Darwin believed there was a scientific basis for the morality of man. Morality and the moral sense are attributes that can be found in our species. So in accordance with his evolutionary mechanism Darwin maintains that moral sensibility can be accounted for in much the same way, as can other traits in evolutionary terms; in other words the development of this moral faculty must have good evolutionary reasons.

Darwin and other evolutionary ethicists such as Herbert Spencer, Julian Huxley, G.G.Simpson and C.H.Waddington believed that we had to refer to social biology.

Darwin expounds his position in the Descent of Man where he says; “any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man.”

Having proposed that mans moral capacity developed as a consequence of evolutionary imperatives he then goes on to identify four main areas where the moral capacity originates. The first is the social instincts that drives animals to take pleasure from being in an association with its fellows, thus according it a sympathetic urge that drives them to act for the benefit of those of the same species and association (family unit). The second is the vivid recollection of past action and motives that would come with a higher mental development, and the feeling of dissatisfaction that arises when desires or instincts are unsatisfied. The third essential element in the origin of the moral faculties is the development of language, which Darwin notes allows the ‘community’ to express it’s wishes and to form common opinion on how the public good can best be served. This however is dependent on the sympathetic character, which Darwin calls the foundation stone of the social instinct. Finally individual habit would shape the conduct of each animal, social instinct and sympathy, in common with other instincts, are strengthened by habit. Habit therefore, shaping the sense of obedience to communal wishes and judgements.

Darwin, however, points out that even if these four building blocks of the moral sense were acquired by social animals that attained a near human intellectual level, it would not guarantee an identical moral code, or a common interpretation of rightness or wrongness.

Nevertheless something similar or identical to the conscience would be developed, because animals would find a conflict of instincts, coupled with an uncertainty as to which impulse should be obeyed, and furthermore emotions such as satisfaction and dissatisfaction would be felt when past ‘experiences’ were reflected upon in the mind. This reflective nature would instruct the animal that one course of action would be better to another, that one ought to do one thing and ought not to the other. This faculty of ‘ought’ or ‘ought not’ reflections, Darwin calls “the most noble of all the attributes of men”.

The most important element though in all of the evolutionary account for ethics is the sociability of man and animals, the affection which animals of the same social group hold for each other and even inter-specieal, in the case of the man/dog relationship. Darwin points to the mutual service in the higher animals that warn each other of danger, or the way in which animals preen each other for parasites or thorns. Then of course there is the phenomenon of pack hunting where the group collectively hunt, kill and feed off of the prey; where the animal if left individually may have considerably less success in its hunting capabilities. Darwin identifies these phenomena as a feeling of love that animals hold for others within the same ‘association’, a sympathising in the pains and less so in the pleasures of others, emotions which are “not felt in non-social adult animals”. Examples of this social sympathy are evident in the cases of young, elderly and vulnerable members of the animal association. Other social instincts that can be seen as moral, is the power of self-command, loyalty and obedience.

This all leads us though to the fundamental question of origins, why do many of the higher animal species exhibit these social instincts, and ultimately why is man moral? Of course the feeling of discomfort when parted and comfort whilst together is a suitable suggestion, but Darwin believes there is more; that the development of the moral faculty and the social instinct is necessary for the continued evolvement and survival of the species.

He states that it is more probable that the feelings of comfort and discomfort when in the presence of society or absence from it, were naturally developed in order to induce those animals that would benefit from association and society, to form such groups. This is comparable to the development of the sense of hunger and the feeling of relief from hunger that was first acquired to induce animals into eating. The social instinct further developed through the young remaining with the parents, so that those animals which took greater pleasure in society, benefited by being generally safer from attack, whereas those animals that did not associate with others would “perish in greater numbers”. Darwin therefore states that the social instinct has largely been gained through natural selection.

And so Man can trace his moral urges to natural selection and his evolution from the lower species; for social instincts of mutual love, sympathy, sociability and obedience, are traits held in common with other animals. Furthermore, man’s higher intellect enables him to be guided according to his inherited instincts to act for the social good. Couple this with his instinctive sympathy, and man is caused to value the approbation of his fellow men and is thus influenced in his actions. Darwin marvels at the moral faculty and acclaims the inherited social instincts as giving “the impulse to some of his best actions”. Man’s instinctual love, sympathy and self-command strengthened by habit and by reason, impels man to act according to particular codes of conduct, in such a way that as Darwin quotes Kant, “I will not in my own person violate the dignity of humanity.”