I see from your response that you have been brushing up on your logic, I feel then it is only proper that I should respond and make pointed defences using logic also.
My comments on Irish mass attendance. I believe the citation you offered was from the LA Times. If you proceed to read the rest of the article or to quote from it you would then not commit the fallacy of significance. The article continues by informing the reader that despite the drop in ‘weekly’ mass attendance, the mass attendance in the Republic of Ireland is still one of the highest within Western Europe. Furthermore the article points out that the reduction in mass attendance does not equate (as I believe I had already argued) with a reduction in belief per se. The article goes on to state that young people although admitting that they did not attend mass weekly did however agree with the views of Fr Noonan, interviewed in the same article, who states that there is still an untapped well of Christianity in Ireland, in other words a fall in ‘weekly’ mass attendance did not equate with a reduction in belief. The article states:
“Young people on the streets of Dublin tended to agree. Although most acknowledged that they didn’t attend Mass regularly, most attributed it to being too busy with their studies, or their parents being occupied with shopping or other activities on Sundays. The church, too, was not as strict and did not exert the pressure it used to, some said. Alan Tobin, 19, a biomedical student at the Dublin Institute of Technology, disagreed that the country had become less religious. “Many people still pray every day,” he said. “It’s just that there is more free will now, and it looks less religious from the outside.”"
With regards my comments that Sweden is not a spiritual wilderness despite the deinstitutionalisation/irreligiosity of the populaces religious beliefs, I reaffirm the above quotation and my constant point religious practise and religious belief are separate phenomena. I am loath to have to provide statistical data which as I will expound in a minute is a pointless exercise and a logical fallacy in philosophical discourse. However, the statistics which are openly available for you equally to find, are that 78% of Swedes belong to the Church of Sweden (this does not infer practise) this statistic is available from http://www.svenskakyrkan.se/statistik/pdf/medlemmar.pdf I would point out that membership is defined only by baptism records and again does not infer regular practise.
In terms of Swedish beliefs I also quoted the widely and openly available eurostat/eurobarometer poll which presented the following information. 23% of Swedish citizens affirmed their belief in the statement “There is a God”. 23% of Swedish citizens affirmed that they did not believe in any “form of Spirit, God or Life force”. Finally 53% of Swedish citizens stated that they believed there was “some form of Spirit or Life force”. These figures are available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_report_en.pdf
I am however as I said loath to use statistics, the old aphorism that ‘you can use statistics to prove anything’ is I’m afraid in Philosophical argument a consistent truth when to the chagrin of Wittgenstein disobeying language rules we misuse or misrepresent statistical method, thus committing the Statistical Fallacy. There are in philosophy and logic two types of truth, synthetic and analytical. The former as in “All bachelors are unhappy” may or may not be true and could perhaps be measured using statistical methods. It is however a synthetic truth whose reliability depends on a great number of factors. On the contrary an analytical truth such as “All bachelors are unmarried men” is necessarily true and there is no fashion by which statistics can measure this statement.
The statistical fallacy which I wish to invoke here is that statistics for the purposes of our arguments are inadmissible unless we can independently demonstrate the methodology applied, the controls over the data that were exercised, agree upon the terminology used, ascertain the precise questions that were asked, and be satisfied with the veracity of the surveyors independence. Citing statistics from atheism.net does not satisfy the veracity of the data any more than I would happily believe gun-crime statistics from the NRA or data on smoking related illnesses commissioned by British American Tobacco. Furthermore with regards our previous comments on religious belief/practise in Vietnam I am not satisfied that the statistics prove anything without us knowing whether the question asked was do you believe in god, a god, many gods, no gods, the spirit world, ancestor worship et al. As previously posited disbelief in a god/gods (i.e. Buddhism) does not infer irreligiosity.
My abhorrence of the use of statistics in philosophical argument goes beyond the simple Statistical fallacy, as many other fallacies are necessarily invoked when we use statistics, including the Fallacy of significance, Contextual fallacies, the Fallacy of arguing from authority, etc.
4 examples of the above fallacies in action.
1) Statistical Fallacy: Two drinking philosophers decide to use the statistical and scientific method to discover why it is they become intoxicated. They go to the pub, have dinner and drink several Scotch Whisky and Waters, they become intoxicated and get carried home. The following night they repeat the exact process but instead drink Irish Whiskey and Water. They become intoxicated and are carried away. The following night they repeat the same processes but instead drink Rye Whisky and Water, again becoming drunk. They conclude in accordance with the statistical method that as water was the only constant factor in all their drinks it must be water making them intoxicated!
2&3) The Fallacy of Significance and Contextual Fallacy. “28% of people in Birmingham have cavities in their teeth.” “62% of Doctors who smoke, smoke Laramie cigarettes.” The first is not significant unless we can compare the statistical data with other cities of comparable size, dental care, economic welfare. The second is contextually fallacious as it does not tell us how many doctors do not smoke, or of those doctors who do not smoke Laramie’s but smoke B&H how many more or less do they smoke in a day/week etc.
4) The Fallacy of arguing from authority. A statement is no more true because X, which is an authority on the matter, says so. Substitute X for the statistical method, and disregard its authority because of the above fallacies.
With regards the scope of my or rather Durkheim’s points on Religion, two responses. It is Durkheim and others who apply the broad inclusive definition of religion, which is considered the academic standard definition. However to avoid committing the Fallacy of arguing from authority not to mention Contextual Fallacies I should have clarified this earlier, equally so as you admit you should have replaced the term atheism with materialism.
We both seem to agree there is a need that is fulfilled by the phenomena of religion/spirituality belief/practise, your position classically materialist is that the need is physiological mine in accepting the transpersonal paradigm proposes the need is metaphysical. We are both then advocating a functionalist position, albeit diametrically opposed. Clearly here is a different argument for a different day. I would personally advocate the thoughts of Karl Popper on Indeterminism, Determinism and Naturalism and his theory of the Open Universe and the Reality of the Three Worlds. This can be discussed at a later date if you wish.
Regards the charge of an argument to the consequences perhaps we should re-read and edit what we have written so as to avoid misunderstandings. The point I was trying to make was that the removal of Iban religion from Iban society would lead to a complete change and restructuring of that society, indeed to the collapse of that originally observed society. The Iban without the Iban religion would not be ‘the Iban’ as we currently ‘know’ or define them. I am making a functional point which of itself is addressing a truth value. My preamble to that statement, which was to your indifferent response to the collapse of Iban society, was possibly an appeal to emotions and therefore had the character of an appeal to consequences. However that preamble was my shocked and personal response to your indifference to the notion of spiritual/ideological/sociological ‘regime’ change. To quote “too bad!” However the argument itself, from Durkheim’s observations on functionalism within society, and the functionalism of religion/spirituality within Iban society and the consequences to their society of losing their religion has no charge to answer regarding the appeal to consequences. Durkheim was making an observation, he did not qualify that observation with notions of desirability or undesirability. The statement is that the loss of Iban religion would lead to the collapse of Iban society, as the one is functionally integral to the other. The statement is not that the loss of Iban religion that would lead to the collapse of Iban society which would be a good or a bad thing. There is no appeal to consequences in the original argument.
In my preamble which states my opinion that it would be wrong to engineer the collapse of Iban society, which you had stated would be “too bad,” once again I refute the charge of an appeal to consequences as the value that I apply to the argument is irrelevant to the original argument anyway. I stated I believed it would be wrong to forcibly change Iban society, the value statement that I apply here however bears no relevance to the fact that Iban religion is functionally integral to Iban society, and its loss would be to destabilise/change Iban society.
My argument had been If X then Y will occur.
Not If X then Y will occur, Y is undesirable so X must be true.
I agree with you we should embrace existential angst, but as part of the journey and not as the destination.
You state: “If it arises in our contact then we should be frank that the weather does not depend on their rituals.” With regards again to the Iban, I would here refer you to Wittgenstein and the language games. In our contact with Iban society, we should observe the phenomena and accept the phenomena for what it is, a function of Iban society. I do not propose that we accept that Iban ritual causes the weather. Why should we make our ‘values’ known where our ‘ethics’ or ‘personal conventional rules’ are not being directly compromised. Our opinions may be validly stated but only then in an honest response to an enquiry. Our language rules here differ from the Ibans language rules, you as a materialist, me as a Christian existentialist. With regards to Fijian cannibals, we should observe the phenomena for what it is, then only if you are invited to the Fijian table you as a vegetarian or non-cannibal were then offered what you knew to be human meat, then if eating it would be to you would an unacceptable infringement of your ‘values’ then indeed you should make your values known. I assume in such a situation then (I quote) your position of “Why do I have to avoid disagreeing with another cultures views?” would then be valid, otherwise you are in Wittgenstein’s terms attempting to interfere with the ‘actual use of language.’
Furthermore on Fijian cannibalism, with regards the above, I do not believe it acceptable for religious missionaries to directly interfere with or overthrow indigenous beliefs. Proselytising is I believe contrary to the existential quest. If the missionaries existed as an independent group that lived alongside for example Fijian cannibals, led a Christian life but did not coerce or encourage or foist their beliefs upon the Fijians except to honestly answer their enquiries, then I would have no problem with them. Indeed perhaps the purpose (often abused) and motto of missionaries should be “By their fruits you shall know them.” (Mt7:20)
Finally in response to your question, we should avoid disagreeing with other cultures views for two reasons. Firstly on the grounds of Wittgenstein and the language rules. Secondly to avoid the Fallacy of arguments which appeal to sentiments or argumentum ad misericordiam. Irrespective of the truthfulness or validity of another cultures world view in comparison to your own, your is not any more truthful because of its reasonability or general acceptedness.
In answer to the Nietzsche problem. I was asking a rhetorical question, certainly the inference was argumentum ad hominem an argument against the man, but it was not of itself an association fallacy, or intended as such. Jung’s views on Nietzsche are observational, you can read into them what you like concerning the validity of his philosophy.
Regards Marinoff who similarly asks rhetorical questions concerning materialism vs spiritualism. The quote which you have taken out of context and thereby committed a Contextual fallacy with in fact is proposing that the materialist view is an argumentum ad ignorantiam, nice try though to turn it back on me. The statement is materialism does not explain the biological basis of being conscious or of thinking thoughts… please tell me though if it does. It does not state that because materialism does not explain the biological basis of being conscious or of thinking thoughts that therefore materialism is false. That was not the proposition, that was the inference that you drew from the proposition. I believe the proposition that Marinoff had argued to through rhetorical questioning (that indeed could be applied in reverse i.e. creationism does not explain the biological evidence for evolution) was that Materialistic views are also often beliefs and therefore are open to the same criticism of being hallucinations, wishful thinking, hysteria etc. And that materialistic views should obey the philosophical and scientific principle of falsifiability, a theory is not a rule, a view is not objective. Therefore Marinoffs method of comparative rhetorical questioning, is only asking the question, it is not answering it. I would suggest that it is an argumentum ad ignorantiam to draw an inference from his proposition, as equally as it would be to maintain materialistic views or beliefs in opposition to any other.
Indeed it would be Wittgenstein’s position that Materialism represents an argumentum ad ignorantiam in its attempts to claim the absolutist high ground. To quote Jung “The Materialistic error was probably unavoidable at first. Since the throne of God could not be discovered among the galactic systems, the inference was that God has never existed. The second unavoidable error is psychologism: if God is anything, he must be an illusion derived from certain motives – from will to power, for instance, or from repressed sexuality. These arguments are not new. Much the same thing was said by the Christian missionaries who overthrew the idols of heathen gods.”
And finally Kierkegaard, indeed at first re-reading it sounds like an appeal to consequences much like many of Nietzsche’s aphorisms. But again I think the statement is rhetorical, firstly he like Nietzsche wrote in a literary and aesthetic fashion and here was speaking through another persons voice. Secondly the quote in isolation has the character of an appeal to consequences but should be taken in the context of an existential tract. The despair and angst and fear of a world without spirit is what drives him and motivates him on his existential quest. The quote is better understood when taken with the rest, how he defines or finds God, how we must then confront the eternal paradox and then how we are left with two choices, belief or disbelief, and how as an existentialist he takes the leap of faith, which resolves his initial existential angst.
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