A humancentric view on humanly observed phenomena by human sociologists with regards to a human sociological theory is hardly controversial, or problematic.

With regards to Irish mass attendance once again aren’t we mistaking religious practise and religious adherence with religious belief? To believe does not implicitly require to practise, belief can be, indeed should be an existential exercise. I would posit that the reduction in weekly mass attendance (practise) is not proportionally represented in a reduction of belief. I will further expand upon this in a forthcoming post on Kierkegaard and existential hope.

I do not think a society has collapsed due to a loss of religion, as I am not aware of any society losing religion. Religion may be replaced, altered or disinstituinalised but it has not dissappeared in any sense of the word.

Taoism is deist not theist, and yes Buddhism is spiritual and therefore could be deemed incompatible with atheism, it is nonetheless though a non-theist religion. Non-theism and atheism (incorrectly from your viewpoint) are often taken to be synonymous.

I would disagree that I am bogging down the conversation, Religion, Spirituality, Magic, Superstition and Ritual are mutually relative phenomena. The irrelegiosity of Sweden does not equate with it being a spiritual wilderness. That specific communal religous adherence to an institutional church is minimal does not infer that the average Swedish citizen has no spiritual dimension. Indeed I did say that religion is deeply integrated into societal structure, but I did not exclude any form of ritual or spiritualistic behaviour or belief from what constitutes religion. Once again why should the definition of religion be restricted to concepts of institutional belief systems. To take Durkheims theories to their very limits the ultimate expression of the divine is society, society is ‘God writ at large’.

I reaffirm also the point who said anything about truth? At least we are in agreement that religion/spirituality fulfils a need, but what price truth you ask? Surely here truth must be taken in its existential form to be somewhat relative. Truth in whose terminology, religious truth, logical truth, empirical scientific truth? All of these ‘truths’ are really just language games that we play, so I refer to another forthcoming post on Wittgenstein and language game theory.

To return to post 3 and Dawkins on the comforts of morphine. Sounds familiar, almost like Marx and the Opium of the masses. It’s a nice aphorism but thats all. We are talking here about functionalism which is not by any means an argument to the consequences. Functionalism is about observation and common sense.

A wheel that turns performs its function.  Morphine that provides pain relief to the terminally ill patient performs its function. Religion that consoles the existential angst of the individual performs its function. I refer back here to post 4 and Durkheims description of the functions of religion.

Back to post 3. You suggest as a possible scenario the Iban fail to perform the raindance the rain falls and they abandon their belief in the efficacy of the raindance. You go on “I accept this might impact their society but too bad!” If they alter their belief system and in turn preserve their social structure and cohesion then your flippance would be tolerable, but if their belief system is crushed under the weight of skepticism and their society changes beyond recognition… too bad? Too right! Such attitudes (Nietzschen no less) is palpably unpleasant and distasteful and reeks of social darwinism and a form of ideological regime change.

A final note on Nietzsche and his poison. As a question is he not delusional with regards the will to power? He has no time for the weak, the unintellectual, the little subservient man. Yet the shoemaker and the baker at the end of his street, content with their lot make life somewhat easier. Nietzsche was an existentialist and to a degree had some fine points (although contrasting with what I call the positive existentialism of Kierkegaard) but ultimately should his philosophy not be taken as autobiographical and rejected as prophetic?