Yet There Is Method In It

Darwin believed there was a scientific basis for the morality of man. Morality and the moral sense are attributes that can be found in our species. So in accordance with his evolutionary mechanism Darwin maintains that moral sensibility can be accounted for in much the same way, as can other traits in evolutionary terms; in other words the development of this moral faculty must have good evolutionary reasons.

Darwin and other evolutionary ethicists such as Herbert Spencer, Julian Huxley, G.G.Simpson and C.H.Waddington believed that we had to refer to social biology.

Darwin expounds his position in the Descent of Man where he says; “any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man.”

Having proposed that mans moral capacity developed as a consequence of evolutionary imperatives he then goes on to identify four main areas where the moral capacity originates. The first is the social instincts that drives animals to take pleasure from being in an association with its fellows, thus according it a sympathetic urge that drives them to act for the benefit of those of the same species and association (family unit). The second is the vivid recollection of past action and motives that would come with a higher mental development, and the feeling of dissatisfaction that arises when desires or instincts are unsatisfied. The third essential element in the origin of the moral faculties is the development of language, which Darwin notes allows the ‘community’ to express it’s wishes and to form common opinion on how the public good can best be served. This however is dependent on the sympathetic character, which Darwin calls the foundation stone of the social instinct. Finally individual habit would shape the conduct of each animal, social instinct and sympathy, in common with other instincts, are strengthened by habit. Habit therefore, shaping the sense of obedience to communal wishes and judgements.

Darwin, however, points out that even if these four building blocks of the moral sense were acquired by social animals that attained a near human intellectual level, it would not guarantee an identical moral code, or a common interpretation of rightness or wrongness.

Nevertheless something similar or identical to the conscience would be developed, because animals would find a conflict of instincts, coupled with an uncertainty as to which impulse should be obeyed, and furthermore emotions such as satisfaction and dissatisfaction would be felt when past ‘experiences’ were reflected upon in the mind. This reflective nature would instruct the animal that one course of action would be better to another, that one ought to do one thing and ought not to the other. This faculty of ‘ought’ or ‘ought not’ reflections, Darwin calls “the most noble of all the attributes of men”.

The most important element though in all of the evolutionary account for ethics is the sociability of man and animals, the affection which animals of the same social group hold for each other and even inter-specieal, in the case of the man/dog relationship. Darwin points to the mutual service in the higher animals that warn each other of danger, or the way in which animals preen each other for parasites or thorns. Then of course there is the phenomenon of pack hunting where the group collectively hunt, kill and feed off of the prey; where the animal if left individually may have considerably less success in its hunting capabilities. Darwin identifies these phenomena as a feeling of love that animals hold for others within the same ‘association’, a sympathising in the pains and less so in the pleasures of others, emotions which are “not felt in non-social adult animals”. Examples of this social sympathy are evident in the cases of young, elderly and vulnerable members of the animal association. Other social instincts that can be seen as moral, is the power of self-command, loyalty and obedience.

This all leads us though to the fundamental question of origins, why do many of the higher animal species exhibit these social instincts, and ultimately why is man moral? Of course the feeling of discomfort when parted and comfort whilst together is a suitable suggestion, but Darwin believes there is more; that the development of the moral faculty and the social instinct is necessary for the continued evolvement and survival of the species.

He states that it is more probable that the feelings of comfort and discomfort when in the presence of society or absence from it, were naturally developed in order to induce those animals that would benefit from association and society, to form such groups. This is comparable to the development of the sense of hunger and the feeling of relief from hunger that was first acquired to induce animals into eating. The social instinct further developed through the young remaining with the parents, so that those animals which took greater pleasure in society, benefited by being generally safer from attack, whereas those animals that did not associate with others would “perish in greater numbers”. Darwin therefore states that the social instinct has largely been gained through natural selection.

And so Man can trace his moral urges to natural selection and his evolution from the lower species; for social instincts of mutual love, sympathy, sociability and obedience, are traits held in common with other animals. Furthermore, man’s higher intellect enables him to be guided according to his inherited instincts to act for the social good. Couple this with his instinctive sympathy, and man is caused to value the approbation of his fellow men and is thus influenced in his actions. Darwin marvels at the moral faculty and acclaims the inherited social instincts as giving “the impulse to some of his best actions”. Man’s instinctual love, sympathy and self-command strengthened by habit and by reason, impels man to act according to particular codes of conduct, in such a way that as Darwin quotes Kant, “I will not in my own person violate the dignity of humanity.”

There are three doctrines, which are held (generally) by Christianity, of which the first two are also shared with the other great Monotheistic faiths, Judaism and Islam.
1) God is good. 2) God wills us to do what is good. 3) God is the basis of ethics.

Le Poidevin points out that the first two are not implicit to the idea of a creator, however, the third premise can be used as the basis of the moral argument for the existence of God.

Plato, in his Euthyphro, identified a problem with the acceptance of all three premises; the third doctrine, namely that God is the basis of ethics, makes it difficult for us to understand the other two doctrines. He presents us with the question, “How are we to understand the idea that God wills us to do what is good?”. To which there are two possible answers, either (a) God wills us to do what is good because certain acts are of themselves good, and he wishes them to be performed, or (b) An act is good only because God wills it. As Le Poidevin states, neither of these answers are wholly satisfactory to the theist, for they both raise problems with theistic belief, as we understand it.

If we accept the first answer, that certain acts are good independent of God, and it is their natural goodness that makes God will them, then it follows that moral values are independent of God. Therefore if God did not exist, there would still be moral values, thus the moral argument for the existence of God is scuppered, and the basis for ethics has nothing to do with theism.

If on the other hand we accept the second answer, that an act is good solely by the virtue of God’s willing it, then we are confronted with another problem; namely that “God wills us to do what he wills us to do”. Therefore, returning to the three original doctrines that we considered, it would seem that God’s willing us to do what is good, is contrary, under a metaphysical interpretation, to the concept that God is the basis of ethics. There is also a contradiction between the notion of God being good and being the basis of ethics, for “if ascribing goodness to something just means that God wills it, then the assertion that God is good becomes the curious and morally empty assertion that God wills that he be as he is”

This renders the arguments that God is the basis of ethics, and that morality is a demonstration of God’s existence, as logically incoherent and therefore false. This is the meta-ethical argument for theism, which takes the following formula:
1/ If theism is true then ‘God is good’ is morally significant.

2/ If theism is true then God plays an explanatory role in ethics.

3/ If ‘God is good’ is morally significant, then moral goodness must be Independent of God.

4/ If God plays an explanatory role in ethics, moral goodness cannot be Independent of God.

Therefore the conclusion that theism is false is reached the following way, 1 and 3 considered together, imply 5:

5/ If theism is true then moral goodness must be independent of god.

But also 2 and 4 mutually considered imply 6:

6/ If theism is true then moral goodness cannot be independent of God.

Positions 5 and 6 therefore provide us with the conclusion that, If theism is true then moral goodness both is, and is not, independent of God. A self-contradictory and seemingly false position.

But the Christian or theist response can be found if the third proposition is re-considered, for it is necessary to explore the meaning of the term ‘goodness’. If we look at Plato’s question (“Does God will us to do what is good because, independently of him, it is good, or is it that what is good is so only because he wills it?”) we find that it is assumed that we must choose one premise or the other and not both. Although at first it would appear that we couldn’t accept both positions. If we attempt to define ‘good’ in more than one way, then it is possible that ‘good’ acts can be independent of God’s will, but also that in another sense of the term, ‘good’ acts are good because he wills them. If the theist position can justify this argument, then it is possible that they can escape the meta-ethical argument.

What is needed is to distinguish between two elements in morality, descriptivity and prescriptivity.

Descriptive morality identifies acts that when done, would bring about a particular beneficial consequence. But there can also be an ‘ought’ statement in descriptive morality, which is of its nature conditional, so for example ‘one ought to eat, if one wants to stay alive’. (The ‘ought’ here is Hypothetical). Prescriptive morality, on the other hand, suggests an obligation in our actions, ie. If we wish to achieve x we ‘Must’ do y. Or to put it another way, a prescriptive sense of ‘good’ carries an unconditional ‘ought’: for example, “one ought to stop killing, full stop, and not merely to avoid censure”. In making this distinction and asserting that there are acts, which are prescriptively and unconditionally good, as well as the conditional descriptive acts, we are “assenting to a certain conception of morality”.

So the theistic response to the meta-ethical argument is to say that something can be descriptively good, which is in our best interests and which is independent of God’s will. And at the same time we can say without contradiction that there are those things that are good because God wills it.

The final consideration that the theist needs to make is the concept that ‘God is good’. The meta-ethical argument suggests that either ‘God is good’ is morally insignificant, or moral goodness is independent of God. The approach to this dilemma that Le Poidevin adopts is that when we say ‘God is good’ what we are doing is applying an analogy of God’s goodness to a morally good member of the human race. For example morally good parents would take care of their children, in the same way that God can be said to take care of his creation. But also implied in the statement ‘God is good’ is that unlike humans, God is a source of moral value, his goodness consists of the fact that he is the origin of ethics. If he were the basis of ethics, then we would agree that such a role would not be insignificant, and comparatively, as Le Poidevin suggests, neither is the concept of ‘God is good’.

Therefore the theist can amend the third premise in the meta-ethical argument; so instead of reading:

If ‘God is good’ is morally significant, then moral goodness must be independent of God.

It should instead read:

If ‘God is good’ is morally significant then moral goodness is not independent of God.

This line of argument has often been used as a defence against the implication from Darwin that humans as a species are not unique or that we are created moral beings.

The Monotheistic traditions maintain that the Moral law is given: the Decalogue, the Sermon on the Mount, and the prescriptions of the Quran and Torah. If the moral law is given we can infer the existence of a lawgiver. This concept has given rise to the Moral Argument for the Existence of God. Its logic is similar to that of the divine clockmaker; through the evidence of design we can infer a designer, similarly through the evidence of moral laws and the moral sense, we can infer the existence of a moral lawgiver.

More specifically, through the evidence of man’s altruism, sense of duty, sense of guilt, we can infer the existence of something to which we feel accountable.

Cardinal John Henry Newman proposed this when he spoke of the role that the Conscience plays in the process of ethical decision-making:

“If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose claims upon us we fear….If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which (the conscientious person’s) perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine.”

The basics of Darwins Evolutionary Theory

Darwin represented the great paradigm shift, for where geology raised controversy it was also easily tamed, because it could not present a mechanism with which to prove evolution or the process of the development of species. Darwin in 1859 published his work The Origin of the Species in which he outlined his mechanism, natural selection, which demonstrated the theory of evolution.

Darwin differed from earlier theories of evolution, in particular Lamarkism, which proposed that species changed gradually as a result of the environment and their diet. A necessary feature of Lamark’s thinking was the theory of Acquired Characteristics, which proposed that characteristics acquired during the lifetime of a species could be inherited by its offspring. The famous example of this theory is the Giraffe, who in needing to reach higher branches in order to eat, stretched its neck until it could reach. The new elongated neck in time became an acquired characteristic, which would be inherited by successive generations of Giraffes. The significant problem with this convenient theory was that no one had actually witnessed any such form of evolution. In fact it was particularly counter-intuitive, if we consider the practise of circumcision as an example. For thousands of years it has been the practise of the Jews and of other cultures to circumcise the male child, for purposes of religious ritual, rite of passage, and more importantly for reasons of hygiene, yet never once in millennia of this practise has a male child been born without a foreskin.

Darwin rejected Lamarkism and the theory of Acquired Characteristics, and instead proposed his theory of ‘Natural Selection’.

- within any species there are individual members whose particular characteristics help them to survive better than others

- those who survive to adulthood are able to breed, passing on those characteristics to the next generation

- by this mechanism, with successive generations, those characteristics which improve the chance of survival will be found in an increasing number of individuals within the species, for they will be the ones who survive to breed

- hence the characteristics of a species are gradually modified in favour of those that facilitate survival; thus nature selects those fittest to survive.

A perfect illustration of this theory was offered by Darwin, who pointed out that people had for many centuries bred domestic animals for particular characteristics.Darwin, in this, was applying the theories of Thomas Malthus, who in his Essays on the Principle of Population (1798), argued that species of animals and plants produce more offspring than is necessary for survival, and the numbers are controlled by lack of food or space. The environment is therefore the limiting factor on the number of survivors in any species, this, with the apparently chance variations in characteristics within a species, provided Darwin with his mechanism.

Modern genetics has demonstrated as much, with small errors in the copying of genes, chance variations arise. Professor Steve Jones in Almost like a Whale describes life as “a series of successful mistakes.”

The Challenge Darwin Presents

Darwin’s theories fundamentally challenged two central doctrines in Christian thought. Firstly, the human species was not unique for it had evolved from an earlier extinct species. Secondly, there is no purpose in creation; species are capable of either flourishing or declining, depending upon their ability to adapt to environmental conditions. The development of the world is fundamentally impersonal, for there is no externally determined purpose in its function.

The scientific revolution occurred almost simultaneously with the renaissance and with the era of enlightenment. The effect was the emergence of a whole new philosophical era in the west, which was to challenge the traditional scholastic philosophy of Aquinas and the Catholic Church. As the sciences flourished they began to discover that the earth, living creatures and the celestial heavens were amazingly complex. Many philosophers and scientists (and Natural Philosophers) began to be attracted to the argument from Design; in identifying order and design in creation it is possible to infer the existence of a designer. To this extent Christendom did not have any necessary argument against science.

But argument did occur where science challenged either the importance of man and the existence of spirit, or where science challenged accepted Christian doctrine, specifically where the basis of that doctrine was to be found in scripture.

The Challenge of Geology

One particular branch of science that was proving to be a challenge to the established and traditional beliefs was the field of geology. Early geologists uncovered a history of the earth that had not previously been accounted for. The geologist William Smith (1769-1839) noted that different rock strata came from different periods. The deeper the strata the older the rock; he also noticed that in some of the older rocks there was fossilised evidence of life forms that were very different from anything known to man in his day and age. Smith’s conclusion was that the different strata represented different stages of life on earth. Smith decided to reconcile his discoveries with the creation account in Genesis; but rather than take the six days of creation literally, Smith believed they referred to six geological periods. Each period represented an act of creation by God, which ended in some form of catastrophe, of which the most recent was the flood accounted for in Genesis.

Charles Lyell in his Principles of Geology (1830/33) differed from Smith’s opinion, stating that it was not necessary to posit separate acts of creation, but instead to perceive geological change as a continuous process. Thus far the discoveries of Geology, and the conclusions drawn by geologists, do not present any challenge to theology and the biblical account of creation. The story of creation in Genesis is accepted as allegorical, God still designs and creates creatures, and all that was in need of reinterpretation was the actual mechanics of creation. (It is worth noting here that a literal creationism, rejecting both the accounts from geology and allegory are more recent fundamentalist developments.)

Hugh Miller a Scottish geologist in 1847 published Footprints of the Creator, where he argued that the biblical account of creation followed by ‘the fall’ could in fact be proved through geological observations. He posited that species did not improve with time, but were created perfect and subsequently fell. He also argued that there was no reason to attribute the origin of mankind to any form of evolutionary development, for this would imply progress, rather than direct divine creation and the sinful ‘fall’. Miller felt that geology was a tool that could be used in defence of the traditional Christian account of creation; if we teach that man is an evolved creature from a lower species, then we are less inclined to think of ourselves as unique, special and spiritual.

Alternatively the geologist Chambers challenged the biblical account of creation and the concept of the uniqueness of man. It was his opinion that the geological records contradicted the scriptural chronology, and that in fact the earth was millions of years old and not thousands. But Chambers had to publish his work The Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844) anonymously, not only were his theories controversial and a direct challenge to Biblical authority, but he also did not possess a mechanism with which to demonstrate his notion of evolution.

In 1857, Philip Gosse, in his work Omphalos, attempted to produce a synthesis that would incorporate geological observations with the account of creation given in Genesis. He suggested that God may in fact have been trying to deceive by creating rocks in the Garden of Eden, which contained fossils, or by creating fully grown trees with rings inside suggesting their age. Gosse also suggested that Adam would have had a navel, despite the fact that its presence would have been wholly unnecessary if God directly created him.

Increasingly, Geology and its account of a long process of creation and development, was becoming harder to reconcile with the accepted Genesis account of Creation, be it literal or allegorical.