The Method of William James
Dialogs July 20th, 2007Some of our recent discussions on theism/atheism have met with immovable doctrinal objects quite possibly as a result of our adherence to a framework that doesn’t permit compromise. For example (although I cannot remember the author) it has been said that a framework of thought that is based solely upon materialism will necessarily reject any attempts towards transcendentalism, and explanations that may tend to the latter are rejected with exclusive preference for materialist explanations.
Two questions arose recently of some importance. The first was a challenge to present a religious idea that was immune to criticism. The second was what is RD and the atheist materialist allowed to criticise about religion when the defenders of religion keep moving the boundaries (so to speak).
An answer to these perhaps come in the form of William James, and his series of lectures The Varieties of Religious Experience. James was a pioneering psychologist and his work on religion, now over a hundred years old is still a recommended text. Although not immune from criticism James’ work garners support from both traditional defenders of science and religion, and represents an interesting mid-point.
I want to present a very brief overview of his work and then answer those two questions about religious ideas and what can critics of religion criticize?
William James in brief.
James took a psychological approach to his subject, which was religious experience. He thought it prudent from a scientific perspective to work with accounts of individual experiences and to ignore religious institutions. He thought it unscientific to argue from his accounts of religious experience towards drawing conclusions in support of, or against the supernatural. The religious ‘idea’, he proposed, was less important than the effect it had on peoples lives. And from the perspective of empirical science he believed it was impossible to answer, or even to formulate the question ‘does God exist’, so he said we must leave that to the theologians and philosophers (pre-empting Wittgenstein). However from the perspective of empirical science he said it was possible to enquire and investigate the effects such ideas and experiences had upon peoples lives. Thus was coined the phrase fruits not roots, to describe the focus of his studies.
He talks about the different personality types engaged in religion. Two in particular interest him, ‘the healthy minded soul’ and ‘the sick soul’. The former is positive bordering manic, the latter is negative bordering depressed. The former may find religious expression in ideas of self-negation and humility, the latter may find religious expression in religious ideas of salvation and reward. James comments that the manic and depressed cover a wider range of human emotions than the ‘healthy’ does, so a religion is more complete when it engages these varieties.
In talking about religious experience James says it elicits various responses including: unification of the self, sense of a higher controlling power, loss of mundane worries, sense of the world having objectively changed, and the knowledge of truths previously unknown. He also talks about ineffability and certitude and countless other elements of religious experiences, or peak-experiences, that go beyond the remit of a brief outline.
He describes the positive side of religious experience as a process of moving from ‘tenseness, self-responsibilty and worry’ towards ‘equanimity, receptivity and peace.’
Revisiting the two questions through James
First of all presenting religious ideas. As mentioned James favours ‘fruits not roots‘ and considers theological speculations as belonging to a language game that science is not involved nor should be interested in. Unless solid claims are made that overstep. James rejects the model that religion is born out of a religious idea. And proposes instead that a religious experience presupposes the development of an explanatory theology. He acknowledges that some may critisize this postulation of the existence of ‘religious experiences’ as pressupposing spiritual realities, but he defends this claim by stating that this is the description that is given to the experience by its participants. This he points out is the fundamental difference in interpretation between someone who has a religious experience and someone who observes/comments upon it. The observer and commentator is always externally situated and operating from a framework, the experiencer usually is not.
“It is also the case that beliefs and religions continue, not because some intellectual conclusoin has been reached about their validity, but because people benefit from them. One could say that beliefs do not work because they are true, but that they are true because they work.”
So what room is there for a critical analysis of religious experience, such as RD would attempt to provide? Again James would point to fruits, but he accepts the question, what if the beliefs cease to work? His explanation comes only through commentating on history, again he reminds us that we ought not engage in theological speculation as to why religious beliefs change, but instead should acknowledge that human cultural impulses are subject to evolutionary change. Thus the gods of the past (once palatable to Grecians and Romans) lose their vitality to modern day humans because we no longer see the appeal in blood-thirsty deities, or such sort.
I am (for once) going to point out an element of RD that is worthy of praise. I often criticize him for his amplification of the negatives and his negating of the positives. In other words for engaging in data selection that confirms his bias. Now although I still assert this criticism and would wish for his critique to engage in an affirmation of positives, I will credit him for getting 50% of the approach correct. I’ll let James speak on this one.
It always leads to a better understanding of a thing’s significance to consider its exaggerations and perversions, its equivalents and substitutes and nearest relatives elsewhere. Not that we may thereby swamp the thing in the wholesale condemnation which we pass on its inferior congeners, but rather that we may by contrast ascertain the more precisely in what its merits consist, by learning at the same time to what particular dangers of corruption it may also be exposed… Insane conditions have this advantage, that they isolate special factors of the mental life, and enable us to inspect them unmasked by their more usual surroundings. They play the part in mental anatomy which the scalpel and the microscope play in the anatomy of the body.
This approach he informs us must also instruct our criticisms of deities, or beliefs held in the past, and merely compels us to reject a theological approach concerned with proving/disproving the supernatural but to look more fervently at the fruits.
To the extent of disbelieving peremptorily in certain types of deity, I frankly confess that we must be theologians. If desibeliefs can be said to constitue a theology, then the prejudices, instincts, and common sense which I chose as our guides make theological partisans of us whenever they make certain beliefs abhorrent… Today a deity who should require bleeding sacrifices to placate him would be too sanguinary to be taken seriously… Once, his cruel appetites were of themselves credentials. Such deities then were worshiped because such fruits were desired.
Conclusion
Unfortunately such a short post can’t do justice to the complete Varieties of Religious Experience. I can recommend (other than reading the text in full) this abridged (16,000 word) summary of his lectures. Or may be able to answer some questions. One common theme that emerges from James’s work, and which has led to his influencing many thinkers across many disciplines is his pragmatic approach. This approach, applauded by many had three key principles and they should suffice as a conclusion to this post.
1) Religious experience should be the primary focus of religious study, not religious institution. Institutions are the descendents of experience.
2) Intense and even pathological experiences (religious or otherwise) should be studied as well as normative experiences, for they represent the closest thing to a microscope of the mind, drastically enlarging the normal processes.
3) In order to usefully interpret the realm of common, shared experience and history, we must each make certain “over-beliefs” in things which, while they cannot be proven on the basis of experience, help us to live fuller and better lives.

July 20th, 2007 at 6:55 pm
Obviously I havent outlined his work in any great detail. But he does present a conciliatory view between the two of us. He is often lauded by theologians/philosophers for taking religious ‘experience’ seriously but is also supported by scientists for promoting and defending the scientific method. He very much presses the right buttons for both camps.
Of the three concluding points, the first and second are his scientific methodology. The third is his ‘philosophy’, this is the area he has come under some criticism for. Although it is interesting when he writes on this third subject he jumps language games and does not ‘break’ scientific rules. Bertrand Russell was a critic, but he couldnt challenge (1) or (2).
I guess it would be interesting if, in religious topics other than say ethics (which can be removed from theology), we tried to apply this approach to our discussions. Or tried to compare it. Rather than just scrap along using the theism vs atheism fight.
I’m not sure where he would stand on the Hans Frei 1-5 type model. As a psychologist I guess he is type 1, working from an external framework, but I get the sense that he overlaps into type 2 or 4 and presents this as a school of thought of its own (he repudiates theology as being the science of god, but believes that a science of religion can be philosophically constructed) that incorporates or at least narrates religious claims in the context of an existential psychology.
July 22nd, 2007 at 1:18 pm
“a result of our adherence to a framework that doesn’t permit compromise”
I am not sure total agreement is achievable or possible. Compromise might not be necessary – only understanding?
“The first was a challenge to present a religious idea that was immune to criticism.”
When I mentioned this challenge, I was considering it almost a thought experiment. Any idea, from any realm of knowledge can be criticized but that does not make the criticism justified. Perhaps that is another difference between our backgrounds. In natural science, an idea is subjected to testing in an attempt to destroy it; if it survives criticism, we think it might be provisionally true or perhaps run more tests.
“He describes the positive side of religious experience as a process of moving from ‘tenseness, self-responsibilty and worry’ towards ‘equanimity, receptivity and peace.’”
In line with criticism for religious ideas (justified or not), I might comment that even this broad definition of the positive side of religion could be called dangerous: transference of responsibility from self to something larger than ones self. This is not automatically a good thing?
“One could say that beliefs do not work because they are true, but that they are true because they work.”
How do we determine they “work”? Because we agree with other people (and society) they do. This is equivalent to saying something is true because we agree it is true.
This apparently discounts the truth of belief of a lone believer (or the mentally ill), how can it be said their belief works?
What of a belief that prescribes the elimination of other belief and “works” for their believers? (I am thinking of evangelical religions.) This might be a belief that is called “true” because it “works” and yet it calls all other beliefs untrue.
My point is thinking of truth as linked to the fruits of the belief as a bit (subjectively?) incoherent and counter intuitive. I think of alternative belief as “possibly true” and almost my own belief as “possibly true”. Since I don’t have knowledge of certain truth, this is probably analogous to your point anyway – I suspect it is just a different emphasis of terminology.
“This approach he informs us must also instruct our criticisms of deities, or beliefs held in the past, and merely compels us to reject a theological approach concerned with proving/disproving the supernatural but to look more fervently at the fruits.”
This consideration of religion as a social and psychological phenomena is generally agreeable (and accepting the possibility it might actually be actually and physically true. Who knows – judgment day might be next Thursday?)
AC1
July 22nd, 2007 at 2:10 pm
Understanding: This is the most likely and desirable outcome. And would move us individually away from types 1 and 5 and towards a form of type 4, testing our frameworks against differing methodologies.
I posted this as an attempt to change the direction and to foster understanding. Like I said he has a tendency to appeal to scientists and theologians, which is a pretty neat trick.
Testing ideas: I see your point, and I think methodologically we do differ. Certainly in my field we dont aim to destroy ideas. However I don’t think we are that far apart, if a theologian/philosopher wants to move away from a fundamentalist view then he must test his ideas.
Transference of self to other: I would have to get into the lectures deeper (but oyu may not want that) in order to assuage your fears. Remember in the James method the possible existence of the divine is ignored, it is only the personal experience attributed to the divine that is studied. So this transference to another can be explained in a positive and therapeutic way, the other as the archetype, collective unconcious, super-projections of the self. It is not necessarily an appeal to an external reality.
As for self-responsibility transference, I think he is talking about the sick-soul personality, wracked with an inferiority complex, guilt complex and so on. Such transferences occuring out of a peak-experience are positive if they help to build a coping mechanism.
Anyway I dont think we really even disagree on this, as you are correct such experiences are not necessarily positive and thats why James urges us to study the fruits of the experience.
Beliefs are true because they work: Its a pure functionalism description. That something is ‘working’ is both personally and socially confirmed. I say ‘method a’ is working for me. People then respond (hopefully) ‘method a’ seems to be benefitting you.
Lone beliefs are equally valid. Social acceptance is not neccessary in this case. I think though James is looking at examples of experiences that lead to stated beliefs. A good indicator of a peak-experience is the need to communicate it to others.
He has a whole chapter on personal lone experiences (mysticism) and on madness. He is better placed to answer the questions.
Incidentally re: madness, he places it within the context of the greater mental experience, that a person is a schizophrenic does not alter the experience in James’ view. It represents an extreme on the spectrum, which through studying provides a greater picture of the whole.
a belief in eliminating other beliefs: James deals with this in his section on theology. First of all he warns us that studying such matters leads to personal bias and a lack of objectivity. That you ask a question about a religious belief that validates itself by demanding the eradication of all other beliefs tells us one thing about the questioner, probably that you find such an idea abhorrent. Again what James is asking the reader to do is not to consider a belief on its merits for you(could I believe in this) but its merits for the believer. Is it possible that a belief that teaches an intolerance for other beliefs is archetypally relevent to a culture suffering from an inferiority complex?
I’m brought to mind of a TV docu the other day about a white supremacist racist. In many aspects this person seemed quite sane and rational, but her hatred of other races was pathologically extreme and borderline violent. Why? There were obvious background issues, one parent was a white supremacist so she was environmentally exposed to this extreme from a young age. She had an awareness form a young age of the politics of the far-right, through the political activities of one parent. However neither of her two siblings shared her white-supremacist views. In her case this environmental exposure to extreme political and racist views was exacerbated by a physical attack she had suffered at the hands of a person from a different racial background. This had become the trigger, this was the experience through which she channeled her racist over-beliefs.
In studying religious experiences James invites us to be unemotive, to avoid preconceptual judgements about seemingly abhorrent belief systems. So the ‘evangelicals’ have a belief that works for them. That we dislike the belief is irrelevant, what is relevant is that it rings true for them, there must be an appeal to them, thats where the focus of scientific study must be.