I actually disagree with some of what DW has to say, but similarly disagree with some of the interpretations given to what he says.

Major point of disagreement is about the existence of Objective morality. Of course it exists, but the problem occurs with either its incoherence because we reduce it to nonsense with metaphysical language, or simply because it is inconvenient. And as we are free-to-act moral agents we can simply choose not to register our approval or disapproval of objective moral concepts.

Relativism and Subjectivism are (as you know the old-chestnut goes) neccessarily objective anyway.  To say “There is no objective truth” is as Wittgenstein would point out “language on a holiday”.
You could say “There is no objective truth, apart from this one” but then you would be committing a fallacy.

But before we descend into total disagreement I would propose that Objectivism, Subjectivism and Relativism are in fact overlapping moral codes. They all bear what Wittgenstein would call “Family Resemblance” they all attain to a certain end, they all arise out of a certain motivation, they all say something about the human condition, the list could go on.
I would propose that certain objective moral values are if you like archetypal values, taboos, which cannot be wholly destroyed as they underpin the fabric of our social existence. But they can be reinterpreted on the two above mentioned grounds; because they are incoherent to us or because they are inconvenient.
Lets take abortion as an example, anti-abortionists are usually termed ‘pro-lifers’ because they are arguing that the fetus is a living, human being with full moral rights (although fewer moral duties), they say it is wrong to kill an innocent life (a long standing social taboo borne out of parental interest and reciprocal altruism) and therefore oppose abortion as they consider it an act of murder.
Lets observe the flip side, the pro-abortionists, generally known as pro-choice, do not characterise themselves as child murderers, or even as murderers at all, because they do not attribute the same moral rights to the fetus, they do not consider fetal life to be the equal of human life, and as they point out if we attribute moral rights to them can we not also expect to exact from them moral duties?

So the original, archetypal taboo of taking the life of a fellow human, that parental interest (primarily) and then reciprocal altriusm (secondarily) would appear to me anyway to have an objective value. Those who would support abortion have either through the incoherence of metaphysical claims made on the behalf of the unborn child, or through the inconvenience of the taboo, have simply decided to transfer their allegiences to a different language game, removing concepts such as child-murder, infanticide and the objective human right to life from their analysis of the abortion debate. In critical terms you could say they were moving the goalposts to suit their game.

A pro-lifer and a pro-choicer would both (I should think) fundamentally agree that murder is an immoral act. The interpretation of the term ‘murder’ that they choose to use, is I would think identical or similar to a close degree. But when it comes to the abortion debate, they radically alter their terminological toolbox and conceptual presumptions.

You will have guessed from the above that I am not advocating the concept that objective moral truths must therefore have a supernatural basis. I’m not sure any existentialist (even a Christian one) could soundly hold that view. In fact the viewpoint we would often take is that the Divine is bound by the same objective rules we are. Just think here of the Noahs Ark story and the making of a convenant that effectively is the divines way of saying “I’m terribly sorry I won’t do that again”.

To briefly clarify another point of mine, I said that certain objective moral taboos underpinned social cohesion. I am not actually proposing that there is somewhere in the ether an actual non-physical truth that says (for example) murder is wrong. But I think there is a principle of causality that manifests itself in these archetypal moral objectives, that says “If I take as my maxim ‘Do unto others, as you would have done unto yourself’ then I must subject my actions to a principle of universalization, therefore if I kill I must expect and agree to be killed, if I do not kill I hold that this value should be held by all others”.

It is this principle that I think manifests itself in concepts such as reciprocal altruism.

Objectivism is sometimes called moral realism, I think it can actually be called ‘moral pragmatism’.

In brief answer to your questions:

1) evolution means morality is subjective, I refer to the above and put it in the context of your line “morality that does not reflect our current situation is flawed”. No it isnt, its either become incoherent (i.e. sexism when there is only one gender) or inconvenient (euthanasia debates in an age of advanced medical science, and economic related health targets). In which case it is adapted and our language about it adapts, but it is not wholly replaced. For example there will never be a sucessful moral argument for murder (like the square triangle it is nonsense).

2) Dead offspring cannot procreate, but the living parents can still (whilst fertile) procreate, to speculate that mothers ceased to eat their young because of an evolutionary imperative is pretty unsound. Because of an adaptation in their moral interpretation of archetypal objective values (i.e. the urge to procreate) then yes. In other words the pragmatic realisation of the parent that in order to continue the genetic string of their line, in order to continue the species it is inconvient to eat your offspring.

3) Jesus and ankles, the goodly theologian is presupposing that Jesus the man-God, was God-made-man. An insertion of a finite and physical being from without the finite and physical universe. I think what he is saying is God pre-exists ankles, Jesus is God, etc. Too close to intelligent design for my liking.