Preamble

In your post you stated your aim as “to argue that we share many characteristics with primates and if we try to understand ethics in humans, we should consider if it would apply to our (distant) cousins.”

You then present the biological case that humans share a common ancestry with a large number (or indeed all) of the worlds other lifeforms. In particular you argue for our incredibly close relationship with the higher primates.

You ask quite pertinently whether we should extend ‘rights’ to those species closest to us, and ask also where should we (if at all) draw the line.  Of the four questions you asked in your conclusion I believe this was the main one, and is the one that I am better qualified to discuss.

Of course we have previously discussed the notion of ‘natural’ rights before and I share with Bentham a certain unease at this notion. I’ll touch on this somewhat more in my conclusion.

By asking whether we should extend certain rights to our primate relatives we are embarking upon a primary assumption.

Equality

Peter Singer says the following on human equality.

“ Equality is a moral ideal, not a simple assertion of fact. There is no logically compelling reason for assuring that a factual difference in ability between two people justifies any difference in the amount of consideration we give to satisfying their needs and interests. The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans: it is a prescription of how we should treat humans.“

It is from this proposition that we can justify our opposition to racism, sexism, homophobia and other forms of oppression. Singer proposed that we could include Specieism as a form of oppression.

Bentham makes the following statement on how one qualifies for equality, he is extending this question to other species.

“The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”

The capacity to suffer is the only benchmark we should look for in a ‘being’ in order to extend to it a degree of equality. If we looked elsewhere i.e., rationality, intelligence, communicability then we should extend the same principle to our judgement of humans (equally capable of suffering) thus rendering equality despite skin colour, gender, orientation etc., irrelevant.

What Should We Do?

Singer argues for vegetarianism and offers as a reason (beyond species equality and a renunciation of unnecessary suffering) good environmental management.

“In order to produce 1lb of protein in the form of beef or veal, we must feed 2lb’s of protein to the animal.”

We kill and eat flesh as a result of the desires of our palate, not as a survival or dietary imperative. Consequently the primary interest of equality in the species (the avoidance of suffering) is ignored in favour of trivial human reasons. Taste!

I  would argue that Singer is guilty of a form of specieism by ignoring vegetable organisms. We can infer from this that he does not believe plant-life capable of suffering. Horticulturists and some scientists argue that plants do feel pain. If they do feel pain, then it is specieist not to grant them a degree of equality. If we argue that they cannot communicate their pain, then we are qualifying their equality claim on the basis of communicability and not their capacity to suffer. Which we have already seemingly rejected.

Critical Clarifications

1) The only ‘right’ or equality we can offer, is the ‘right not to suffer needlessly’. We cannot give a pig the right to vote, anymore than we can grant to a male the right to abort his pregnancy. The equality we are offering is a limited and relative equality.

2)  By these standards the affliction of suffering is worse than killing. It is seemingly wrong to kill a human, because a human is conscious of his existence overtime and has desires and purposes that extend into the future. We cannot make the same assumptions for other primates (as yet) due to communicability problems. So the avoidance of suffering is our prime inter-species moral benchmark.
The Problem

By the 2nd standard we are therefore arguing that there are circumstances where is is morally acceptable to kill the human infant, the terminally ill and the mentally deficient. In fact it is more acceptable to kill these humans than it is to kill an adult primate.

This favouritism to other species, over our own species, suggests the beginning of a rejection of the principle of reciprocal altruism among close kin (See Robert Trivers’ theory of ‘parental investment‘) which plays such a crucial role in human ethics. See also Axelrod’s beneficial payoff for mutual cooperation found in the Prisoners Dilemma.

This is a problem I would suggest, and one that sits top of a pile of other problems with Singer’s argument, including:

i) If we develop Singer’s theory and extend equality to all organic life, what are we then to eat?

ii) If killing is less morally abhorrent than the infliction of suffering does this not then provide an impetus into researching ‘painless’ death as a moral force for good?

Specieism Continued

Singer extends the charge of specieism to two other areas. Firstly to animal experimentation. To those who support animal vivisection with the retort “one animal saves thousands of human lives” he responds with the question “would you be willing to experiment on an orphaned infant?”

If the answer is no, then the experimenter is specieist. Singer does argue that we could apply the ‘argument from potential’ in defence of the rights claim of an infant human over those of an adult mouse. But he says if you hold this view, then you must consistently also oppose abortion and contraception in all its forms.

I agree with Singer on the consistency argument re: abortion, but I disagree that contraception can be soundly rejected on the grounds of potentiality.

Singer’s second charge of specieism is levelled at Philosophy and Science in general. Neither discipline is doing enough to extend the notion of the equality of the species and further vegetarian lifestyles. Philosophy he argues, is happy to argue for ‘rights’ for the unborn child,  for murderous psychotics like Hitler and for the Mentally Ill, yet will not give such rights to even our closest primate relatives.

Critique

Apart from objections and observations that I have already made, my main critique is concerned with how equal is species equality?

I agree that:

-Humans should not needlessly nor trivially inflict suffering on another species.

-In our scientifically advanced age (soya, tofu, GM crops) a carnivorous diet is a trivial and specieist luxury. And besides equality eco-management is an important task for our future.

-An ‘equality of sorts’ should be extended to other species, but only insofar as it is a prescriptive command to humans not to inflict suffering on other species.

However… it is important for us to note (as you have in your post) that ethical systems and socio-behavioural conventions have been observed in primate communities. Research on Chimp ethics is rather advanced. See research by Jane Goodall and by Frans De Waal.

These primatologists made two specific observations concerning primate ethics:

1) One good turn deserves another

2) An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.

This ethic is based upon a reward/punishment paradigm, with individual ‘moral’ agents and with the arbitrators of justice being the social group as a whole.

Sounds familiar? So it should be, for it has developed from the same evolutionary ethical system found in our notion of human-reciprocal-altruism.

The problem with Singer’s idea of species equality, is that it is a “top-down” and “one-way” ethical system. Our granting of ‘equality’ to other species garners us nothing in return from these species.

Of course granting such equality would/could reduce the amount of suffering inflicted upon other species by human behaviour (a desireable outcome). But it will do nothing to alter the number of human illnesses caused by mosquito bites, or the situations where humans (accidentally) become prey to another species.

Our modern eco-conscientiousness has to led to the impulse not to seek retribution after an animal (lets say a Great White Shark) kills a human. Why? Because we do not accept that the animal acted malevolently with intent, or that it understood the consequences of its actions. We may also argue that the human victim had trespassed into its killers territory thus eliciting a deadly response. Either way we are guilty of specieist intellectualism, something we are supposed to have rejected.

In other words the top-down and one-way ethical system that we are promoting when we talk of extending ‘equality’ to other species, involves no element of reciprocity to it. All we as a species gain from such an ethic is a feel-good sensation.

Conclusion

I still agree that we should not inflict unnecessary suffering upon other animals, primarily because they are capable of suffering and because we are closely related to them and should reject the imposition of suffering as being an acceptable behaviour. But I believe we can maintain these principles without recourse to a notion of extending ‘equality’ or ‘rights’ to other species.

Instead of animal rights, perhaps we should talk about human responsibilities. Instead of issuing edicts about inter-species equality, perhaps we should encourage the concept of stewardship. (Which I would propose is the ‘true’ message of the creation story in Genesis).

We have an obvious position atop a ‘heirarchy’ of the species, evident by our intellectual, scientific and cultural accomplishments. So instead of renouncing our position at the ‘top of the tree of life’ for fear of specieism, should we not focus our evolutionary advantages and our ethical consciousness towards developing a satisfactory concept of stewardship of the earth and respect and ethical behaviour towards all of its organic lifeforms?