Paragon of Animals 6
Dialogs June 7th, 2007I had fun discussing this topic because I think we agreed on most of the starting assumptions. I have restated the core of my argument in light of your comments and added one or two minor additions. This concludes what I want to say for the present.
Common Descent
If there are any facts in science, one of them is common descent of all life from a single simple life form (or a single gene pool). Our biological design is contained in DNA. DNA is a digital data storage system. As we changed from simple to complex life forms over billions of years, we can think of it as moving though a multi-dimensional landscape. Points close together in the landscape represent a small genetic change. All life started at the same point on the landscape and moved to form the millions of species, each occupying a niche. The journey from the start point was a continuous path without breaks (although technically the small steps, being digital, were punctual but generally small). In fact each species, with each individual varying slightly genetically, occupies a small area on the landscape.
Put this another way, all life genetically speaking is related. If we consider genetic distance in the landscape, we are a finite distance from each other human as well as a finite (but larger) distance from all life. All life are literally our cousins (or closer).
Morality and a Slight Tautology
As I said: “Systems of good and evil applies between all the family of life, unless there is a logically valid reason why some part should be excepted.”
You correctly observed: “If you can propose exceptions to the rule, then the rule is not without exception.” Essentially, I stated A or not A.
I would say my statement is, deliberately, a tautology. But in the next line I give the critical context: “Note: I have not yet heard a valid reason why animals and plants should be excepted.” My argument is then: A or not A. Not A is false. Therefore A. My point is “Systems of good and evil applies between all the family of life and no exceptions“.
Now is probably the time to acknowledge that you disagree with my first point in its broadest interpretation.
Application to Human Equality
My second central point is most ethical laws we currently depend on apply only to humans. To quote you “I am sure you would agree with the proposition that I cannot grant a pig the right to vote” in reference to current culture “all humans above age X are allowed to vote”. In light of my first point, this law would be invalid since it discriminates in an arbitrary way.
Therefore all human laws of equality are flawed. Universal equality laws, if they could be devised, would be permissible. I doubt this applies to all ethical systems as long as we accept some discrimination (such as caring for your offspring rather than every living thing – see its not all bad!).
Source of Good and Evil
Two sources of good and evil are the natural behavior (i.e. naturalism) and metaphysics. To quote you again “I do not think that either case can be satisfactorily demonstrated to be analytically true”. What is interesting is the implications of each if we accept my first point (which you don’t).
If naturalism is true, well obviously we are in atheism territory. No surprise.
If metaphysics is true, then metaphysics gave good and evil to all living things – not just humans.
In Defense of Suffering
This is not exactly central to my argument but I wanted to note your point: “it is wrong for all species to unneccessarily suffer, where the avoidance of suffering can be facilitated”
This rule implies a life without suffering is ideal. This is like trying to ban inclement weather! To take any risk, there has to be the possibility of a negative outcome – which in life leads to suffering. This rules out taking great risks. We are condemned to mediocrity.
I imagine you want to refute that 
And the last word (in this post anyway) goes to the Bard – was he being sincere or sarcastic?
What a piece of work is a man!
how noble in reason! how infinite in faculties!
in form and moving how express and admirable!
in action how like an angel!
in apprehension how like a god!
the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals!
June 8th, 2007 at 2:53 pm
I almsot forgot to say: Jonathan Swift made this point way before me in much more agressive and satirical form in Gulliver’s Travels (A Voyage to the Country of the Houyhnhnms).
“The book finishes with a peroration against pride that is ironically boastful, and seems to be intended to show that Gulliver’s reason may have turned. Others argue that Swift’s point is that the basic difference between humans and the Yahoos is largely artifice.” Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulliver's_Travels#Part_IV:_A_Voyage_to_the_Country_of_the_Houyhnhnms
AC1
June 8th, 2007 at 3:32 pm
Nice conclusion. I guess we did agree on a great many things, and you managed to demonstrate the areas of concurrence pretty precisely in your concluding comments. I think the difference is we are in total agreement with propositions ‘q’ to ‘w’, logical disagreement with propositions ‘x, y and z’ and yet through the method or motivation encouraged by ‘q’ to ‘w’ reach a near identical conclusion.
A brief concluding comment from me in response to your post.
I think most of the differences hinge on my inability to accept your first proposition in its broadest sense.
I think where we come pretty close to agreement is your comment about if it was possible to devise universal laws of equality. I’m not wholly convinced we can. The influence of metaphysics here would be (and I was unwilling to use this as an argument as it is too conditional on other assumptions) that a universal law of equality cannot be devised by a human, or in fact by anything ‘within’ nature, such a law could only be derived from ‘outside’ and this could lead us to positing a moral argument for the existence of God. But I didn’t want to do that as I thought the concept of stewardship, or of ‘responsibilities’ over and above ‘rights’ could be posited as an open philosophy (compatible with materialism and metaphysical ethics).
It was in order to avoid this that I didnt wish to engage in the natural vs metaphysics origin of ethics arguments too much. And on reflection as you neatly concluded I probably couldnt have engaged in such a discussion anyway having flatly rejected proposition 1.0
Yes, it would seem that I am proposing that a life without suffering would be ideal. Not only does it eliminate risk taking and potentially condemn humanity to mediocrity but it is also contrary to most spiritual traditions that ironically also allow for suffering as a natural consequence of the world we live in.
My only defence is that as I am proposing a form of Negative Utilitarianism I have to posit that the ideal is the elimination of suffering. But I guess my get out clause could be that I am proposing a form of act-negative-utilitarianism. A form of consequentialism where the agent has to determine between two courses of action, both of which may cause suffering, therefore compelling the agent to make a qualitative judgement which action will cause more or less suffering in the end.
I confess though this is where the argument becomes difficult having rejected a felicific calculus with which to calculate the outcome. In such a situation then the act-negative-utilitarian is faced with these outcomes action a= -(negative = suffering) act b= – negative = suffering) therefore act a or b= -(negative = suffering).
The only logical alternative would seem to be inaction. I guess that has to be acceptable, the only consolatoin is not all moral scenarios will be lose/lose situations.
(Hopefully!)
June 9th, 2007 at 10:01 am
The point about minimizing suffering and human reality is commented on in movie The Matrix.
“Agent Smith: Did you know that the first Matrix was designed to be a perfect human world? Where none suffered, where everyone would be happy. It was a disaster. No one would accept the program. Entire crops were lost. Some believed we lacked the programming language to describe your perfect world. But I believe that, as a species, human beings define their reality through suffering and misery.” … “Which is why the Matrix was redesigned to this”
AC1
June 9th, 2007 at 8:00 pm
Thought i’d add this just as a comment rather than in a post.
The Ethical implications of propositions 1.1-1.4 in the Paragon of Animals
1.1 we cannot discriminate against humans, other animals and flowers on a genetic basis, otherwise we can discriminate on our fellow humans on a genetic basis.
Our medical knowledge concerning the role of genetics is rapidly increasing. We already know the quite fundamental role your genes play in your pre-natal devolopment and your cellular evolution from conceptus to fetus. We are gaining ever greater knowledge about the roles that genes play in our post-natal development, including the genetic predispositions towards certain illnesses, physical and mental, ranging from cancer to addiction.
If we cannot discriminate on these grounds is it not wrong therefore (in no particular order) to refuse surgery to the obese or to smokers; to consider alcoholism and gambling as moral abberations as opposed to serious medical problems; and to recommend abortion to parents expecting a child with downs syndrome?
1.2 It is wrong to discriminate on the grounds of intelligence.
I am including here not only intelligence (or lack of), mental illness and learning disabilities but also language/communication abilities. If it is wrong to discriminate on these grounds is it not therefore wrong (in no particular order) to: segregate children into different schools or streamlined groups, to have an education system (Private/Grammar/State) that does not equally distribute all its resources to all children regardless of ability; to disenfranchise everyone under 18 from voting in elections; to legislate on the grounds of age in cases concerning the ability to marry, to drink alcohol, to smoke cigarettes, to have consensual sexual relations with one another; to withdraw medical treatment from the elderly (also ageist); to withdraw autonomy and consent from individuals (including those in a coma and in a persistent vegatative state) by granting power of attorney to other individuals whether family or otherwise?
1.3 We cannot discriminate on the grounds of differing ethical systems.
This is more difficult to explore the ethical implications, other than to propose that does this not mean that in morally-problematic-issues you are paralised by an inactivity based on the fear of discriminating between two competing ethics. For example blood transfusions for Jehovahs Witnesses, The separation of the conjoined twins (double effect). Furthermore does a fear of discriminating against different ethical systems, mean an acknowledgement that different ethical systems are therefore subjective thus discriminating against those ethical systems that have a clear objective definition of good/evil, right/wrong?
1.4 It is wrong to discriminate on physical abilities.
See genetic arguments in 1.1, if it is wrong to discriminate on physical abilities then abortion, infanticide and non-voluntary euthanasia should come under extremely critical scrutiny. As indeed should medical treatment priority protocols that favour treating one patient over another on the grounds of potentiality (potential to survive, recover, flourish, live a long life)?
Unfortunately this comment has taken on the character of reductio ad absurdum, which I dont wholly intend as in principle propositions 1.1 to 1.4 are benevolent and virtuous motivations for an ethical opposition to discriminatory behaviour. And I am in limited agreement with the principles, and with the spirit with which they were intended.
But… when we talk about equalities are we not simply paying an antinomian lipservice to very un-equal ethical practises that we also generally agree with?
June 9th, 2007 at 8:02 pm
1.3… isn’t this a case of self-discrimination when faced with a contradictory ethical system?
June 11th, 2007 at 12:37 am
Was sat in a smoky pub drinking cider as is my wont of an evening or two when the following thoughts concerning suffering hit me.
Suffering exists in the world, and it can be said that suffering is a characterisation of some of the human experience. Indeed it could be an Irenaean theology (the one that goes your made in the image of God but you grown in the likeness through your life experiences).
But we are applying a very broad interpretation of suffering here.
As an act-negative-utilitarian I cannot expect to be able to prevent a fox killing chickens for the sake of bloodlust anymore than I can expect to be able to eradicate the suffering of illness or the effects of earthquakes. These things just happen, and are a part of our experience of nature.
But…. as an act-negative-utilitarian I am in many regards a justified agent by not causing illness and by not effecting an earthquake.
As an act-negative-utilitarian I can support the efforts of medicine to cure, contain, or ease the effects of illness. And proclaim such medical intervention as being morally righteous.
As an act-negative-utilitarian I can also support the efforts into researching earthquakes whilst accepting that beyond developing sound building techniques I am rather limited in my efforts to precisely predict earthquakes and to try to prevent them.
So although act-negative-utilitarianism is essentially a moral code to facilitate the cause of non-suffering, I must accept that some ‘forms’ of suffering exist about which I as a moral agent am unable to effect. So I must therefore focus my effort on those situations that I can effect.
June 11th, 2007 at 11:37 am
Woke up this morning thinking about act-negative-utilitarianism and came to the following conclusions. Having accepted that we cannot eliminate all suffering (i.e. what we may term natural suffering) we accept that the individual is capable of suffering. Such suffering could occur in the context of risk-taking and as the result of a moral action. Take as an example a wartime scenario where a soldier dives onto a grenade quite probably killing himself in order to prevent greater suffering to his comrades.
I do still have a problem in trying to solve the puzzle by rejecting the felicific calculus. For if we consider the above scenario we can look at the physical suffering of the sacrificed soldier versus the phschological suffering of his comrades (who have witnessed something horrendous, who feel they owe a debt of gratitude, who perhaps suffer from post-traumatic-stress).
In my previous post I suggested moral inaction if the equation read act a= -negative(suffering) + act b= -negative(suffering) = -negative(suffering)
But perhaps in a slight surrender to a felicific caluculus I should at least offer one evaluation of the suffering, is act a or act b greater than the other?
Now instead of engaging in a felicific calculus per se I could make a simple distinction between does the suffering effect me and me alone versus does the suffering effect a larger number of people.
In other words where act A= -ngeative(suffering) on a personal level.
and act B= -negative(suffering) on a ‘nationwaide’ level then by sheer force of numbers the amound of suffering of act B is > greater than act A.
So risk-taking that may involve personal suffering is not rejected outright by act-negative-utilitarianism if the suffering is miniscule, especially when compared say to inaction.
June 25th, 2007 at 10:09 pm
‘Altruistic’ chimps act for the benefit of others
“Chimps happily help out unrelated chimps and unfamiliar humans, even if it means exerting themselves for no reward, a new study shows.
True altruism – unselfish acts for another’s benefit – was until recently considered uniquely human. Usually when animals cooperate, they either help relatives – thereby increasing chances of passing shared genes to the next generation – or they count on having favours returned in the future.”
New Scientist
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn12132
June 26th, 2007 at 7:25 pm
Interesting. But as there is a family resemblance between chimps and humans this should not be suprising.
If it could be shown that a mollusc shared the same altruistic tendencies then that would be interesting.
May 23rd, 2008 at 8:33 pm
[...] own opinion has been expressed in my blog post – the Paragon of Animals. To base objects based on divisions between species is, almost by definition, arbitrary and [...]