How We Operate
Dialogs August 11th, 2007We started discussed each others biases and argument methods. Just to recap, I said:
“My concern, which I don’t think you directly addressed, is you seem to compulsively deny any negative connotations of religion.” and “Pick any religious idea, I can probably find criticism for it.”
And part of your response caught my attention:
“it would be impossible for me to take such a challenge seriously when in your challenge you immediately declare that you can find a criticism of it. In other words how do I know that if I presented religious idea ‘a’ you would analyse it from a neutral and fair perspective and not start from the premise that idea ‘a’ is false, dangerous, inherently bad?” and “you havent clarified your methods”.
This got me thinking about how exactly I evaluate a new argument and how one should evaluate a new argument. The obstacles to a proper evaluation of an argument are many and varied. Although I think I objectively follow logical arguments, I also know that this is probably a delusion or at least partially a delusion. The mind is prone to bias and using confabulation to justify that bias. An argument in the conscious mind is often just an ad-hoc justification for our instincts. Confirmational bias and self serving bias are often the driving force here.
Also we have to consider that axioms and assumptions made in the argument – if we don’t accept the arguments premise we are bound to be more critical. Perhaps the most significant axiom (or what I consider to be an axiom) is the existence or non-existence of God. As soon as one of us starts from an axiom we disagree with, we start looking for opportunities to shoot down the argument – even though we have only temporarily accepted the axiom. (By we, I mainly mean me and perhaps people generally.)
A third area of difficulty is: what is the valid criteria for evaluation an argument? Should we just follow rules of logic (Tractatus style) or allow aesthetics or instincts to guide us? Or a mixture?
How I Operate
First off, confirmational bias – if I have already a view on a topic (death penalty for example), and argument for pro-death penalty would get a harsh examination unless it undermined one of my axioms. (My very brief argument is the justice system is for protection of the public and rehabilitation of offenders and NOT for punishment and not for deterrence – therefore the dealth penalty is unnecessary.)
If an argument convinced me that the primary purpose of the justice system was punishment of offenders, I would be forced to reconsider my view on the death penalty. Of course confirmational bias would make that difficult to achieve also.
If I have not made up my mind on an issue, this step is skipped – so there is some hope.
Second principle – my naturalistic/Occam’s razor world view. This is indeed an axiom of mine but I am not sure what proof could ever be presented that would change my mind. Although I acknowledge that Descartes attempted a rationalism approach (and I admire his starting point), I don’t think that he can get very far – he quickly makes further unjustified assumptions to progress his argument. Perhaps one extreme piece of evidence would be the disproof of causality and the proof that all phenomena of the world are totally random. That is probably unlikely 
but not impossible. The other direction of disproof might be an a priori argument against naturalism. But can a priori disprove an a posteriori statement?
Another possibility is meeting God and some tricks to show off his power – but I might be then asking if this was not an impostor with some advanced technology… although this would not strictly disprove naturalism – existence of life after death might be a better proof of metaphysics. But then again “physical proof of X” would only agree with naturalism! Can I ever accept any other type of proof? (I think I just confused myself!)
Third: Rules of logic. Although logic should be more fundamental than the above, the fact is I only consider it consciously after processing by biases for and against an argument. Logic arguments can take more effort since I need to truly understand the argument before I can make comment. (In other words, I try to get into their language game so I can see if they are playing by their own rules).
That’s all I can think of at the moment. I might get on to overcoming biases but that will require more thinking!
Anti Citizen One
August 11th, 2007 at 9:32 pm
An excellent and sensitive post. I will give some of my answers soon.
Paul Feyerabend deals with a lot of this in his works (specifically against method) and he concedes that most theories and most schools of thought are predetermined within the thinker. Confirmation bias has a lot to answer for.
One nice thing he said which neatly surmises perhaps our unconscious approach to the existence/non-existence of God goes as follows. (He is talking specifically about the scientific approach, but I think it works across the boundaries).
“Feyerabend attacks the consistency criterion. He points out that to insist that new theories be consistent with old theories gives an unreasonable advantage to the older theory. He makes the logical point that being compatible with a defunct older theory does not increase the validity or truth of a new theory over an alternative covering the same content. That is, if one had to choose between two theories of equal explanatory power, to choose the one that is compatible with an older, falsified theory is to make an aesthetic, rather than a rational choice. The familiarity of such a theory might also make it more appealing to scientists, since they will not have to disregard as many cherished prejudices. Hence, that theory can be said to have “an unfair advantage”.”
He was also critical of naive falsificationism, saying that “no interesting theory is ever consistent with all the relevant facts” he uses Renormalization in Quantum Mechanics as a case in hand.
He thinks that progressive thinking requires a form of relativistic method.
Your “Physical proof of X” would only agree with Naturalism! is I think a statement that I can agree with, and one that Feyerabend tries to analyse. Is a restrictive method correct, or does it impede progressive thinking. Instead of and inductive aproach should we not become counter-inductive?
It would be interesting to see if an atheist could make a serious attempt at arguing for the existence of God that they couldnt/wouldnt believe in? Or vice versa, and without any hint of conversion but with a tacit acceptance of relativism.
I think as we discussed before and your post nicely puts, our methods are obstacles in the way of any constructive debate on those issues which radically confirm or deny our method.
August 14th, 2007 at 7:40 pm
“the mind is prone to bias” I think this is absolutely true. It is not necessarily irreversable but most ‘philosophers’ entering into a debate have a history and have a context through which they view things. Therefore as you say…
“if we don’t accept the arguments premise we are bound to be more critical” but there is perhaps three maybe four approaches to any argument:
(i) accept the premise and attempt to understand and rationalise the premise and why you could accept it.
(ii) deny the premise and provide a comparitive critique of why you deny the premise and what premise you could/would accept.
(iii) neither accept or deny the premise but attempt to understand it from either an alternative external frame of reference, or try to absorb the premise into another one that is altogether stronger or more palatable.
(iv) deny the premise and attempt to undermine it.
But this still leaves us asking as you do:
“what is the valid criteria for evaluation an argument? ”
My opinion is that is wholly dependent upon the language game being played. So a critico-rationalist perspective (much like atheist materialism) immediately places restrictions upon what is considered valid evidence, purely logical or empirically testable evidence may be an example. Is this wrong? I don’t think so, obviously it means that God exist/not exist becomes a loaded argument because some of the arguments for Gods existence probably lay outside of the criteria for rational/empirical consideration. But were for example atheist materialism to take the axiom that God does exist and then try to work against it, to deconstruct that axiom, then I do not think the same language game is being played. The rules have changed ever so slightly. The same applies in reverse, it is probably wholly impossible for the theist to accept atheism as a starting point for argument.
But if effective dialog is to take place then one or two things need to occur. Firstly the diametric opposition of say the theist vs the atheist needs to be recognised. It sounds obvious, but in order for any such dialog to be fruitful there needs to be a common understanding of what constitutes admissible evidence and at which point certain argumentation oversteps dialog and enters into polemic or contested insult. (The contentious use of the term ‘militant’ for example.)
Secondly assuming that there are some common grounds for dialog (which I’m sure there must be) ideally the protagonists should confess to their respective biases. Thus providing a clearer contextual framework and outlining what is possible through dialog and what is impossible.
So I think as you have said a certain amount of personal aesthetics is involved.
How you operate:
1) Confirmation bias: I agree that where personal ethics, principles, politics, philosophy or belief system is involved, then when challenged by a worldview that opposes your own it is natural to defend your own position first. Unless your own position became in your opinion incoherent or inconvenient, in which case it is possible that you may wish to reevaluate your own beliefs and assumptions.
2) Occams Razor is in my humble opinion just a reductionist tool. There are various counter-razors that make valid points against over-simplification. Either way the razor and the anti-razors tend to be supported by personal aesthetics and confirmation bias and as such can prove to be more of a hindrance than a help.
The danger with the Razor is that it can become a form of inductive reasoning.
Bertrand Russell gives a humorous critical response to induction in his problems of philosophy: the chicken having been fed every morning, expects the same thing to happen on Christmas Eve, it does not expect to have its head chopped off. Instead of being fed it has its head chopped off, thus the argument goes we never know, in going through evidence, whether the next piece we examine will not prove to be our christmas eve.
As Menger said arguing against the razor, “it is vain to do with fewer what requires more.”
Your a priori/a posteriori question deserves more attention than I’m going to give it. But I shall suffice by saying that it is an unresolved philosophical debate. And much like the thoughts above on the razor, very often those who support the primacy of one form of knowledge over the other do so because it supports their worldview.
3) Logic: I liked the way you put this. I think it is very difficult, unless you are a logician by trade, to formulate your thinking processes in strict accordance with the rules of logic. Often the best process for non-logicians (albeit ones who have a passable knowledge of what constitutes logicial validity and fallacious reasoning) is to revise your thoughts and beliefs in the light of logical propositions.
My favourite line of yours was: “But then again “physical proof of X” would only agree with naturalism! Can I ever accept any other type of proof?”
I think perhaps in asking the question you already have an answer, and I think in light of our brief flirtations with language games we would both perhaps hold similar views.
Physical proof of X, presupposes that X is capable of presenting physical proof, and that physical proof is any kind of proof at all. These assumptions are inherent and integral in naturalism and if you accept naturalism and its language games, then as you said how could you possibly accept any other kind of proof?
August 15th, 2007 at 11:20 am
“There are various counter-razors that make valid points against over-simplification.”
You seem to be implying that Occam’s Razor and the various Anti-Razors are in disagreement. If we look at the “classic” wording of Occams Razor: “entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity”, this merely compliments Menger’s comment “it is vain to do with fewer what requires more” or to paraphrase him “entities should not be reduced beyond necessity”. They are non-overlapping in their effect and hardly warrent the name anti-razor.
Also the modern phrasing of Occam’s Razor: “All things being equal, the simplest solution tends to be the best one” is actually a fusion of both the “classic” razor and the so-called anti-razor. The words “all things being equal” immediately disallows over simplification.
To be continued… (I had to get the above off my chest pronto)
AC1
August 15th, 2007 at 2:48 pm
“disallows over simplification.” if you insist.
August 15th, 2007 at 3:24 pm
let me clarify, yes technically it does not imply over simplification, as you correctly stated “all things being equal” is a safeguard against it.
But it is still used (or misused) as an exercise in simplification and as such is a tool of disengagement, specifically when used for ideological purposes. (Note this is a comment about its broader use, not about your correct use of it).
And the name anti-razor is commonly applied to those alternative (including overlapping) systems that disagreed with what is percieved to be the extreme or rash nature of Occams Razor.
August 16th, 2007 at 9:13 am
I agree Occam’s razor can be misused. As they said in the X-Files:
In a strict interpretation of Occam’s razor, it is just an application of the rules of logic. In my own notation, if we have the proposition:
if X and (Y or (not Y)) then Zlogically, we can reduce this to
if X then ZOccam’s razor states that the latter form is preferable – that is hardly a big step since we lose no information and it’s quicker to write!
I think I read that about the time I was reading Wittgenstein so its probably his idea. I did find one reference to the razor in his early work.
Lastly, a point that I read on the discussion page on Wikipedia which I will paraphrase here: Occam’s razor is in fact rarely used in science in a direct manner. The principle only applies to two explanations of equal value (“all other things being equal”). In science, since metaphysical explanations do not have a high scientifically predictive value, they are immediately discarded. Occam’s razor is unnecessary. In other words, it is my view on naturalism that is more of a factor than Occam’s razor.
AC1