“The main example of the influence of natural interpretations that Feyerabend provided was the tower argument. The tower argument was one of the main objections against the theory of a moving earth. Aristotelians assumed that the fact that a stone which is dropped from a tower lands directly beneath it shows that the earth is stationary. They thought that, if the earth moved while the stone was falling, the stone would have been ‘left behind’. Objects would fall diagonally instead of vertically. Since this does not happen, Aristotelians thought that it was evident that the earth did not move. If one uses ancient theories of impulse and relative motion, the Copernican theory indeed appears to be falsified by the fact that objects fall vertically on earth. This observation required a new interpretation to make it compatible with Copernican theory. Galileo was able to make such a change about the nature of impulse and relative motion. Before such theories were articulated, Galileo had to make use of ‘ad hoc’ methods and proceed counter-inductively. So, ‘ad hoc’ hypotheses actually have a positive function: they temporarily make a new theory compatible with facts until the theory to be defended can be supported by other theories.

Together these remarks sanction the introduction of theories that are inconsistent with well-established facts. Furthermore, a pluralistic methodology that involves making comparisons between any theories at all forces defendants to improve the articulation of each theory. In this way, scientific pluralism improves the critical power of science. Thus Feyerabend proposes that science might proceed best not by induction, but by counterinduction.”

As you pointed out one of the main difficulties with it is the ‘ought’ assumption. And Hume states as much, that theories cannot be derived from facts. So Feyerabend says science as we know it can only exist if we drop the demand and revise our methodology.
But as you were kind enough to point it out, and as I’m feeling in a hume bashing mood today I will try to respond without dwelling too much on this.

I think the main area of thought is the principle of induction, which is widely supported in empiricism, and which Feyerabend attempts to dismiss. (Although he makes no attempt to replace it).

As you put it the methodology that accurately predicts the events should surely be favoured over those that are innacurate (or uninterested).

I’d accept the second point, where a methodology/language game makes no prediction of outcomes in certain situations (such as denial of the external world) it has substantially less value to us than a method that does.

I’d further develop this by saying that a method that makes no predictions of situational outcomes is of less calue than any method (accurate or inaccurate) that does.

I’d guess so far we would agree.

Where we seperate is on the ‘ought’ imperative to follow consistently accurate methods of prediction.
Although really this could be rephrased as the ‘ought’ imperative to follow consistently accurate methods of prediction to the exclusion of all other methods.

Feyerabend proposes that to follow one method to the exclusion of others is
a) not very progressive thinking, and
b) contrary to the ‘experience’ of science history (particularly paradigm shifts and conceptual revolutions).

Feyerabend therefore proposes counterinduction. Which is in essence a plurality of methods. He analyses Galileos defence of the Copernican theory against Aristotelian critics (including the Church for whom Copernicus seemed to contradict the inherent Aristotelianism of Thomist philosophy). Galileo it would appear operated using counterinductive methods.

Rather than quote extensively I shall link to the relevant page:
http://www.philsci.com/book6-8.htm
and scroll down to (or find text) the line beginning “Feyerabend illustrates counterinduction “

My thoughts (most are tautologies I know):

1) Various methodologies (or even word games) make a prediction on what happens in this situation or they don’t. (e.g. Some may deny external reality exist. Some may not consider cannon balls and feathers to be interesting and make no prediction.)

2) Of the methodologies that make a prediction in this situation, they either accurately reflect what happens or they don’t.

Assumption introduced: We ought to value accurate predictions of the physical world over inaccurate predictions. (Note the “ought” here).

Question:

For different methodologies that make a prediction in this situation, how can they be thought of as equal value if we value accurate predictions more? Some are clearly incorrect and some are (at least a bit more) correct?

I am trying to focus the discussion on the main point of contention. I expect my “ought” statement to take the flak but I might be surprised…

Historical footnote: The situation I described is a test of the equivalence principle, which has been debated for millenia.

AC1