In closure I’m going to limit myself to four responses.
Functionalism, falsifiability,Wittgenstein and language games, and a final attempt at structuring my position in the original posts.
Functionalism. There are lots of different theories on functionalism but I have focused mainly on Durkheim’s sociological theory of Functionalism. Which has been developed into Structural Functionalism. This article gives a good outline of the different applications http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structural_functionalism
There are criticisms of functionalism which can be found here which also outlines some alternatives to functionalism http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_%28sociology%29
The basic drive I was making was the ‘organic analogy’ that society is made up of different interdependent organs that must function together in order for the greater body of society to work. Durkheim wanted to explain a phenomena in terms of its function within society, saying “the determination of function is…necessary for the complete explanation of the phenomena.” The position I was proposing is that functionalism is describing an effect not a cause. So religion/spiritualism is a phenomenological effect of an un-defined cause which could be the transpersonal realm, social language games, a mythology of justification, or mere delusion. Whatever the cause may be which could be non-definable the effect is observable.
This brings me to part 2 falsifiability. On this matter I’m rooting for Karl Popper. A scientific theory is only scientific if it is falsifiable. Furthermore empirical experimentation logically cannot verify a theory (infinite experiments needed) but can falsify one. I think Popper and Wittgenstein fall into similar categories with regards language games. Questions have been raised as to whether sociological functionism is scientific. I think that is an interesting debate. There are alternatives to and criticisms of functionalism so I think it fulfils the falsifiability criteria.
Wittgenstein and language games, here I’m responding to the addendum you have posted which has the character of reductio ad absurdum
nicely used as well.
Using Wittgensteins rules on language games it would be an interference with the principles of language for an argument in favour of the transpersonal paradigm to attempt a proof or demonstration in verifying the position using the language of a naturalist or scientist. Likewise he considers it illogical and abberrant to use the language of science to disprove or refute the transpersonal paradigm. To sum up you cannot use the language of Naturalism to prove/disprove Supernaturalism or vice versa. It would be like explaining the game of tennis using the rules of chess.
Which I think swiftly sinks Intelligent Design. (Another point of agreement between us).
Concerning our dialog and whether Wittgensteins rules dissallows it to even take place, or as you put it, is it right for me a supernaturalist to try to advance its theories to a naturalist? I think the dialog is allowed where the language rules are obeyed, but this can lead to: Confusion (wrong language use), Disagreement (opposite language games) leading to Stalemate or if the language rules change through the person making those changes (existential choice) Resolution.
Wittgensteins response is that religion is valid on the personal experiential level, and cannot claim an absolute truth for that would disobey fundamental language rules. So an individual should choose existentially any religion or no-religion depending on what worked for the individual. Dialogue then between believer and disbeliever could have 4 possible outcomes: Stalemate (again), Belief to disbelief, disbelief to belief, or a new belief based on common ground or consensus. All of the four though have one thing in common, that is independent language games and rules. Only by changing the rules can resolution be reached, and that is what I was trying to demonstrate with Kierkegaard, the ideal of existential choice.
In conclusion. Durkheim sees religion as a social phenomenon, that where it exists, serves certain functions within the organic whole of society. For Kierkegaard ‘true’ religion or belief is a matter of existential choice that transcends institutions and scientific observations or attempts at structuralism. Wittgenstein doesnt approve of such approaches either on the grounds of differing language games and the logical conflict between different truth claims. The language games though are valid in themselves and religious belief is valid on a personal level as indeed is disbelief. To paraphrase Wittgenstein ‘whatever works for you…’ In that case religion can be seen as a personal phenomenon that serves certain functions within the individual… including consolation, development of the conscience, personal ethical standards, self-understanding, etc. The observation is of an effect not a cause, so these functoins or phenomonological effects are valid for the individual whether believer/unbeliever. Which I hope I demonstrated with Wittgensteins defence through language games, Kierkegaards existentialism and Durkheims organic analogy of functionalism.
finis
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