Yet There Is Method In It

This is a great parody of all those moralists who assume the right to improve mankind:

This is a difficult time in our nation’s history. There is a rift—a deep, enduring wound—among the people of this once-great land, and while I’m not sure it will be healed in my lifetime, I do not think all hope is lost. I believe change is possible, but the road will be long and difficult. The truth is, this nation can never be united as long as it is home to people other than myself. The Onion

I am deep into reading Waldon. It’s good so far.

AC1

I recently had an infuriating conversation which revealed staggering selective intellectual blindness. I am reminded of the quote:

In certain pious people I have found a hatred of reason, [...] But to stand in the midst of this rerum concordia discors [the concord of things through discord] and all the marvellous uncertainty and ambiguity of existence, and not to question, not to tremble with desire and delight in questioning, not even to hate the questioner–perhaps even to make merry over him to the extent of weariness–that is what I regard as contemptible[...] The Gay Science, Aph 2.

I am glad to get that off my chest.

AC1

An interesting problem that arises from logic is the Münchhausen Trilemma. This applies in most situations when we are arguing to support a particular proposition (justificationism). A problem arises when we ask where do the axioms of a logical argument come from? This is expressed in the three “horns” of the Münchhausen Trilemma:

• The circular argument, in which theory and proof support each other. A because B. B because A. e.g. “The Bible is true because the Bible says so.” Since anything can be justified by a circular argument, it is considered absurd to use this as a valid logical argument. It is also can involve tautology.
• The regressive argument, in which each proof requires a further proof. A because of B, B because C, C because D, to infinity. If every proposition is supported by other propositions, there is no “foundational axiom”. Since there is no foundational axiom, we cannot even try to assess if our basic assumptions are true. Therefore we cannot know if our conclusion is true or false. This is classically seen in some versions of the cosmological argument.
• The axiomatic argument, which rests on accepted precepts. This is problematic for the philosopher, as how can we know our axioms are true? Hume, among others, have pointed out the impossibility of a priori knowledge of a posteriori experience. We also can use the argument from obviousness, but this can be countered by claiming “nothing is obvious”, Descartes evil dæmon, Plato’s cave, etc. Also, if there is a disagreement on the truth value of an axiom, there is no way to verify it – this allows possibly any axiom to be claimed as “obvious” and we are back to absurdity. Mathematics rests on axiomatic assumptions but this is acceptable for an abstract field of knowledge. But outside a-priori knowledge, certainty of axioms seems impossible.
  

  “I shall begin with observing, that there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by any arguments a priori. Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary implies a contradiction. Nothing, that is distinctly conceivable, implies a contradiction. [...] I propose this argument as entirely decisive, and am willing to rest the whole controversy upon it.” Cleanthes in David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion

Given the objections and doubts of all possible logical justification, we are forced to conclude that no certainty in a-posteriori knowledge is possible! This leads us to fallibilism, the belief that all knowledge could, in principle, be mistaken. I do not go as far as claiming knowledge is impossible (for one thing, that statement might be considered “knowledge”).

Another way of analysing justification of logical argument is Fries’s trilemma. This ignores circular arguments (since they are worthless) and splits Münchhausen’s “axiomatic argument” into two futher divisions.

• Dogmatism – we can just assume the truth value of axioms. This is usually unacceptable to philosophers. It also opens the door to possibly false statements.
• Infinite regress – again, a problem.
• Psychologism – defined by Popper as “the doctrine that statements can be justified not only by other statements but also by perceptional experience.” Remember that this too abandons certainty in knowledge, due to the variability in interpretation of perceptions. This highlights the need for philosophy to be aware of psychology.

Given the apparently inescapably of fallibilism, anyone who claims to be certain of something is “a question mark concerning his wisdom”. We need modesty in what we know. But I don’t think most people would be comfortable with the idea that everything they know could be false…

Anti Citizen One

PS Simpsons Quote: Moe: “It’s po-mo! [blank stares from all] Post-modern! [more staring] Yeah, all right — weird for the sake of weird.”

PPS Looks like the UK government was in on the US’s torture and rendition antics the whole time.

Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. Rousseau

I am on a roll with political philosophy books: I recently finished The Open Society, The Communist Manifesto, The Republic and The Social Contract. I have started on the collected works of Thoreau. Rousseau’s The Social Contract reminds me of Thomas Paine’s writing style. Arguments are put forward using rather large metaphysical assumptions and emotional appeals – although I sometimes agree with their conclusions. For example, the quote above sounds really cool but I am not sure it has any concise meaning. This is in contrast to Popper’s dry and logical approach to a similar goal. Rousseau is more abstract than other political philosophers, at times I was just reading “blah blah blah” as the meaning – I am metaphysically skeptical.

The way I (badly) understand Rousseau’s foundational argument, people collectively choose to participate in a state. So far, so existential. Rousseau calls the generalisation of their state’s interest as “the general will”, which is what people would want, if they had the interests of “all” at heart. This approach has some difficulties. We cannot objectively say what the general will is unless everyone is in agreement. Rousseau claims the general will is distinct and unified, as it is the will as if people had no private interests. Unfortunately, we cannot reconcile the possibility if people really have distinct interests, even distinct at the “state level”. Rousseau evades this difficulty by claiming there are sometimes two states in one geographical area. This makes his system unworkable and pretty tautological. This is similar to his definition of “laws”: they are the expression of the general will (and if they are not in agreement, they are merely “decrees”). Since we cannot easily say what is the general will in most realistic cases, we cannot know if a rule is a “law” or a “decree”. All this idealism tends to result in a ruling body, who “knows” what the general will is and can rule over the unenlightened masses. This is Poppers fear as expressed in The Open Society.

Rousseau’s criteria for a successful state are rather worrying. As I remember, he says history will be the judge (which can justify any arbitrary action), that stability and unanimity is good (we can bring in thought crime laws now) and population growth is a good sign. Obviously he was not aware of the dangers of unrestrained population growth! Basically he has some bizarre ideas.

He did have a few interesting points on how governments should be formed, with the executive (“the prince”) and the legislator being separated. This can reduce the arbitrary use of power by the executive. This idea was the basis of the US government system (among others? Greek? Roman?). I find this concept attractive.

He ends with an analysis of the instability that would arise in a completely Christian state. Since Christians tend to tolerate mistreatment (turn the other cheek), they are unable to stop a minority usurping power. He also notes that Christians have been persecuted, along with all non-state religions, for undermining the common code of right and wrong within a state. Having two masters, the state and religion can undermine the “general will”. He contrasts Christianity (and offshoots) with pagan religions where the entire state was forced to worship a common set of gods that represented the ideals of the state. This all seems rather illiberal but, of course, that does not make Rousseau factually wrong.

Anti Citizen One

The UK government is hold a consultation which is seeking ideas for laws to abolish. They are also using an internet collaborative “cloud” approach – anyone can suggest an idea, and comment on or rate other ideas. Both are encouraging trends in engaging the public. Hopefully we will see the abolition of bad laws and more good ideas from the public. I don’t know if the government will follow through with action but I can hope.

Some popular topics include:
Motoring
Religion
Sex
Education

The underbelly of this consultation is any reactionary or ill informed opinion can be aired (but it’s a necessary side of free speech). Some examples can be found by searching for:

Lunatic
Racist
Bad Idea
Luddite

It is quite addictive until you realise there are so many duplicated ideas, not all morons can be deflated.

Anti Citizen One

I finished part 2. I already commented on part 1. While the previous volume discussed Plato, the second dealt with Hegel and Marx. Popper is generally not in agreement with the political philosophies of any of these writers but he does note any small areas of agreement when he can. He claims of their systems all justify totalitarianism in various guises. He is scathing of Hegel which is significant since Hegel is held in high regard by many philosophers. Popper observes Hegel sold out his integrity to the reigning Frederick William III and attempted to create philosophical systems that justified Prussian nationalism. Since Hegel does not avoid contradictions, being part of the Hegelian dialectic, he can justify pretty much anything. Popper condemns this as anti-critical rationalism and he agrees with Schopenhauer’s accusation that Hegel was a charlatan.

I started reading Popper’s analysis of Marx but I realised I needed to get up to speed on Marx. I therefore read the communist manifesto (“Workers of the world, unite!”). I want to say a few words on my initial reaction before talking about Popper’s analysis. What struck me about the manifesto was it basically argued that unrestrained capitalism has serious flaws, it was unstable and the only alternative was a classless society – meaning the working class was the only class. It strangely provided very little detail on how to administer a communist system or what it would be like. It only had what engineering designers call “requirements”. Requirements are not a design (but are a good starting point). Marx called for a society where people were not exploited. That is all well and good (apart from being ressentiment morality) but how this is achieved, or if it is even possible, is not addressed.

Popper basically agrees with my initial reaction but takes his analysis far further. He praises Marx’s analysis of history based on institutions. Although Marx overemphasised the role of institutions, it was a fruitful endeavour. Popper then turns around and takes apart Marx’s analysis that communism must follow from unrestrained capitalism. The most telling point is that capitalism has been replaced by government interventionism and the conditions of the working class has improved since the mid 1800′s (when Marx was writing). This contradicts Marx’s prophesy that working conditions must worsen over time.

Popper rounds up the two volumes by talking about how histronic idealism and anti-critical rationalism tends to lead to totalitarianism, while critical rationalism tends to lead to “the open society”. This is probably because some propaganda is needed to commit really nasty actions, while most humans tend to think that killing is bad. He observes that critical rationalism in its dogmatic sense is self refuting because we must question the basis for critical rationalism itself. He instead uses a more modest view of critical rationalism but admitting all knowledge is provisional. But he does not go as far as admitting he is using an anti-critical rationalism basis for his system, which I think would have been more accurate. And even if we adopt critical rationalism, which is quite effective at planning social changes, it still does not give us an idea of what type of society we want to achieve. We must again go back to moral choices and possibly anti-critical rationalism (perhaps Popper does not intend to apply these labels to moral choices). But he manages to satisfy my existential tastes by saying (or implying) any legitimacy of the state is based on the choice of a group of individuals, meaning individual choice is the basis for values. This is like an echo of Rousseau’s Social Contract (which I am currently reading) but it does not suppose a population wide “general will”.

Anti Citizen One

I heard an interesting podcast by Brian Leiter on four common myths in the perception of Nietzsche’s philosophy. I agree that Nietzsche was not an anti-Semite, and I could not have said it better myself! But I disagree with this other points to a greater or lesser extent. I will address two points as one: are the concepts of the superman and the will to power central to Nietzsche’s philosophy? Leiter argues they are not significant because they are not present throughout his writing, particularly when compared to the transvaluation of all values. I disagree that they are not central because these three concepts are related and refer to Neizsche’s meta-ethical view. At the risk of oversimplification, the superman’s main (or only) attribute is to perform the transvaluation of all values using the will to power. I believe statements concerning one of these “the superman”, ToAV, WtP can be rewritten using either of the other two forms of terminology.

This point of view is supported by the ToAV not being directly mentioned in Thus Spake Zarathustra, but the superman is used exclusively in that book. The underlying message in Nietzsche’s works is broadly the same. He just chooses terminology to suit the style of the work but the development of thought and his themes is continued. These various terms refer to the same core idea. Academics probably prefer the ToAV over the superman because they rate his esoteric Zarathustra below his other, more academic friendly books. In conclusion, Nietzsche’s meta-ethics is a central theme, and these three forms of terminology are all facets of the same concept.

Incidentally, it is probably not appropriate to discuss what it and isn’t “central” to Neitzsche’s philosophy, because this assumes his philosophy is a system or unified in some way. This is the opposite of what he intended. “I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity.” (Twilight) But we can ask which of his ideas have had the most impact.

Was Nietzsche a proto-postmodernist?

Leiter argues Nietzsche was not a proto-postmodernist and claims postmodernists have read too much into Nietzsche’s “man is the measure of reality”-type statements. I tend to disagree, and not just because of Nietzsche’s sustained attack on idealism and objective truth, which arguably opened the door to postmodernism. His views of language and some of his methods are not only compatible with postmodernism, they outline some of the foundations of postmodern thought. Unfortunately, this issue is complicated by the diverse views within postmodernism.

In “The Twilight of the Idols”, both the preface and the chapter “The Problem of Socrates” have an almost deconstructionist approach. He states that the author’s views on the subject were addressing a topic that was unknowable and therefore not to be taken literally.

“The consensus of the sages must show us the truth.” Shall we still talk like that today? May we? [...] These wisest men of all ages — they should first be scrutinized closely.

Judgments, judgments of value about life, for it or against it, can in the end never be true: they have value only as symptoms, they are worthy of consideration only as symptoms; in themselves such judgments are meaningless.

Moral judgments are therefore never to be taken literally: so understood, they are always merely absurd. Semiotically, however, they remain invaluable[...] (The “Improvers” of Mankind)

Nietzsche then sets about uncovering psychological, historical and ideological assumptions in the texts. He does this by close analysis of two short sections that provide insight to the overall problem. The first is the physiognomist Zopyrus telling Socrates he was a moral monster and Socrates responded, “You know me, sir! But I overcame them all”. The second section is Socrates’s last words “To live — that means to be sick a long time: I owe Asclepius the Savior a rooster.”. Neither example is taken using the literal meaning, but are seeds that provides insight into the underlying contradictions in the text. This method of close reading of text to find the text’s framework is very much in agreement with deconstructionism.

Nietzsche’s view of the inevitable reinterpretation of history in the Gay Science, aph 34 (quoted below) is similar to the never ending postmodern reinterpretation of texts – this is what I think he refers to as “retroactive powers”. On the other hand, Nietzsche’s view that only great men, presumably those who participate in the ToAV, can revalue history. Would Nietzsche consider scholars as great men? mmm, probably not. I suspect Nietzsche considered history is only being reinterpreted by the creation of new values that provide a perspective to view existing texts.

Historia abscondita–Every great man has a power which operates backward; all history is again placed on the scales on his account, and a thousand secrets of the past crawl out of their lurking-places–into his sunlight. There is absolutely no knowing what history may be some day. The past is still perhaps undiscovered in its essence! There are yet so many retroactive powers needed!

Nietzsche’s view of language is at least sometimes in agreement with postmodernism. He claims words are often “error and arbitrariness” that obscures what things are (Gay Science, aph. 58). The name of a thing can finally eclipse the thing, making a name what actually “operates as the essence”. This replacement of reality by a sign code is referred to as hyperreality by postmodernists. This arbitrariness of words is also mentioned in Thus Spake Zarathustra: “Are not all words made for the heavy? Do not all words lie to the light ones?”

I do not claim that Nietzsche was a postmodernist, and he probably would have objected to the movement and labelled it as “decadent”, because of its assumption that all authority is to be held in suspicion merely because it is in authority. This attitude is effectively ressentiment and is therefore not life affirming. He states in Ecce Homo:

I do not refute ideals, I merely draw on gloves in their presence.

Postmodernism is an attempt to uncover assumptions and frameworks in ideologies – with the tacit assumption that this destroys all ideologies. Unlike postmodernists, Nietzsche doesn’t claim he knows the ideals are false a-priori, but he proceeds to test them using many of the same methods that were adopted by postmodernism.

Anti Citizen One

PS I feel slightly intimidated by Brian Leiter’s obvious knowledge of this topic and professional status… I wonder if I will be shot down one day…

I have been watching the idiot box (the TV) recently. I saw “I ♥ Huckabees” (aka I Heart Huckabees), a comedy film about characters trying to find existential answers in their lives. I probably need to watch it again because it covers many topics in existentialism, almost too many – it discusses them without dwelling on them. And although many ideas are discussed, the characters barely have time to act on their situation based these ideas. Still, it has many funny moments. This film is philosophically self-conscious and tries very hard to be very existential (jargon is sometimes used to blind and confuse the audience) – this is almost the opposite of movie “The Unbearable Lightness of Being”, which does not try hard enough to capture the philosophy of the original work!

Vivian Jaffe: What do you think would happen if you didn’t tell the stories? Are you being yourself?
Brad Stand: How am I not myself?
Bernard Jaffe: [musing on the question] How am I not myself?
Vivian Jaffe: [musing] How am I not myself?
Bernard Jaffe: [musing] How… am I not… myself?

Two main existential interpretations are presented: “everything is interconnected” optimism and “the world is full of pain” pessimism. The film doesn’t come to any firm conclusion on existentialism, which as appropriate for the topic, except to hint a middle way between the two extremes is a solution (rather like Aristotle’s golden mean, or Hegel’s synthesis). The topics discussed in the film tend to be late existential ideas (Sartre, Camus), while I have a personal preference for the early existential period (you know: Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, etc.). “I ♥ Huckabees” is jargon heavy (almost it enjoys the sounds of the words rather than the just the concepts), while understanding the jargon is actually irrelevant to having an existential approach to life – although I guess the audience probably would not notice unless it was made explicitly clear. “Are not all words made for the heavy? Do not all words lie to the light ones?”

I recently finished “The Wire” series 2 and 3. It is a TV drama revolving around police work and organised crime in contemporary Baltimore – rather like LA Confidential meets Traffic. It is hard to overstate the quality of the series – intellectually and as a story. As William Julius Wilson said:

“[a]lthough The Wire is fiction, not a documentary, its depiction of systemic urban inequality that constrains the lives of the urban poor is more poignant and compelling [than] that of any published study, including [my] own.” Slate

Series 2 was notable in having multiple tragic characters that are worthy of a Shakespeare play. Tragedy as entertainment is a very interesting philosophical area – how does an audience derive pleasure from watching a sympathetic character’s downfall? and what does that tell us about the world? And after all the hard work of the police, are peoples lives any better? is the actual crime rate significantly changed? The Wire can be bleak on occasion! (“Listen carefully”)

Series 3 is more preachy than previous series, but it happens to be advancing an idea I agree with: drug legalisation (or pseudo-legalisation in this case). A senior police officer, approaching retirement with nothing to lose (or so he thinks), attempts a social experiment by tolerating drug dealing within certain limits. In the series, this reduces overall crime in his district, since the police have more time to solve other socially harmful crime while drug dealing is relocated outside occupied neighbourhoods. When the top level police and politicians find out, there is trouble… (If people think this wouldn’t work, remember the end of prohibition.)

Anti Citizen One

I reread Chomsky and Achcar’s Perious Power. The format of the book is a dialogue between these two intellectuals, which was subsequently polished and with addition of references to sources. It is a wide reaching examination of the middle east situation and international policy. Chomsky’s usual method is applied: examine a leaders rhetoric and then their actual actions to see if there is any discrepancy. He argues that the stated goals of western powers to bring democracy and human rights to the middle east is contradicted by a long history of hypocrisy in that regard. Of course, this continues today with various countries bullying Iran. Chomsky returns to a recurring topic: the most obvious definition of terrorism implies that the US and allies are the worst terrorist states. For example, Iran might have significant human rights problems and possibly threatening to use military power (although this was probably political grandstanding, not actual policy) but compare that to the US, UK, Israel who go far beyond threats and actually are militarily aggressive and have an overall appalling human rights record. The list of specific instances is too long for me to detail – just read this book! (or The Shock Doctrine by Naomi Klein). Until the US cleans up its act in human rights and military aggression, and its allies stop being accomplices to this acts, I place very little stock in the current US/UK military adventures.

Here are a few general ideas, they might want to consider to actually get back on track:

• Military forces should be used as the last resort. The democratic route should be preferred. The rhetoric states this is policy, but clearly it isn’t.
• Don’t perform military actions in other countries or kidnap people across boarders (“rendition”) – this undermines the rule of law. Drone bombings are extra-judicial killings. (US 14th Amendment – due process and all that)
• Highlight human rights abuses then they are conducted by our “allies” (Saudi Arabia, Israel, Russia, Pakistan) and not just by our “enemies” (Cuba, Iran, China). (Remember when Canada listed the US as a country that practices torture? The truth hurts.)
• Replace military forces in occupied countries, particularly if against the popular will, (Iraq, Afghanistan, Tibet) with a UN force or withdraw completely.
• Stop support (military, economic, diplomatic) to countries that occupy territory by force or use disproportionate force (Israel by US, North Korea by China)
• Prosecute people who order or perform torture. (This applies to all countries, and it is where Obama’s credibility evaporated from my perspective.)
• Encourage resolution of occupied territories – this could be achieved in Palestine by the US if they had the will. (See the US record on UN resolutions with respect to Israel)
• Pay reparations to countries that you messed up with military action, supporting coups, etc. (Most colonial powers and the US would have a long list of candidates here.)
• Don’t use collective punishment on countries using sanctions or military action (did someone say “war crime”?). (US on Cuba, US on Iran, US on just about everyone, Israel on Palestine.) This is taken to an extreme when countries elect the “wrong” government and are punished in consequence. Don’t ignore governments with popular support just because they are distasteful. (Hamas)
• Prisoners are to have fair trials in civilian courts or the Geneva Conventions apply. Also the UDHR applies. In all cases, coercion should not be used.
• Ban nukes.
• In short, cut the double think and hypocrisy.

Oddly, most of these are already law or have been discussed many times at the UN. Unfortunately very little will be done until other issues are resolved: dependence on oil, the influence of businesses on politics and reduction of propaganda. I also read Media Control, which is more of an introduction to all of the above. It is very short – more pamphlet length than book length and not hard to read (in fact a bit too light compared to his other works).

Anti Citizen One

PS Chomsky always gets me in the mood for Rage Against the Machine: “I am the Nina, The Pinta, The Santa Maria”!

I certain news item prompted me to think about the role of institutions with respect to knowledge. The Northen-Irish Culture minister privately wrote to the Ulster Museum, calling for minority opinions to be represented in exhibits. This letter was leaked. The letter’s intent is fairly questionable: what does the minister know about running a museum? On the other hand, the minister claims it is a “human rights” issue. I am not sure that representation of public opinion, even of minority groups, in museums is a human right. Human rights protect individuals, not groups. However, cultural rights protect groups, but this concept is half baked IMHO. The minister included creationism as one of the minority views that should be represented. For many people, this makes his intellectual credibility self destruct. He has called for “reasonable discussion” of the issue, but refused to personally enter into further debate on creationism – which seems contradictory to me. But this raises an interesting question, who determines what is called “truth” at museums and institutions?

We might choose institutional gatekeeper based on our intended outcome of the institution’s functioning. This raises a new problem: who determines what role institutions have? But the choices include: experts (meritocracy), central institutions (propaganda), tradition, the institution’s members (democratic) or public opinion (widely democratic). I guess that history, being written “by the winners”, has a measure of political influence, this is probably unavoidable. But when taken too far, reality is rejected in an Orwellian fashion to suite the ruling party. This occurs in many places in the world, from Texas removing inconvenient topics in text books to North Korea in cloud cuckoo land and Turkey brushing genocide under the carpet. For museums, we also don’t particularly want democratic or public opinion deciding what is historical knowledge; a history based on public opinion would be similar to mythology. I hope that experts would do better. That last statement is a bit of a tautology: I am defining “expert” as someone who can arrive at correct historical knowledge. An obvious objection is “who decides who is an expert?”. This is particularly a problem since non-experts generally don’t have the capability to evaluate who is in expert.

This question is slightly easier in science. Although the peer review system generally works, it is not the fundamental consideration in determining what is scientific knowledge, rather it is falsificationism (if we allow Popper’s view). But other domains of knowledge of networks of peer review. But just because a school of knowledge has peer review, does not necessarily imply it is not quackery. (Of course, post-modernists might claim it is all just different points of view – well they should know all about “hot air”.) What is historical knowledge? Anyway, there is probably no point in getting as pedantic as Popper can be on the answer here. I don’t think there is a philosophically satisfactory answer, beyond existentially deciding it should be X, Y or Z. Anyway, moving on from these abstract considerations…

In my view, expert historians should determine what appears in museums – not politicians or public opinion! One necessary (but not sufficient) requirement for expects is intellectual integrity. “…and what is that?” No definitive answer again. But it might include: critical thinking and not over estimating what is currently known (personally and collectively, see also “Socratic ignorance”), as well as the limitations on what is knowable. Creationism fails spectacularly on these criteria. I guess my crude definition of intellectual integrity is scepticism (remember this is just my view). Of course, believers have their own criteria – but they fail my criteria. I have less objections to fideism compared to flawed arguments from evidence. Evidence based creationists and people with intellectual integrity are two non-overlapping groups. (Sorry to friends who might be offended, but it’s my sincere view). For more information, see Hume’s good ol’ Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Finally, if we admit creationism into museums, any interpretation however ridiculous could be included in museums. To put it another way, if we include the Christian creation, why exclude the Norse creation myth? or the Flying Spaghetti Monster? If we do allow public opinion to determine historical knowledge, absurdity results. What the minister is tacitly calling for is only “serious” myths to be called history – the ones deemed “worthy” are decided by an outside force, religion and politics in this case. In other words, it is a call for propaganda to replace history.

Anti Citizen One

PS. A quote that I like, with debatable relevance:

And can you blame me, CLEANTHES, if I here imitate the prudent reserve of SIMONIDES, who, according to the noted story, being asked by HIERO, What God was? desired a day to think of it, and then two days more; and after that manner continually prolonged the term, without ever bringing in his definition or description? Could you even blame me, if I had answered at first, that I did not know, and was sensible that this subject lay vastly beyond the reach of my faculties?

Hume