redundant! For the relativist themself are stuck within the ‘cosmology’ of being and are equally in obeyance to the notion that its truths are also relative.

It is an ironic irritant that just as you insist that atheism means many things and cannot be pigeonholed into the simplistic descriptions and definitions I have sometimes offered, so too relativism does not fit neatly into one definable specific category.

“non-methodic compromise” was a poor turn of phrase on my behalf, but is again better explained by the latter post. In the process of compromise, there is no set method, although even this does not discount the possibility that a mutually agreeable method may be stumbled upon.

To talk of non-libertarian anarchy is a bit of a misnomer. Although both Feyerabend and myself are talking of anarchy, the libertarian strain is definable as the sovereignty of the individual. That is the central tenet.

You define anti-x for yourself as incompatible. Yet such incompatibility can only fully be known when it is placed within the context of every other tradition.

*sigh*
I’d say they are “not equal”.
But is your implied statement “all points of view have equal worth” an absolute statement or not?

If it is absolute, it proves that not all statements have equal worth.
If it is not absolute, it is not true in all cases.

This just proves my answer: “not equal”. (I know this argument has been recycled but it’s a classic.)

“The attempt to reach compromise is not assigning natural rights, as the process of compromise must be non-methodical.”

But the (non-methodical) compromise is mandatory? So the other party has a natural right to a compromise solution? Any requirement for compromise, consensus or agreement is necessarily a limitation of (so called) freedom (and also assigning natural rights to the other party). The only solution to total freedom is non-libertarian anarchy.

“why should we surrender to the idea that traditions x and anti-x are irreconciliable?”
Axiom: for every view, there is an incompatible alternative view. Anti-X is defined (by me) as incompatible with X. Is there a counter example? A compromise view of X is longer X but Y. And there probably exists anti-Y.

AC1

Anything less than the recognition that the individual is sovereign is paying lipservice to the idea of freedom, and is simply saying I dissapprove of tradition ‘x’.

Another point: why should we surrender to the idea that traditions x and anti-x are irreconciliable? That the holders of these traditions cannot compromise? Or that these traditions could coesxist almost paradoxically side by side?

If anti-x is intractable in their opposition to x, is it because they have become a slave to their tradition?

Concerning ‘X’ and ‘anti-X’ the relatavist is acutely aware of the possible paradox that such conflict can bring about. After all it is not so relatavistic to try to enforce relativism.

The outline of what one could call the Feyerabendian state I mentioned in this post http://www.methodinit.org.uk/methodinit/2007/08/22/feyerabend-science-the-state-the-self/

If you do not subscribe to the view that all points of view have equal worth then you deny the liberty of the individual.
John Stuart Mills classic line was: “Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign”
this stands in opposition to the tyranny of the majority in whose name society commits many ills.
This is the core principle behind all liberal philosophies, and anything to the contrary is as Feyerabend describes it at its extreme as ratiofascism.

As the individual is sovereign then the individual is free, it is only when the individual relates to other individuals and then as a group becomes society that conlficts of these innate freedoms begin to arise. The attempt to reach compromise is not assigning natural rights, as the process of compromise must be non-methodical.

It is a pragmatic approach
“The tradition adopted by the parties is unspecified in the beginning and develops as the exchange goes along. The participants get immersed into each others’ way of thinking, feeling, percieving to such an extent that their ideas, perceptions, world views may be entirely changed – they become different people participating in a new and different tradition. An open exchange respects the partner whether he is an individual, or an entire culture while a rational exchange promises respect only within the framework of a rational debate. An open exchange has non organon though it may invent one, there is no logic, though forms of logic may emerge in its course.”

It is possible to say that all traditions have equal access and that this is anarchism. See the Zapatista movement as an example.