http://www.methodinit.org.uk/methodinit/2007/06/10/the-moon-is-made-of-granite/ Blogging on Philosophy and Politics Wed, 21 Dec 2011 09:09:48 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 http://www.methodinit.org.uk/methodinit/2007/06/10/the-moon-is-made-of-granite/comment-page-1/#comment-119 Yet There Is Method In It » Blog Archive » What is the Purpose of Education? Sat, 15 Sep 2007 14:11:47 +0000 http://www.methodinit.org.uk/methodinit/2007/06/10/the-moon-is-made-of-granite/#comment-119 [...] Or brainwashing. Verbal information is ripe to be understood by Wittgenstein’s theory as a socially constructed interpretations. Although knowledge is necessary to practice students skills, it should not be the goal. For [...] [...] Or brainwashing. Verbal information is ripe to be understood by Wittgenstein’s theory as a socially constructed interpretations. Although knowledge is necessary to practice students skills, it should not be the goal. For [...]

]]> http://www.methodinit.org.uk/methodinit/2007/06/10/the-moon-is-made-of-granite/comment-page-1/#comment-118 El Sordo Mon, 11 Jun 2007 11:06:44 +0000 http://www.methodinit.org.uk/methodinit/2007/06/10/the-moon-is-made-of-granite/#comment-118 "To sum up: if by 'name' one means 'word whose meaning is learnt by bare ostensive definition', then 'pain' is not the name of a sensation; but if by 'name' one means what is ordinarily meant by that word, then of course 'pain' is the name of a sensation. (BB 82). If the word 'pain' does not refer to a sensation by being attached to it by bare ostensive definition, how does it refer? In what way is it connected with the sensation? One possibility, Wittgesnetin says, is that it is a learnt, articulate replacement of unlearnt, inarticulate expressions of sensation such as moans and winces (Pii, 244). The word 'pain' cannot, as it were, hook on to pain directly; it must be atached to pain throught connections with the natural expressions of pain." “To sum up: if by ‘name’ one means ‘word whose meaning is learnt by bare ostensive definition’, then ‘pain’ is not the name of a sensation; but if by ‘name’ one means what is ordinarily meant by that word, then of course ‘pain’ is the name of a sensation. (BB 82).
If the word ‘pain’ does not refer to a sensation by being attached to it by bare ostensive definition, how does it refer? In what way is it connected with the sensation? One possibility, Wittgesnetin says, is that it is a learnt, articulate replacement of unlearnt, inarticulate expressions of sensation such as moans and winces (Pii, 244).
The word ‘pain’ cannot, as it were, hook on to pain directly; it must be atached to pain throught connections with the natural expressions of pain.”

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