Are the arguments of ‘Militant’ Atheists peurile and threadbare?
Dialogs July 7th, 2007Yes, according to Peter Lewis, and according to a variety of writers who have challenged, for example, Richard Dawkins and his latest book the God Delusion, and Christopher Hitchens and his polemical work God is not great.
One particular aspect that seems to get on these authors goat is the oft repeated claim by Dawkins or his disciples that religion is evil, or is a major source of evil in the world. Further to this it is their stated aim that they should wish to eradicate religious belief from the world. Although perhaps sometimes they would prefer to use the language of liberation, as opposed the language of intolerance. Either way it is the conviction and hope that, as Dawkins wishes: “religious readers who open this book will be atheists when they put it down.” It is towards this type of atheist that the perjorative ‘militant’ is prefixed. Likewise Hitchens happily switches from analytical language to polemical and judgemental language in the short course of a sentence when he says: “Religion is man-made. Religion poisons everything.”
It is not worthy of serious commentary at this stage to refute the arguments that wars, intolerances, hatreds and so on are the offspring of religious belief, Anymore than it should be necessary to keep reminding people of the particularly atheist characteristics of certain totalitarian regimes, including Stalinism and Nazism, who between them possibly contrived to industriously murder somewhere in the region of 50 million people, as recently as the last century.
That violence between one man to another, between one state to another exists is undeniable, to then specifically attribute the source of this violence (even in atheist regimes) to religion, borders on the hysterically delusional. It is a rather unfortunate and unjustified observation to attribute fault, say to religion, the behaviour of its most extremist adherents, just as unjustified as it would be to state that all Germans are culpable for the actions of the Nazis, that all socialists are tainted by Stalin and Mao, that all white europeans bear the burden of responsibility for slavery.
I am reminded at this stage of a criticism levelled at Dawkins by Alister McGrath, who reminds us that Dawkins in his own book challenges the selective use of data, yet all the while for the purposes and advancement of his own argument collapses into that very fallacious practise of data selection. Dawkins, and for that matter most of the ‘militant’ atheists for whom religion is an institution to be abolished, have a tendency to abandon the scientific, acceptable and rigorous pretences of evidence-based scholarship, often presenting examples of the pathological as though it were the normal. All the while presenting anecdote as though it had the same scholarly value as evidence garnered from a whole host of primary sources.
Then of course there is the casuistical use of scripture by its opponents. Particularly handy for this retort is the Old Testament, whose myths, tales, ritual prescriptions and socio-cultural accounts come in for a great deal of atheist critcism. For example Krauss (in the previously posted article with Dawkins in the Scientific American Magazine) declares in solidarity with Dawkins: “If one believes that homosexuality is an abomination because it says so in the Bible, one has to accept the other things that are said in the Bible, including the allowance to kill your children if they are disobedient or validation of the right to sleep with your father if you need to have a child and there are no other men around, and so forth.” Such observations of course lead Dawkins to present such rational descriptions of the God of the Israelites as being “a petty, unjust, unforgiving control freak.” And for good measure he adds “A misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, megalomaniac and capriciously malevolent bully.”
What is most extraordinary about this attack from Dawkins is his utter conviction that people of religion all truly believe in that ’sort’ of deity. There probably is a core band of homophobic, rascist and malevolent bullies who do glorify in such a characterisation of the deity, but then again there are equally capriciously malevolent scientists who have sought to inflict pain and misery upon their victims. Yet these demonic figures, lets use the abhorrent Dr Josef Mengele as an example, are by no means truly reflective of the benign and even benevolent majority of scientists and scientific motivations. I certainly could not criticise medical science and hold up Dr Harold Shipman as a paradigm of everything that is wrong with medicine and expect to get away with it. Yet it would appear that it is this puerile approach that Dawkins and Hitchens seem to be so ready to use.
It is incredible that in the case of Dawkins, a highly respected scientist in his own right, who in all fairness is also motivated to defend science from its ignorant detractors, he is so willing to abandon scientific notions of evidence based research in favour of personal prejudices. As the literary critic Terry Eagleton said in criticism of the God delusion: “Such is Dawkins’s unruffled scientific impartiality that in a book of almost four hundred pages, he can scarcely bring himself to concede that a single human benefit has flowed from religious faith, a view which is as a priori improbable as it is empirically false.”
Where, the question goes, in Dawkins and in Hitchens work is the scientific literature on the relationship of harmful and healthy aspects of religion?
But for now lets return to scripture. Its critical use as a weapon against belief seems to bely the fact that as intelligent scholars both Dawkins and Hitchens should be aware of the nature of myth-making throughout human history. Let us take Genesis and the creation story as an example. First of all if anybody was to take an absolutely literalist view of the creation account they must at first contend with the fact that there are two different accounts given. Then as we now know through the various branches of science there is a huge wealth of evidence to debunk for example the idea that the world was created in literally seven days, or that it was a recent event in the nature of 6000 years ago. But for hundreds of years theologians and biblical scholars have proposed that seven days did not literally mean seven calendrical humanly measured days as you and I would experience it. They refer to a letter from Peter in the New Testament who says that a Day to God is like a Thousand years to us. And no, theologians did not then infer that creation took seven thousand years then. What they did infer was that the creation account was a myth chosen as a form of explanation to satiate the intellectual hunger of those who asked the philosophical questions of why, where and how? Science of course has the methodology to give us the answer to the question how, and very often also to where, but more on that in a moment. As for the 6000 year old earth, or young-creationist ideal, that isn’t even a biblical assertion, rather it was ‘calculated’ by a bishop many hundreds of years ago, ironically in the quest for scientific certitude. But of course, there are those Christians who hold a literalist view of Genesis and who happily and sometimes ignorantly maintain that their view is the correct one. This is just grist to the mill for Dawkins of course who can then merrily debunk them as delusional members of the lunatic fringe of humanity. But where is his account of the views of the patristic fathers? Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Origen, Augustine, Eusebius, and Basil did not believe the Genesis account depicted ordinary solar days and read creation history as an allegory as well as being theologically true. An allegorical reading of scripture would, if we are to accept the scholarly credentials of these great thinkers be acceptable. So why then is the Creation story to be taken as a myth and not as literal truth? Well, other than scientific sign posts that point to the obvious, let us consider the reasons for making myths, a peculiarly human activity. Is it not feasible to believe that at some stage in human social development, when a common language emerged and when common social cause was found, lets say in a fledgling religion, that a person enquired ‘how did it all begin?’ Accepting this as a feasible allegory in itself there are three options, respond to the enquiry with an ‘I don’t know’, respond to the enquiry with a ‘It could have been like this’, or simple ignore the question hoping it will go away. It is pretty likely that the authors of Genesis, specifically the creation account, chose the second option and provided an answer that they hoped would satisfy the enquiry. Of course they made the myth because options 1 or 3 do not satisfy the question, and the myth as it has come down to us today, took the form that it did because the authors some hundreds of years BCE did not have the knowledge and understanding of the universe that todays scientists benefit from. Is this not comparable to the often ham-fisted or ‘factional’ attempts at explanations that parents offer to their small children when they ask sometimes uncomfortable enquiries about things, either the parents do not think the child capable of understanding, or about which the parents do not have sufficient understanding about themselves? Is this not perhaps comparable (although not equivalent) to telling a child who asks ‘where did I come from?’ not that they came from under a cabbage patch, or were delivered by a stork (both fictions), but that they came from mummy’s tummy, or that they were born because their parents loved each other?
It would seem from the denunciations of Dawkins and Hitchens that even allegory is inadmissable. Must we then, as it would seem they propose, refuse to read the Iliad and the Odyssey because Homer’s existence is as historically uncertain as is the siege of Troy? Must we also reject the axioms of Euclid, who my never have existed and who have been the collective pseudonym for a committee of mathematicians?
But Dawkins and Hitchens have more pressing purposes at hand, surely having demonstrated the unlikelihood of God they must now demonstrate how science is a more reliable answer to all of our uncertainties. This is not to deny sciences usefulness in the field of human knowledge, but it is a small observation to make that science is hardly complete, that we are seemingly no nearer to a grand theory of everything than we were when we first embarked upon this quest. That scientific knowledge is by its nature transient, that the great theories and theoreticians of the past probably will or already have been superceded by those who have demonstrated a greater clarity and refinement in their thinking, is not beyond any doubt.
Dawkins of course subscribes to the belief that eventually one day science will know everything there is to know. Note my italicisation of the word belief, for of course, much to chagrin of Dawkins and likeminded others, to talk of a completion of scientific knowledge, something that not even the majority of scientists are convinced is going to occur anyway, is to make vague appeals and speculations about matters that they just cannot possibly know.
Another criticism of Dawkins is that having made this appeal to a future where science can show everything and knows all that is true, he is still unable to answer the question that once Liebniz posited ‘Why is there something, rather than nothing?’ Now the content of the question is unimportant, what is central though is the enquiry why? Liebniz, like many others of science and of faith, of no science and not of faith, is asking for a purpose. This is where Dawkins becomes derailed. He cannot provide a purposeful explanation, so he adheres to the theory that there is no purpose, that there is no need for explanation. “The Universe has no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but pitiless indifference.” This of course satisfies the criticism levelled at Dawkins that he is an amateur theologian, that he does not have sufficient background knowledge of the topic to be able to speak with any authority on the matter. His response? Theology is a non-subject about a non-entity, therefore why should he waste his time learning about an irrelevance when he can be focusing on debunking the central tenet of religious belief… God?
But lets get back to purpose, or more specifically Dawkins’ view of universal purposelessness. His view, as expressed at Douglas Adams funeral is that the universe is finely tuned, in fact exquisitely finely tuned, so much so that a slight imperceptible difference in the values of gravity and the strong nuclear forces of the sun would have rendered life here impossible. Of course there are numerous other fine tuned elements to the existence of the earth and to life on earth, each of which had it been slightly different would have caused enormously varied consequences for earth and lifeforms on earth. But, having acknowledged this, Dawkins and his particular school of atheism choose to explain this by means of a non-explanation. It is all simply luck, random chance and an infinite number of improbable coincidences. A neat, tidy but alas dogmatic and doctrinal argument that seeks to disengage from the debate.
Of course the problem that Dawkins and Hitchens et al face, is why do so many people, including scientists and people of reason, believe in a God that does not exist?
The standard answer is because believers are deluded, so much so that perhaps out of a fear of death they choose to create a God in order to fulfil their wishful fantasies about living beyond death. Interesting notion, actually I have some sympathy towards this, every religion seems to have a preoccuppation about death and what happens to the ‘person’ after death. But this does not infer wish fulfilment or delusion, it is in fact a perfectly reasonable response to a common existential problem for the living.
Hitchens and Dawkins detest faith, they detest religious belief and they would like to see it eradicated. For Hitchens “we distrust anything that contradicts science or reason.” A pity then that he should spend his life rejecting belief beyond evidence, perhaps he should become a recluse and withdraw from the world, after all he cannot enter into a taxi without having a degree of faith that the driver knows how to drive, that the car isn’t about to explode, that the destination isnt still attainable. Perhaps he should even reject Dawkins when he calls non-thinking faith ‘evil’, after all he can only take it on faith that Dawkins is who he says he is, that he knows what he purports to be an authority upon, and that the theories (seemingly sound) that he defends or promotes may not one day be so thoroughly superceded that in the future people may look back and wonder why so-called learned men were so deluded.
Perhaps also we should ridicule the geneticists who expound their theories using the model of DNA, the particle phycisists who talk with certainty of electrons and the cosmologists who maintain that the universe is full of Dark Matter, a ‘thing’ which is by its nature neither observable nor measurable. Instrumental non-existing entities, in other words belief in things beyond evidence.
All in all it would appear that many of the attacks by Dawkins and Hitchens and the ‘militant’ atheist brigade are indeed puerile and threadbare. This is not to deny that we must be vigilant to safeguard scientific progress, that we must shun the most fundamentalist forms of activity based on belief without evidence. We must of course as Dawkins is occasionally trying to do provide a critique of religion. But to dismiss it as poison, evil, brainwashing, child abuse to name but a few of the criticisms is to fall into a horrendous observational and personal fallacy. I’m reminded and would wish to remind the militant atheists of the agnostic, skeptic, science writer Michael Sherman who stated that “Religion, like all social institutions of such historical depth and cultural impact, cannot be reduced to an unambiguous good or evil.”

July 10th, 2007 at 5:23 pm
I will respond by asking for further information, then by proposing an alternative view on some of your points that are not central to this discussion and then finally to address the central argument. Shorter answers would probably make me happier but it’s up to you! You might consider putting this in a separate post since I might need to refer to it later.
Also try to remember I did not pick this topic and I am forced to criticize your beliefs. My style is more chipping away at the foundations, rather than Dawkins’s frontal attack! I aim to question peoples assumptions rather than their conclusions (as I think you do too). “Moral: morality must be shot at.”
“Are the arguments of ‘Militant’ Atheists peurile and threadbare?”
Was the question phased by Peter Lewis or yourself?
Are you saying a childish, clichéd arguments are always incorrect?
“It is not worthy of serious commentary at this stage to refute the arguments that wars, intolerances, hatreds and so on are the offspring of religious belief, Anymore than it should be necessary to keep reminding people of the particularly atheist characteristics of certain totalitarian regimes…”
It is irrelevant if atheism is evil or good and we can separately discuss that topic if you want. Can you distinguish your argument from the “Tu quoque” fallacy?
‘…including Stalinism and Nazism, who between them possibly contrived to industriously murder somewhere in the region of 50 million people, as recently as the last century.’
Nazism had elements of Völkisch folklore, Positive Cristianity and Hitler was anti-atheist. In 1933, he declaired, “We have . . . undertaken the fight against the atheistic movement, and that not merely with a few theoretical declarations: we have stamped it out.”
And I don’t see how belief in “the non-existance of God” can justify anything. Due to Hume’s Fork, it would be difficult for Stalin or Hitler to find the inspiration for their actions from atheism. Of course religious belief does contain moral codes so can be used for various purposes.
Any thoughts?
“That violence between one man to another, between one state to another exists is undeniable, to then specifically attribute the source of this violence (even in atheist regimes) to religion, borders on the hysterically delusional.”
As far as I know, no one said it was the only cause. Any thoughts?
“I am reminded at this stage of a criticism levelled at Dawkins by Alister McGrath…”
If you can provide quotes or references, I will comment on them. Otherwise I will pass over this (in silence).
“Such is Dawkins’s unruffled scientific impartiality that in a book of almost four hundred pages, he can scarcely bring himself to concede that a single human benefit has flowed from religious faith, a view which is as a priori improbable as it is empirically false.” Terry Eagleton
If he wants to criticize Dawkin’s argument, can he directly point at the flaw? He is criticizing the nature of Dawkins’s argument, not the argument itself. His point is therefore a red herring. Perhaps Dawkin’s did not find Terry Eagleton’s hypothesis necessary?
“It is pretty likely that the authors of Genesis, specifically the creation account, chose the second option and provided an answer that they hoped would satisfy the enquiry.”
Given that the creation story is a myth, how can we tell what other passages reflect reality (are “true”) and which are also myths? I would say we cannot use Homer’s work as a description of divine beings that could actually be worthy of worship. Why should be treat the Bible differently from a The Odyssey or a totally fictional “The Silmarillion”?
“Dawkins of course subscribes to the belief that eventually one day science will know everything there is to know.”
I would like a reference or direct quote on that, since scientists should not promise we can understand everything. Note that science explaining everything and a “theory of everything” are two very separate things. Can you locate a quote?
“But, having acknowledged this, Dawkins and his particular school of atheism choose to explain this by means of a non-explanation.”
Can you provide a reference for that? I doubt Dawkins says he is sure about this, or he knows this as a fact.
Why do you think a random process is non-explanation? If a win the lottery, can I explain that by luck?
“A neat, tidy but alas dogmatic and doctrinal argument that seeks to disengage from the debate.”
Why is this dogmatic and doctrinal?
“Of course the problem that Dawkins and Hitchens et al face, is why do so many people, including scientists and people of reason, believe in a God that does not exist?”
Are you saying it is hard to explain why most people believe in a God? Many books have been written on this such as “Why People Believe Weird Things” by Michael Shermer. The fact that “a large number of people believing in God” has nothing to do with the truth of God.
“Perhaps also we should ridicule … the cosmologists who maintain that the universe is full of Dark Matter, a ‘thing’ which is by its nature neither observable nor measurable.”
I think the consequences of dark matter is observable (as are electrons and DNA), if you happened to have the right gear. But then the effect of gravity is observable, I imagine you believe in that, and you have never seen a graviton?
“Instrumental non-existing entities, in other words belief in things beyond evidence.”
Do you believe in anything that requires an instrument to see? Germs for example?
AC1
July 10th, 2007 at 7:59 pm
“Are the arguments of ‘Militant’ atheists peurile and threadbare” is a combination of Peter Lewis’s conclusions (ie. that they are) and those were the words he chose, and my rephrasing his conclusion as a question.
I was not making a broad or general assumption that childish or cliched arguments are inccorect.
July 10th, 2007 at 8:06 pm
“It is not worthy of serious commentary…” was not an attempt to fob off discussion of this matter by means of the Tu Quoque fallacy. It was a tacit admission that an already lengthy post in the writing would become a post of epic proportions if I chose to make comparitive examples ad nauseum of religious and atheist crimes against humanity.
It was also a recognition that you and other readers would be able to suggest your own examples without me churning out a list.
It is not irrelevent if atheism is evil or good, infact it is supremely relevent that a worldview such as atheism should be tested according to the same principles that the religious world view is tested.
The very simple point I was making was that religion and atheism, or more importantly religious and athiest persons have commited wrongful acts throughout history, and that by pointing this out by presenting an exhaustive list of who did what to whom, where and when, is an unnecessary waste of time for the purposes of this discourse.
July 10th, 2007 at 8:23 pm
“including Stalinism and Nazism” was a reference to two ideological ‘isms’ that collectively had theist and atheist ideals, and which included individually persons who had atheist and theist ideals. This was an extension of my comparison that movements that utilised ideals of institutionalised religion or institutionalised atheism were equally capable of committing crimes against humanity.
As for Humes fork, it is self-refuting: “Hume must base this argument on relations of ideas alone if it is to be certainly true, according to his definition. That being the case, the argument cannot be applied to matters of fact (that is, the world). Thus, the argument is self-refuting – it cannot make an absolute claim about the world by virtue of its proposition.”
As for deriving moral imperatives from religious belief or lack of, this is once again ignoring the strategic element of human behaviour. Classical marxism opposed religion on the grounds of its being false consciousness imposed upon the ploleteriat by the beourgois. In other words like Wittgenstein it sought to ‘dissolve the question’ however in order to practically achieve this against organised religion it had to undermine organised religion and the worldview or theory through which this could be achieved was to appeal to atheism.
Although one may suggest that a psuedo-religious idolatry occured in the deification of the party, the sanctification of the state and its leader and the salvation of its people.
In other words a moral philosophy can only inform a person of what actions ought to be taken, it cannot compel (even with notions of post-mortal reward or punishment) anyone to act.
My overall argument was that it is futile to discuss the misdeeds of religious institutions with phrases such as “religion causes wars” as it would equally be to declare with equal certitude “atheism causes wars”.
Both of these propositions are synthetic truths and are therefore inadmissable to the argument. Dawkins and Hitchens would tend to use such propositions as though they were analytical truths, thus sensationalising history in order to lend weight to their argument.
July 10th, 2007 at 8:34 pm
If Hitchens and Dawkins are suggesting that religion is not the only cause of wars, then they are doing so in a manner that is too subtle for me. I refer to the preceding comment, they frequently use synthetic truths as though they were analytical truths. They frequently present opinion and prejudicce as though it were fact. And as I stated in the original post they also have a habit of presenting pathological extremes as though they were normal.
The spirit of Dawkins to me: “Osama-bin-Laden is a religious man. He leads a terrorist organisation. Al-Qaeda have religious ideals. Al-Qaeda attacks innocent members of society. Al-Qaeda and Osama-bin-Laden are ‘evil’. By extension religion is evil.”
Dawkins presents this argument with a straight face and with absolute dogmatic sincerity. I can see that this is evidentially true, why can’t you?
The devils-advocate in me to the Spirit of Dawkins: “Comrade Duch chief torturor and executioner of the Khmer Rouge regime was an atheist. He killed many people for the Khmer Rouge regime. He is now a born again Christian and abhors all that he once did and has confessed to his crimes. The Khmer Rouge, Comrade Duch and by extension atheism is evil.”
The spirit of common sense speaking to the two above protagonists: “you are both engaging in fallacious arguments.”
My point was/is that Dawkins and Hitchens selective use of the data is intentionally weighted to present negatives and to negate positives. It is as believable as a guns-dont-kill you survey commisioned by the NRA!
July 10th, 2007 at 8:39 pm
“I am reminded at this stage of a criticism levelled at Dawkins by Alister McGrath…”
I was paraphrasing Alister McGrath’s arguments, I presented an outline of what the criticism was (namely the use of selective data) it is a criticism that is readily accessed using most good search engines.
“Anecdote is substituted for evidence; selective internet trawling for quotes displaces rigorous and comprehensive engagement with primary sources.” Alister McGrath, ‘The Dawkins Delusion’ page 20 in direct response to Dawkin’s “inept” attempt to engage with Luther in ‘The God Delusion’ on page 190 (as an example.)
July 10th, 2007 at 8:41 pm
…obviously having a sense of the ironic I did not wish to present Alister McGraths criticism of the use of internet quotations whilst simultaneously linking to a webpage.
And by the by, as this is a blog and a commentary on a blogpost I think we are safely exempt from this criticism. Dawkins on the other hand in producing a scholarly polemic has failed McGraths criteria for sound scholarship.
July 10th, 2007 at 8:45 pm
“Such is Dawkins’s unruffled scientific impartiality… Terry Eagleton”
This quote came from a literary review. Reminds me of the saying of Brendan Behan that critics are like eunuchs in a whorehouse, they know what to do, they’ve seen it done, they’d like to do it, but it remains for them an absolute impossibility!
If Dawkins does not wish to have the method of his argument, or the character of his argument criticised then he should not publish said arguments.
Furthermore unwilling to over extend the original post I again felt it unneccessary to keep referencing individual mistakes when a broad generalisation would suffice. The Eagleton quote satisfactorily provided me with such oppurtunity.
July 10th, 2007 at 8:48 pm
in addition to the above, Eagleton does have specific rebuttles as well in his book Holy Terror. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005
Eagleton further stated in the London Review of Books (in a critique of Dawkins work) “Imagine someone holding forth on biology whose only knowledge of the subject is the Book of British Birds, and you have a rough idea of what it feels like to read Richard Dawkins on theology.”
July 10th, 2007 at 8:57 pm
The Bible, other myths, total fictions.
Different books in the bible make different claims. The author of Genesis does not make a claim to being a witness to the events described, thus it is easier to conclude that this was allegory. The author of the Gospel of Luke on the contrary goes to certain lengths to provide sufficient detail (which is testable) to lend weight to their claims to being a witness to actual events. This does not deny that the Gospel may still be an allegory, but it is less obviously so than Genesis for example.
You would say Homers works could not be used in a particular way, but this was the way in which once they were indeed used. Just because you wouldnt does not mean that others wouldnt either. Your on fallacious grounds there.
The Silmarillion is fictional in that the stories were not actual events. But for Tolkien they contained truths, either archetypal or specific. You cannot read the ainulindale without noting that it is an allegory that by its nature and content is similar to the Genesis account of creation. Certain motifs are different but core ideals were not.
Myth as you well know can be true, can be reflections of truth. My commentary on the holographic theory is long overdue and I will provide it in detail someday. But suffice to say that biblical allegory may be presented as being a constituent part of a greater whole, that when looked at in isolation may ‘point towards’ something larger than itself.
July 10th, 2007 at 8:59 pm
“Dawkins of course subscribes to the belief that eventually one day science will know everything there is to know.”
To clarify Dawkins is proposing a certitude in one form of truth claim. This is naturally so, as a scientist he defends science, but he does not, and again this may be for reasons of propaganda spend a great deal of time affirming that scientific ‘belief’ and ‘truth’ are transitory in nature.
July 10th, 2007 at 9:03 pm
“But, having acknowledged this, Dawkins and his particular school of atheism choose to explain this by means of a non-explanation.”
Again as a clarification, Dawkins states explicitly the view that the universe is meaningless. Theology as an academic discipline at times will engage with the idea that there may be purpose. Sometimes it even goes so far as to elucidate what that purpose may be.
Dawkins rejects theology outright, in other words rejects one language game altogether, in fact rejects that there are any language games other than that within which he operates.
If he proposes that the universe is without meaning, he is hardly then proposing a point by point rebuttal of the propositions of meaning and purpose that others have given to the universe. He is simply disengaging. Dissolving the question.
There is nothing wrong with that in itself as those may be the terms of his language game, but as I have said he does not seem admit to the possibility of other language games. Ergo ‘its my way or the highway’.
July 10th, 2007 at 9:06 pm
To further clarify regarding random processes. If you reject purpose or meaning and propose total randonimity then by the terms of the argument any sequence of events (even those that others see purpose in) remain meaningless and random. Thus it is a disengagement, to admit of any possibility of purpose is to refute the proposition of randominity.
This is really closing in on a different discussion though incuding ‘loaded dice’.
July 10th, 2007 at 9:10 pm
Why dogmatic and doctrinal?
As in the above comment. When adhering to a principle of absolute randonimity one cannot admit to the possibility of purpose or meaning.
Dawkins is making an absolute statement, he is iterating a doctrine (from the latin doctrina: code of beliefs) that you cannot accept total randonimity and purpose in the same system.
And therefore because it is self-refuting to allow purpose in a proposition of total randominity it becomes a dogma (from the greek dogmas: meaning a belief or doctrine that is to be held as absolute, authoritive and indissoluble).
July 10th, 2007 at 9:15 pm
“Of course the problem that Dawkins and Hitchens et al face, is why do so many people, including scientists and people of reason, believe in a God that does not exist?”
I am not saying why is it hard to explain, nor am I trying to establish the truth of a proposition by virtue of its number of adherents.
I am proposing that Dawkins and Hitchens, by the weighted means of argument that they choose, find themselves incredulous to the notion that other people cannot see the ‘truth’ that they are witness to.
Thus they become incorrigible preachers and evangelists of their worldview. Hoping as Dawkins states as an aim in his book, that believers may read his book, be convinced by the validity of his arguments and emerge after the book as atheists.
Dawkins and Hitchens by the dogmatic nature of their arguments fall foul of the fallacy Bentham observed in the US Bill of Rights…
“We hold these truths self-evident”.. as if to say those of you who do not change your beliefs after you’ve read this are stupid or moronic or both.
July 10th, 2007 at 9:15 pm
… and most importantly justify that criticism by saying… “because we say so”.
July 10th, 2007 at 9:16 pm
Instrumental non-existent entities entail a degree of belief or acceptance of validity that goes beyond your primary senses. True or false?
July 11th, 2007 at 2:35 pm
Randominity: in your comment you asked how other than by randominity were you to explain your winning the lottery… by luck?
ii) you will have picked six numbers from a possible 49 available numbers.
But if you were to win the lottery that would not be a random event.
i) you would have to entered into the lottery draw by buying a ticket thus improving your chances of winning considerably
iii) you can win by correctly choosing a variety of combinations.
iv) to win you do not need to pick the numbers in any particular order.
v) if you win the jackpot it is because you have picked 6 numbers that have been drawn out of a possible 49.
vi) the odds of getting 6 out of 6 are in the region of 14 million to one.
vii) the odds of getting 3 out of 6 are 54 to one.
viii) what is random about the lottery? very little it is just a sequence of closed probabilities.
If however you managed to win the lottery despite not having the correct numbers, or despite not buying a ticket, or despite there not even being a lottery… then I would agree that you winning would be random… and by a strange quirk outrageously lucky as well!
July 11th, 2007 at 5:03 pm
[...] is an expansion really of some of the ideas developing out of the post concerning the claims of ‘militant’ atheists and the discussions myself and AC-1 have [...]
July 11th, 2007 at 10:02 pm
Brief answers please. If you ignore something, we agree to disagree, etc.
“It is not irrelevent if atheism is evil or good, infact it is supremely relevent that a worldview such as atheism should be tested according to the same principles that the religious world view is tested.”
We agree that “atheism should be tested” with a through discussion, but its irrelevant to the proposition we are currently discussing. The (approximate) proposition we are discussing is: “Religion should be abolished because it is harmful”. Mentioning atheism is not mentioned or required for this discussion.
“This is a classic Red Herring since whether the accuser is guilty of the same, or a similar, wrong is irrelevant to the truth of the original charge.”
“As for Humes fork, it is self-refuting”
I see you lifted that from Wikipedia - lol. Let me try to rephrase it: you believe there is a separation between synthetic and analytic truth? Well that’s Hume’s fork!
Perhaps Hume’s fork has a (provisionally true) synthetic version. Until rationalism can explain the real world (of synthetic truth), I think we can say Hume’s fork is still in force. I know (as a synthetic truth) that this has not happened.
The ironic thing is: I should have cited Hume’s is-ought problem which is more relevant to my point! oops.
“In other words a moral philosophy can only inform a person of what actions ought to be taken,”
You are arguing that Marxism gives guidance on “what actions ought to be taken” but I did not ask for that. How does atheism provide moral guidance, that it could be blamed for peoples actions? Remember don’t confuse atheism with other movements like humanism, Marxism, etc.
“Both of these propositions are synthetic truths and are therefore inadmissable to the argument.”
Why are synthetic truths not admissible?
“[Hitchens and Dawkins] frequently present opinion and prejudicce as though it were fact.”
Quotes please. You are arguing from a premise that I don’t agree with.
“Dawkins presents this argument with a straight face and with absolute dogmatic sincerity. I can see that this is evidentially true, why can’t you?”
I think you are misrepresenting Dawkins’s argument. He does not say he is “sure” in an analytic sense (I think). We need to go to line by line analysis to get me to make progress on this argument.
“I was paraphrasing Alister McGrath’s arguments, I presented an outline of what the criticism was (namely the use of selective data) it is a criticism that is readily accessed using most good search engines.”
I hoped we could avoid use of references (in these dialogs) to keep the dialogs readable.
‘”Anecdote is substituted for evidence; selective internet trawling for quotes displaces rigorous and comprehensive engagement with primary sources.” Alister McGrath, ‘The Dawkins Delusion’ page 20 in direct response to Dawkin’s “inept” attempt to engage with Luther in ‘The God Delusion’ on page 190 (as an example.)’
Since I don’t have a copy of “The Dawkins Delusion”, its going to be harder for me to fairly comment on Alister McGrath but will give it a go…
How Dawkins came by the quotes of Martin Luther is irrelevant. McGrath seems to imply that Dawkins is mischaracterizing Luther, but what evidence has he to back this up? I’d say Luther’s opinions are more than “anecdotal” since he was an influential person. Just saying, without evidence, that Dawkins’s scholarly method is unsound is ad hominem.
I would much prefer to see the full text of Alister McGrath or perhaps you provide analysis of Dawkins yourself.
“If Dawkins does not wish to have the method of his argument, or the character of his argument criticised then he should not publish said arguments.”
No, the point is the argument stands or falls based on discussion of the argument alone. His research methods or the evidence he omits is irrelevant to criticism of the argument (assuming the argument itself is sound obviously).
“Furthermore unwilling to over extend the original post I again felt it unneccessary to keep referencing individual mistakes when a broad generalisation would suffice. The Eagleton quote satisfactorily provided me with such oppurtunity.” “…I again felt it unneccessary to keep referencing individual mistakes when a broad generalisation would suffice”
You might be right but I don’t agree with the premise of the generalizations. Citing books that I don’t possess is also unlikely to convince me of anything - this is more a practical objection than a criticism. It is easier for me if you argue from first principles or a premise that we both accept.
Eagleton further stated in the London Review of Books (in a critique of Dawkins work) “Imagine someone holding forth on biology whose only knowledge of the subject is the Book of British Birds, and you have a rough idea of what it feels like to read Richard Dawkins on theology.”
This is an attack on the authority of Dawkins, not his argument. Therefore irrelevant.
“This does not deny that the Gospel may still be an allegory, but it is less obviously so than Genesis for example.”
Since you think the Gospels might be an allegory, then we agree. There may or may not be a historical Jesus but to accept Genesis and the Gospels as allegory, I don’t have a problem. Since much of it is intended as allegory (parables, etc) this is not a big deal!
“You would say Homers works could not be used in a particular way, but this was the way in which once they were indeed used.”
I thought I was arguing from an agreed premise (between the two of us anyway) but an argument might run: Does Homer’s book describe divine beings worth of worship? Is Eru of “The Silmarillion” is worth of worship? Is the flying spaghetti monster worthy of worship? I suggest no in these cases. I think reductio ad absurdum.
“Myth as you well know can be true, can be reflections of truth.”
If all religious people had your attitude, then it would make most criticism of the Bible unnecessary. Unfortunately, there are may believers that say the Bible is true and infallible in certain passages. Therefore Dawkins and crew are aiming criticism at literal believers (of which there are millions) and not at you.
“To clarify Dawkins is proposing a certitude in one form of truth claim.”
Again, no quotes.
“Dawkins rejects theology outright, in other words rejects one language game altogether, in fact rejects that there are any language games other than that within which he operates.”
No (I think) he rejects all language games that make claims of the operation of the physical world (that disagree with science). There are many language that do not overlap with science. Before you say religion does not overlap, Dawkins (I think) believes it does. I am a bit worried about misrepresenting Dawkins here, since he does not address language games directly. I am trying to transposing his views into more your terminology.
“If he proposes that the universe is without meaning, he is hardly then proposing a point by point rebuttal of the propositions of meaning and purpose that others have given to the universe. He is simply disengaging. Dissolving the question.”
Umm, I think understand your argument but you are a self confessed existentialist… I think we agreed that the universe is without a meaning, unless we assign one ourselves. What is the point of disagreement with Dawkins?
“If you reject purpose or meaning and propose total randonimity then by the terms of the argument any sequence of events (even those that others see purpose in) remain meaningless and random.”
My argument which might be what Dawkins is saying:
1. Many multiple universes exist (totally unproven axiom)
2. This multiverse may or may not have a purpose (tautology)
3. Each universe with the multiverse has random physical characteristics (totally unproven axiom)
4. We happened to live in one universe (from observation)
5. Therefore we live in a universe with random physical characteristics
6. Therefore purpose is independent to randomness of physical constants QED
Disclaimer: if other universes are undetectable, this is not a scientific hypothesis.
But since I don’t have the actual quote, destroying my argument might not address Dawkins’s point. And what does any of this matter to existentialists (like us)?
“When adhering to a principle of absolute randonimity one cannot admit to the possibility of purpose or meaning.”
No, if scientists discover meaning to the universe then they will incorporate that evidence and abandon randomness (not that this is a popular view as far as I know). Have you got evidence that Dawkins will not consider new physical evidence?
“Dawkins and Hitchens by the dogmatic nature of their arguments fall foul of the fallacy Bentham observed in the US Bill of Rights…”
They did not say science is obvious or self-evident. They did not call people stupid. Dawkins did call people “ignorant” who where not aware of science but in a non-pejorative sense. You accuse them of argument to authority: direct quote please (from the writer’s own pen would be nice)?
“Instrumental non-existent entities entail a degree of belief or acceptance of validity that goes beyond your primary senses. True or false?”
I can see there can be a case for this but it is a fairly arbitrary place to draw the line between the external world and the self. For example, if someone wears glasses, do they see the real world? Obviously they do, just as much as someone with perfect vision. And the senses are subject to cognative bias so can we trust (senses+bias) and more than (microscope+senses+bias)? I think not.
Conclusion: False. Using devices to augment our senses have the same reality as directly looking. The problem is “the truth” they may reviel are we are not very good at using devices (e.g. microscopes) and we may mistake what we see (but the mistake is “real”).
There is a lot to go through here but take your time. I am away until Saturday!
AC1
July 13th, 2007 at 7:00 pm
[...] differ with our approach to reaching those answers. And of course occasionally as you will have noticed we find ourselves fundamentally in disagreement with perhaps all three [...]
July 15th, 2007 at 12:54 pm
[...] I decided to post on a few issues that were more observational in style rather than completely confrontational (as were my comments before). [...]
July 15th, 2007 at 3:59 pm
To mention atheism is not irrelevant. What do you have in the absence of theistic belief? Atheism.
I think though we may disagree on the proposition of the argument: “religion should be abolished because it is harmful” but I can tbe bothered (tu quoque) to provide an alternative. It is an aspect of the argument that necessarily arises, and my method is to attempt to leave no stone unturned.
I lifted the opposition to Humes fork from wiki as it was convenient to do so, and more coherent than my attempt at refuting it. I do hold to the analystic/synthetic proposition, but not Hume’s version, I hold to the Kantian version and he proposes that you can have synthetic a priori propositions.
“how can atheism provide moral guidance”…
we actually get to the crux of our mutually distinguishable definitions. You (correctly) ask that atheism be distinguished from other ’similar’ worldviews such as humanism and marxism which have attempted to propose moral guidelines to action. But you have a very hard definition of atheism as being purely theist-negation. Even amongst atheists there is no satisfactory self-description, my definition is broader, but I accept I should clarify by stating marxist-atheism when I talking about marxist inspired atheism, or atheist inspired marxism.
Some forms of Buddhism are described as being atheist and they have moral philosophies. I shall stop here though as this is liable to descend into a what came first the chicken or the egg scenario.
What I will say is that all persons (theist and atheist) are moral agents and the primary authority of reference is the individual conscience. Aside from self-preservation tendencies (which can include mutually beneficial altruistic behaviour) moral decision making is coloured by ideological context. A christian or an atheist is liable to make moral decisions coloured by their respective language games.
The synthetic propositions ‘religion causes wars’ ‘atheism causes wars’ or ‘wars are fought by religious persons’ and ‘wars are fought by atheists’… are inadmissable without the presentation of supporting evidence which I thought was beyond the scope of the original post. As i’d explained I could have written a wholly seperate post ad nauseum on why Crusades x,y and z were wars of greed and political stategy and why crusades a and b were probably ‘religious wars’. Without the supporting pillar of contextual history it is a non-argument of who did what to whom and where and when. I also deemed it unnecessary as it would be a counter example of using pathological extremes as (unrepresentative) general examples.
There are numerous examples of RD and CH presenting opinion and prejudice as fact and for the same reasons as above I did not see fit to quote examples. I’m suprised that you disagree with the premise, as we both agree that confirmation bias is a difficulty in such matters, is RD unbiased?
Anyway here is a quote from RD from the docu root of all evil, he describes peoples of faith as “would-be murderers . . . who want to kill you and me, and themselves, because they’re motivated by what they think is the highest ideal.”
If this is not presenting a pathological extreme as though it were a norm, if this not amplifying a negative whilst negating a positive, what is it?
Am I would-be murderer? Is it fair that I should be branded as such?
Furthermore as previously stated where does RD provide the counter-argument to the ‘root of all evil’ idea, namely that religion has positive influences or effects upon people? He does not present such cases and thus reduces his arguments to rhetoric. Again from the docu he visits Lourdes and hears of how someone describes the experience as ’spiritually’ healing, that the experience of the place made them ‘feel’ somehow better, even if they had not brought about a physical miracle. How does RD respond? He expresses doubt about such subjective experiences and then states isnt it funny how an amputee never grows a new leg at lourdes.
Crticism of Dawkins method is NOT argumentum ad hominem. Such an argument is only relevent when used with regards syllogistic logic, in evidence based argument, which is what Dawkins is trying to present, critical analysis of method and sources is supremely relevant. As are considerations of motive and the philosophical framework from which he is arguing. The argument does not stand or fall alone on the basis of the argument if he chooses to use external references to support his arguments. If he chose to argue without supporting references then yes the merits of the argument should then be considered in isolation. But in this case the merits of the argument have to be considered in context.
If we are going to limit ourselves to discussing texts with which we are familiar or with which we have a readily available copy, we might as well forget reference based dialogue altogether. But I believe that referenced based dialogue is helpful especially in cases where an ‘authority’ is better placed to provide a narative summary than say you or I may be.
If Dawkins is aiming his biblical criticism at literalists solely, then so be it. But then again so do biblical allegorists from within the respective traditions. Because ‘millions’ of people are literalists sounds like an appeal to ’strength in numbers’ in your argument. It seems to be the equivalent of saying ‘a proportion of scientists disagree with the global warming hypotheses therefore the hypotheses is false’. Either way it is falling into the RD and CH trap of presenting pathological extremes as the norm.
Although by no means is this an academic proof of my argument in all my years involved in the philosophy of religion I have only met 2 biblical literalists both of whom were odd and neither was representative of the norm. I would even go so far as to suggest that their literalist interpretation was born out of a pathological and existential need for a certainty that their cumulative life experiences up to that point may not have provided them with.
I dont think I need to provide quotes to support my premise that Dawkins will admit of no other truth-claim. It is (in my opinion) a tautology. I concede though that at some point I may need to provide a critical analysis of the man in order to clarify this.
This is also relevent to the language games scenario and I accept this is difficult to discuss without ‘putting words’ into his mouth. In my defence though I have not said that the religion language game does not overstep into the physical world language game. In fact it does, and my critique of Dawkins is that the religion language game is entitled to this crossover, so long as it is understood not to have the scientific validity of science.
I also think it is impossible not to have this crossover, but to clarify this would require me to elaborate on Wittgensteins theory of ‘family resemblance’. The science language game and the religion language game have family resemblances to each other, and it is these resemblances that lead to misinterpretation and conflict. This is where Dawkins steps in. As you said he refuses to admit entrance to the science language game of anything that makes claims about the physical world (the realm of the science language game). But this is exclusionist and fallacious, my hypotheses would be that the science language game explains the mechanics (etc) of the physical world and in this it is an exclusive authority. A religion language game may make explanations concerning meaning that seem to resemble mechanical statements, it is entitled to do this so long as the demarcation is clear.
My existentialism does not accept of a universal meaninglessness, but an incoherence and a perception of meaninglessness. I guess here my existentialism is pro-kierkegaard, yours and RD’s is pro-satre/nietzsche. The question and some of the methodology is identical, the conclusions are not though.
Points 1 to 6 are a nice argument towards supposing randonimity in the absence of observable purpose. And if I step outside of my methodology for a minute I can actually support the argument. However stepping back in, the argument hinges on the unproven 1st axiom. Anyway as you said existentially lets not worry about this.
What I’m saying about RD and an argument from randonimity is better clarified in my above statement. RD proposes an argument from randonimity in the absence of empirically knowable purpose. By the rules of that sub-game (the randominity one) to be consistent he must reject and disengage from the possibility of meaning and purpose. But I accept if confronted with ‘evidence’ then he could change or dispose of the argument from randonimity.
How can ‘calling’ someone ignorant be non-perjorative?
And CH does propose that science is ’self-evident’.
Your pro-instrumental explanation will have to suffice for now, as we seem to agree the theoretical possibility of the anti-realist perspective.
However without glasses I am seeing the ‘real’ world as it is percievable through my eyes. Glasses ‘distort’ that perspective thus watering down the ‘reality’ for me of that (imperfect) world (but making driving an easier thing to do).