What, the moon is not made of cheese?! :-)
On a serious note though, this is Wittgenstein’s deeper point beyond simple linguistics. There are (in a narrow definition) two types of language, sense and nonsense.
Sense language corresponds with sense-data, including specifically empirical forms of knowledge (I guess that covers your genre).
Sense language is that which we also know as rational and logical language. In other words it observes and follows extremely strict rules of verification and falsifiability and logical objectivity. Just think about the analytic/synthetic truth split.
All bachelors are unmarried (always true)/all bachelors are happy (could be but not necessarily true).
Non-Sense language (to give it it’s correct hyphenation) is types of language that do not necessarily conform to the strict rules of sense-language.
But although it denies the possibility that non-sense can be analytically true (as far as we know by sense-language rules) it does not exclude the possibility that non-sense can be synthetically true. As an example (Pascals simple formula) God may or may not exist (is true as stated). However I am not suggesting that non-sense is nonsensical language, or that it is simply conceptual risk-taking. For as the later Wittgenstein states: words are tools and their ‘full’ meaning (which goes beyond naming picture-ideas) is found within the context (language game) that it is used.
As a simple example: “NO”
Can be a command, a situationally emotive response, a simple inference of a negative, and so on.
A complex example, “God is love” is (in certain language games) not a description (as in ‘the entity that we call God is an embodiment/expression/synonym et al of loving forms of behaviour’) but is a rule for how the word “God” is to be used. (Specific here of course to the Christian language game as opposed to the Taliban Islamic language game). God (as is understood by the Christian theistic tradition is synonymous with the ideal of agape the type of sacrificial love characterised in the maxim ‘turn the other cheek’).

Incidentally a psycholinguistic game that probably brings us closer together is Wittgensteins later ideal that words do not always have a meaning of themselves, but it is the context in which they are spoken that applies a reason to them. Words are tools. Words are subject to the rules of the language games that are being played.

As a cheese-obsessed mouse with a precocious talent for analytical philosophy and for expressing my observations of the world around me, is it not conceivably possible that in my mousey language games the picture-idea represented by the word “cheese” is factually synonymous with the material structure of the moon (that you human non-cheese-obsessed creatures have given an alternative word-symbol for the picture-idea of the moon)?