Faith Schools 2
Dialogs September 18th, 2007In response to AC-1’s interesting and thought provoking post I had written a point by point response, highlighting werethere was agreement and clarifying my position where there was disagreement. Yet as I read over what I had written it occured to me that it was unsatisfactory, that despite a fairly common level of acceptance on certain libertarian principles, there were still one or two axiomatic principles of which neither of us were ever likely to agree. I therefore decided to avoid the circular route and chose instead to write this post here. I have divided it into three sections, in the first I outline what I consider to be a key principled disagreement between AC-1 and myself. In part 2 I present the view that the ‘moderate’ faith school system as it exists in the UK is not worth all the hysteria that some secularists have spent on it, and finally in part 3 I quote extensively from Paul Feyerabend on the problems of education in general.
Freedom of Choice, Freedom of Thinking
In AC-1’s last post he disagreed with my assertion that prohibiting the existence of faith schools is an attack on the principle of freedom of choice, which by extension is an attack on free thinking. He claims that it would be possible into indoctrinating people into making ‘free choices’ by choosing what he would percieve as the not-so-free choice of a faith school.
Yet in a libertarian worldview, and an agenda of open debate where all ideas are free to exist, the notion that freedom to choose a method (no matter how offensive that method may be) could be seperate from the notion of free thinking is incomprehensible. They are in my opinion inseparable, to remove one (the freedom to choose) in order to preserve the other (free thought) is no true freedom at all but is instead a tyranny and a guided debate and contrary to all libertarian ideals.
Ac-1 proposes that Faith schools be abolished on the grounds that they are at worst indoctrinating children or in the least preventing them from having a free-thinking education. Yet his opposition to this is grounded in the idea that a faith ethos is a bad thing, in essence that faith is bad method. Immediately it should be obvious that such an opinion is itself the weapon of an indoctrinaire agenda. In this case the agenda of secular humanism and atheism.
It is in fact an attack on freedom to restrict or remove parental choice as to how they may educate their children. But it is an attack not only on free-choice but crucially on free-thinking. For the opponents of faith schools, with their hysterical accusations of indoctrination are in fact saying that the option to recieve a faith school education must be removed because they do not think the parents are capable of making a free or informed choice in the matter. The opponents of faith schools who defend their position as free-thinkers are in fact demonstrating a remarkably judgemental and patronising attitude to society. “We know whats best for your children, and as you seem incapable of making the right choice, we shall remove the option for you.”
It is ironic, but I can think of no greater an example of the propaganda and indoctrination of one methodic worldview over another, than this one.
What is a Faith School?
As I read over AC-1’s considered attacks on faith schools I noticed that little attention was paid to what it actually means to be a faith school. I shall attempt in brief to rectify this.
Firstly a faith school is affiliated to a ‘faith.’ But in practise this means that a faith institution, such as a Church contributes towards the funding of that school. Such a beneficent act (probably seen as the carrot and stick incentive to those who accuse them of indoctrination) has its roots in the philantropic traditions of each faith, and the cultural identity also. But lets look at the funding, 85% of the funding for a Faith school is paid by the state. A sizeable proportion, in return there are obvious rules and regulations that need to be followed. This brings us to the second fact about faith schools, and that is that they are obliged as are all other schools to teach the curriculum and are assessed and inspected in accordance with same criteria as secular schools. In other words a faith school teaches exactly the same material as a non-faith school. What role then does faith play in the teaching of religious education? In 57% of faith schools the faith that the school adheres to is taught with reference to an anthropology of other faiths where the curriculum deems it to be appropriate. In the remaining 43% of faith schools a non-denomination religious educational curriculum is taught. Across all faith schools its policy of religious education is presented to prospective parents and pupils pre-enrolment. So do faith schools only employ and teach members of that faith community? The answer is no! No school can have a prejudicial employment or enrolment policy, and this is safeguarded in the Race Relations Act and other employment legislation. Although a preference may be shown, a system is devised by school governors and the local education authority to determine what constitutes a fair admissions policy. All schools (faith and non-faith) have to determine an admissions system that favours the local, and which reflects upon the social demographics.
Besides indoctrination (which is the focus of AC-1’s ire) another contentious issue (which he hints uopn) is the suggestion that faith schools promote divisiness and intolerance and that by their very existence damage race-relations and the agenda of multicultural integration. Besides pointing out that the agenda of multiculturalism is accused of being a doctrine by some, and therefore is open to attacks that it is indoctrinaire in nature, I am more willing to accept a conciliatory tone on this matter. In particular I think there have been positive attempts at promoting legislation to make faith schools even more inclusive. This is infact the basis of much recent educational policy.
A final point on faith schools is this. AC-1 is as we should now know opposed to their indoctrination techniques, as though a faith school employs a thought police that weeds out heresy and malpractise. This should be exposed for the utter rot that it is. A faith school like any other school in the land aims to provide a rounded multi-curriculum education. It’s success in doing so is measured (rather glibly) by the academic performance of its students. Therefore a succesful faith school is a school that succeeds in its educational remit. As schools are measured by independently set standards any failure to facilitate the well-rounded education demanded of the curriculum are met with measures imposed by the education authority. Therefore the aim of all schools faith or non-faith is to provide that curriculum to the best of their abilities.
Yet if we were to believe AC-1 for a fraction of a second we should think that the succesful graduation of a pupil from a faith school should depend upon their religious belief, their attendance at religious ceremonies, their ability to recite the holy scriptures of their respective faith, and so on. If AC-1 should choose to step into a faith school (and this can be arranged) he will note that the ‘faith’ element has no bearing upon the material being taught, and the hopes and expectations that teachers and parents have for their pupils. A faith school like any other seeks to churn out succesful students (albeit a standard of success that I disagree with) not soldiers of God.
An analysis of what happens in ‘education’
One area that we both agree with is that education/schooling is in an imperfect state. But I feel we perhaps disagree to what extent or as to how we can rectify this. To this extent I have decided to conclude not with my ‘manifesto’ for education but with a quote from Paul Feyerabend on his views about the matter.
From 1958 to 1990 I was a Professor of Philosophy at the University of California in Berkeley. My function was to carry out the educational policies of the State of California which means I had to teach people what a small group of white intellectuals had decided was knowledge. I hardly ever thought about this function and I would not have taken it very seriously had I been informed. I told the students what I had learned, I arranged the material in a way that seemed plausiable and interesting to me – and that was all I did. Of course, I had also some ‘ideas of my own’ – but these ideas moved in a fairly narrow domain (though some of my friends said even then that I was going batty).
IN the years around 1964 Mexicans, blacks, Indians entered the university as a result of new educational policies. There they sat, partyly curious, partly disdainful, partly simply confused hoping to get an ‘education’. What an oppurtunity for a prophet in search of a following! What an oppurtunity, my rationalist friends told me, to contribute to the spreading of reason and the improvement of mankind! What a marvellous opportunity for a new wave of enlightenment! I felt very differntly. For it now dawned on me that the intricate arguments and the wonderful stories I had so far told to my more or less sophisticated audience might just be dreams, reflections of the conceit of a small group who had succeeded in enslaving everyone else with their ideas. Who was I to tell these people what and how to think? I did not know their problems though I knew they had many. I was not familiar with their interests, their feelings, their fears though I knew that they were eager to learn… Was this the right thing to offer to people who had been robbed of their land, their culture, their dignity and who were now supposed first to absorb and then to repeat the anaemic ideas of the mouthpieces of their oh so human captors? …
Now there was much talk of liberation, or racial equality – but what did it mean? Did it mean the equality of these traditions and the traditions of the white man? It did not. Equality meant that the members of different races and cultures now had the wonderful chance to participate in the white man’s manias, they had the chance to participate in his science, his technology, his medicine, his politics. These were the thoughts that went through my head as I looked at my audience and they made me recoil in revulsion and terror from the task I was supposed to perform. For the task- this now became clear to me- was that of a very refined, very sophisticated slavedriver. And a slavedriver I did not want to be…
I wanted to know how intellectuals manage to get away with murder- for it is murder, murder of minds and cultures that is committed year in year out at schools, universities, educational missions in foreign countries… I envisaged a new kind of education that would live from a rich resovoir of different points of view permitting the choice of traditions most advantageous to the individual. The teacher’s task would consist in facilitating the choice, not in replaceing it by some ‘truth’ of his own… I thought that regarding all achievements as transitory, restricted and personal and every truth as created by our love for it and not as ‘found’ would prevent the deterioration of once promising fairy-tales and I also thought that it was necessary to develop a new philosophy or a new religion to give substance to this unsystematic conjecture…
I now realize that these considerations were just another example of intellectualistic conceit and folly. It is conceited to assume that one has solutions for people whose lives one does not share and whose problems one does not know. It is foolish to assume that such an exercise in distant humanitarianism will have effects pleasing to the people concerned…
My own view differed from those just mentioned but it was still a view, an abstract fancy I had invented and now tried to sell without having even shared even an ounce of the lives of the recievers. This I now regard as insufferable conceit. So – what remains?…
I could follow my own advice to address only those people whom I think I understand on a personal basis… Another possibility is a change of subject. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, pp263-267

September 19th, 2007 at 8:26 pm
I am posting this as a comment as it does not introduce any new ideas. It is more of a comment on the discussion so far (which has been most stimulating!).
“…the notion that freedom to choose a method… could be seperate from the notion of free thinking is incomprehensible.”
I have a few comments on this:
1) You have not actually stated why freedom of actions and freedom of thought are inseparable. You did call it “incomprehensible”, “tyranny” and “contrary to all libertarian ideals” but I don’t actually see any argument to refute.
2) Giving everyone freedom of choice (or action) is impossible. Person A would have freedom to kill person B. Then person B would not have his freedom to live. Their rights immediately conflict and therefore universal freedom of action is impossible.
3) We have previously agreed natural rights are an illusion, including freedom of action. (But you have every right to reverse your views; as do I).
4) You are saying the consequence of my argument is tyranny. Saying the consequences of my argument is “bad” is irrelevant to disproving my argument.
(Unless its a valid reductio ad absurdum, naturally.)
“Yet his opposition to this is grounded in the idea that a faith ethos is a bad thing, in essence that faith is bad method.”
My other views are not relevant to disproving my argument. Since we started this thread on education, did I make a value judgment on faith? I think I was careful not to do so in my axioms.
“It is ironic, but I can think of no greater an example of the propaganda and indoctrination of one methodic worldview over another, than this one.”
I find it amusing you call my argument “indoctrination”. My argument is, briefly, “faith schools indoctrinate regarding systems of values” and “indoctrination is bad” therefore “faith schools are bad”. I did not state what action we could take, so why accuse this of indoctrination?
“AC-1 is as we should now know opposed to their indoctrination techniques, as though a faith school employs a thought police that weeds out heresy and malpractise. This should be exposed for the utter rot that it is.”
I am taking the position of “indoctrination is bad” as a view just for this thread. Currently, I don’t think it is a universal value, but I know you are rather attracted to this idea and hence I used it as a temporarily agreed axiom.
I am not objecting to the curriculum the school provides (generally speaking). A faith school stands for a set of values. If someone disobeys the values of the school, which are often codified as “the rules”, then the teachers are indeed a kind of police.
“A faith school like any other seeks to churn out succesful students (albeit a standard of success that I disagree with) not soldiers of God.”
Soldiers of God is their aim! From that prospectus: “The school seeks to [promote development], where everyone shares a vision based on the teachings and exemplary life of Jesus Christ”.”.
Ask yourself, does the school (from it’s senior leadership and official policy) stand for one value system or more than one?
Is this value system presented in an uncritical manner? (Also considering teachers can’t usually openly violate school policy.)
Finally, my objection to faith schools could not have been stated more simply than: “Who was I to tell these people what and how to think?” – Feyerabend
I think you will find support for Feyerabend and support for faith schools are incompatible beliefs, at least as far as I can see.
AC1
September 20th, 2007 at 1:11 pm
Interesting comments, but some are grounded on a misinterpretation.
1, 2 & 3.
Attempting to reduce ‘freedoms’ into ‘rights’ is the problem here. It is a naturalistic fallacy. That I have the freedom to pick my weapon of choice and to kill someone does not mean that I ought to. That I ought to do something or that I have a right to do something is not the same as the simple existential fact that I am free to do something.
Freedom of action and freedom of thought is indentical insofar as they are questions of liberty and autonomy. The libertarian agenda that says we must defend freedom (not declared rights) also adresses the problem of conflicting freedoms.
If I have the right to kill and you have the right to life, then they are conflicting rights, but as has been previously argued neither of these are natural rights, all rights are assumed, and effectively all rights are legislative ideals, or to use your phrase social values.
But being free to kill and free to live (although in conflict) are natural states of affairs. They are both the offspring of being free agents.
Likewise freedom to choose, and freedom to act in accordance with those choices. Both inseparbly connected notions with the ideal of freedom, and being free.
When conflict occurs our social norm is to restrict or limit one freedom over the other. To formulate rights: thus the right to live is given priority over the right to kill. This is an unnatural act inasmuch as the freedom to choose, the freedom to be a moral agent is denied.
That we restrict wholesale freedom in such ways is itself a reflection of a social value!
When such conflict occurs the libertarian response is not to restrict or dilineate freedoms. Rather the ideal is to bring about consensus. Which in a way if you like is to conjure up the illusion of rights, to thus make the restriction of freedom more palatable to the society at large. But is it really a restriction? Is it not possible that one may freely choose non-violence, and not-killing as a viable course of action?
But it is in extreme cases that we can talk of conflicting freedoms in this way. Most people though free to kill, equally agree that they are free not to kill, and are content to abide by this.
4
I was indeed attempting a reductio.
For what you are proposing is ‘bad’ in the eyes of libertarianism, you are restricting freedom.
When you state indoctrination to be bad, and then when you state your belief that faith schools indoctrinate, and then conclude that in order to avoid this one must abolish faith schools. How is this not an expression of a doctrine? And when you choose to argue in support of this doctrine, hoping that people may ’see reason’ may be ‘convinced of the validity of your arguments’ or indeed may be ‘forced to concede that your opinions are correct/more desireable to a particular outcome’, how may I ask is this not the result of indoctrination?
Do not all schools (as they are) represent a value system? This is what I had argued before. Whether that value system is expressed in a faith ethos, in its uniform rules, rules of discipline, are they not then defending a system of values? I think we would agree that by this defintion they do, and by such a definition if those values are integral to its continuity and being then rule breaches are indeed policed.
But this is my point about the real activity taking place. A faith school does not expel a pupil nor sack its staff for stating ‘there is no God’, or for refusing to attend religious ceremonies (which are non compulsory anyway). This just does not happen!
Yet, schools do exclude for the non-adherence to its uniform policy. And as I remember (unless you have sinced changed your views, which you are entitled to do) you support uniforms in principle as they (paraphrasing you) promote academic and social discipline.
So in essence (if you genuinely support school uniforms) are you are saying that one social value system (faith) is less desireable to you than other?
In essence as all schools and indeed all institutions are arbiters and promoters and defenders of peculiar social values why dont we just do away with the lot of them?
Finally, you have misunderstood Feyerabend. As a relativist libertarian grounded in the ideals of open debate he would not support any policy of restriction.
“Who am I to tell these people what and how to think” is his renunciation of intellectualism. His renunciation of the idea that he has any notion better than anybody else over what constitutes good education fills him with revulsion.
There are some quotes that would help clear up his idea of education policies.
“The best education consists in immunizing people against systematic attempts at education”
He qualifies this with a tirade against institutional science, and the agenda of rationalists/realists in the education sector.
“But science still reigns supreme. It reigns supreme because its practitioners are unable to understand, and unwilling to condone, different ideologies, because they have the power to enforce their wishes, and because they use this power ‘ just as their ancestors used their power to force Christianity on the peoples they encountered during their conquests. Thus, while an American can now choose the religion he likes, he is still not permitted to demand that his children learn magic rather than science at school. There is a separation between state and church, there is no separation between state and science.
And yet science has no greater authority than any other form of life. Its aims are certainly not more important than are the aims that guide the lives in a religious community or in a tribe that is united by a myth. At any rate, they have no business restricting the lives, the thoughts, the education of the members of a free society where everyone should have a chance to make up his own mind and to live in accordance with the social beliefs he finds most acceptable. The separation between state and church must therefore be complemented by the separation between state and science.”
In a free society “all traditions have equal rights and equal access to the centres of power”.
Thus faith schools must be defended as a principle of freedom. And open debate must be guarunteed.
Neither Feyerabend nor myself are arguing that all schools should be uniform, that all schools should be faith schools, or that one way is better than another. What we do propose is that all citizens should be free to make that choice.
September 21st, 2007 at 5:46 pm
[...] You quoted: In a free society “all traditions have equal rights and equal access to the centres of power”. (SFS, p. 9), Feyerabend [...]
September 22nd, 2007 at 12:14 pm
“For what you are proposing is ‘bad’ in the eyes of libertarianism, you are restricting freedom.”
You are using Libertarianism as an axiom. That has no bearing on my original argument since I did not employ that axiom and we don’t agree on it (for the purposes of this thread).
“When you … conclude that in order to avoid this one must abolish faith schools. How is this not an expression of a doctrine?”
Again, you are attacking the nature of the argument, not the argument itself. Even if my conclusion is indoctrination, it does not disprove my argument.
“A faith school does not expel a pupil nor sack its staff for stating ‘there is no God’, … This just does not happen!”
You don’t address my argument. I said “if X then Y”. You said “Y never happens”. The fact “Y never happens” does not disprove my argument!
“So in essence (if you genuinely support school uniforms) are you are saying that one social value system (faith) is less desireable to you than other?”
I already said my other views on faith and uniforms are not relevant to my argument. I try to refrain from accusing fallacies but you repeated this ad hominem circumstantial. (Last time you said “Yet his opposition to this is grounded in the idea that a faith ethos is a bad thing, in essence that faith is bad method.”)
“Finally, you have misunderstood Feyerabend.” “The best education consists in immunizing people against systematic attempts at education” (Feyerabend)
Oh, I think I get his meaning better than you think. Faith schools are a systematic attempt at educating a value system (as are arguably all schools). If there was a school that had atheism classes, humanistic values and selected the majority of students on their atheistic beliefs, I imagine you might consider that brain washing – but how is this “lack of faith school” any worse than a faith school in indoctrination?
“He qualifies this with a tirade against institutional science,”
I think Feyerabend’s views on science biases you towards him. Why the big quote on science – was this relevant to the discussion on faith schools or just to wind me up?
AC1
September 22nd, 2007 at 1:26 pm
Considering I have rejected the nature of rational argument and thus its correlating fallacies, why indeed should I not question the nature of the argument?
“Even if my conclusion is indoctrination, this does not disprove my argument”.
I’m not interested in the argument anymore, once the veil has been lifted and the possibility that your conclusions equate to indoctrination are shown then it is open season on your views. As with any attempt at the reductio I leave it to the reader to guage how absurd your arguments may be.
We will agree to disagree on how well you understand Feyerabends position. Suffice to say that an ‘athiest school’ that picks its pupils on ‘atheist beliefs’ and teaches ‘atheist methods’, though not in accordance with my tastes, is a perfectly valid concept. If it is brainwashing it is brainwashing insofar as all teaching is brainwashing.
That Feyerabend is quite willing to attack science makes him no more or no less appealing to me, that is a bit of low punch on your behalf. Feyerabends intentions are that philosophers, indeed all people, should follow the methods, doctrines and beliefs about which they feel comfortable or uncompromised. Consequently my experience is that Feyerabend makes a fitting addittion to my reading list following on from Wittgenstein.
September 22nd, 2007 at 1:35 pm
Feyerabend starts from the position of Philosopher of science. That he rejects scientific method leads him to make inferrences about other topics. Thus epistemological anarchism leads to a consideration on other matters such as politics and social freedoms.
If it wound you up, then I will allow myself a short giggle, but it was not my intention.
September 22nd, 2007 at 2:53 pm
[...] “I have rejected the nature of rational argument and thus its correlating fallacies” [...]